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JANUARY, 1917 ——————— APRIL, 1917

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Edited by HAROLD COX

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The Edinburgh Review

JANUARY, 1917 No. 459

AUSTRIA AND EUROPE.

THE death of Francis Joseph enables us to regard Austria —that is to say, the Hapsburg Monarchy—without prejudice. Not even the sentimentalists who felt, or affected, special tenderness for the 'poor old Emperor' can now extend their favour to his great-nephew. The Emperor Charles, in his thirtieth year, is too old to make any appeal to sentiment on account of his youth, and too young to command reverence by reason of his age. We are therefore able to face the Austro-Hungarian problem on its merits.

It would be idle to pretend that in all the Allied countries opinion is unanimous in demanding the dismemberment of the Hapsburg Dominions. Old sayings like Palacky's, 'If Austria had not existed it would have been necessary 'to invent her,' and even epithets like 'Austria, the lumber-'room of Europe,' have left an impression of the 'necessity' or the 'usefulness' of Austria that cannot easily be effaced. Besides, certain very definite interests and political conceptions are bound up with her maintenance. Some, though by no means all, Roman Catholic circles in Allied countries hold that the disappearance of a great Catholic Monarchy would be a serious loss to the Roman Church, and that the Hapsburg Emperor ought to be preserved with as much as possible of his power and prestige lest Roman Catholicism be no longer represented by any sovereign of the first rank.

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To these arguments, which are breathed and whispered rather than publicly proclaimed, there is added the specious but, in the eyes of the unreasoning, plausible plea that the destruction of Austria-Hungary would strengthen Germany by leaving a block of nine or ten million Austrian Germans to be included in the German Empire, whereas the preservation of the Hapsburgs and their realms would operate as a check upon the power of the Hohenzollerns.

Side by side with notions and propaganda of this kind—which should preferably be called 'Clerical' rather than 'Catholic,' inasmuch as they take into account the supposedly political interests of the Roman Church—runs an apparently different order of ideas that tends towards the same conclusion—the saving of Austria. These ideas are even less frankly expressed than those of the 'Clericals.' They suggest, indeed, that Austria should be 'saved' lest Germany be strengthened, but the source of their inspiration must be sought chiefly in cosmopolitan financial quarters in Austria-Hungary and in their counterparts among the Allies. Their authors realise that the destruction of the Hapsburg Monarchy would strike the power of Prussia-Germany a deadly blow: (1) by removing from German control some 42,000,000 of the 51,000,000 Hapsburg subjects of whom Germany now disposes; and (2) by cutting in twain the vast German-Jewish financial organisation that controls the economic affairs of Central Europe and extends through Austria to the Balkans and to the East. In this organisation nearly all the German-Jewish financiers and financial houses of Europe, if not of the world, are, directly or indirectly, interested. The influence of which they dispose is being used on both sides of the Atlantic to save Germany. It was really, though not avowedly, on their behalf that the German-Jewish financier of New York, Jacob Schiff, strove, and is still striving, to promote a movement for immediate peace. There are signs that they, too, inspired the American 'peace' motion simultaneously brought forward by the 'official' Socialists in the Italian Chamber. If the war could be stopped, there might be some chance of preventing the relaxation of the German economic and financial grip upon the world and of retaining the lands of the Hapsburg Crown as a German fief. Hence the curious parallelism recently noticeable between the efforts of the Clerical and those of non-Clerical peacemongers—a parallelism that may

seem at first sight fortuitous, a consequence of similarity of method, despite fundamental diversity of ultimate aim. But it is not fortuitous. Careful observation confirms the accuracy of information recently received from a competent neutral quarter to the effect that there is so close an understanding between the various pro-Austrian and therefore pro-German influences now at work in Allied and neutral countries as to constitute a real alliance.

If every supporter, or professed supporter, of the Allied Cause could be asked the question, 'Do you desire the dismemberment of Austria as a means to the thorough defeat of Germany?' the issue might be clarified. Those who should qualify their eagerness to see 'Prussian Militarism' defeated by making reservations in favour of 'saving' the Hapsburg dominions, would reveal either their half-heartedness or their ignorance of the true terms of the problem which the Allies have set themselves to solve. This problem is nothing less than the political reorganisation of Europe. There can be no 'adequate security' for the future without it. Mr. Asquith, Viscount Grey, Mr. Lloyd George and others have called it 'the destruction of the power of Prussian Militarism.' That, doubtless, broadly stated, is the end. Who wills the end should will the means, for there are no other means of destroying the power of Prussian Militarism than to deprive it of the instruments and weapons that have made it strong. A glance at the political history of Prussian Militarism in its relation to the Hapsburgs during the last half century, that is, since it again became formidable in Europe, reveals the force of this contention. The late Emperor Francis Joseph, and through him Austria, was at once its victim and its instrument.

The first definite stage in the discomfiture of Francis Joseph and his conversion into an instrument of Prussianism was marked by the Frankfurt Congress of Princes in 1863. Bismarck has recorded the struggle that ended in the abstention of the Prussian Sovereign from the Congress and in the consequent defeat of Francis Joseph's plans. The Austro-Prussian War against Denmark in the following year, leading up to the war of 1866 between Prussia and Austria, were the next and, as the event proved, the decisive stages in the process. Before being defeated in the field at Sadowa, Francis Joseph had been decisively worsted in the diplomatic contest.

Two elements entered into the military downfall of Austria.

The first was Francis Joseph's inability to perceive that Italian unity could not be prevented and that the timely cession of Venetia might have secured for him the neutrality, if not the alliance, of Italy in the inevitable trial of strength with Prussia. By hardening his heart against the Italians and allowing the Bismarckian intrigues with the Italian Radicals, or 'Party of Action,' to ripen into a Prusso-Italian Alliance, he exposed himself to a war on two fronts and was compelled to employ, in gaining a barren victory over Italy, the forces which would have given him a decisive triumph over Prussia. A Prussian defeat at Sadowa would have meant the overthrow of Bismarck and Moltke, the triumph of the Prussian Liberals in the Diet, and the frustration of the schemes which were to lead to the discomfiture of France and the establishment of a German Empire under Prussian control in 1870–71. The other element was Russian resentment of Austrian ingratitude during the Crimean War. Francis Joseph has been called 'mean.' The reproach is well deserved, if it be applied to his statecraft. A generous soul would have welcomed in 1853–54 the opportunity to render a service to Russia in return for the service she had rendered the Hapsburg Dynasty in 1849. But Francis Joseph was in this respect typically Austrian. Moral values had no place in his reckonings.

Therefore, when, in 1869, the Archduke Albert—who had culled at Custozza the victory prepared by Benedek and had displayed his 'gratitude' by a betrayal of Benedek more heinous than any recorded in recent history—negotiated with the French and the Italians a league against Prussia, Francis Joseph saw the league collapse under a Russian veto. Doubtless he hoped, at the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War, that French resistance might enable him to intervene profitably in the contest, or, at least, so to shift the yoke which Bismarck had contrived to place upon his neck at home as to acquire a certain freedom of movement. In Prussian eyes the essence of the Dual Settlement, or Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, that followed Sadowa, was that it made the German minority supreme in Austria and the Magyar minority supreme in Hungary, and rendered each of these minorities jointly and severally dependent upon Prussian support. Whether Francis Joseph understood in 1867 how deftly he had been caught in the Prussian toils is a matter

for speculation. It is probable that he construed the Dual Settlement as subject to revision as soon as the Magyars, whose support he had purchased by it, should have helped him to overthrow Prussia. In any case it is certain that, by the summer of 1870, his Austrian Premier, Hohenwart, had convinced him of the disadvantage of being bound by an arrangement to which Prussia held the key, and had persuaded him to modify it by assigning to Slav Bohemia a position in the Monarchy scarcely less important than that held under the Dual System by German Austria and Magyar Hungary. The rescripts of September 1870, by which he promised the Bohemians to be crowned as their King at Prague and held out to them a prospect of an autonomous *status* in the Empire, clearly prove his intention. But the German victories in France and the rapidly-formed coalition between Bismarck, Beust (the Austrian Chancellor), and Andrássy (the Magyar Premier) compelled him to withdraw the rescripts, alienate the Bohemians, and to suffer the yoke which he had thought provisional to be riveted upon him for the rest of his life.

Having thus reduced Francis Joseph to lasting bondage, the next step of Bismarck and Andrássy was to turn his mind away from Germany and in the direction of the Balkans. The prospect of acquiring Bosnia-Herzegovina completed his enslavement. No Hapsburg could resist the temptation of securing 'more acres'; and upon the bargain struck at the Berlin Congress, Bismarck and Andrássy set their seal in October 1879 by the conclusion of the Austro-German Alliance against Russia. Once again the Prusso-Magyar combination proved the determining element in German control over the Hapsburgs; and it is, to say the least, a singular coincidence that the action on the part of the Hapsburgs, which opened the series of European crises that led up to the present war, should have been taken at a moment when the supremacy of the German element in Austria, and of the Magyar element in Hungary, appeared to be exposed to some danger, if not actually imperilled. That action was the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in October 1908. It is worth while briefly to examine its domestic Austro-Hungarian antecedents.

However deftly arrangements may be organised for maintaining the supremacy of minorities, there come moments when the pressure of the relatively disfranchised majorities threatens

the existence of the oppressive system. Between 1902 and 1904 the Magyar Independence Party—which presently expanded, in January 1905, into an anti-Tisza and anti-Francis Joseph coalition—carried on, by parliamentary obstruction and by the organisation of 'passive resistance' in Hungary, a determined campaign against the military demands of the Crown. In September 1905 Francis Joseph startled his subjects by threatening to have the issue between himself and the Magyar Coalition tried by the ordeal of universal suffrage, which would have meant the collapse of the Magyar minority or, rather, of the Magyar oligarchy in Hungary. So frightened were the leaders of the Magyar Coalition at this prospect, that their decision to come to terms with Francis Joseph may be dated from the autumn of 1905, though it took effect only in April 1906. Count Tisza, whom the Coalition had overthrown in January 1905 and who was the object of its fiercest hatred, regained at a stroke the respect and almost the admiration of his enemies by publishing a series of impassioned articles against universal suffrage and warning the 'Magyar nation'—that is to say, the oligarchy—of the deadly peril to which it was exposed. Needless to say, after coming to terms with Francis Joseph and taking office in the spring of 1906, the Magyar Coalition successfully burked all attempts at serious franchise reform.

Nevertheless, the idea of universal suffrage had excited the disfranchised non-Magyars of Hungary and had awakened in Austria an echo too loud to be ignored. To the developments in Austria reference will presently be made. In Hungary the disquiet of the Magyars was so deep that it led them to take what was—from the Prusso-Magyar point of view—an astonishing step. In their anger, they actually concluded an alliance with the Southern Slavs against Vienna! It is vaguely known in Western Europe that, since 1868, there has existed between Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia a settlement analogous in name but very different in reality from that created in 1867 between Austria and Hungary. Mr. Gladstone, whose correspondence with the famous Southern Slav Bishop Strossmayer* reveals a keen interest in the liberation of

* Cf. 'The Southern Slav Question,' by R. W. Seton-Watson, Appendix xvii.

the Southern Slavs, imagined, somewhat ingenuously, that the relationship between Hungary and Croatia was one of 'home rule,' which might well serve as a model for the system of self-government he hoped to establish in Ireland. He sent a trusted emissary to Budapest with instructions to inquire into and report upon the working of Croatian 'home rule' and the practical relations between Croats and Magyars. 'I believe we have something on paper about the 'Croatians,' replied an eminent Magyar authority to Mr. Gladstone's envoy, 'but, in practice, we do with them 'pretty much as we like.' Further inquiry confirmed this terse account of the situation, and Mr. Gladstone cited the example of Croatia no more.

The Magyars continued to do 'pretty much as they liked' with Croatia-Slavonia until, in the summer of 1903, the Croatian peasants revolted against the rule of the Magyar Governor, Count Khuen-Hedervary, who fled to Budapest and sought refuge in an opportune vacancy that had occurred in the Hungarian Premiership. The Croatian disturbances were suppressed, but the ferment spread throughout the Southern Slav provinces of Hungary and affected also the Austrian provinces of Istria and Dalmatia, of which the former is largely and the latter overwhelmingly Southern Slav. A new spirit of brotherhood grew up between Croat and Serb until, in the autumn of 1905, a conference of Austro-Hungarian Croat leaders held at Fiume ended by the adoption of a programme in the form of a resolution, which led up to the formation of a Croato-Serb Coalition embracing the Austrian as well as the Hungarian Southern Slavs. This political reconciliation of the Croat (or Roman Catholic) with the Serb (or Orthodox) Southern Slavs of the Monarchy was a portent. As such it was immediately regarded in the German and pro-Prussian camp at Vienna and subsequently also by the Magyars at Budapest. But, at the moment, the Magyar Coalition was too preoccupied with its fight against the crown and too perturbed by Francis Joseph's threat in regard to universal suffrage, to trouble greatly about the new friendship between Croat and Serb. Rather did the Magyar Coalition welcome the opportunity afforded by the resolution of Fiume to conclude a working alliance with the Southern Slavs. The basis of the alliance was an undertaking that the Croato-Serb Coalition should

support the Magyar Coalition in the fight against Francis Joseph, and that, if and when the Magyar Coalition took office, it should grant better government to Croatia with honest Croatian Under-Secretaries of State, clean elections, and a new franchise.

The object of the Southern Slav leaders in making this alliance with the Magyar Coalition has not always been understood. Yet its purpose was sufficiently clear. A real improvement in the Southern Slav position could only come from and through Hungary under whose rule the great majority of the Hungarian Southern Slavs lived and groaned. The adversity of Hungary—that is to say, of the Magyar Coalition—was the Southern Slav opportunity. When, in April 1906, the Magyar Coalition eventually came to terms with the Crown and took office, the leaders of the Croato-Serb Coalition in the Croatian Diet presented their bill for payment. Somewhat reluctantly, the Magyar Coalition honoured its signature, though one of the most important terms of the agreement—the appointment of honest Croatian Under-Secretaries of State at Agram—was only fulfilled after the application of severe pressure by the Southern Slavs.

This pressure took the form of concerted silence on the part of the Southern Slav inhabitants and municipalities of Dalmatia during the presence of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand at the land and sea manœuvres in September 1906. So general and so effective was this demonstration of silence that the only Dalmatian town to give a welcome to the Archduke was Zara, the capital, which is also the only Italian municipality in Dalmatia. Meanwhile the pressure had its effect both at Budapest and at Vienna. The Southern Slav leaders secured their main demands and with them a new era of liberty in Croatia-Slavonia. In a ' clean ' election the adherents of the Croato-Serb Coalition swept the constituencies of Croatia-Slavonia (Dalmatia, though belonging juridically to Croatia-Slavonia, was and is *de facto* an Austrian province), secured undisputed control of the Croatian Diet at Agram and of the deputation of forty members which represents the Croatian Diet in the Hungarian Chamber. The franchise was reformed and prospects seemed bright when, in 1907, the Magyar Government, influenced from Vienna and Berlin, suddenly broke faith with the Croato-Serb Coalition and drove it into opposi-

tion. The truth is that the alarm felt in Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest at the rapid development of Southern Slav sentiment had culminated in a determination to break the Croato-Serb Coalition and to revert to the old repressive system of government in Croatia-Slavonia. This determination inspired the notorious High Treason Trial at Agram, the perpetration of the anti-Southern Slav forgeries (subsequently exposed during the Friedjung Trial) as a preparation for the intended annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the whole scheme of vexatious tyranny of which the Southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary were the objects down to the beginning of the war. On the outbreak of war, administrative tyranny became sanguinary persecution, and the hangman reinforced the bureaucrat and the gendarme.

At this point it is necessary to revert to the Austrian situation as it stood in September 1905 when Francis Joseph launched the threat of universal suffrage against the recalcitrant Magyar Coalition in Hungary. Received with ill-disguised terror by the Magyar oligarchy in Hungary, the cry of Universal Suffrage aroused enthusiasm in Austria. For eight years, with rare and brief intervals, the working of the Austrian Parliament had been impeded by strife between the representatives of the various Austrian nationalities—mainly between Germans and Czechs—who had in turn effectively obstructed parliamentary business. Government had been carried on by an abusive interpretation of the Emergency Clause of the Constitution. There seemed to be some hope that these difficulties might be overcome were the whole framework of the Austrian Chamber to be melted down and cast in a new mould. The system of *curiae*, or categories, under which a certain number of seats had been allotted to rural districts, urban districts, the large landed proprietors and the Chambers of Commerce respectively, was suddenly regarded as too cramped and artificial to permit of a true expression of the public will. Since 1896 there had been tacked on to the categories of Deputies above mentioned a fifth category or *curia* of seventy-two deputies elected by universal suffrage. It was now proposed to merge the whole Chamber into a single category of universal suffrage ; or, in other words, to sweep away all distinctions between the various classes of popular representatives. The Austrian Germans, and, especially, the so-called German Liberals, fought hard

against this modification of a system which, with all its faults, had propped up and maintained an artificial predominance of German votes in the Chamber. Ultimately their resistance was overcome by the Emperor himself, who commanded them to accept the arrangements made for the introduction of universal suffrage. Though these arrangements comprised many restrictions upon the representation of the non-German races of Austria, they put the German representatives—Clerical, Liberal, and Socialist—definitely in a minority as compared with the Slav representatives, and recognised officially for the first time that Austria was a State preponderatingly Slav. Eminent judges of the position in Austria, who deplored the introduction of universal suffrage and foretold its failure as an expedient for the removal of racial strife from the Austrian Parliament, expressed at the time their settled conviction that the only path of safety for the Hapsburg Monarchy would in future lie in the direction of 'Austro-'Slavism': that is to say, in the gradual development of the Monarchy as a mainly Slav polity on some kind of federal basis.

This possibility was undoubtedly feared at Berlin. The first Austrian general election on the basis of universal suffrage was held in the spring of 1907. It revealed the growing strength of the Slav elements (Poles, Czechs, Ruthenes, Slovenes, Croats and Serbs) in the Empire, and the rapid diminution of the 'Liberal' German elements upon whose support Berlin had in the past chiefly relied for the maintenance at once of the Dual System and of the Austro-German alliance. They—the German 'Liberals'—numbered barely 85 in a House of 516 members. The non-Liberal German element in Austria, that is to say the Clerical and Christian Social parties (who numbered 96) and the German Social Democrats, 50 in all, could not be considered unconditionally reliable. The Clericals, and especially the Christian Socialists, were held to be under the supreme direction of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. He was regarded as an opponent of the Dual System and as a partisan of some form of federalism under which the artificial preponderance of Germans and Magyars in the Monarchy would be irremediably broken. The Social Democrats tended at that moment to subordinate all racial issues to the exigencies of their economic

and political programme. They were, besides, decidedly anti-Magyar. Consequently, the out-and-out supporters of Germanism and of Dualism in the Austrian Parliament were reduced by the operation of universal suffrage to a small minority—a state of things that could not fail to disquiet Berlin. The health of Francis Joseph seemed precarious. In the autumn of 1907 he fell seriously ill—the result of a chill caught during the visit of the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess Vladimir of Russia to Schönbrunn—and the prospect of the accession of Francis Ferdinand, with his federal ideas, was disturbing. A remedy had to be found. It was found in the following year.

The year 1908 was the Emperor Francis Joseph's year of diamond jubilee. The first of the series of important manifestations by which it was marked was the appearance, in May, at Schönbrunn of the German Emperor at the head of a bevy of German federal sovereigns who came to offer Francis Joseph their jubilee congratulations. The primary object of this manœuvre was to remind Francis Joseph that he too was a German Sovereign ; its second is understood to have been a suggestion that the most fitting celebration of his jubilee would be the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The diplomatic history of this period is still very obscure. It is not certain whether the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was originally designed by Germany as a move to embroil Austria with Russia, nor to what extent the Foreign Minister, Aehrenthal, was privy or opposed to such an aspect of the design. At the beginning of 1908 he had certainly made, with the help of Germany, an anti-Russian move in the form of his scheme for an Austro-Hungarian railway through the Sanjak of Novi Bazar ; but by the beginning of June, soon after the German Emperor's jubilee visit, he was admittedly in negotiation with Russia in regard to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and other matters. Possibly Aehrenthal's main purpose at the time was to detach Russia from England. From the outset of his career as Foreign Minister his attitude had been anti-English, and in the spring of 1907 he had invited Russia to join an anti-English combination of the Powers. When, in August 1908, King Edward paid, in his turn, a jubilee visit to Francis Joseph at Ischl, he found the Emperor decidedly disinclined to listen to any suggestions for

limitation of naval armaments. The die was already cast, and though the annexation was only sanctioned formally by an Austrian cabinet council on the 18th of August, 1908, the mind of Austria was definitely made up to start upon the course which was to lead through the annexation crisis to the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 and to the Austrian attack upon Serbia of July 1914.

Into these developments there entered an element which it is not necessary here to analyse. Between the original suggestion that Austria should annex Bosnia-Herzegovina and the actual annexation in October 1908, there occurred the Young Turkish revolution. There are indications that the outbreak of the revolution caused Germany to hesitate and almost to withdraw her support from the annexation scheme, lest it should jeopardise still further German influence at Constantinople. But Aehrenthal was headstrong and ambitious, Francis Joseph was eager to complete his title to the occupied provinces, and the Austro-Hungarian military party was impatient for action. Prince Bülow, the German Chancellor, made at first no secret of his displeasure at Aehrenthal's comparatively independent conduct, but is stated to have been brought into line by urgent representations from the old *Éminence Grise* of the Wilhelmstrasse, Herr von Holstein, who emerged from his retirement to adjure the Chancellor not to abandon Austria lest the whole Austro-German alliance, and with it the position of Germany in Europe, should be imperilled. Germany therefore came into line with Austria, but Prince Bülow took his revenge upon Aehrenthal on the 23rd of March, 1909, by presenting to Russia some form of ultimatum and securing her assent to the annexation without the direct Austrian intervention. Aehrenthal was thus deprived of the personal triumph he had hoped to win. His relations with Berlin were never again really friendly. He began to flirt with the British and French Ambassadors. Germany saw in him a dangerous and unsatisfactory collaborator. Her ambassador in Vienna, the late Herr von Tschirschky, therefore set about making Aehrenthal's life a burden to him, and finally hounded him into his grave at the beginning of 1912. With his death disappeared the only potential obstacle to a resumption of the policy which the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina had originally been intended by Germany to promote.

That policy was the overthrow or the absorption of Serbia as a preliminary to the opening of the German road to the East. When viewed in retrospect, the simplicity of German, or rather of Prussian, aims becomes striking. Having once secured for Austria the fatal gift of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and having shrewdly limited her title to an ' occupation,' so that eventual annexation might always be held as a bait before her, Germany could be quite sure that Austria would never turn her attention again to Europe, at least so long as her internal affairs were controlled, under the Dual System, by the Germans in Austria and the Magyars in Hungary. This was long the somewhat negative aim of Prussian diplomacy in regard to Austria. But, with the growth of the Pan-German spirit and the strengthening of German influence in Turkey, Austria wandered, or was driven, more and more in the direction marked out by German ambitions—that of being a pioneer of Germanism in the Balkans. For this purpose it was essential that she should secure control or possession of Serbia. While King Milan lived, Austrian control of Serbia was almost unchallenged. Under his miserable son Alexander the position became less secure, and there is strong ground for believing that the decision to have him removed from the throne—though not necessarily assassinated—was taken in Vienna as soon as it was discovered, early in 1903, that he was coquetting with Russia. Certainly the plot that culminated in his assassination was hatched in Vienna with the knowledge and approval of the Austro-Hungarian authorities. One of M. de Kállay's most trusted lieutenants, Dr. Louis de Thálloczy (the ' Civil Governor ' of occupied Serbia who was recently killed in a railway accident when returning from the funeral of the Emperor Francis Joseph), was deeply involved in it. Indeed the aggressive phase of Austro-Hungarian policy towards Serbia only dates from the summer of 1905, two years after the accession of King Peter, when Austria declared a ' pig war ' upon Serbia as a punishment for Serbian impertinence in having dared to negotiate a Customs Union with Bulgaria. From the resistance of Serbia to Austro-Hungarian bullying dates the determination of Austria to crush Serbia. In this determination must be sought the source of all the intrigues and chicanery that marked the Southern Slav policy of Vienna between 1905–1914.

Two factors only operated against continuance upon a course which could but complete the enslavement of Austria-Hungary. One was Article VII. of the Triple Alliance, by which Austria-Hungary and Italy guaranteed to each other compensation for any extension of territory either of them might obtain beyond the *status quo*. The other was the gradually growing power of the Slav elements in the Monarchy that threatened, as has been shown, to undermine the Dual System and gradually to prepare the way for some form of Federal 'Austro-Slavism.' Seeing that Austria was determined to grant to Italy no serious compensation in Europe for any ulterior extension of Hapsburg territory, a war with Italy was regarded by the Austrian military and 'forward' party as the necessary preliminary to the conquest or absorption of Serbia. This militant anti-Italian tendency was very marked between 1908 and the premature renewal of the Triple Alliance in September 1912. The names of Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorff, Chief of General Staff, and of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand were constantly associated with it. It was, to say the least, tolerated by Germany because it tended to keep both Austria and Italy dependent upon the goodwill and 'honest brokerage' of Berlin. The other factor—the growth of Slav influence—was thoroughly obnoxious to Berlin, to the Austrian Germans, and to the Magyars alike, for it represented the only tendency that could put the Hapsburgs on their feet again as independent sovereigns, enable them to withstand German pressure, and play a useful part in Europe and the Near East. As I have explained in a former article,* the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand coquetted from time to time with an 'Austro-'Slav' solution of the problem of the Monarchy. But as he approached it only from a Roman Catholic or, rather, clerical standpoint, he was incapable of comprehending its essential features.

An indispensable condition of the transformation of the Hapsburg Monarchy into an independent non-German polity would have been a pro-Hapsburg solution of the Southern Slav question. At the moment when the aspirations of the

* See 'A Programme for Peace,' EDINBURGH REVIEW, April 1916.

Austro-Hungarian Southern Slavs—that is to say, the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes—towards national union with the Serbians of the Kingdom found clear and definite expression, it might have been possible for Austria to have promoted Southern Slav unity and to have turned it in her own favour. There existed in Serbia a noticeable tendency, if not, indeed, an actual party, in favour of a far-reaching political and economic agreement with Austria, while the motto of the Austro-Hungarian Southern Slavs was then 'Union: within the 'Monarchy if possible, but, at all costs, Union.' But it would have needed an Austrian Cavour to read the signs of the times and to carry through a policy which would have secured for the Hapsburgs a predominant influence in the Balkans, and would at the same time have given them a solid basis for retrieving their former independence in Europe. In view of these possibilities no surprise can be felt that Germany should have moved every lever in Austria and in Hungary to force an anti-Southern Slav attitude upon Vienna, and to preclude any pro-Hapsburg solution of the Southern Slav question. Indeed, on looking back over the years between the annexation crisis and the outbreak of the present war, the hand of Germany appears even more visible in the policy of Vienna than it was to contemporary observers on the spot. All the Austrian and Hungarian politicians and writers, including the notorious Dr. Friedjung, who were most prominent in the anti-Serbian and anti-Southern Slav campaign, were precisely those who were most intimately connected with Berlin. This phenomenon—the identity of anti-Southern Slav propagandists with the agents or dupes of Germany—has also been noticeable during the war, and is too significant to be lost sight of in any consideration of the terms of a lasting European settlement.

Like the establishment of an ethnographically complete Rumania and a reunited Poland—objects which the Allies are admittedly pledged to obtain—the creation of a united Southern Slav State is now incompatible with the continued existence of Austria-Hungary. No false solicitude for the welfare of 'those nice people, the Austrians,' ought therefore to militate against either Southern Slav Union or the formation of an independent Bohemia, or Czecho-Slovakia. It is necessary clearly to recognise that in no case can Austria-Hungary

continue to exist as a self-controlled monarchy. If she be not dismembered by the Allies in the interests of European security, she will be transformed and directed by Germany in the interests of Pan-Germanism. It is for this reason that the ' Pro-Austrianism ' of the Clericals, of Cosmopolitan High Finance, and of some deluded publicists and diplomatists among the Allies, is, in effect, but a form of Pro-Germanism. The argument that to add the German provinces of Austria to the present German Empire would be to 'strengthen' Germany, will not bear examination. There are, at most, between nine and ten million Germans in Austria. (Those in Hungary are *enclavés* and isolated.) The addition of these Austrian Germans to the German Empire would hardly make up numerically for the losses Germany would sustain by the inclusion of the Duchy of Posen in a reunited Poland, the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, and possibly of Schleswig to Denmark, while the subtraction of the other 42,000,000 Hapsburg subjects from the political and military command of Germany, and the organisation of most of them into independent States, would create, on the basis of the principle of nationality, a new counterpoise against the German block. It is, besides, improbable that the inclusion of 8,000,000 or 9,000,000 Austrian Germans in the German Empire under a Hapsburg Sovereign would leave unaltered the composition of the Federal Council or the balance of forces in the Empire itself.

From what has been said it should be clear that a chief cornerstone of any solid and lasting European reconstruction must be the creation of a united Southern Slav State consisting of the kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia, and the purely Slav portions of Istria, Carniola and Styria, with due allowance for the necessity of fixing a practicable geographical boundary. Unless this State is formed, the main purpose of the Allies—the destruction of the power of Prussian militarism—can scarcely be achieved. The German road to the East will not be blocked, the principle of nationality will not have been vindicated, and the seeds of future wars will have been sown. It is a grave error to regard the Southern Slav question as merely an isolated issue in the Great War, a thing which the Allies can attend to or neglect without affecting substantially the quality of their victory. It was the immediate cause of the war. Hence the importance

of understanding it thoroughly and of facing betimes the difficulties by which it is surrounded.

Some idea of these difficulties may be gleaned if it be remembered that the interests of Roman Catholic and Orthodox 'clericalism,' as well as the claims of extreme Italian 'national-'ism,' militate against the complete unification and fusion of the Southern Slavs; while, within the Southern Slav family itself, differences of development and tradition require the most careful and far-sighted treatment. By Orthodox 'Clericalism' is meant the tendencies associated with the Russian Holy Synod in its narrower manifestations, which are apt to oppose any 'inquination' of Serb Orthodoxy by the association of the Orthodox, or Serb, with the Croat and Slovene, or Roman Catholic, Southern Slavs in one and the same State. By Roman Catholic 'Clericalism' is meant the tendencies which would fain keep the Catholic Southern Slavs politically segregated from the Orthodox, lest political unity and the establishment of complete religious equality hamper Roman Catholic propaganda. I do not for a moment believe that the religious interests of either Church would be adversely affected by Southern Slav unity. Rather the contrary. By extreme Italian 'nationalism' is meant illiberal claims to the annexation by Italy of considerable tracts of purely Southern Slav territory, partly for ill-defined 'strategic' reasons, partly in the name of historical memories extending from the Roman Empire to the fall of the Venetian Republic, and partly out of a desire to prevent the establishment of any strong State on the eastern shore of the Adriatic. Apart from the general consideration that to sanction the application of the 'strategic principle' against the Southern Slavs, in defiance of the principle of nationality, would deprive the Allies, including Italy, of any moral right to combat the equally 'strategic' claims of Germany in Belgium, there is the practical consideration that the deliberate creation of an anti-Italian Southern Slav Irredentism would tend to perpetuate those very causes of unrest which helped to bring on the present war. Unless the new European settlement removes all the main causes of Slav unrest by reuniting the Poles, and uniting the Czecho-Slovaks and the Southern Slavs, it will be halting and precarious. There is the less reason to run this risk in that a

fair and amicable settlement of the Italian and Southern Slav claims in and around the Adriatic is perfectly feasible without doing grievous wrong to either. Once in possession of Trieste, with a sufficiently deep littoral and defensible border extending from the present Italian frontier eastwards and southwards round the Gulf of Trieste, and including at least the western half of the Istrian peninsula with Pola and the Riva Arsa; with the Istrian Islands, besides Lissa and Vallona, the Italian strategic situation in the Adriatic would defy attack without infringing any essential Southern Slav rights. There would remain the question, which naturally appeals strongly to Italian sentiment, of preserving the traces of *italianità* at the few points on the Dalmatian coast where they remain 'in being,' and, in particular, of assuring the position of Italian-speaking minorities of the population. No experienced student of the Southern Slav question can anticipate any real difficulty on this score, provided that the Italian Government and the Southern Slavs alike be persuaded that agreement and co-operation are essential to both, and take their stand frankly on the principle laid down by the Italian Premier Sigr. Boselli in the Chamber on the 7th of December, that peace, to be lasting, must be based upon 'an equilibrium built up upon 'the rights of nationalities.' Lord Robert Cecil said truly, at the inauguration of the British Italian League on the 24th of November, that there is no real conflict between the Southern Slav and the Italian National ideals. 'I am certain,' he added, 'there is room for both. It only wants clear under-'standing on both sides to avoid misconception.'

The first requisite of a 'clear understanding' is impartially to ascertain the facts and to free the debate from the heated polemics which partisan spirit and enemy intrigue have envenomed. The matter needs to be taken out of the hands of propagandists more anxious to score a point off the other side than to promote good feeling and agreement. No excuse can be offered for some recent manifestations in the Italian press; and though the earlier mistakes of Southern Slav propagandists may be viewed with greater indulgence if their position as refugees, and therefore, to some extent, trustees for their less fortunate fellow-countrymen, be taken into account, it cannot be gainsaid that they too have erred by placing before the

European public statements of their case that challenge criticism. But the work of conciliation is eminently a task for the Allied Governments, and especially for that of Italy. Italy, as the elder sister of unredeemed Hapsburg peoples, has a mission of liberation to accomplish. Some of her writers and statesmen have revealed their understanding of this mission and have proclaimed a lofty conception of it and of true *italianità*. One such statement, published in the *Secolo* of Milan on the 28th of November, contained the following passage :

'The question how the various Austrian peoples, once liberated from the yoke, will constitute themselves as self-governing States and group themselves according to their tendencies and nationalities, ought not to preoccupy us during the effervescence of war. The urgent and important thing is the undoing of Austria. . . . The important thing is that these peoples, once liberated, should become a sure bulwark against Germanism and a pledge of lasting peace in Europe. If Italy wishes to be really great, prosperous and powerful, she must embody this conception of the European settlement according to the natural tendencies of peoples. She must resolutely plant on her borders a banner bearing the device of "Liberty and Nationality," and direct towards this end every act of her international life. This is the third mission of Italy in the world.'

This article drew from a prominent Southern Slav, Dr. Lazar Markovitch, of Belgrade University, who edits at Geneva the Southern Slav organ *La Serbie*, the following comment :

'Never has the mission of Italy been more clearly and nobly defined. Words so worthy and so just, from the pen of a true representative of the Italian people, will go to the heart of all Serbians and Southern Slavs ; and with such an Italy the friendship between the two neighbouring peoples would be eternal.'

Lest it be imagined that the writer in the *Secolo* spoke for himself alone, the declarations of two eminent members of the present Italian Government, Signor Bissolati and Baron Sonnino, may be added to that of the Premier, Signor Boselli. After defining 'victory' as the redemption of Italian lands, the reconstitution of Belgium, the restoration to France of all her provinces now under the German heel, the re-establishment of Serbia and the liberation of the Rumanes * from the

* By 'Rumanes' are meant the unredeemed Rumanians of Austria-Hungary as distinguished from the people of Rumania.

Magyar yoke, Signor Bissolati added that ' victory ' must also free the German people from its tragic intoxication and deprive the barbarous militarism of Prussia of its chief weapon.

'This weapon,' he continued, 'is the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. As long as the Monarchy exists—a State which is the negation of all its nationalities save the German and the Magyar—Imperial Germany will always be able to make a weapon of those nationalities and to renew the struggle. The many-headed monster must be slain in order that from its dead body may arise in freedom the races which its artificial unity has compressed.'

Baron Sonnino was scarcely less emphatic in his great speech of the 18th of December, which, by order of the Chamber, was placarded throughout Italy :

' We all desire peace, and lasting peace ; but by " lasting peace " we understand an ordered settlement of which the duration shall not depend upon the weight of the chains forged to subject one people to another, but which shall depend upon a just equilibrium between States, upon respect for the principle of nationality, for the canons of International Law and the rights of humanity and civilisation. While intensifying our every effort to overthrow the enemy—with the most scrupulous observance of the laws of war—we aspire in no way to establish any international settlement based on servitude or mastery, or implying the annihilation of peoples or nations.'

. . . . . .

The conviction that only by the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary can the power of Prussian militarism be effectually destroyed is shared by all experienced Allied students of Central European affairs. No better vindication of their belief can be found than in the determined efforts now being made by Germany, and by the partisans of Germany in Austria and Hungary, so to reconstruct the Hapsburg Monarchy during the war as to ensure the continued predominance of the German and Magyar elements within its borders. That faithful organ of Germanism, the *Neue Freie Presse,* recently divulged the main features of the German programme. They include the separation of Galicia (represented by 106 Polish and Ruthene deputies in the Reichsrath) from Austria ; the redistribution of the administrative (and probably also of the electoral) districts of Bohemia, so as to place the Czech majority under the control of the German minority ; the establishment of German as the language of State throughout Austria in place of the eight Austrian languages hitherto recognised

as official ; and the transfer of Dalmatia from Austria to an ' autonomous ' Southern Slav State, which it is apparently proposed to create under the same kind of Magyar rule as the Croatians have, with brief intervals, ' enjoyed ' since 1868. The removal of the 106 Galician and of the 11 Croat and Serb Dalmatian deputies from the Vienna Parliament would automatically ensure the absolute predominance of the Austrian Germans in all legislative matters, while the drastic reform of the parliamentary Standing Orders (also contemplated by the German programme) would enable a German president to silence, or to eject from the Chamber, any recalcitrant Czech or Slovene representative. In other words, the aim pursued is the forcible Germanisation of Austria proper in accordance with the example set by the Magyarisation of Hungary. Thus, with the Germans in unchallenged command of Austria, as the Magyars are in unchallenged command of Hungary, the Dual System would be immeasurably strengthened and the Hapsburg Monarchy reduced to its destined position as a subordinate factor in the Pan-German scheme.

Under such a dispensation, the fate of an ' autonomous ' Southern Slav State ' consisting of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, portions of Serbia' and possibly Montenegro, may readily be imagined. Croat would be played off against Serb ; the Catholic clergy would be used to harass their Orthodox ' brethren in Christ ' ; the Musulman Slavs of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be employed as a further element of disunion ; the Serbians of the kingdom would be oppressed with every refinement of administrative tyranny ; and over the whole would brood the Hapsburg police, with its retinue of informers, forgers, and perjurers. The country would be ' developed ' by the construction of strategic railways, the cost of which would be borne by an overtaxed and downtrodden peasantry, while Jews from Berlin, Vienna, and especially Budapest, would secure every valuable mining and industrial concession for the greater glory and profit of cosmopolitan finance. Some future German Chancellor would thus be enabled to dilate upon the successful efforts of Greater Germany to foster small nations and to hasten their progress along the high road of *Kultur*.

What positive programme have the Allies to set against this formidable plan ? It is doubtful whether any single Allied government has yet thought out and set down exactly

what it means by 'complete victory.' President Wilson, in his untimely Note to the belligerents, asked them to state what they are really fighting for. Germany certainly knows, but is not likely to say. The Allies cannot yet say, because they hardly know. Yet, if they wish to give a clear direction to the 'will to victory' which burns in all their peoples, they should lose no time in defining the precise objects they have in view and in canalising that will towards the attainment of those objects. As regards Austria-Hungary, the essential objects are clear. Unless the war is to end in a bad draw, or worse, the western half of Galicia must be included in a reunited Poland and the (mainly Ruthene) eastern half, with the north-eastern or Ruthene counties of Hungary, must go to Russia. Bohemia,with Moravia and the north-western or Slovak counties of Hungary, must form an independent or at least a self-governing State, linked up, possibly, by some form of agreement with Poland. Transylvania and the Rumane districts of Hungary, with the Rumane section of Bukovina, must become Rumanian, due provision being made for the fair treatment of the Saxon and Magyar minorities. The Southern Slav provinces must be united with Serbia. The Magyars would retain the central Hungarian plain, and, once freed from the rule of their own oppressive oligarchy, would find it easy to maintain profitable relations with their neighbours. The Italians naturally belong to Italy. As to the Austrian Germans, little harm would be done should they elect to enter the German Empire with the Hapsburgs at their head. The Allies are not seeking to crush the German people, or even to prevent the union with it of outstanding German 'tribes.' They are seeking to break the power of Prussian militarism—that is to say, of the Prussia-ridden Germany created by the wars of 1864, 1866, and 1871. How that Germany has turned the Hapsburg Monarchy into a formidable political and military weapon I have tried to show. The work done by Bismarck in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles, and its consequences, require to be undone, and the ascendency of Prussia reduced to proportions compatible with the liberties of the other German States and of Europe. To this desirable end the only path leads through the dismemberment of the present Hapsburg realms.

HENRY WICKHAM STEED.

THE END OF GREEK MONARCHY

1. **Ainsi parla Venizelos.** By Léon Maccas. Paris: Librairie Plon. 1916.
2. **La Politique de la Grèce.** (Speeches of M. Venizelos in the Hellenic Chamber, October and November 1916.) Paris: Imprimerie de l'Est. 1916.
3. **The European Concert in the Eastern Question.** By T. E. Holland, D.C.L. Oxford: University Press. 1885.
4. Πολιτικὴ Ἐπιθεώρησις, Nos. 42 and 43. Athens, October 17 and 22 (O.S.), 1916.
5. **Speech of M. Venizelos to the People,** August 27, 1916. London: The Anglo-Hellenic League. 1916.

I

IT can hardly be maintained that the attitude of the neutral nations in the present struggle has ever been properly appreciated in England. The English press as a whole and the writers and public speakers who have undertaken to influence public opinion seem to have forgotten that in a fight it is not sufficient to attempt to convince or even to succeed in convincing a spectator of the justice of your cause: you have to appeal not only to his better feelings but also to his political interests. The small nations are apt to receive with the coldest cynicism every moral argument addressed to them by one of the Great Powers; perhaps because they have learned by experience that the principles of abstract justice have not usually had any determining influence in the regulation of international disputes. It is not even enough to remind the Balkan States that the military Empire of Germany is a continual menace to the small Powers that have been helped to their feet in the last hundred years and now stand in the way of her advance to the East, or that the Austrian Empire is already a Bluebeard's chamber of crucified nationalities. It is quite true that in the present tumult England is the policeman of Europe; but it is not enough to blow the whistle of outraged law.

The fact is that all small nations regard the Great Powers with something between contempt and suspicion, which can be compared only to the feeling of potential hostility with which the socialist workman in a great private factory regards his employer. The employer may be just and benevolent, but he is a capitalist, a member of another order, whose struggles with other members of his own class are not the concern of the wage-earner. Or perhaps small nations feel that from great empires, as from joint-stock companies, some human element is wanting, so that sincere friendship with them is impossible. Some such feeling of distrust probably enters into the psychology of the small neutral States, and has worked as a sort of personal equation to distort the logic of British diplomatists. Germany alone has attempted to allow for this factor in her calculated relations with the outside world, and she has seldom been disappointed in her work of propaganda because she has never pretended to be benevolent. Certain it is that German propaganda in Greece has been peculiarly successful. Greece may be said—in so far as it is possible to generalise in such matters—to be a nation of precocious intellect and immature judgment, and every Greek profession of benevolent neutrality is tempered by a cynical suspicion of all Great Powers. There is many a Greek who loves England and English ways, but nevertheless believes that the present clash of maddened empires is no concern of his. He is quick to rationalise the motives which inspire the numerous invitations he receives from either belligerent; his hypertrophied political sense, or perhaps his national vanity, takes a certain pleasure in analysing their conflicting arguments; but he believes all the time that each Great Power is a clumsy Titan of another order—*οὔτε δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοῖος οὔτε νόημα*—whose interests are not commensurate with his own, and that his best chance of protection lies in exploiting the mutual jealousy of his protectors.

It is, of course, possible to overestimate this element of cynical detachment which leads the average citizen of a small country to smile politely when he is invited to exercise his moral judgment in this imperial brawl. But it is certainly a factor to be reckoned with, although it may not be easy to produce documentary evidence of its existence. One curious illustration of it I have found, very unexpectedly, in an amusing

little paper published at Patras, which is called Φωνὴ τῶν Ἐπιστράτων ('The Reservists' Voice'). This venomous rag is, as the name implies, the organ of the League of Reservists, a Tammany organisation which German money has set up in Greece, with the encouragement of King Constantine, in order to frustrate by the merest hooliganism any serious consideration of the political ideals proposed by M. Venizelos. This official publication of the League is given up to illiterate abuse of Venizelos and his followers, and to highly metaphorical flattery of King Constantine, who, in spite of his leonine attributes, is in need, it seems, of many defenders. But the number which appeared after Rumania's declaration of war contains none of the stock metaphors about ungrateful vipers, and none of the demonstrations which might have been expected of Rumanian folly in joining the wrong side. On the contrary, the comment, to one's surprise, is all in the vein of almost congratulating Rumania on having succeeded, presumably, in driving a satisfactory bargain with Russia, and in securing a signed, sealed, and official contract with the Entente Powers. There is not a word about the nobility of Germany; but the sagacity of Rumania is contrasted with the merely moral and chivalrous enthusiasm of Venizelos. Venizelos himself, in the course of his great speech to the Hellenic Chamber on October 4, 1915—the speech which preceded his final dismissal by King Constantine—was careful to take into account the underlying cynicism of his audience.

'We must indeed take into consideration that every one of the Great Powers has its particular interests to serve. But I believe that with reference to Oriental problems, in the sphere of which our own national problems are comprised, it is the two Western Powers whose interests can be best harmonised with our own. Greece understands to-day that we cannot expect foreigners to befriend us. What we must do is always to seek out and find, among those whose interests best accord with our own, one or two who will work and fight at our side.'

My remarks are intended to suggest the conclusion that if the British Foreign Office, or the united Foreign Ministries of the Allies, had spent as much money or displayed as much energy as the Germans in attaching and retaining the margin of undecided opinion in Greece, M. Venizelos would now be as fairly established in Athens as he was before the war, to the great advantage not only of the Allies but of the Greek people.

II

The answer, of course, will be that although war has obliged England to adopt German methods of organisation and militarism at home, she has no wish to imitate Germany in her treatment of neutral nations. Happily, however, there was no need for England to depart from justice in order to display resolution. A resolute policy in Greece would have been fully justified by her rights as a Protecting Power. Greece does not stand to the Entente in the relation of an ordinary neutral State. It has been clearly shown by a conspectus of the relevant treaties contributed to 'The Times' (November 28 and 29), as well as in a cogent article by Dr. R. M. Burrows in 'The 'New Europe' (a weekly periodical which marks an epoch in English journalism by devoting itself solely to foreign affairs), that England, France, and Russia possess certain exceptional rights of intervention in Greece, which permit them to secure the good government of the Greek people without diminishing the independence of the Greek State.

Anyone who cares to follow the complicated negotiations that passed between London, Paris, and St. Petersburg while Turkey was crushing the life out of the Greek Revolution can trace the origin of those rights. The fact that stands out is that a hundred years ago England, France, and Russia were the only Powers in Europe who cared enough for freedom to rescue the Greek nation from the Turkish Empire. The Balkan problem in all its successive phases is only a result of the incomplete dissolution of Turkish Imperialism. Wellington and Nesselrode first decided on intervention in 1826, and after France had joined them, and the fleets of the Three Powers had stunned Turkey with an unpremeditated blow at the battle of Navarino in the following year, they proceeded with their negotiations, which culminated in the Protocol of London (1830). That agreement, with the negotiations which led up to and succeeded it, made the Three Powers the agents of the Hellenic race throughout the world for securing the good government of the new Greek State which was then inaugurated. It has been elaborated and confirmed by many subsequent documents, of which it is only necessary to mention here the treaty of May 7, 1832, by which the throne of Greece was offered to Prince Otho of Bavaria by the Three Powers 'duly authorised for this purpose by the Greek nation';

and the treaty of July 13, 1863, which records, after the deposition of Otho, the 'arrangements to be taken in order 'to give effect to the wish of the Greek nation,' confers the crown on Prince George of Denmark, and supplements the original guarantee of national independence by the insertion of the word 'constitutional'—an evident attempt to remind the new sovereign and his successors that Otho's expulsion was the result of his Bavarian manners and his failure to observe the spirit of the written constitution imposed on him in 1843. The agreement of February 3, 1830, has been supplemented, but its main provisions have never been superseded. Its validity was explicitly reaffirmed in 1862 when the Greek people, in opposition to the self-denying clause contained in it, proposed to choose their King from the reigning House of England.

Finally, the agreement of 1830 foresees the possibility of the Three Powers, by mutual consent, landing troops in the territory of the new Greek State. By a curious coincidence the second half of Clause 8, which embodies that provision, is omitted from the White Paper in current use ('Treaties of 'Guarantee,' 1898), so that its very existence might have been forgotten but for the invaluable handbook of Professor Holland, who not only gives the full text but prints the second half of Clause 8 in the Roman type which distinguishes such portions of the documents as are still in force.

Such is the origin of the exceptional rights of the Protecting Powers; and it is impossible to question their validity, for they proceed from a guarantee given, not to an individual or a dynasty, but to the Greek people. Lord Clarendon, whose words at the Conference of Paris in 1856 are quoted in 'The Times' articles already referred to, declared that the 'well-being and 'prosperity of the Greek people' were the objects to be attained, and the pursuit of those objects clearly involves a practical mandate to secure any necessary reforms in the internal government of the country. Whether the democratic control of foreign policy is necessary to the 'well-being and 'prosperity' of a small community whose citizens are almost morbidly conscious of their political dignity is a question which need not be discussed, for King Constantine's secret and 'dynastic' diplomacy is far from being the only feature of his reign that has infringed the rights of his subjects. In any case there can be no question as to the validity of the treaty

rights of the three Protecting Powers to intervene in Greece between King and People, or even, let it be said, between a constitutional and an unconstitutional party—for it would be idle to ignore the fact that since his first unconstitutional intervention in September 1915 King Constantine has acquired by corruption and calumny a sufficiently solid body of adherents. Unfortunately there are reasons for thinking that our policy in Greece was originally misguided by Viscount Grey's reluctance to sanction any dealings with a small Power which might be misinterpreted in neutral countries as being high-handed, or as resembling German conduct avowedly based on the theory that might is right.

III

King Constantine's defenders have not been silent even in this country. Even British officials have busied themselves in London society in defending the interests of Athenian royalty, and in promoting the legend that King Constantine is a very fine fellow whom we have treated very badly, and that Venizelos in an adventurer whom we had no business to encourage. Certain it is that many Englishmen in Greece have been bluffed into admiring King Constantine by the simple fact that he drinks whisky and soda. The political basis of the defence of King Constantine was not less irrelevant. It was argued that a small Power, already exhausted by the wars of 1912 and 1913, might desire very properly to keep out of the tumultuous and bloody mess of European war, and that England and France had no right to take advantage of their status as Protecting Powers in order to press Greece to exchange a safe neutrality for risks which might be fatal to a State so much smaller than themselves. The answer to the first point is that States which do not want to fight should not contract defensive alliances with their neighbours ; the answer to the second point is that although the conduct of the King would have remained unconstitutional and dishonourable, there would have been no pressure put upon him by the Entente Powers had he maintained the neutrality he professed.

It may be doubted whether King Constantine's attempts to explain away his treacherous desertion of Serbia have ever been taken seriously by anyone in the world. He certainly did not take them seriously himself, for neither he nor any of

his puppets ever thought of inventing them until the repudiation of the treaty, on German instructions, was a dishonour accomplished. If ever there was in the whole history of diplomacy an unquestionable *casus foederis*, it was that which was precipitated by the Bulgarian attack on Serbia in the first days of October 1915; and that was the moment chosen by King Constantine to dismiss Venizelos, whose policy of supporting Serbia according to the treaty, explained in his great speech of October 4, had just received the full confidence of the Hellenic Chamber. The events which led up to that royal defiance of the constitution are still more significant. M. Maccas has shown, in an admirable chapter which traces the whole inception and history of the Greco-Serbian Treaty with the fullest documentation and many references to the press of all parties, that until August 1915 the validity of the defensive alliance between Greece and Serbia in case of a Bulgarian attack had never been so much as questioned even by the most fanatical opponents of Venizelos.

On the outbreak of the European war, Venizelos, after consultation and in full agreement with the Serbian authorities, decided that the best service which Greece could render to her Serbian ally, in view of the strategic position of the Serbian armies on the Austrian frontier, would be to take no active part in the war, but to maintain an attitude of watchful neutrality, so as to guard against the possibility of a Bulgarian surprise and to keep open Serbia's indispensable line of communication with Salonica. This policy was publicly explained by Venizelos on the 30th of September 1914, when it received the unanimous approval of the Hellenic Chamber. At that time the undisputed interpretation of the treaty was that it created a potential obligation, inasmuch as Greece must automatically commence hostilities the moment Bulgaria sided with the Central Powers.

Accordingly Greece maintained (in spite of German solicitations insinuated through Venizelos' Foreign Minister Streit, who resigned when they were rejected and has ever since played the part of German conscience to the King) an attitude of extraordinarily benevolent neutrality. There is even ground for thinking that after the Austrians had been driven out of Serbia in November 1914 they abandoned the idea of a renewed offensive (in February 1915) for fear of provoking the active participation of Greece. It was indeed in January and February 1915, after negotiations with England, that Venizelos

addressed to the King his famous memoranda, advocating the immediate entry of Greece into the war on the side of the Entente, for reasons based only on considerations of Greek interest, not on any modified view of the treaty.

The arguments of these memoranda were so irrefutable that King Constantine decided to get rid of Venizelos at once. But even his successor, Gounaris, declared officially on the 10th of March 1915 that the Greek attitude to Serbia would not be modified in any respect. In the following month, when Bulgarian 'irregulars' attempted to cut the Nish-Salonica railway, Gounaris energetically associated Greece with the Serbian protest at Sofia, reminding Bulgaria of the treaty's potentiality. His action was cordially approved by the entire Greek press, including the anti-Venizelist papers which have since discovered an attachment to German and Bulgarian interests. The same papers renewed their declarations of fidelity to Serbia at the beginning of August 1915, on the signature of the Turco-Bulgarian agreement. Meanwhile, however, Venizelos had won the elections of June 1915, and it had become clear that he could not by ordinary methods much longer be excluded from office. So quite unmistakably can be traced the German plan for the invalidation of the Greco-Serbian Treaty, or rather the German plan for preparing public opinion in Greece to accept the fact that King Constantine did not intend in any circumstances to fight for Serbia against Germany.

The notorious Schenk, of whom so much has been heard, was just a simple little press agent with plenty of money, and he would naturally begin with the provincial press. There, surely enough, the first murmurings of hostility to Serbia made their appearance in July. But when in effect Venizelos returned to power in September the denunciations of Serbia were taken up by the opposition newspapers, which were only too glad to find a method of attacking Venizelos and at the same time to console themselves for the loss of office by drawing German pay. Of course the Germans did not work through Schenk alone; he was quite a subordinate official, employed only to prepare the ground; other independent departments were established in Athens for military information, submarine supply, and political graft. But the real headquarters of their operations were at the palace, where King Constantine and Streit were in direct communication with Berlin. From the palace Bulgaria was secretly informed that the uncon-

ditional neutrality of Greece had been secured. Upon that information Bulgaria mobilised. Venizelos immediately ordered a counter-mobilisation, but was astounded, when he took the decree to the palace for signature, to be told for the first time that the mobilisation was to be regarded only as a precautionary measure.

The opposition papers then began to develop a suggestion that Serbia was not in a position to carry out her own obligations under the treaty. It was in order to nullify these arguments that Venizelos asked the Entente Powers if, in the event of actual war between Serbia and Bulgaria and the consequent bringing into operation of the Greco-Serbian alliance, England and France would be prepared to send a force to Salonika to take the place of the Serbian contingent which the military convention attached to the treaty provided for service with the Greek army. It has been pointed out by Dr. Ronald Burrows and the few other well-informed writers that this was the full extent of Venizelos' so-called 'invitation.' French and British troops began to land at Salonika on the 2nd of October on the natural assumption that Greece would respect the treaty; but Venizelos was obliged to protest, because the landing was technically a violation of Greek neutrality, which would lapse automatically only at the moment when Bulgaria commenced hostilities against Serbia. On the 4th of October Venizelos explained in the Hellenic Chamber the negotiations which had led up to the existing situation, and declared his intention of respecting the treaty and using the Greek army for the defence of the Serbian flank. M. Gounaris, as leader of the opposition, then for the first time, in spite of the fact that he had been in power from March till August, publicly announced his discovery that the treaty did not apply in the case of a 'European' as opposed to a 'Balkan' war. The policy of Venizelos was approved by more than three-fifths of the Chamber, but he was immediately dismissed by King Constantine. From that day onwards the various Governments at Athens were all puppets manipulated from the royal palace, and although from time to time they were allowed to profess a 'benevolent' neutrality, they all remained consistently hostile to the interests of the Entente. It was only three weeks later, in a note addressed to England, that the repudiation of the treaty was embroidered with diplomatic excuses.

The betrayal of Serbia was in itself sufficient to indicate the

quality of King Constantine's 'neutrality.' It was in effect an act of hostility to Serbia, and Serbia was the ally of England, France, and Russia, the protectors of Greek liberty. But the protectors preferred to take the word of King Constantine and prepared to accept his 'benevolent neutrality.' Venizelos at first offered to support the new Ministry, and his majority in the Chamber only overthrew it after they had been grossly insulted by the Minister for War, who was immediately appointed to a high office at Court. When a general election became inevitable (in December 1915) the methods adopted for its 'preparation' were so flagrant that Venizelos and his supporters abstained altogether from the poll.

In spite of the fact that there was no intention of helping Serbia, nor even, as it subsequently appeared, of resisting a Bulgarian invasion of Greek Macedonia, the army was kept mobilised. Thus the electorate was prevented from expressing its discontent with a government which did not represent its views, while at the same time the men, by a system carefully organised by the admittedly pro-German General Staff, received daily instruction in the wickedness of Venizelos, the virtues of King Constantine, and the invincibility of Germany, a theme which was illustrated when convenient by such announcements as that of the fall of Verdun.* It was the application, not of industrial, but of 'political' conscription. Incidentally it had a disastrous effect on the finances of the country, which are supposed to be under the supervision of the Three Powers. At Athens there was no longer any pretence at constitutional government. The representatives of the Allies were openly insulted, while King Constantine maintained a force of secret police at the service of German interests and refused even to acknowledge a respectful petition addressed to him by the Greek communities abroad.

On the 25th of May Fort Rupel, a commanding position on the flank of General Sarrail's army, which had entrenched itself at Salonika during the winter, was handed over to the Bulgarians with all its defences, by an agreement secretly arranged between Athens, Berlin, and Sofia. The existence of this agreement, indignantly denied at the time by the Greek Government, was subsequently proved by documentary evi-

* This was officially announced at Kavalla to the troops paraded in honour of the King's birthday on the 3rd of June last.

dence.* After the demobilisation at the end of June things went from bad to worse. The men released from the colours were drafted into the now notorious League of Reservists, which, with King Constantine's approval and *in his name*, terrorised the civil population and committed every sort of outrage and robbery with impunity, on the pretext of a plot against the King's life. This organisation was financed by the German legation.

Meanwhile Bulgarian and German troops, again by arrangement, occupied Kavalla, where a whole division of the Greek army was instructed to surrender, and was conveyed, with all its equipment, to Germany. Subsequently the whole of Greek Macedonia, as far as Florina, was occupied by the Germans and Bulgars, who appropriated all the Greek frontier works and war material, said to have cost the Greek Government about £8,000,000. The protests of the Entente were politely ignored, or postponed with assurances of good will, or placated by a change of Ministry. Almost every politician in Athens was invited to form a Ministry, except Venizelos, who had twice received the confidence of the electorate. The only honest man of the many who attempted to do so, M. Zaimis, actually recommended King Constantine at the beginning of September to recall Venizelos and declare war against Bulgaria. As this was after the Rumanian entry into the war and the consequent formation at Salonika of the Greek Committee of National Defence (which was joined a month later by Venizelos himself), King Constantine allowed it to be believed that his neutrality was no longer inflexible, and there was once again a general pretence of reconciliation. This, however, was the signal for such a violent outbreak of terrorism on the part of the Reservists' League (which was long ago supposed to have been dissolved) that the British Fleet had to anchor off the Piræus.

But the only result of this demonstration of power was the arrest of a few German agents and spies—including Baron Schenk, who told an English journalist in a Parthian interview that his work would be carried on after his own departure—and the surrender of the post offices. Nothing more seems

* See the *Patris*, October 16–18 and November 6–11 (o.s.) 1916, and compare the *Morning Post*, June 21, 1916, and the *Preuss Zeitung*, June 7, quoted in the *Morning Post*, July 28.

to have been said about the Reservists, and poor M. Zaimis, who had promised their final disappearance, found his position impossible, for behind his back his Minister of the Interior was acting on private instructions received from the palace. All the time the real control of affairs remained with King Constantine, who cancelled the appointments of persons, however distinguished, who ventured to utter a word in favour of Venizelos or of the Constitution, and replaced them by the corrupt place-hunters of the old régime who had been so laboriously weeded out by Venizelos in 1910. He surrounded himself at the palace with a cabal consisting of his chief political adviser Streit, German-bred staff officers like Dousmanis and Metaxas, and Viennese dandies like Theodore Ypsilanti, whose wife, a Hungarian, distinguished herself in the outbreak of the 1st of December 1916, by personally inciting the Reservists to loot and massacre. In this select circle King Constantine would express, in the barrack-room language for which he is noted, his hatred of Venizelos, his contempt for constitutional government, his contempt for France and England. And when the representatives of these Powers began to be suspicious of his charming proposals that they should, as a mere guarantee of good faith, begin by financing and equipping his army, he would retire to bed with a recrudescence of his old wound, or send one of his brothers, Prince Andrew, or Prince Nicolas, on a diplomatic tour of the Allied Courts to complain that he was only too anxious to help the Entente if they would ask their representatives not to bully him.

There are many unproved details about King Constantine's rule that might be added by anyone who cares to be sensational; there is, for instance, the circumstantial story printed in an obscure Greek paper of the royal mail-bag on its way to Berlin, captured in Thessaly by the British Intelligence Service some months ago; but I have preferred to mention only those charges which are based on unimpeachable evidence. They suffice to make it quite clear that there was never any question of 'allowing a small Power to remain neutral.' Rather, the difficulty at Athens was that of imposing neutrality on a nest of German intrigue. King Constantine's observance of neutrality was characterised by the closest possible co-operation with Germany, and it is impossible to believe that this fact can have escaped the notice of all departments of the British Government.

IV

The Foreign Office at least must have been well informed about King Constantine's demeanour, for there is reason to believe that it is represented at Athens by a thoroughly efficient staff. We cannot know, and possibly for many years to come we shall not be allowed to know, the contents of Viscount Grey's despatches to Sir Francis Elliot. But after taking every known factor into consideration, we are justified in thinking that his general attitude was one of excessive caution and credulity. It is a curious irony, illustrating the dangers of manufactured opinion, that Viscount Grey, the unscrupulous imperialist of socialistic pamphleteers, the vulturine schemer of German caricatures, should be in reality a man of morbid timidity, who spent most of his time at the Foreign Office telling his subordinates to be careful. Such at least is the conclusion to which we are led by the only evidence that is accessible to the ordinary citizen.

It must be understood that any attempt to give an account of the attitude of the Foreign Office in face of the Athenian situation depends mainly on inferences and personal impressions. Anyone who has read through two or three collections of State Papers will have in his head the wonderfully inconclusive rhythm which is one of the proudest traditions of our diplomacy, and will be able to imagine Viscount Grey's instructions couched in that familiar instrument of non-committal, the conditional statement of fact, which gradually evaporates altogether in a series of qualifications. This picture of the optimistic and therefore obstructive character of the Foreign Office under Viscount Grey is supported by the fact that our most drastic intervention at Athens prior to the 1st of December — our ultimatum of June 21, when we demanded demobilisation and a general election—had the appearance of being quite unintentional, for the naval blockade seems to have been enforced two or three days before the ultimatum was delivered. It is further supported by the fact that both General Sarrail and Admiral du Fournet seem from time to time, usually at the wrong moment, to have taken matters into their own hands. Reviewing the series of incomplete or half-hearted ultimatums which have alternated with assurances of benevolence during the last twelve months, one gets a picture of some strong

personality among our representatives at Athens occasionally galvanising the Alliance into decided action before being once more entangled in the slow-dropping veils of diplomatic qualification, or even daring to act on his own initiative, and being suddenly reminded from Downing Street that he must not hurt the feelings of a King who, to quote a phrase used by the Speaker of the House of Commons, 'is at present neutral, 'and who must be treated as a Sovereign of a friendly State.'

In any case it cannot be denied that after M. Venizelos, relying on our protection, had left Athens and put himself at the head of the Provisional Government at Salonica, we not only refused to give his government any official recognition, but we actually assured King Constantine that the movement of National Defence should not be allowed to spread beyond the narrow limits assigned to it. We gave King Constantine this assurance gratuitously, on the pretext of avoiding civil war in Greece, in spite of the fact that Venizelos had repeatedly denied that the movement had any designs against the Throne. There is yet another reason for regarding Viscount Grey as principally responsible for the periodical mist of conciliation and apology which seems to have risen between Sir Francis Elliot and King Constantine—namely the remarkable analogy that exists between our credulous year at Athens and our credulous year at Sofia before Bulgaria entered the war. Of the negotiations at Sofia in 1915 it has been said that Viscount Grey, being a perfect gentleman, judged the Bulgarians by his own honour and thought them incapable of bargaining with England if they were already bound to Germany. It is, to say the least, tempting to suppose that in the following year Viscount Grey judged King Constantine by the same standard.

It will be naturally objected that it is unfair to make England, in the person of Viscount Grey, responsible for the collective bargaining of the Allied Powers. This in effect was the plea repeated by Lord Robert Cecil in the House of Commons in answer to the devoted band of Philhellenes * who attempted to defend the interests of Venizelos and to elicit the cause of the extraordinary tenderness shown to King Constantine. Lord Robert seemed to affirm with an air

* Notably Commander Bellairs, Sir Edwin Cornwall, Mr. Dillon, Dr. Lynch, and Mr. Ronald McNeill.

of injured innocence that there was no such thing as British policy, its place having been taken for the duration of the war by the policy of the Allies; and that his own function was merely to describe that policy, not to defend it or to 'discuss whether that policy was a good or a bad one'—perhaps the most extraordinary words ever uttered in the House of Commons by a member of the Executive. Such a theory of partnership would, if upheld, put the conduct of an *ex hypothesi* democratic war into the control of the least democratic partner; and it might easily be extended so as to allow a minister to disclaim responsibility for his own department on the ground that he was only one member of a collectively responsible Cabinet. It might be observed incidentally that Lord Robert Cecil would have done better to apply the principle of separate and distinct responsibilities, enunciated by himself only a few days before, when, in speaking of the relation of the Executive to the House of Commons, he implied that the Cabinet were responsible for the conduct of the war, and the House of Commons only for the result; this might have led him to conclude that each member of an alliance has a separate function for which he is individually responsible, and that consequently diplomats, like generals, can co-operate without losing their independence. Leaving this theoretical point on one side, it is certain that British policy in Greece must have had no little influence on the policy of the Alliance: and if, as Lord Robert was careful to explain, the Allies were in complete agreement, there can be no reason why British Ministers should escape full responsibility.

The apparently evasive answers of Lord Robert Cecil gave the unfortunate impression that some secret influence was at work to protect King Constantine, and this naturally gave life to many fantastic rumours of 'dynastic' interference. They are worth mentioning, because rumours, such is their nature, die as soon as they are printed; and as this war is largely the outcome of Prussian autocracy, it is proper that there should be no suspicion of monarchical interference on our own side. Let us confess then that it was whispered around London that King Constantine was a monarch, and that the Russian Court would forbid any European monarchy to be imperilled; that King Constantine was a nephew, and that some member of our own Royal Family might be sorry, out of mere family affection, to see him humiliated; that even the French Premier

might have a tender spot for a King whose brother was married to a French princess and had made his home in Paris. It will be noticed that each of the Three Powers in turn could be plausibly made responsible for the general hesitation. None of these ingenious inventions deserves a moment's credence. Yet so studiously mysterious were the official pronouncements that one could almost believe that Cabinet Ministers were inclined to encourage these suburban stories of family feeling so that their own incompetence might be covered up by the legend of royal and extraneous influences.

As an example of official methods the reader may be reminded that the Foreign Office professed to be deeply shocked when they learned that Miss Hobhouse—a lady whose offence consisted in believing, with Spinoza, that hatred ought in all circumstances to be discouraged—had entered Germany and interviewed a German official; although the report of her experiences was not published till after her return to England, and might therefore, if it really endangered the Defence of the Realm, have been suppressed by the censor. Yet, the Foreign Office apparently saw no objection to the grand tours of King Constantine's brothers. Prince George of Greece was even received at the Foreign Office before he left London for Berlin.

Incidents like these, though doubtless intrinsically unimportant, served to distract public attention from the real reason of diplomatic delay, and also increased that delay by distracting diplomatic attention from Athens, which should always have remained the centre of Allied policy in the Balkans. The final reason for the inefficiency of Allied diplomacy in Greece, for its uncertainty and frequent retractations, was the necessity of consulting three or four different governments before any decisive action could be taken by the ministers at Athens who alone knew what action was required. King Constantine knew perfectly well that whatever he did nothing could happen to him until at least sixteen different men in four different capitals had written to each other and received satisfactory replies. Sir Francis Elliot can do nothing until he has consulted the Foreign Office, and the Foreign Office can do nothing until it has consulted individually and collectively each of our numerous Allies. As an example of the contemptible consequences of this centrifugal diplomacy it is sufficient to record that on December 1 King Constantine —for his complicity is not denied—shot down in cold blood

with hidden machine-guns the detachments of French and British marines which Admiral du Fournet, in a last attempt to enforce Greek neutrality, had sent to occupy certain pre-arranged points of the Greek capital. Yet, until a fortnight after the event, no joint ultimatum was presented by the Allies and, beyond the automatic proclamation of a blockade, no united policy had been determined. During that fortnight King Constantine, in wireless communication with Berlin, was mobilising his army, while his hooligans of the Reservists' League (which was long ago ' dissolved ') had shot or imprisoned without trial anyone who professed Liberal opinions, had looted and burned and tortured, and his journalists had continued, by methods which included the crudest forgery of incriminating documents, to urge the complete extirpation of the democratic party and the democratic Powers.

The necessity for united action is, and always must be, an impediment to the diplomacy of an alliance :* and this impediment could only have been minimised by a centripetal system which would have concentrated power in the hands of Sir Francis Elliot, so as to allow him to act on the spot in concert with his diplomatic colleagues, and especially *by delegating the authority of the alliance to the three members who were peculiarly qualified to act in Greek affairs.* It seems clear, however, from Lord Robert Cecil's references to ' the policy of the ' Allies,' that no action was taken at Athens by the Three Protecting Powers as such, and that every step in the negotiations required the approval and co-operation of Italy and, for all we know, of Belgium, Portugal, Serbia, and Japan.

The inclusion of Italy in these negotiations complicated the situation, for the knowledge of Italy's territorial ambitions in the Near East was quite sufficient to antagonise a portion of the Greek population. There can be no object in pretending to ignore this unfortunate result, for a considerable section of the Italian press had made no attempt to conceal a hostile attitude to Greece and to many Greek claims. That section

* In 1862, for example, to refer to a case in which all the correspondence has been published, it took a full month of negotiation before Earl Russell and Prince Gortchakoff could decide to make a collective declaration at Athens on a principle which both were equally determined to uphold, namely the exclusion from the Greek throne, according to the Protocol of 1830, of all members of the reigning families of the Protecting Powers.

of the Italian press, which had lately been conducting a virulent campaign against Venizelos, was alone to blame if the failure of the Allies to settle the Greek problem was sometimes attributed to Italy's lack of good will.

V

Italians hate Greeks, Greeks hate Bulgarians, Bulgarians hate Serbians, Serbians hate Albanians, Albanians, I am bound to confess, hate nobody except the tax-collector (although Miss Durham, who by her admirable work among the Albanians has earned some right to speak on their behalf, supplies the omission, being certainly less than just to the Serbians). Such is the real Balkan problem, a problem of conflicting hatreds, most of which are entirely artificial. Hatred is not a natural or necessary accompaniment of nationalism. It is a manufactured article, and various forms of nationalistic propaganda are alone responsible for making nationalism appear to be incompatible with any satisfactory settlement of the Balkans or of Europe. Such propaganda, of which the Balkan Peninsula, needless to say, is a hotbed, start with the two false assumptions of racial purity and racial hatred. Racial purity does not exist, and if it did it would not be a sufficient explanation of national culture, which is the only sound criterion of nationality. Secondly, no national culture need be accompanied by the hatred or intolerance of any other. There is no earthly (or spiritual) reason why two distinct national cultures should not continue to live side by side in the same political community, provided only that a measure of autonomy is secured by a decent and democratic form of government,* without which a satisfactory settlement would be in any case impossible.

This fact cannot be too strongly emphasised in the discussion of any settlement in the Balkans, where the various nationalities are so irregularly distributed in pockets and percolations and enclaves that it is *physically impossible* to trace the political frontiers on so-called ethnological principles. The acceptance

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* *Cf.* a remarkable article by Mr. A. E. Zimmern on 'Nationality and Government' in *The Sociological Review* (January 1916): 'Between free Government and nationality there is no need, and indeed hardly a possibility, of conflict.'

of this impossibility will automatically deprive of their occupation the priests and propagandists who for fifty years have been trying to impose ethnological purity on the unhappy Macedonians. If the régime of blood and ikons is once abolished, the natives of Macedonia who are of mixed Hellenic and Slavonic stocks, will make worthy citizens of either Greek, Serbian, or Bulgarian democracies. Nationalism without hatred is the only ultimate solution of the Balkan problem, and nationalism without hatred will lead inevitably to Federation. It is possible that the Balkan States, if they escape the menace of Imperialism, may yet give an example to Europe.

VI

The solution is easy—on paper. In practice it will require the hands of a statesman of more than ordinary strength, temperance, and imagination ; and a man of this quality will hardly be found in any of the great Courts of Europe. But he exists to-day in Greece. This is not the place for any elaborate estimate of the genius of Venizelos ; a mere chronicle of his redemptive work in Greece since 1910 would require a volume to itself. It is, however, worth while to refer to an article which has lately appeared in an Athenian weekly, because this article represents the worst that can be said against Venizelos by his most implacable and most articulate enemies. The Πολιτικὴ Ἐπιθεώρησις ('Political Review') is the organ of a central party in Greek politics which consists essentially of M. Ion Dragoumis, formerly minister at Petrograd, a brilliant but impatient young man who regards everything as a failure which is not done by himself, and consequently hates Venizelos, because he has achieved more in five years than anyone else in Athens. M. Dragoumis has no sympathy for Germany, and indeed believes that Greece should have allied herself with the Entente—at any time since the beginning of the war, when the alliance could have been arranged without the help of Venizelos. The writer of this attack on Venizelos is M. Ch. Chrestoulaki, the editor of the 'Political Review.'

M. Chrestoulaki's usual method is to concede most of the qualities which have enabled Venizelos to win and to deserve the confidence of his people, and then to declare that those merits are either the neuropathic stigmata of the hysterical degenerate, or else the pathological instincts of the Cretan

peasant, the non-moral, but not really criminal, type of primitive! If the continual repetition of these pseudo-scientific terms begins to pall, the writer falls back on the more obvious trick of judging every good quality by the possibility of its abuse. By these methods mental energy and vitality become 'egocentric and fanatical obstinacy,' sagacity and resourcefulness are only low cunning and insincerity, eloquence (of course) becomes 'demagogic art,' optimism and self-confidence are obvious marks of the primitive, fearless intelligence is only a correlative of the 'deplorable absence of moral doubt,' and impartiality denotes opportunism and a complete lack of settled principles.* The absurdities of this article in the 'Political Review' illustrate the complete failure of his enemies to maintain a consistent case against the Periclean wisdom and dignity of Venizelos. The average Greek mind seems to be bewildered by the impartiality and the philosophic detachment which are primary qualities of the statesman as distinguished from the politician. Such an attitude sometimes makes one despair of the future of the Greek people. One can only hope that the average Greek is above the level of this envious fool who describes the inspiration of genius as 'regrettable impulsiveness' and observes without admiring the supreme political virtue of *σωφροσύνη*.

Venizelos' unique powers of compromise and imagination, which are different aspects of the same virtue, are necessary to Greece and perhaps to Europe. Without imagination the Balkan problem can never be solved. Compromise there will have to be, for the Peace Conference is not going to be an exercise in dictation.

VII

To restore Venizelos to power is the first necessity. He is the only man in Greece with sufficient authority to heal the divided nation, and with a nation divided against itself there

* Chrestoulaki repeats the old charge of personal ambition, although it has been proved by documents published in the 'Patris' that when, just after Venizelos had left Athens at the end of September, King Constantine approached him through an intermediary with the suggestion that he or his party might be represented in one of the new ministries, Venizelos replied that he made no claim to ministerial office, but would return to Athens to serve in the humblest capacity if the King would declare war against Bulgaria.

can be no sobriety in the treatment of the Balkan problem. In order to promote the interests of Germany, the Athens Government, as Venizelos said to a correspondent of the 'Nea Hellas' on the 22nd of November, 'is making every effort to widen the 'breach between the two sections in Greece and to make a recon-'stitution more difficult.' It is therefore remarkable that the policy of the Allied Powers has had the unfortunate effect of perpetuating this division, possibly because the weak hands of Viscount Grey were forced, in the wrong direction, by some influence in the Alliance which is hostile to Greek union or to Greek democracy. We cut Greece in half, and set up a sort of balance of power between Athens and Salonika, at first, perhaps, in hope that the population would gradually trickle from one scale to the other. But towards the beginning of November there were strong indications that we gave King Constantine some sort of assurance that the National Movement would not be allowed to extend beyond certain fixed limits. About the same time the administration of the Neutral Zone, established south of Salonika with the laudable intention of preventing civil war in Greece, was so unsatisfactory that Venizelos, in a telegram addressed to Dr. R. M. Burrows, was obliged to complain of the 'impossibility of expanding in 'Thessaly.' Whatever the origin of this policy, it is clear that it plays directly into the hands of King Constantine. Our object now, considering both the interests of Greece and the interests of the Alliance, must be not merely to recognise but to extend and restore the authority of Venizelos, who has been twice constitutionally chosen by the body of the whole nation. It is to be hoped that after the events of the 1st of December we shall no longer be deceived by the apparent concessions and German promises of King Constantine, which have deceived us so often before. So now, if we believe him, he will deceive us again; 'so now,' like Plato's treacherous tyrant,* 'if he has the power, he will keep his dear old father-'land or motherland, as the Cretans say, in subjection to his 'new retainers, whom he has introduced to be their rulers and 'masters. This is the end of his passions and desires.'

* 'Republic,' 575 D: οὕτω πάλιν τὴν πατρίδα, ἐὰν οἷός τ' ᾖ, κολάσεται ἐπεισαγόμενος νέους ἑταίρους, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτοις δὴ δουλεύουσαν τὴν πάλαι φιλὴν μητρίδα τε, Κρῆτές φασι, καὶ πατρίδα ἕξει τε καὶ θρέψει. καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τέλος ἂν εἴη τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ τοιούτου ἀνδρός. . . . Ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν τοὺς τοιούτους ἀπίστους καλοῖμεν;

The health of Greece can only be restored by the removal of King Constantine. From an interview published in the 'Manchester Guardian' on the 1st of December he was evidently aware, a whole year ago, of a diplomatic suggestion that he should be replaced by one of his brothers—a most unhappy suggestion, for Prince George, who, on account of his Parisian domicile, is probably the candidate referred to and cannot, it is true, be called a Germanophile, has no particular talent and more than his share of the family's fanatical jealousy of Venizelos. No national end can be served by preserving a dynasty which has never done any good to Greece. Of the two monarchs it has produced it can only be said that King George, who reigned for fifty years and never visited the provinces of his adopted country, did on the whole less harm than his son, who in fourteen months has subjected a happy and renascent nation to the worst miseries of dishonour, invasion, and civil war. It is useless to substitute for King Constantine and his retainers a milder or allotropic form of the same political perversion. The time is ripe for the proclamation of a Greek Republic. If it be objected, as Conservatism or inertia will always object, that the people are 'not 'yet fit for it,' the answer is that if the Greek people, after a political experience of more than two thousand years, have not yet learned to govern themselves, it is high time they began. It requires considerable courage to differ on this point from Venizelos, who, such is his horror of extreme measures, is in favour of preserving not only the monarchical form of government but also the reigning family; but in spite of his many arguments, published and unpublished, I cannot help thinking that the proclamation of a Republican government would not only put new life into the movement of National Defence and complete the demoralisation of Germanic influence; it would carry a message of revival to Greeks all over the world, and call back to the mother country some of the thousands in England and America who have learned the value of independence. If the modesty of Venizelos will not allow the Provisional Government to declare that no more kings are wanted by the Hellenic people, Greece will lose an opportunity that may not quickly return, and Europe an example.

JOHN MAVROGORDATO.

FRANCE AND THE BRITISH EFFORT

1. **L'Angleterre et la Guerre.** Par ANDRÉ CHEVRILLON. Paris: Hachette et Cie. 1916.
2. **Histoire de l'Entente cordiale Franco-anglaise.** Par J. L. DE LANESSAN. Paris: F. Alcan. 1916.
3. **Chez les Anglais pendant la grande Guerre.** Par HENRY D. DAVRAY. Paris: Plon. 1916.
4. **Une Visite à l'Armée Anglaise.** Par MAURICE BARRÈS. Nancy: Berger-Levrault. 1915.
5. **En Liaison avec les Anglais.** Par PHILIPPE MILLET. Paris: Perrin et Cie. 1916.
6. **Angleterre.** Par ANDRÉ SUARÈS. Paris: Émile-Paul Frères. 1916.
7. **L'Armée Anglaise sur le Continent.** Par RENÉ PUAUX. Paris: E. Fasquelle. 1916.

IN the final months of 1914, and indeed until the spring of 1915, the literature of France was reduced to silence by the terrific shock of German invasion. It was really not until April or May of the latter year that books began to make their appearance. Up to that time a journalistic record of the evolution of events was the utmost literary effort of which France was capable in its violent crisis. The earliest volumes on the war were collections of articles from the daily newspapers, among the most important of them being 'La Patrie en Danger' of M. Gustave Hervé (from 'La Guerre Sociale') and 'L'Union Sacrée' of M. Maurice Barrès (from 'L'Écho de Paris'). Of each of these an account was given in the EDINBURGH REVIEW at the time of its appearance. But these and similar collections of republished articles will be found, on re-examination, to contain extremely little about the part which England was playing in the great war. There were occasional side-glances, shakes of the hand, expressions of sympathy, but the pressure of anxiety was too violent to admit of anything more explicit than this. Moreover, very few persons in Paris really knew what were the attitude and intentions of the British Empire.

The fact is that, in times of peace, nations, whether friendly or unfriendly, seldom take the trouble to learn much about one another. The task of penetrating the conventionalities of national character is embarrassing, and neighbours procrastinate. One thing that the great war has done is to make it worth while for the Allies to understand each other. M. Paul Deschanel remarked the other day that August 1, 1914, was a rather late date for France to begin to make a study of Germany. But he might equally well have suggested that it was a late date for France to comprehend England and for England to find out the secret of France. These investigations are always delicate, and nations, like individuals, require a critical situation before they are persuaded to speak out loud. The fact remains that in the autumn of 1914 French opinion cordially but vaguely attributed to England noble preoccupations with honour and justice, and instinctively rejoiced to think that the Entente was complete. But presently followed the revelation that our ways were not as their ways, and there rose an undercurrent of suspicion: —'Les Anglais ne font ' donc rien ? ' people in Paris whispered to one another. The character of the effort of Great Britain, the methods necessary to British action, were unknown to the mass of Frenchmen, because unintelligible to them in their detail.

This discomforting condition—which affected, of course, only the civilian public, and not the Governments or the Armies—continued until comparatively late in 1915, up to which time no comprehensive or exact account of the British effort was published in France. One of the first, if not the very first, of those writers who have so generously and brilliantly illuminated the position of this country in the war was M. Henry D. Davray, who has been for many years past in the forefront of those French critics who have kept their readers accurately informed of the movement of current English literature. M. Davray came over to London, and studied the sentiment and action of our people with that intelligence for which a profound study of our language had prepared the way. The essays which he has now collected into his volume ' Chez les Anglais ' are not dated, and this is the only reproach which we have to bring against them. But the distinguished critic would probably reply that they were not written as history, but to supply such immediate information as was

needed to guide Parisian opinion. In that field they were admirably adapted to do good work.

The French conventional view about England is illustrated by several passages in the rhetorical prose-poem which M. Suarès has issued in an outburst of good nature and enthusiasm. 'Il faut te réveiller,' he shouts, 'car tu aimes tes aises, le 'congé après la tâche faite, et la grasse matinée.' If M. Suarès were not so tremendously pleased with us, we might be a little abashed at his reservations. 'Longtemps cruelle, tu 'hais la cruauté,' he exclaims, and Britannia, with her eyes cast down, blushes, and wonders what he means. Great dangers lie in ambush for authors of the rhetorical order, but M. Suarès is true at heart. 'Tu es Marthe, sage et forte 'Angleterre,' he says, 'et la France est Marie.' This is ingenious, and more agreeable to listen to than such very dubious compliments as 'Tu as le sang lourd, parfois; tu 'manges trop de chair, et ton ivresse est triste.' M. Suarès would heartily endorse the sarcasms of Lord Devonport about our meat-lunches and our afternoon teas. If, however, M. Suarès sometimes puts in his shades with rather a heavy hand, he can be charmingly sympathetic. This is delightfully put:

'Angleterre, notre sérieuse et loyale ennemie autrefois, à présent l'amie solide et loyale, sœur de lait et de peine plus qu'alliée, tu es celle pour qui l'affection ne pense plus à s'exprimer, tant est forte la confiance.'

He gives England full recognition for her loyalty in that, when she saw that poor servant of the Lord, the faithful Belgium, lying murdered at the door of France, she hesitated not a moment, but rushed, sword in hand, to punish the cursed Attila. M. Suarès, who is a fervent admirer of Lord Kitchener, paints a portrait of him in the Cubist manner, as 'le grand rectangle d'homme aux yeux magnétiques, une 'hache de silex, une frontière fichée droite devant l'ennemi.' But he challenges discussion when he declares, with his finger raised at England in a minatory 'Sache-le!' that she hesitated to come into the fight, and that France did not. Although M. Suarès' 'Angleterre' was not published until August of last year, its attitude is noticeably that of Paris before May 1915.

The articles which M. René Puaux has collected into the volume called 'L'Armée Anglaise sur le Continent, 1914–

'1915,' were composed with the special object of dispersing the mists of ignorance and prejudice which still distorted the vision of certain classes in France. The author is one of the most distinguished younger authorities on the art of war, and he holds a prominent position in Parisian journalism. M. Puaux has written copiously since the beginning of the war, but these particular articles appeared, as a series in 'Le Temps,' for the avowed purpose of proving to French critics the firm resolution of England to prosecute the struggle to the end with the fulness of her national energy. The author admits that the purely military co-operation of England in August 1914 was weak, but he insists that from the first it was far from negligible. He sets down a minute record of the movements of the British Expeditionary Army during the month of September of that year, and describes in very touching terms the fraternity between the British and their French comrades, when the latter made the surprising and poignant discovery, even in the moment of retreat, that 'ces stoïques garçons sont les 'frères des nôtres, ils ont le même cœur élargi de la même 'pensée.'

This brotherhood in arms, awakened during the actual battles of the Marne and the Yser, was not an ephemeral sentiment aroused by community of danger. It was the effect of the moral interpenetration of the two peoples, and of the reality of this fusion of heart all the later volumes on our list to-day give evidence. This may be summed up in the admirable words used by M. Cambon, so lately as the 8th of November 1916, in a speech which does not seem to have been preserved in this country, and of which therefore a fragment may be quoted here. The Ambassador remarked :

'Le cœur de tout soldat français est maintenant rempli de gratitude pour l'Angleterre. J'espère que ce sentiment se développera de plus en plus et survivra cette guerre terrible.'

It is the manifest conviction of M. René Puaux that it will do so, and he bases his belief on arguments which are logically and lucidly set forth in the chapter of his book which is entitled 'L'Amitié Française.' He closes his essay with an ancedote taken from his personal experience ; it is not to be read by an Englishman in these thrilling times without a sense of vivid sympathy :

' Le peuple anglais a pris contact avec le peuple français, . . . avec l'âme française. L'Angleterre a compris. J'ai eu peu d'émotion plus grande que celle qui m'étreignit lorsqu'une brigade de l'armée Kitchener nous fut présentée. Nous avions fait l'inspection de ces nouveaux arrivés, tous gaillards solides, d'une allure irréprochable, impassibles comme de vieux soldats, lorsque nous passions devant les files. Nous venions de rejoindre le pavillon planté en face de cette ligne imposante, quand le général commandant lança un ordre. Ces milliers de soldats retirèrent leur casquette, la mirent sur la pointe de leur baïonnette, et toute cette brigade, d'un élan magnifique, cria " Vive la France ! " Je songeais en quittant le terrain de la revue, alors qu'ils acclamaient encore ma patrie, au chemin parcouru, au travail qui s'était fait dans la conscience anglaise pour parvenir à ce résultat. C'est une des plus grandes leçons de cette guerre, une de celles qui font certainement réfléchir notre ennemi et détruisent le futile espoir qu'il caressa de nous désunir.'

With this fervent tribute from a youthful master of the military art we might compare, did space permit, the statement of a veteran, who is neither journalist nor politician, the most eminent naval engineer of France, Monsieur L. E. Bertin, who, in his address to the Five Academies of the Institute (on the 25th of October, 1916), devoted to the spirit and action of the British Fleet such a panegyric as probably no foreigner in his position has ever given before. These things are too rarely noted in the English press, in its importunate bustle of local interests, and it seems decent and due that some record should be made of them. It is not enough that France should learn to know us. We need to know France, its character, its turns of thought, its tenderness and loyalty, its moral magnificence.

In the first days of the war there was a general scepticism in France as to whether the English would arrive at all. The inhabitants of Boulogne shrugged their shoulders and said to one another ' Ils ne viendront pas.' On the 10th of August a motor-car full of British officers was seen coming from the harbour. It was a vision and a sensation, and the whole town burst into applause. What it represented, of course, was the general staff arriving to make the necessary preparations for disembarcation of the troops, but to the wrought nerves of the watchers in Boulogne it was like the first streak of light ' when the morning doth unfold.' M. Maurice Barrès, in his sympathetic account of the visit he paid to the British front, dwells upon the impression made on the French people

by the strange guests who rose out of the sea to help them. What the witnesses of this earliest arrival dwell upon is, first of all, the tranquillity of the English. There was no wish to produce an effect, no display of vanity. They did not boast, but they very quietly assured their friends in the Pas de Calais that they were not going to leave off till their work was done. 'Il faut aller jusqu'au bout.'

The works which we have quoted, and the majority of those which have appeared on this subject in Paris, confine themselves to a generous statement of the English effort, or illustrate it, as M. Philippe Millet does, by a variety of gratifying anecdotes. But there have been some which go deeper into the causes of the phenomenon, and endeavour to show not merely what has happened, but why it has happened. Among these are to be mentioned 'L'Angleterre et la Guerre,' by M. Cestre, a professor at the University of Bordeaux, and 'L'Empire Britannique 'et la Guerre Européenne,' by M. J. M. Crazannes, who is well acquainted with England and a careful student of the English press. These works are well informed, and they carry out their aim of illuminating the immense effort which has been made by the British nation. From each of these volumes the French reader who does not read English may obtain a more or less exact impression of the progress of events, and their utility is not to be questioned. We do not, however, recommend them to the English reader, because there is scarcely anything in them, except a cordial enthusiasm, which is not familiar to him already.

Now that much is said about the propriety of bringing French and English literature more closely into mutual relation, it becomes necessary to distinguish between a mechanical transference of data and opinion from one language to another, and a philosophical treatment of those data in the light of a distinct national training. We see it in the treatment of *belles lettres*. A young Englishman haunts the boulevards, and contributes to an English journal views which literally reproduce two or three shades of opinion held by one particular group or newspaper. He may do this with agility and skill, but the result has no real critical value. It does not give the impression which a cultivated English mind ought to receive amongst exotic manifestations, but it simply transfers bodily to an English medium a local and unrelated

French prejudice. On the other hand, an examination of foreign poems, novels, or essays, which is introduced by a wide knowledge of English literature, and is the result of long thought on home lines, may be very valuable. It may positively enrich our general conception of the work of imagination under notice, by illuminating new facets of it, and exposing it to a different critical light.

Very peculiar gifts are needed for a sympathetic criticism of this kind, and among those who have written about the effort of England in this war there is perhaps but one man who has exhibited them to a really brilliant degree. Most of the volumes published during this struggle are doomed by their essential character to make the most of an ephemeral existence. But the volume by M. Chevrillon is an exception ; whatever is neglected by the impatience of future readers, his book must continue to be studied, for it is a work of permanent importance. M. Chevrillon is far better acquainted with the conditions of the British Empire than, we will not say most Frenchmen, but even most Englishmen. So long ago as 1891, his book on India revealed a remarkable knowledge of the East. He has written on the age of Sydney Smith ; he is the author of a subtle monograph on the thought of Ruskin ; his 'Études Anglaises,' followed by 'Nouvelles 'Études Anglaises,' have proved him a past-master in all our national modes of thought. The great war has called his thoughts back from India ('Sanctuaires et Paysages d'Asie ') to a contemplation of the monstrous struggle in the West, and it is only natural that it is the part taken in it by Great Britain which rivets his attention.

He is ready to admit, in accordance with the general feeling of his countrymen at the time, that from a purely military point of view it may be regrettable that the army of Lord French did not arrive forty-eight hours sooner than it did. But the issue would probably have been in no wise different, the Germans having planned so long before, and with a disproportion of forces so enormous, their crushing stroke. And in our very hesitation M. Chevrillon finds evidence of the innocence and patience of our people, which could not persuade itself to believe in the treachery of the enemy. He dwells, with great ingenuity, on the part which the English conscience played in the crisis. Although Great Britain had not been

willing, from an honourable scruple, to arm herself sufficiently to fight, yet, when the necessity came, she scarcely hesitated in the performance of her duty, pausing only just long enough to become persuaded that the horrible act of treason had been committed, that the 'scrap of paper' which she regarded as a sacred bond had been torn into shreds to serve a selfish ambition. And, following out this thought, M. Chevrillon has some reflections which are of great importance, and anticipate the view which history will take of the English action :

'Par une ironie des choses et à la stupeur des Allemands, c'est justement la conscience anglaise qui jette l'Angleterre, ignorante encore de la haine et de la convoitise qui la guettent, à la lutte que son seul tort est de n'avoir jamais préparée ; c'est elle qui, parlant à des millions de jeunes hommes, va susciter une armée volontaire et de l'ordre continental, rassembler le pays dans une volonté toujours accrue de résistance et de victoire, improviser l'impossible, et, réparant de plus en plus vite les fautes accumulées du passé, décupler pour les Alliés la valeur de l'appoint anglais. Et c'est ainsi cette conscience qui va sauver l'Angleterre.'

M. Chevrillon is a close and acute student of the English temperament, of that *âme anglaise* which has puzzled so many Continental observers by its apparent contradictions. We doubt whether any foreign writer has in recent times analysed with such brilliant success as he the elements which go to the formation of our political and intellectual conduct. He notes that the sentiment of danger is needed to rouse England into the frame of mind which induces her to shake off her ancient habits and her secular prejudices, and that this sentiment arises in us very slowly. It is difficult, to a degree highly puzzling to the more alert French mind, to disturb the conviction of security which laps the English nation round like a coverlet of down. The peoples of the Continent have something of the wary disquiet of wild animals, haunting a forest where other animals as wild as they prowl in the darkness. They all keep one another wide awake, but England, in the remoteness of her seas—'attentive et riche en bons calculs,' as M. Suarès says—thinks that as everything has always turned out for the best at last, so it is bound to do again, and yet again. She is like a domestic animal, grown a little somnolent by successive generations of safety.

Upon this M. Chevrillon has some observations which are well worthy of attention. He says that for England—and for

England alone among the belligerent nations—pessimism is patriotism. He records the stupefaction of France in learning that during the first six months of the war large sections of the daily press in England competed with one another in enumerating the strength, the organisation, the formidable effort of the Germans. He says, not without humour, that the ineffable Sven Hedin himself did not celebrate the resources, the confidence, and the energy of the Central Powers with so much unction as did certain London journals. What he does not say, but what was obvious to anyone examining French opinion a year ago, is that our friends in Paris were greatly disturbed and seriously troubled by the apparent attitude of the English newspapers. It was actually suggested that these constant wailings of journalistic pessimism could only be paid for by Germany ; and so, in any other country but England, they must have been. In particular, a series of articles which appeared in the London press in July 1915, on the superior organisation of Germany, were read by such of our allies in France and Italy as chanced upon them, with stupefaction. The press censorship in those countries would not have lost a moment in suppressing them, and in inquiring into the antecedents of the writer. But, as M. Chevrillon shrewdly recognises, their appearance in the English press was perfectly consistent with the nature of our people, since, in England, ' le pessimisme ' est le patriotisme.'

The gradual awakening of the British Empire to the terrific nature of the struggle in which she and her Allies are involved was brought about, in M. Chevrillon's opinion, largely by the action of pessimistic criticism. He records his impression that methods which would have paralysed the force and alienated the sympathy of other countries were positively needed to rouse our national temper, and especially to break down our extraordinary tradition of ' le système du petit ' bonheur,' muddling along because everything is sure to turn out right in the end. There was, to the foreign eye, an aspect of levity in English home methods which contrasted violently with the simple seriousness of our soldiers on the front. This is especially true of the first six months of 1915, when it was very difficult for our Allies to comprehend our attitude. It was a common thing then to hear French people complain of the English ' ils ne sont pas sérieux,' and Paris

was scandalised by anecdotes about football and afternoon tea in the trenches.

M. Chevrillon discusses with courage and perspicacity what has been called 'the football phase of 1915.' That close association of games with all the serious responsibilities of life, which is to foreigners a most bewildering phenomenon of the modern British character, did very much at the beginning of the war to breed suspicion between the French and ourselves. To the French, with their bitter passion for the soil, with their conviction that military glory is too serious a thing for humour, the sort of 'playing fields of Eton' tradition among our young officers was highly distasteful. 'Ils sem-'blent considérer la guerre comme une partie de football,' the French soldiers murmured, and the passion of our men for this particular game gave an offence to the French which we were slow even to perceive. A ridiculous anecdote, invented by some London journalist, to the effect that the Highlanders went into the battle of Loos kicking a football in front of them, created quite a scandal of indignation in Paris, of which, by the way, our own people remained blissfully ignorant.

Into this question of the relation of sport to the British character M. Chevrillon has entered with great intelligence and penetration. He finds himself in the presence of a phenomenon unknown to the rest of Europe, and produced by certain phases of English individualism which require, and from him obtain, long and sympathetic examination. But he believes that the war will produce a very radical change in this order of our ideas. We began the war with the sentiment on our lips and in our hearts that 'both sides must play the game.' It was from our national sports, to which he admits that he thinks we have been too rigorously and too superstitiously addicted, that we took the terms and symbols of our manner of fighting. Two rules of 'playing the game' were, to respect the adversary, and to bear with good-humour the chance of being beaten by him. It was in this spirit—too naïvely, perhaps, inspired by cricket and polo—that we started the action of the Expeditionary Force. Our first experiences of the Germans in Belgium, our disasters at Mons and Le Cateau, were insufficient to disturb the tradition. But gradually it was borne in upon these brave and simple-hearted men that war

with Germany was not 'une partie de football,' and the English soldier became unwillingly convinced that his adversary had not the slightest intention of 'playing the game.' And then an immense change came over the English, a change which automatically brought them into moral line with the French. They experienced, what the Greek poet describes, the

> 'anger which, far sweeter than trickling drops of honey,
> Rises in the bosom of a man like smoke.'

The geographical causes which affect the intelligence of different nations were discussed long ago by Diderot, in his curious observations on 'L'Homme' of Helvetius. Diderot observed that if a witty man can be made perfectly stupid by a cold in his head, or if a dull man talks brilliantly in the delirium of fever, those who study mentality ought to take into consideration such matters as differences of temperature and division of light and darkness, in their effect upon the intellectual habits of a race. He says that if climate and food affect the body we have every reason to expect to find them affecting the brain. We do not know whether M. Chevrillon had Diderot's argument in his mind when he wrote his extremely ingenious and spirited pages on the strange reluctance of the English to accept any form of intellectual discipline. It was not easy for a foreigner to address himself to this rather painful subject without seeming disagreeable, but the good faith of M. Chevrillon and his complete enthusiasm for the character of the British nation are so patent that it would be foolish to take offence. First of all, he defines what we may all agree to discover amongst our neighbours:

> 'Rien de comparable à ce grand public intellectuel de Paris qui, sans dépasser un certain niveau, puisqu'il n'est, en somme, formé ni d'artistes créateurs, ni de penseurs véritables, puisqu'il n'est qu'une moyenne, peut parler de tout, juge, discute, critique chaque production de l'art et de pensée, et, justement, parce que son opinion compte pour beaucoup, tend à les astreindre à ses propres goûts et habitudes, fait obstacle, souvent, à ce qui pourrait dépasser ses normes et critères.'

Then he observes, with amazement, that while other Continental capitals, in a less degree than Paris, but with a certain ambition in the same direction, possess each its

intellectual public, London not only possesses none, but in consequence of a racial dislike of ideas, and a persistent preference for physical over cerebral activity, positively discourages thought. He finds it the most extraordinary feature of our country that it deliberately—for, as he puts it, 'il ne 's'agit pas ici d'une incapacité, mais d'un parti pris social'—that it deliberately sets material things above pure intelligence and above knowledge. He gives a series of instances of this which have come within his experience. At Sandhurst a youth remarked to him, with complete complacency, 'I'm 'not good at exams.!'—a remark which to a French student would be like smilingly admitting 'I never clean my teeth!' At Cambridge a distinguished Hellenist (let the 'distinguished 'Hellenists' of Cambridge blush!) assured M. Chevrillon, as though it were a thing to be proud of, that he never read a book. This attitude towards mental application, which has been recently defined by one of our poets:

> 'Lo, everywhere the unplenished brain!
> Everywhere—dire as bondsman's chain,
> Or laws that crush, or creeds that blind—
> The leanness of the unnourished mind'

has always been characteristic of us, but had been growing before the outbreak of the war to a dangerous degree. M. Chevrillon may like to add to his anthology the following flower. A popular Cabinet Minister, approached on the subject of a modified Higher Education, stupefied his audience by suddenly replying 'Well, I'm a business man, and I can 'tell you I've found those the best workmen who can neither 'read nor write!' But the intellectual quality has never been part of the English ideal.

Nevertheless—and this is the paradox for those who are inclined to sacrifice everything to the pursuit of pure knowledge—this England of ours, which has such a contempt for 'intensive cultivation' of the mind, and which looks with suspicion upon all the intellectual organisation of the rest of Europe as mechanical and useless, has not ceased for five centuries to produce thinkers of a high order, great inventors, matchless poets, and persons of all species of talent, so that by the force of these individuals England has kept as high as France herself in the range of civilisation. But our benevolent and admiring French critic has to admit that we are, by our

popular and general indifference to and want of curiosity about ideas, placed at a great disadvantage in dealing with the German macrocosm, where each man is trained to occupy his exact place in a huge mental machine, which he and all his fellows alike regard with a fanatical satisfaction. The German cerebral effort is really an enormous enterprise in which, with a complete disregard of individual considerations, every citizen is proud to take his part. Naturally, this presents an opposition of the most formidable character to the individualism of England, always so loath to adapt itself to any kind of organisation.

But it must not be supposed that in recording, for wonder more than for blame, 'la parfaite indifférence anglaise aux 'symétries logiques,' M. Chevrillon despairs of our success or depreciates the immense value of our alliance. His admiration of our new army knows no bounds, and his tribute to its character is not the less welcome because the wording of it is so completely unlike what we are in the habit of listening to from our own panegyrists. This is how it struck our critic at the beginning of 1916 :

'Cette armée sans précédent a réussi à se rattacher à toute la vieille tradition militaire du pays, et à participer de son prestige. Elle est, cette armée, la plus pure émanation qui soit jamais sortie du profond de l'Angleterre. Tout l'essentiel de ce peuple s'y laisse reconnaître : habitudes et formes d'esprit, religion, éthique, idéal, consignes et conventions, préjugés sociaux, énergies et vertus. Avec le sentiment d'une opération toute spirituelle et presque mystérieuse, je regardais s'accomplir, à Londres, près du Guildhall ou de Westminster, l'incessant et profond travail qui, depuis quinze mois, se poursuit par toute l'Angleterre, et, de la foule, matière vague, amorphe de la nation, distille cette pure et claire quintessence.'

In May 1915 Frenchmen visiting this country were astonished that London felt no pressing sense of peril. In one form or another this surprise is expressed by all those guests who have published their records of that time. They were conscious of a strange fulness and accumulation of life and wealth ; they compared these things with the solemn silences of Paris, from which the mobilisation had pumped away, to use M. Chevrillon's striking image, all the streams of vital energy. London seemed to them a world apart, divided from the rest of Europe, actuated by ancient forms of elementary life which were quite

independent of outside influences and untouched by the great crisis. In face of the danger, in face of the tremendous sacrifice already made by France, Belgium, and Russia, England appeared radically undisturbed; everywhere the orderly arrangements of civic behaviour were continued. It is curious to note that this isolation, which many of us in England were already beginning to regard with rapidly increasing alarm, was on the whole pleasing to our visitors. Perhaps they looked deeper than our domestic critics did, and on the unperturbed activity of London they founded a confidence in the latent energy of the British Empire which calmed and reassured them. They admired, with generous effusion, the English tenacity, the English application to duty, the proud respect for recognised moral authority, the loyalty to ancient institutions; and they believed that these elements, developing slowly to a certain aim, would culminate in a collective force which would be at last irresistible.

It is manifest, from the testimony of all the friendly volumes before us, that it took some time for the general public in France to appreciate the harsh and silent rôle of the British navy in this war. M. Suarès has some generous strophes in praise of our fighting admirals; and he admits that English statesmen, and still more French ones, have not always understood the value and the quality of our sailors. He celebrates their virtues in glowing numbers, if, as we have ventured to whisper, in somewhat Cubist style. He gives us 'Jellicoë avec son 'profil en taille-vent' and 'Beatty au visage de goëland,' and he celebrates, as through a trumpet, the Battle of Jutland. This is how the panegyric of M. Suarès closes:

'Sois donc louée, Angleterre, en tes marins et tes soldats, en tes garçons rieurs et brusques, qui rougissent de mentir, et dans tes filles plus fraîches que ta rosée sur l'herbe de Windsor.

'Sois louée dans ta bataille et ta victoire, guerrière de la mer.

'Sois louée de ne nous avoir point déçus. Sois louée de nous aimer enfin, et d'avoir mérité que la France, plus belle dans son sang d'homme qu'en toutes les roses de sa gloire, t'aimât comme une sœur fidèle et te serrât sur son sein.'

It is no little thing to be thankful for that in the midst of these dreadful days France can speak to England in these ardent and vibrating accents.

It was in a very different mood that the writer of the 'Satyr

'against France' of 1690, composed when Trouville had just beaten the English navy off Beachy Head, asked in sarcasm the question:

"'When did we ever find in France a friend?'

The former Governor-General of Indo-China, and Minister of Marine in the Waldeck-Rousseau Cabinet, who has had unrivalled opportunities of comparing the influence of England with the intrigues of Germany in the East, sets about to answer this challenge gravely and in the affirmative. M. de Lanessan traces the relations of France and England from the fifteenth century down to the present day. He faces with courage and capacity the many delicate situations which such a survey presents to him, and it is with no accent of hesitation that he declares there do not exist, on the face of the globe, two nations better adapted, by geographical situation, by conditions of climate, or by national character, to live in harmony and sympathy than the French and the English. M. de Lanessan has the happy tact which enables him to touch the most sensitive scars without making his interlocutor wince. If he mentions Fashoda, it is only to compliment King Edward VII. and President Félix Faure on the adroitness of their diplomacy. He regards the naval war that closed in 1748 with the shattering of the French navy as a just chastisement for France, which had feebly encouraged Prussia and, by permitting the annexation of Silesia, had taken the first step towards creating the noxious and nefarious empire of Germany. We can never wish to find an advocate more indulgent to British policy than M. de Lanessan, who is even 'to our faults a little blind.'

The arguments by which M. de Lanessan meets the scepticism of those who, in England as well as in France, venture to doubt whether the warmth of the Entente will survive the proclamation of peace, are worthy of close attention. He holds that there is no doubt of its durability, because the populations of both countries comprehend at last that they are in sympathy with and require the support of one another. They complete, in their unison, a political corporation which, for the rest of time, must be the most liberal and the most enlightened, and also the most powerful in the world, and they have only to become convinced of their mutual dependence to accept, without reserve or suspicion, the theory of a close

perpetual alliance. The jealousies which have troubled their colonial and maritime relations in the past will be found on careful inspection to be groundless and almost silly. Looking back on history, each of the great fraternal Powers will wonder at the senselessness of the hostilities which have occasionally divided them. They will need to be united to resist the cupidities of brutal force, which we should be thinking too optimistically if we considered crushed for ever. France and England must stand side by side, alert and grave, watching over the welfare of mankind. 'Dans l'avenir,' to quote the fine phrase of M. de Lanessan, 'leur suprême honneur sera 'd'être les grandes ouvrières, sur tous les points du globe, de 'la civilisation et du progrès dans la liberté.'

The English reader rises from the perusal of these volumes on the effort of his race—composed, with varying degrees of knowledge but with a uniform benevolence, by a number of observant Frenchmen—more than ever impressed with a sense that what mainly strikes a foreigner in the contemplation of England is the spectacle of our irreducible individualism. In 1914 we were still what we had been in the days of the Roman poet, 'toto divisos orbe Britannos.' That acute cosmopolitan, the late Dutch novelist 'Maarten Maartens,' once remarked that if a man knew how to behave in one Continental capital he knew how to get on in all the rest, but it would give him no idea of how to live in London. The instinctive principle of self-government has been the force which has created our institutions; as M. Chevrillon puts it, we are all by instinct volunteers and yeomen. This individualism of ours made it very difficult for us to respond rapidly to the demand put upon our race at the beginning of the war. It was distasteful, it was almost impossible, for us to recognise that any circumstances could arise which might demand the compulsion of an Englishman's freedom of action. Our friends and allies gazed across the Channel in anxiety to see how we accepted the shock to our individualism. They said:

'Elle n'est pas, cette Angleterre, une personne mystique comme la sainte Russie, une idéale figure de mère, comme la France. C'est plutôt un vieux domaine héréditaire, chargé des reliques et souvenirs du passé, et dont chaque génération possède l'usufruit, le fonds appartenant d'avance à la génération suivante, comme les terres et les châteaux de l'aristocratie.'

A comprehension of this state of traditional feeling was needful to explain the apparent stiffening of the English people, at first, against any change in the national routine. 'Business as usual,' which so naïvely astonished our neighbours, was a gesture of self-protection on the part of our individualism, rudely disturbed by the unparalleled contingencies of the war. It was inevitable that England should awaken slowly, as she always does, from the dream of her secular isolation. With extreme satisfaction France watched the growth of moral anger in England, and several of the writers on our list confidently attribute this revolt of the conscience to the crime of the 'Lusitania.' Very gradually, England accepted the notion that she and her allies were fighting not so much for the safety of the soil, nor even for a democratic ideal of justice, but for liberty itself against an inhuman system of autocracy. The air-raids on Scarborough and Hartlepool, the poisoning of wells in South-West Africa, the cruelties in Belgium and French Flanders, all helped to disillusion the long-suffering conservatism of Great Britain, but it was the cowardly murder of women and children on the 'Lusitania' which finally roused the popular spirit of the English. For that reason, our French critics are unanimous in dating from May 1915 the genuine and final effort of British indignation. From that date onward France has fought at our side with unruffled confidence.

EDMUND GOSSE.

THE BIRTH-RATE

1. **The Declining Birth-Rate.** Report by the National Birth-Rate Commission. Chapman and Hall. 1916.
2. **The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct.** By A. SUTHERLAND. Longmans. 1898.
3. **Fruchtabtreibung und Präventivverkehr.** By M. HIRSCH. Würzburg. 1914.
4. **The Task of Social Hygiene.** By HAVELOCK ELLIS. Constable. 1912.

THE numbers of every species are determined, not by the procreative power of its members, which always greatly exceeds the capacity of the earth to support a progeny increasing in geometrical progression, but by two factors, the activity of its enemies and the available supply of food. Those species which survive owe their success in the struggle for existence mainly to one of two qualities, enormous fertility or parental care. The female cod spawns about 6,000,000 eggs at a time, of which at most one-third—perhaps much less—are afterwards fertilised, an infinitesimal proportion of these escapes being devoured by fish or fowl. An insect-eating bird is said to require for its support about 250,000 insects a year, and the number of such birds must amount to thousands of millions. As a rule there is a kind of equilibrium between the forces of destruction and of reproduction. If a species is nearly exterminated by its enemies, those enemies lose their food-supply and perish themselves. In some sheltered spot the survivors of the victims remain and increase till they begin to send out colonies again. In some species, such as the mice in La Plata, and the beasts and birds which devour them, there is an alternation of increase and decrease, to be accounted for in this way. But permanent disturbances of equilibrium sometimes occur. The rabbit in Australia, having found a virgin soil, multiplied for some time almost up to the limit of its natural fertility and is firmly established on that continent. The brown rat has exterminated our indigenous black rat, and the Maori rat in New Zealand.

The microbe of the terrible disease which the crews of Columbus brought back to Europe, after causing a devastating epidemic at the end of the fifteenth century, established a kind of *modus vivendi* with its hosts, and has remained as a permanent scourge in Europe. Other microbes, like those of cholera and plague, emigrate from the lands where they are epidemic, like a horde of Tartars, and after slaying all who are susceptible disappear from inanition. The draining of the fens has driven the anopheles mosquito from England, and our countrymen no longer suffer from 'ague.' Cleanlier habits are banishing the louse and its accompaniment typhus fever.

Fertility and care for offspring seem as a rule to vary inversely. The latter is the path of biological progress, and is characteristic of all viviparous animals. That any degree of parental attention is incompatible with the immense fecundity of the lower organisms needs no demonstration. Such fertility is not necessary to keep up the numbers of the higher species, which find abundant food in the swarming progeny of the lower types, and are not themselves exposed to wholesale slaughter. Speaking of fishes, Sutherland says :

'Of species that exhibit no sort of parental care, the average of forty-nine gives 1,040,000 eggs to a female each year ; while among those which make nests or any apology for nests the number is only about 10,000. Among those which have any protective tricks, such as carrying the eggs in pouches or attached to the body, or in the mouth, the average number is under 1000 ; while among those whose care takes the form of uterine or quasi-uterine gestation which brings the young into the world alive, an average of 56 eggs is quite sufficient.'

Man is no exception to these laws. His evolution has been steadily in the direction of diminishing fertility and increasing parental care. This does not necessarily imply that the modern European loves his children better than the savage loves his. It is grim necessity, not natural affection, which determines the treatment of children by their parents over a great part of the world, and through the greater part of human history. The homeless hunters, who represent the lowest stage of savagery, are now almost extinct. In these tribes the woman has to follow the man, carrying her baby. Under such conditions the chances of rearing a large family are small indeed. Very different is the life of the grassland nomads,

who roam over the Arabian plateau and the steppes of Central Asia. These tribes, who really live as the parasites of their flocks and herds, depending on them entirely for subsistence, often multiply rapidly. Their typical unit is the great patriarchal family, in which the *sheikh* may have scores of children by different mothers. These children soon begin to earn their keep, and are taken care of. If, however, the patriarch so chooses, Hagar with her child is cast adrift, to find her way back to her own people, if she can. The grasslands are usually almost as full as they can hold. A period of drought, or pressure by rivals, in former times sent a horde of these hardy shepherds on a raid into the nearest settled province; and if, like the Tartars, they were mounted, they usually killed, plundered, and conquered wherever they went, until the discovery of gunpowder saved civilisation from the recurrent peril of barbarian inroads. Barbarians of another type, hunters with fixed homes, seldom increase rapidly, partly because the dangers of forest-life for young children are much greater than on the steppe.

In the primitive river-valley civilisations, such as Egypt and Babylonia, the conditions of increase were so favourable that a dense population soon began to press upon the means of subsistence. In Egypt the remedy was a centralised government which could undertake great irrigation works and intensive cultivation. In Babylonia, for the first time in history, foreign trade was made to support a larger population than the land itself could maintain. There was little or no infanticide in Babylonia, but the death-rate in these steaming alluvial plains has always been very high.

When we turn to poor and mountainous countries like Greece, the conditions are very different. It was an old belief among the Hellenes that in the days before the Trojan War 'the world was too full of people.' The increase was doubtless made possible by the trade which developed in the Minoan period, but the sources of food-supply were liable to be interfered with. Hence came the necessity for active colonisation, which lasted from the eighth to the sixth century B.C. This period of expansion came to an end when all the available sites were occupied. In the sixth century the Greeks found themselves headed off, in the west by Phœnicians and Etruscans, in the east by the Persian Empire. The problem

of over-population was again pressing upon them. Incessant civil wars between Hellenes kept the numbers down to some extent ; but Greek battles were not as a rule very bloody, and every healthy nation has a surprising capacity of making good the losses caused by war. The first effect of the check to emigration was that the old ideal of the 'self-sufficient life,' which meant the practice of mixed farming, had to be partially abandoned. The most flourishing States, and especially Athens, had to take to manufactures, which they exchanged for the food-products of the Balkan States and South Russia. The result was an increasing urbanisation, and a new population of free 'resident aliens.' Conservatives hated this change and wished to revive the old ideal of a small self-supporting State, with a maximum of 20,000 or 30,000 citizens. Plato, in his latest work, the 'Laws,' wishes his model city to be not too near the sea, the proximity of which 'fills the streets 'with merchants and shopkeepers, and begets dishonesty in 'the souls of men.' On the other side Isocrates, the most far-seeing of Athenian politicians, realised that the day of small city-states was over, and that the limited, 'self-sufficient' community would not long maintain its independence. He urged his countrymen to pursue a policy of peaceful penetration in Western Asia, as the Greeks were soon to do under the successors of Alexander. But the prejudice against industrialism was very strong. Greece in the fifth century remained a poor country ; her exports were not more than enough to pay for the food of her existing population ; and that population had to be artificially restricted. The Greeks were an exceptionally healthy and long-lived race ; their great men for the most part lived to ages which have no parallel until the nineteenth century. The infant death-rate from natural causes may have been rather high, as it is in modern Greece, but it was augmented by systematic infanticide. The Greek father had an absolute right to decide whether a new-comer was to be admitted to the family. In Ephesus alone of Greek cities a parent was compelled to prove that he was too poor to rear a child, before he was allowed to get rid of it.* Even Hesiod, centuries earlier, advises a father not to bring up more than one son, and daughters were sacrificed

* Myres, 'Eugenics Review,' April 1915.

more frequently than sons. The usual practice was to expose the infant in a jar; anyone who thought it worth while might rescue the baby and bring it up as a slave. But this was not often done. At Gela, in Sicily, there are 233 'potted' burials in an excavated graveyard, out of a total of 570.* The proportion of female infants exposed must have been very large. The evidence of literature is supported by such discoveries as that of the graveyard at Gela, and by such letters as this from a husband at Oxyrhynchus: 'When—'good luck to you—your child is born, if it is a male, let it 'live; if a female, expose it.' † Besides infanticide, abortion was freely practised, and without blame.‡ The Greek citizen married rather late; but as his bride was usually in her 'teens this would not affect the birth-rate. Nor need we attach much importance, as a factor in checking population, to the characteristic Greek vice, nor to prostitution, which throughout antiquity was incredibly cheap and visited by no physical penalty. As for slaves, Xenophon recommends that they should be allowed to have children as a reward for good conduct.§

A rapid decline in population set in under the successors of Alexander. Polybius ascribes it to selfishness and a high standard of comfort, which is doubtless true of the upper and middle classes; ** but the depopulation of rural Greece can hardly be so accounted for. Perhaps the forests were cut down, and the rainfall diminished. It was the general impression that the soil was far less productive than formerly. The decay of the Hellenic race was accelerated after the Roman conquest, until the old stock became almost extinct. This disappearance of the most gifted race that ever inhabited our planet is one of the strangest catastrophes of history,

* Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 'Kultur der Gegenwart,' 2, 4, 1.

† Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates all had three sons, and apparently no daughters.—Zimmern, 'The Greek Commonwealth,' p. 331.

‡ Cf. (e.g.) Plato, 'Theaetetus,' 149.

§ We may suppose that the disproportion of the sexes, caused by female infanticide, was about rectified by the deaths of males in battle and civic strife. We do not hear that the Greek had any difficulty in finding a wife.

** Families, he says, were limited to one or two, 'in order to leave these rich.'

and is full of warnings for the modern sociologist. Industrial slavery, indifference to parenthood, and addiction to club-life were certainly three of the main causes, unless we prefer to regard the two last as symptoms of hopelessness about the future.

The same disease fell upon Italy, and was coincident not with the murderous war against Hannibal and the subsequent campaigns, costly though they were, in Spain, Syria, and Macedonia, but with the Hellenisation of social life. Lucan, under Nero, complains that the towns have lost more than half their inhabitants, and that the country-side lies waste. Under Titus it was estimated that, whereas Italy under the Republic could raise nearly 800,000 soldiers, that number was now reduced by one-half. Marcus Aurelius planted a large tribe of Marcomanni on unoccupied land in Italy. In the fourth century Bologna, Modena, Piacenza, and many other towns in North Italy were in ruins. The land of the Volscians and Aequians, once densely populated, was a desert even in Livy's time. Samnium remained the wilderness that Sulla had left it ; and Apulia was a lonely sheep-walk.

The causes of this depopulation have been often discussed, both in antiquity and in our own day. Slavery, infanticide, celibacy, wars and massacres, large estates, and pestilence have all been named as causes ; but I am inclined to think that all these influences together are insufficient to account for so rapid a decline. The toll of war was lighter by far than in periods when the population was rising ; infectious disease (unless we suppose, as some have suggested, that malaria became for the first time endemic under the Roman domination) invaded the empire in occasional and destructive epidemics, but a healthy population recovers from pestilence, as from war, with great rapidity. The large grazing ranches displaced farms because corn-growing in Italy was unprofitable, but there was a large supply of grain from Sicily, Africa, and other districts. Slavery undoubtedly accounts for a great deal. This institution is excessively wasteful of human life ; it is never possible to keep up the numbers of slaves without slave-hunting in the countries from which they come. And we must remember that ancient civilisation was almost entirely urban. The barbarians found ample waste lands between the towns, which they did not as a rule care to

visit, probably because those who did so soon fell victims to microbic diseases.* The sanitary condition of ancient cities was better than in the Middle Ages; but the death-rate was probably too high to permit of any increase in the population. But after admitting that all these causes were operative, it may be that we shall be obliged to acknowledge also a psychological factor. If a nation has no hopes for the future, if it is even doubtful whether life is worth living, if it is disposed to withdraw from the struggle for existence and to meet the problems of life in a temper of passive resignation, it will not regard children as a heritage and gift that cometh from the Lord, but rather as an encumbrance. That such was the temper of the later Roman Empire may be gathered not only from the literature, which is singularly devoid of hopefulness and enterprise, but from the rapid spread of monasticism and eremitism in this period. The prevalence of this world-weariness of course needs explanation, and the cause is rather obscure. It does not seem to be connected with unfavourable external conditions, but rather with a racial exhaustion akin to senile decay in the individual. But there is no real analogy between the life of an individual and that of a nation, and it would be very rash to insist on the hypothesis of racial decay, which perhaps has no biological basis.

The influence of Christianity on population is very difficult to estimate. Nothing is more unscientific than to collect the ethical precepts and practices of nations which profess the Christian religion, and to label them as 'the results of 'Christianity.' The historian of religion would indeed be faced by a strange task if he were compelled to trace the moral ideals of Simeon Stylites and of Howard the philanthropist, of Francis of Assisi and Oliver Cromwell, of Thomas Aquinas and Thomas à Becket, to a common source. The only ethical and social principles which can properly be called Christian are those which can be proved to have their root in the teaching and example of the Founder of Christianity. But the Gospel of Christ was a product of Jewish soil. It

* Barbarians unaccustomed to city life cannot survive in European cities. Hence, while every Asiatic trade-centre has its native quarter, the negro and American Indian rapidly die of tuberculosis and other diseases in our cities.

is historically connected with the Jewish prophetic tradition, which it carried to its fullest development and presented in a universalised and spiritualised form. Its social teaching consists chiefly of general principles which have to be applied to conditions unlike those contemplated by its first disciples, who were under the influence of the apocalyptic expectations prevalent at the time. Jewish morality was in its origin the morality of a tribe of nomad Bedawi ; and we have seen that infant life is held sacred by these peoples. Marriage is regarded as a duty, and childlessness as a misfortune or a disgrace. The forward look, characteristic of the Hebrews from the first, made every Jew desirous to leave descendants who might witness happier times, and one of whom might even be the promised Deliverer of his people. No Hebrew of either sex was allowed to be a servant of vice ; abnormal practices, though screened by Canaanite religion, were far less common than in Greece or Italy. To this wholesome morality Christianity added the doctrines of the value, in the sight of God, of every human life, and of the sanctity of the body as the ' temple ' of God.' To the Pagans, the continence of the Christians was, next to their affection for each other, their most remarkable characteristic. From the first, the new religion set itself firmly against infanticide and abortion, and won one of its most signal moral triumphs in driving underground and greatly diminishing homosexual vices. Its encouragement of celibacy, especially for those who followed the ' religious ' vocation, was an offset to its healthy influence on family life, and ultimately, as Galton has shown, worked great mischief by sterilising for centuries many of the gentlest and noblest in each generation ; but this tendency was adventitious to Christianity, and would never have taken root on Palestinian soil. The cult of virginity has lasted on, with much else that belongs to the later Hellenistic age, in Catholicism.

In the Middle Ages the population question slumbered. The miserable chaos into which the old civilisation sank after the barbarian invasions, the orgies of massacre and plunder, the almost total oblivion of medical science, and the pestiferous condition of the medieval walled town, which could be smelt miles away, averted any risk of over-population. Families were very large, but the majority of the children died. Millions were swept away by the Black Death ; millions more by the

Crusades. Such books as that of Luchaire, on France in the reign of Philip Augustus, bring vividly before us the horrible condition of society in feudal times, and explain amply the sparsity of the population.

The early modern period contains another notable example of a sudden and unaccountable decline in population. The scene is Spain, which, after playing an active and very prominent part in the world's history, sank quickly into the lethargy from which it has never recovered. It may be noted that here, as in the case of Rome, the decay of population and energy followed a great influx of plundered wealth. On the other hand, the increase of population in our newly-planted North American colonies must have been phenomenal for two or three generations.

The enormous multiplication of the European races since the middle of the eighteenth century is a phenomenon quite unique in history, and never likely to be repeated.* It was rendered possible by the new labour-saving inventions which immensely increased the exports which could be exchanged for food, and by the opening up of vast new food-producing areas. The chief method by which the increase was effected, especially in the later period, has been the lengthening of human life by improved sanitation and medical science.† Since 1865 the average duration of life in England and Wales has been raised by a little more than one-third. Other European countries show the same ratio of improvement. This astonishing result, so little known and so seldom referred to, was bound to have a great effect on the birth-rate. So long as the swarming period continued at its height, a net annual increase of 15 or even 20 per thousand could be sustained; but the expansion of the European peoples has now passed its zenith, and a tendency to revert to more normal conditions is almost everywhere observable. One of the most advanced

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* The population of England and Wales is said to have been 4,800,000 in 1600, 6,000,000 in 1700, and 6,500,000 in 1750. It was 8,890,000 in 1801, 32,530,000 in 1901, and approximately 37,000,000 in 1914.

† Statistics are wanting for the early part of the industrial revolution, but my study of pedigrees leads me to think that the average duration of life was considerably increased in the eighteenth century.

nations, France, has already reached the equilibrium towards which other civilised nations are moving. The old-established families in the United States are believed to be actually dwindling.

The student of international vital statistics will be struck first by the very wide differences in the birth-rate of different countries. He will then notice that the more backward countries have on the whole a considerably higher birth-rate than the more advanced. Thirdly, he will observe the parallelism between the birth-rate and death-rate, which makes the net increase in countries with a high birth-rate very little larger than that of countries with a low birth-rate. The following figures will illustrate these points ; they are taken from the Registrar-General's Blue Book for 1912.

	Birth-Rate	Death-Rate	Net rate of increase
United Kingdom	23·9	13·8	10·1
Australia	28·7	11·2	17·5
Austria	31·3	20·5	10·8
Belgium	22·9	16·4	6·5
France	19·0	17·5	1·5
Germany	28·6	17·3	11·3
Italy	32·4	18·2	14·2
New Zealand	26·5	8·9	17·6
Norway	25·4	13·4	12·0
Roumania	43·4	22·9	20·5
Russia	44·0	28·9	15·1

It will be seen that Australia and New Zealand, with low birth-rates and the lowest death-rates in the world, increase more rapidly than Russia with an enormous birth-rate and proportionately high death-rate. No one can doubt that our colonies achieve their increase with far less friction and misery than the prolific but short-lived Slavs. Civilisation in a high form is incompatible with such conditions as these figures disclose in Russia. The figures for Egypt and India are similar to the Russian, but in India, which is overfull, the mortality is greater than even in Russia, and the same is true of China, in which we are told that seven out of ten children die in infancy. It has been suggested that the fairest measure of a country's well-being, as regards its actual vitality, is the square of the death-rate divided by the birth-rate. The order of descending well-being in Europe would, according to this test, be Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, England,

Scotland, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Austria, France, Spain.*

It is well known that a decline in the birth-rate set in about forty years ago in this country, and has gone on steadily ever since, till the fall now amounts to about one-third of the total births. It thus corresponds very nearly to the fall in the death-rate during the same period. It is also well known that this decline is not evenly distributed among different classes of the people. Until the decline began, large families were the rule in all classes, and the slightly larger families of the poor were compensated by their somewhat higher mortality. But since 1877 large families have become increasingly rare in the upper and middle classes, and among the skilled artisans. They are frequent in the thriftless ranks of unskilled labour, and in one section of well-paid workmen—the miners. The highest birth-rates at present are in the mining districts and in the slums. The lowest are in some of the learned professions. In the Rhondda Valley the birth-rate is still about forty, which is double the rate in the prosperous residential suburbs of London. In the seats of the textile industry the decline has been very severe, although wages are fairly good ; among the agricultural labourers the rate is also low. It will be found that in all trades where the women work for wages the birth-rate has fallen sharply ; the miner's wife does not earn money, and has therefore less inducement to restrict her family. In agricultural districts the housing difficulty is mainly responsible ; in the upper and middle classes the heavy expense of education and the burden of rates and taxes are probably the main reasons why larger families are not desired. Mr. and Mrs. Whetham† have found that, before 1870, 143 marriages of men whose names appear in ' Who's Who ' resulted in 743 children, an average of 5·2 each ; after 1870 the average is only 3·08. Celibacy also is commoner among the educated. ' From the reports issued by two Women's Colleges, it appears ' that, excluding those who have left college within three years ' or less, out of 3000 women only 22 per cent. have married, ' and the number of children born to each marriage is un- ' doubtedly very small.' The writers consider that this state

* Havelock Ellis, ' The Task of Social Hygiene,' p. 153.
† The Family and the Nation, p. 143.

of things is extremely dangerous for the country, inasmuch as we are now breeding mainly from our worst stocks (the feeble-minded are very prolific), while our best families are stationary or dwindling. Without denying the general truth of this pessimistic conclusion,* it may be pointed out that the miners are, physically at least, above the average of the whole population, and that the very low birth-rate of residential districts is partly due to the presence in large numbers of unmarried domestic servants. The death-rate of the slums is also very high.

The fears of the eugenist about the quality of the population are far more reasonable than the invectives of the fanatic about its defective quantity. Of the latter class we may say with Havelock Ellis that 'those who seek to restore the 'birth-rate of half a century ago are engaged in a task which 'would be criminal if it were not based on ignorance, and which 'is in any case fatuous.' And yet I hope to show before the close of this article that for two or three generations the British Empire could absorb a more rapid increase, and that the Government might with advantage stimulate this by schemes of colonisation. The lament of the eugenist resounds in all countries alike. The German complains that the Poles, whom he considers an inferior race, breed like rabbits, while the gifted exponents of *Kultur* only breed like hares. The American is nervous about the numbers of the negro; he has more reason to be nervous about the fecundity of the Slav and South Italian immigrant. Everywhere the tendency is for the superior stock to dwindle till it becomes a small aristocracy. The Americans of British descent are threatened with this fate. Pride and a high standard of living are not biological virtues. The man who earns little and spends less is the ultimate inheritor of the earth. I know of no instance in history in which a ruling race has not ultimately been ousted or absorbed by its subjects. Complete extermination or expropriation is the only successful method of conquest. The Anglo-Saxon race has thus established itself in the greater

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* The births per 1000 married men under 55 in the different classes are:—Upper and middle class, 119; Intermediate, 132; Skilled workmen, 153; Intermediate, 158; Unskilled workmen, 213.

part of Britain, and in Australasia. In North America it has destroyed the Indian hunter, who could not be used for industrial purposes; but the temptation to exploit the negro and the lower European races was too strong to be resisted, and Nature's heaviest penalty is now being exacted against the descendants of our sturdy colonists. We did not lose America in the eighteenth century; we are losing it now. As for South Africa, the Kaffir can live like a gentleman (according to his own ideas) on six months' ill-paid work every year; the Englishman finds an income of £200 too small. There is only one end to this kind of colonisation. The danger at home is that the larger part of the population is now beginning to insist upon a scale of remuneration and a standard of comfort which are incompatible with any survival-value. We all wish to be privileged aristocrats, with no serfs to work for us. Dame Nature cares nothing for the babble of politicians and trade-union regulations. She says to us what Plotinus, in a remarkable passage, makes her say: 'You should not ask 'questions; you should try to understand. *I am not in the 'habit of talking.'* In Nature's school it is a word and a blow, and the blow first. Before the close of this article I will return to the eugenic problem, and will consider whether anything can be done to solve it.

At the present time, when an apparently internecine conflict is raging between the British Empire and Germany, a more detailed comparison of the vital statistics of the two countries will be read with interest. In England and Wales the birth-rate culminated in 1876 at a little over 36, after slowly rising from 33 in 1850. From 1876 the line of decline is almost straight, down to the ante-war figure of about 24. In Prussia, owing partly to wars, the fluctuations have been violent. In 1850 the figure (omitting decimals) was 39; in 1855, 34; in 1859, 40; in 1871, 34; in 1875, nearly 41. From this date, as in England, the steady decline began. In 1907 the rate had fallen to 33; in 1913 (German Empire) to 27·5. Here we may notice the abnormally high rate in the years following the great war of 1870, a phenomenon which was marked also throughout Europe after the Napoleonic wars. We may also notice that the decline has been of late slightly more rapid in Germany, falling from a high birth-rate, than in England, where the maximum was never so high. Another

fact which comes out when the German figures are more carefully examined is that urbanisation in Germany has a sterilising effect which is not operative in England. Prinzing gives the comparative figures of *legitimate* fertility for Prussia as follows :

	1879–1882	1894–1897
Berlin	23·8	16·9*
Other great towns	26·7	23·5
Towns of 20,000 to 100,000	26·8	25·7
Small towns	27·8	25·9
Country districts	28·8	29·0

Now urbanisation is going on even more rapidly in Germany than in England. The death-rate in England and Wales rose from 21 in 1850 to 23·5 in 1854; after sharp fluctuations it reached 23·7 in 1864 ; since then it has declined to its present figure (in normal times) of 14. In Prussia, after the war of 1870 and the small-pox epidemic of 1871, there has been a steady fall from 26 to 17·3 (German Empire in 1911). The net increase is only slightly larger (in proportion to the population) in Germany than in England ; and the increase in our great colonies, especially in Australasia, is much higher than in Germany. There is therefore no reason to suppose that a rapid alteration is going on to our disadvantage.

It is widely believed that the Roman Catholic Church, by sternly forbidding the artificial limitation of families, is increasing its numbers at the expense of the non-Catholic populations. To some extent this is true. The Prussian figures for 1895–1900 give the number of children per marriage as :

Both parents Catholic	5
Both parents Protestant	4
Both parents Jews	3·7

An examination of the entries in 'Who's Who' gives about the same proportion for well-to-do families in England. The Catholic birth-rate of the Irish is nearly 40.† The French-Canadians are among the most prolific races in the world. On the other hand, their infant mortality is very high,

* It must be remembered that the illegitimate birth-rate in Berlin is scandalously high.

† The crude birth-rate of Ireland is wholly misleading, because so many young couples emigrate before the birth of their first child.

and it is said that French-Canadian parents take these losses philosophically. It is quite a different question whether it is ultimately to the advantage of a nation which desires to increase its numbers to profess the Roman Catholic religion. The high birth-rates are all in unprogressive Catholic populations. When a Catholic people begins to be educated, the priests apparently lose their influence upon the habits of the laity, and a rapid decline in the births at once sets in. The most advanced countries which did not accept the Reformation, France and Belgium, are precisely those in which parental prudence has been carried almost to excess. We must also remember that the Dutch Boers, who are Protestants, but who live under simple conditions not unlike those of the French-Canadians, are equally prolific, as were our own colonists in the United States before that country was industrialised. The advantages in numbers gained by Roman Catholicism are likely to be confined to half-empty countries, where there is really room for more citizens, and where social ambition and the love of comfort are the chief motives for restricting the family.

The population of a settled country cannot be increased at will; it depends on the supply of food. The choice is between a high birth-rate combined with a high death-rate, and a low birth-rate with a low death-rate. The great saving of life which has been effected during the last fifty years carries with it the necessity of restricting the births. The next question to be considered is how this restriction is to be brought about. The oldest methods are deliberate neglect and infanticide. In China, where authorities differ as to the extent to which female infants are exposed, the practice certainly prevails of feeding infants whom their mothers are unable to suckle on rice and water, which soon terminates their existence. Such methods would happily find no advocates in Europe. The very ancient art of procuring miscarriage is a criminal act in most civilised countries, but it is practised to an appalling extent. Hirsch, who quotes his authorities, estimates that 2,000,000 births are so prevented annually in the United States, 400,000 in Germany, 50,000 in Paris, and 19,000 in Lyons. In our own country it is exceedingly common in the northern towns, and attempts are now being made to prohibit the sale of certain preparations

of lead which are used for this purpose. Alike on grounds of public health and of morality, it is most desirable that this mischievous practice should be checked. Its great prevalence in the United States is to be attributed mainly to the drastic legislation in that country against the sale and use of preventives, to which many persons take objection on moral or æsthetic grounds, but which is surely on an entirely different level from the destruction of life that has already begun. The 'Comstock' legislation in America has done unmixed harm. It is worse than useless to try to put down by law a practice which a very large number of people believe to be innocent, and which must be left to the taste and conscience of the individual. To the present writer it seems a *pis aller* which high-minded married persons should avoid if they can practise self-restraint. Whatever injures the feeling of 'sanctification and honour' with which St. Paul bids us to regard these intimacies of life, whatever tends to profane or degrade the sacraments of wedded love, is so far an evil. But this is emphatically a matter in which every man and woman must judge for themselves, and must refrain from judging others. There is a considerable weight of moral authority against these practices, and to disregard authority in the sphere of morals is always dangerous. Those who justify them do so on utilitarian grounds, and can make out a very strong case. But might not the same arguments be used to cover other expedients, which do not commend themselves to any decent-minded persons? And may not even those who do not believe in divine promptings and inhibitions attach some value to the deep-seated racial instinct which shrouds these functions in awe and mystery? These are questions which must be considered before a decision is taken on a very complex and difficult problem of conduct.

In every modern civilised country population is restricted partly by the deliberate postponement of marriage. In many cases this does no harm whatever; but in many others it gravely diminishes the happiness of young people, and may even cause minor disturbances of health. Moreover, it would not be so widely adopted but for the tolerance, on the part of society, of the 'great social evil,' the opprobrium of our civilisation. In spite of the failure hitherto of priests, moralists, and legislators to root it out, and in spite of the acceptance

of it as inevitable by the majority of Continental opinion, I believe that this abomination will not long be tolerated by the conscience of the free and progressive nations. It is notorious that the whole body of women deeply resents the wrong and contumely done by it to their sex, and that, if democracy is to be a reality, the immolation of a considerable section of women drawn from the poorer classes cannot be suffered to continue. It is also plain to all who have examined the subject that the campaign against certain diseases, the malignity and wide diffusion of which are being more fully realised every year, cannot be successful through medical methods alone. If the institution in question were abolished, medical science would soon reduce these scourges to manageable limits, and might at last exterminate them altogether; but while it continues there is no hope of doing this. I believe then that the time will come when the trade in vice will cease; and if I am right, early marriages will become the rule in all classes. This will render the population question more acute, especially as the diseases which we hope to extirpate are the commonest cause both of sterility and of infant mortality. Under this pressure, we must expect to see preventive methods widely accepted as the least of unavoidable evils.

When we reflect on the whole problem in its widest aspects, we see that civilised humanity is confronted by a Choice of Hercules. On the one side, biological law seems to urge us forward to the struggle for existence and expansion. The nation in that case will have to be organised on the lines of greatest efficiency. A strong centralised government will occupy itself largely in preventing waste. All the resources of the nation must be used to the uttermost. Parks must be cut up into allotments; the unproductive labours of the scholar and thinker must be jealously controlled and limited. Inefficient citizens must be weeded out; wages must be low and hours of work long. Moreover, the State must be organised for war; for its neighbours, we must suppose, are following the same policy. Then the fierce extra-group competition must come to its logical arbitrament in a life and death struggle. And war between two over-peopled countries, for both of which more elbow-room is a vital necessity, must be a war of complete expropriation or extermination. It must

be so, for no other kind of war can achieve its object. The horrors of the present conflict will be as nothing compared with a struggle between two highly-organised State socialisms, each of which knows that it must either colonise the territory of the other or starve. It is idle to pretend that such a necessity will never arise. Another century of increase in Europe like that of the nineteenth century would bring it very near. If this policy is adopted, we shall see all the principal States organising themselves with a perfection far greater than that of Germany to-day, but taking German methods as their model; and the end will be the extermination of the looser organisations. Such a prospect may well fill us with horror; and it is terrible to find some of the ablest thinkers of Germany, such as Ernst Troeltsch, writing calm elegies over 'the death of Liberalism' and predicting the advent of an era of cut-throat international competition. Juvenal speaks of the folly of *propter vitam vivendi perdere causas*; and who would care to live in such a world? But does Nature care whether we enjoy our lives or not?

The other choice is that which France has made for herself; it is on the lines of Plato's ideal State. Each country is to be, as far as possible, self-sufficing. If it cannot grow sufficient food for itself, it must of course export its coal or its gold, or the products of its industry and ingenuity. But it must know approximately what 'the number of the State' (as Plato said) should be. It must limit its population to that number, and the limit will be fixed, not at the maximum number who can live there anyhow, but at the maximum number who can 'live well.' The object aimed at will not be constant expansion, but well-being. The energies liberated from the pitiless struggle for existence will be devoted to making social life wiser, happier, more harmonious and more beautiful. Have we any reason to hope that this policy is not contrary to the hard laws which Nature imposes on every species in the world?

In the first place, would such a State escape being devoured by some brutal 'expanding' neighbour? What would have happened to France if she had stood alone in this war? The danger is real; but we may answer that France, as a matter of fact, did not stand alone, because other nations thought her too precious to be sacrificed. And the completely organised

competitive State which I have imagined would be a far more unlovely place than Germany, and more unpleasant to live in. The spectacle of a saner and happier polity next door would break up the purely competitive State from within; the strain would be too great for human nature. We cannot argue confidently from the struggle for existence among the lower animals to our own species. For a long time past, human evolution has been directed, not to living anyhow, but to living in a certain way. We are guided by ideals for the future, by purposes which we clearly set before ourselves, in a way which is impossible to the brutes. These purposes are common to the large majority of men. No State can long maintain a rigid and oppressive organisation, except under the threat of danger; and a nation which aims only at perfecting its own culture is not dangerous to its neighbours. It is probable that without the supposed menace of another military Power on its eastern flank German militarism would have begun to crumble.

In the second place, would the absence of sharp competition within the group lead to racial degeneration? This is a difficult question to answer. Perhaps a diminution of pugnacity and of the means to gratify this instinct would not be a misfortune. But it is certainly true that, if the operation of natural selection is suspended, rational selection must take its place. Failing this, reversion to a lower type is inevitable. The infant science of eugenics will have much to say on this subject hereafter; at present we are only discovering how complex and obscure the laws of heredity are. The State of the future will have to step in to prevent the propagation of undesirable variations, whether physical or mental, and will doubtless find means to encourage the increase of families that are well endowed by Nature.

Thirdly, assuming that a nation as a whole prefers a policy of this kind, and aims at such an equilibrium of births and deaths as will set free the energies of the people for the higher objects of civilised life, how will it escape the cacogenic effects of family restriction in the better classes combined with reckless multiplication among the refuse which always exists in a large community? This is a problem which has not yet been solved. Public opinion is not ready for legislation against the multiplication of the unfit, and it is not easy to see what

form such legislation could take. Many of the very poor are not undesirable parents ; we must not confound economic prosperity with biological fitness. The 'submerged tenth' should be raised, if possible, into a condition of self-respect and responsibility ; and the upper and middle classes should simplify their habits so far as to make marriage and parenthood possible for the young professional man. Care should also be taken that taxation is so adjusted as not to penalise parenthood in the socially valuable middle class.

For some time to come we are likely to see, in all the leading nations, a restricted birth-rate, prompted by desire for social betterment, combined, however, with concessions to the rival policy of commercial expansion, growing numbers, and military preparation. The nations will not cease to fear and suspect each other in the twentieth century, and any one nation which chooses to be a nuisance to Europe will keep back the progress and happiness of the rest. The prospect is not very bright ; a too generous confidence might betray some nation into irretrievable disaster. But the bracing influence of national danger may perhaps be beneficial. For we have to remember the pitiable decay of the ancient classical civilisation, which was partly due, as we have found, to a desire for comfortable and easy living. A low birth-rate may indicate a tendency to withdraw from the struggle for existence, and to sacrifice the future to the present. There have been signs that many of our countrymen no longer think the strenuous life worth while ; part of our resentment against Germany resembles the annoyance of an old fashioned firm, disturbed in its comfortable security by the competition of a young and more vigorous rival. It is even suggested that after the war we should protect ourselves against German competition by tariff walls. This abandonment of the policy on which our prosperity is built would soon bring our over-populated island to ruin.

In conclusion, if we leave the distant future to fend for itself when the time comes, what should be our policy with regard to population for the next fifty years ? I am led to an opinion which may seem to run counter to the general purport of this article. For though the British Isles are even dangerously full, so that we are liable to be starved out if we lose the command of the sea, the British Empire is very far from being over-populated. In Canada and Australasia there is

probably room for nearly 200,000,000 people. These countries are remarkably healthy for Northern Europeans ; there is no reason why they should not be as rich and powerful as the United States are now. We hope that we have saved the Empire from German cupidity—for the time ; but we cannot tell how long we may be undisturbed. It would be criminal folly not to make the most of the respite granted us, to people our Dominions with our own stock, while yet there is time. This, however, cannot be done by casual and undirected emigration of the old kind. We need an Imperial Board of Emigration, the officials of which will work in co-operation with the Governments of our Dominions. These Governments, it may be presumed, will be anxious, after the war, to strengthen the colonies by increasing their population and developing their resources. They, like ourselves, have had a severe fright, and know that prompt action is necessary. Systematic plans of colonisation should be worked out, and emigrants drafted off to the Dominions as work can be found for them. Young women should be sent out in sufficient numbers to keep the sexes equal. We know now that our young people who emigrate are by no means lost to the Empire. The Dominions have shown that in time of need they are able and willing to defend the mother country with their full strength. Indeed, a young couple who emigrate are likely to be of more value to the Empire than if they had stayed at home ; and their chances of happiness are much increased if they find a home in a part of the world where more human beings are wanted. But without official advice and help emigration is difficult. Parents do not know where to send their sons, nor what training to give them. Mistakes are made, money is wasted, and bitter disappointment caused. All this may be obviated if the Government will take the matter up seriously. The real issue of this war is whether our great colonies are to continue British ; and the question will be decided not only on the field of battle, but by the action of our Government and people after peace is declared. The next fifty years will decide for all time whether those magnificent and still empty countries are to be the home of great nations speaking our language, carrying on our institutions, and valuing our traditions. When the future of our Dominions is secure, the part of England as a World-Power will have been played to a successful issue,

and we may be content with a position more consonant with the small area of these islands.

I believe, then, that if facilities for migration are given by Government action, it will be not only possible but desirable for the increase in our population to be maintained during the twentieth century. It is, of course, possible that chemical discoveries and other scientific improvements may greatly increase the yield of food from the soil, and that in this way the final limit to the population of the earth may be further off than now seems probable. But within a few centuries, at most, this limit must be reached; and after that we may hope that the world will agree to maintain an equilibrium between births and deaths, that being the most stable and the happiest condition in which human beings can live together.

W. R. Inge.

THE FUTURE OF ENGLISH RAILWAYS

THREE important countries, the United States, Canada, and India, are at this moment conducting official and exhaustive inquiries into the whole question of the relation of railways to public authority. Yet in no one of these three countries is the position so acute as here. We are admittedly in a condition of unstable equilibrium, but nothing is being done to decide when and how a stable equilibrium shall be restored. Our railways are at present being worked as agents of the State, under the orders of a Government Department, and at the costs and charges of the public exchequer. And this state of affairs is, nominally, so purely provisional that it might in theory be terminated at any moment on an Order in Council after only one week's notice. In practice it is universally admitted that a mere return to the *status quo ante bellum* is quite impossible.

Before proceeding farther it is well to give a brief account of what has actually happened. On the 5th of August, 1914, the Government, under the powers conferred by the Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871, took possession of all the railways in Great Britain—though not in Ireland—with negligible exceptions.* The management was handed over to an Executive Committee composed wholly of the General Managers of the principal companies. The nominal chairman is the President of the Board of Trade. The actual working head of the organisation is the Deputy Chairman, himself a General Manager. So far as can be judged from the outside, the Executive Committee, as was natural and probably in the main right, have refrained from trespassing collectively on the preserve previously belonging to each member of the Committee individually. They have, in fact, suggested to each General Manager how he can best employ his line in the general interest of the traffic of the country rather than given him positive instructions to do such and such things. And each General Manager naturally has felt that, while for the

* Irish railways were not taken over till Dec. 17th, 1916.

moment he was trustee for the nation at large, his permanent position was that of trustee for the company of which he was the responsible head. That this system has worked as well as it has is a tribute to the good sense and patriotism of the men who have worked it.

The financial bargain between the Treasury and the separate companies is, in its main outline and neglecting unnecessary detail, a singularly simple one. The Government guarantees to each separate company the same net revenue which it earned in the year 1913. As between the different companies, each company keeps all the money it takes. If, for example, a man books from Woolwich to Wick, the South-Eastern keeps the whole fare, and neither the North-Western, the Caledonian, nor the Highland receives any portion of it. Similarly, if the passenger on his return journey takes a ticket from Wick to Woolwich, it is the Highland Company that keeps the whole fare. Traffic carried on behalf of the Government, whether military or naval passengers, or goods or coal, is carried on warrant and no money passes at all. The natural result of this system is to upset altogether the previous standard of receipts. One company may do a great deal of work and get very little money, while another company may do comparatively little work and get much money. In the case given, for example, the North-Western Railway would do the bulk of the work and not receive one penny for it. Each company has, however, not only to meet its own working expenses, but also to have available at the end of the half-year the same amount of money as it had in the corresponding half of 1913 to meet its interest and dividend payments. Consequently some companies have balances to hand over to the Executive Committee, while other companies have to draw on the Committee to make up the deficiency. Looking at all the companies as one from the Treasury's point of view, it is evident that, if the gross receipts are equal to the expenses plus the guaranteed net revenue, the Treasury neither pays nor receives anything ; if the gross receipts are less than the sum of these amounts, public taxation has to make up the deficiency. If the gross receipts are more, the excess goes to the Treasury in relief of taxation.

As to what has actually happened, there is no public information available. Since 1913 the accounts of the companies

have been issued only in skeleton form. The Board of Trade Railway Returns, which in 1913 occupied 201 pages, are, for the year 1914, compressed into a single page. For 1915 nothing has yet been published. Why the figures, which must exist and have been printed for the use of the accountants and Treasury officials concerned, should not be made public, it is impossible to understand. It cannot be that information of use to the enemy would be disclosed. The French railways, including the Nord and the Est, the whole of whose systems are in the *zone des armées* except those portions which are actually in enemy occupation, continue to publish their reports as usual. Their expenditure is given under all its usual heads, and the receipts are duly classified under the heads of passengers, merchandise, military traffic, &c. But all the information vouchsafed by the Board of Trade is set out as follows:—'Total receipts, including miscellaneous net 'receipts, £139,098,000. Expenditure, £88,173,000. Net 'income, £50,925,000.' To the figure of the 'total receipts' a note is attached saying that it includes the 'estimated 'amount receivable by the companies in agreement with the 'Government in respect of the control of British Railways 'during the period from August 5th to December 31st.'

In the absence of official information we can do some guessing, probably sufficiently accurate for present purposes. For the first five months, during which there was a slump in trade, there must have been a considerable deficit to be met by the Treasury. Then, in 1915, trade rapidly improved. Big wages were earned by the working classes; and they travelled almost as freely as usual, not at the old cheap fares, with excursion and week-end tickets, but paying the full penny a mile. Moreover, the passenger services being much curtailed, the trains were very crowded; and no one needs to be told that it is more profitable to carry 180 passengers in one train than to run two trains carrying 100 each. In the early part of 1915 it was commonly understood that the Government had made a very good bargain; that the money received from the general public sufficed to cover the working expenses and to provide the guaranteed net income of the companies; so that in effect the Government was getting its vast military traffic carried practically for nothing.

Later the scene once more changed. Railway wages have always been on the low side, and just before the outbreak of war it looked as though strong measures would be taken by the staff to force a considerable increase all round. When the war began the men patriotically waived their claims. Then came the rise of prices, and their claims could not be put aside. Not only were the wages low, but railway men were not free, like the ordinary workman, to leave their job and go in quest of higher wages elsewhere. Quietly but firmly, the men's leaders demanded an increase; and a bonus of five shillings a week was granted to the great bulk of the staff. The cost of this increase may be put at £6,500,000 a year. Three-fourths of this sum was by agreement borne by the Treasury, the remaining fourth came off the net revenue of the companies. As a set-off, a large part of the wages of the men who had enlisted was saved. It may be assumed that from the end of 1915 there was a substantial deficit in the guaranteed net revenue which the Treasury had to make up.

The rise in food prices continued, and again, in September 1916, the railway staff claimed and secured a second five shillings a week. In this case the whole of the £6,500,000 per annum is being paid by the Treasury. To be on the safe side, let us assume that the whole additional cost is £12,000,000 a year. There can be little doubt that for the latter months of 1916, and thenceforward indefinitely for at least so long as the war lasts, the Treasury will have to meet a substantial deficit. Whether, even so, the Government has made a bad bargain, is a question that can only be answered by those who know what has been the amount of Government traffic passing without charge, and what the charges for it would have been, if the agreed rates, as they were before the war, had been paid or credited to the companies.

It is useless to speculate what further changes in the situation the progress of war may bring about. Let us see what would be the position, if, at the end of the war, the Government were to exercise its right to hand the railways back to the respective owning companies forthwith. As we have said, the war bonuses imply something like £12,000,000 per annum addition to the present wages bill. Moreover, many men who have enlisted and are now drawing pay from the army will, after the war, come back on to the railway pay roll. We

cannot, therefore, put the future additional charge at less than £12,000,000. Possibly, even probably, if the price of food falls abruptly, some portion of the war bonus may come off again; but no one can suppose that the average rate of wages will go down again to the pre-war figure. Assuming that in other respects the receipts from traffic and the expenses of working will revert to the pre-war figures—and this is not likely to be true, for additional cost of material will probably more than absorb any increase of traffic receipts—the companies will be faced with a net revenue reduced by at least £12,000,000 per annum. In the last year before the war the total sum paid in dividends on ordinary stocks was £17,700,000. Of course different companies will be differently affected, but, regarding the companies as a whole, it would appear that roughly three-fourths of the ordinary dividend has been swept away. It would evidently, therefore, be inconsistent with justice to the ordinary shareholders for the Government merely to hand back the railways and terminate their bargain. For, though nominally the increase of wages granted to the staff was the act of the railway managers, in fact the managers were only the agents of the Government, and public policy was the main ground of the sweeping concessions that were made.

There is another reason which makes it impossible for the Government to hand back the railways *sans phrase*. Goodwill is an important item in the value of every commercial concern, and it is certainly not less valuable than usual in railroad business Now the course of trade has been entirely upset by the war. Traffic is being carried over unaccustomed routes, to and from strange ports; and the selection of routes and inlets and outlets has been made, not by the trader influenced by the eloquence of a railway canvasser and the excellence of a company's service, but in conformity with the interest of the traffic as a whole, by the over-mastering authority of the railway Executive Committee and the Board of Admiralty. It is impossible that after the war traffic will resume its old channels; and yet one company has been exalted and another abased, not for any fault or virtue of its own, but by overruling necessity. And the State must in fairness take responsibility for its own action.

But while on the one hand the Government cannot leave

the shareholders to lie on the bed which it has itself made for them, on the other hand the Government cannot undertake permanently to guarantee the shareholders against a reduction of their former income. As matters stand, some £500,000,000 of ordinary stock, representing not expectations, not 'water,' but hard sovereigns honestly put into the concern, would be left earning income at the rate of about 1 per cent. per annum. The situation is extremely difficult, and it will have to be faced. Doubtless some politicians would be only too pleased for the Government to retain control of the railways after the war. The war has certainly accustomed us to the exercise of large and unquestioned powers by the Executive Government. But it would be a very serious matter indeed for the Government to assume a new liability of not less than £1,000,000,000, and place 600,000 voters upon the pay sheets of the national exchequer. It is eminently desirable, therefore, that the matter should be discussed betimes.

Even before the war, it was clear that the railway policy of this country was in a state of unstable equilibrium. Competition had practically ceased; and it was to competition that the English people had looked for two generations as the main regulative force. The three great companies between London and the North-East, the Great Northern, the Great Eastern, and the Great Central, had entered into a close alliance, and it was understood that the bulk of their traffic was pooled. To the West of them, three other great companies, the North-Western, the Midland, and the Lancashire and Yorkshire, were in the same case. The Scottish companies, too, were working in close combination. Alone of the great companies, the Great Western maintained its independence, though even the Great Western Railway had entered into agreements with the South-Western in respect of the traffic to Exeter and the South-West. There was a good deal of dissatisfaction in the ranks of the railway staff, as was very clearly shown by the great strike of 1911, which the Agadir crisis, followed by strong Government pressure, abruptly brought to an end. There was also a widespread feeling among the public that our railway management, as a whole, had fallen behind the times, and that far-reaching reform was necessary. Railway shareholders, who had seen the market quotations of their stocks

falling steadily but not slowly on a scale beyond that which the change in the market value of money could justify, were equally dissatisfied. Everybody agreed that something must be done.

A Royal Commission, constituted, contrary to most recent precedents, wholly without representation of the interest mainly affected, was appointed in October 1913 and at once proceeded to hear evidence. Many traders and manufacturers appeared as witnesses and recounted in appalling details scores of petty personal and local grievances. Indeed they planted so many trees, if indeed most of them should not rather be called saplings, that the chances of the Commission ever seeing the wood appeared small. At the outbreak of the war the Commission suspended its sittings, we may assume for good. For events since August 1914 have so entirely transformed the situation that it is quite impossible that matters can be taken up where they were before. We are confronted with a wholly new situation. On the one hand railways, after the war, will not be able to pay their way without higher rates; on the other, in the fierce struggle for business after the war manufacturers and traders will claim, and in some trades at least with justice, that they cannot hold their own in international markets without lower rates. The situation is serious, and it must be boldly faced. It cannot be dealt with except by radical reform of English railway methods. Let us see what a comparison with our three chief commercial rivals, Germany, France, and the United States, has to teach us.

It will be necessary to use figures, but while the figures for Germany, France, and the United States are accurate statistical calculations, the corresponding figures for this country will have to be guessed. The men who manage the English railways say, and the Board of Trade has hitherto been content to agree with them, that it is not necessary for the public, or even for themselves, to know what is the average rate charged for carrying a passenger or a ton of goods a mile; what is the average weight of goods conveyed in a truck or in a train; or what is the volume of traffic carried over a given line. Yet these are the figures by which in other countries railway men, as also the controlling public authority, and the outside critics financial and other, judge performances. In

order to make comparisons, it is necessary for us to guess as nearly as we can at the corresponding English figures. They will probably be correct within a margin of error of, say, 20 per cent. as a maximum.*

A word in passing about passenger traffic. Passengers are much less important than goods for two reasons. In the first place, passenger journeys are largely in the nature of luxuries. They represent in many cases an expense altogether avoidable, while in other cases, such as family holidays at the seaside or commercial travellers' journeys, they account for but a small percentage of the total outlay of the persons who pay for them. Goods rates, on the other hand, are a necessary addition to consumers' prices. Further, passenger receipts are always the smaller part of railway revenues. Even in England, where the proportion is higher than anywhere else, they amount to a good deal less than half : in France about three-sevenths ; in Germany not much more than one-third ; and in the United States only about a quarter. Now in an international comparison of passenger fares England comes out well. The average rate of charge for carrying a passenger a mile is, in round figures—in America 1*d.*, in France and Germany ½*d.*, and in England (probably) not more than three-fifths of a penny. The extra tenth of a penny by which England is in

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* Studying the Board of Trade Railway Returns and, judging by the only traffic figures given, the number of tons dealt with, one is led to believe that the North London Railway (14 miles in length) is a much more important carrier of goods than the London and Brighton, and is indeed more important than the South-Eastern and Chatham combined. Similarly one finds that the Taft Vale is a much more important carrier of coal than great systems like the Caledonian and the Great Northern. On the other hand, from the carriage of goods the North London only earned £174,000, while the London and Brighton earned £501,000, and the South-Eastern and Chatham £715,000. From the carriage of coal, the Taff Vale earned under £600,000, against £936,000 on the Caledonian and £1,280,000 on the Great Northern. What is the explanation ? Is it that the rates of the companies with the smaller volumes of traffic are much lower than those of the companies with the larger volumes of traffic ; or is it perchance that the companies with the larger systems normally carried their traffic for two or three times the distance ? The Board of Trade Returns, as also the accounts of the respective companies, give us no help in the solution of the problem.

excess of France and Germany can be fully justified by the superior quality of service given.*

Goods rates, however, are on a very different basis. In round figures, in the United States a ton is carried three miles for 1*d.*; in France or Germany three miles for 2*d.*; and in England three miles for (probably) 3½*d.* What is the explanation? It is not the 'waste of competition.' It is true there is no internal competition in France and Germany, though there is a good deal in the case of international traffic, but in America competition is far more keen and more ubiquitous than in this country. Nor is the explanation to be found, as is sometimes suggested, in the fact that the proportion of high-class traffic is larger in this country than elsewhere. The contrary is the case. The Board of Trade returns show that, out of 568,000,000 tons carried on our railways, coal alone accounted for 345,000,000 of tons, practically three-fifths; other minerals 102,000,000 tons; while 'general merchandise' was only 121,000,000—that is, about 22 per cent. of the total. In America the 'products of mines' of all kinds only amounted to about 56 per cent. of the traffic against the English 80 per cent. German coal traffic, again, amounted to only 33 per cent. of the total. The French statistics do not separate the figures, but notoriously French mineral traffic is a bagatelle compared with that of England.

One of the main causes of the larger average mileage rate in England—and it is a cause which must always remain—is the comparative shortness of the haul. The average ton in America is hauled about 150 miles, in France 78 miles, in Germany about 60 miles. In England the average haul is (probably) somewhere between 25 and 30 miles. Now, apart from the fact that, as every railway man knows, it is for various reasons cheaper to haul one ton 150 miles than to haul five tons for 30 miles, it is evident that the cost of constructing,

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* The figure given for English railways is based on several actual calculations that have been made of particular railways for short periods. The common assumption that the average English fare is one penny per mile takes account of full fares only, and makes no allowance for the numerous dilutions of the penny fares due to the hundreds of millions of journeys taken by passengers who travel on season tickets, return tickets, week-end tickets, excursion tickets, workmen's tickets, &c., at fares often not more than one quarter or one-fifth of a penny per mile.

equipping, and working the stations and yards, and loading and unloading the traffic at each end, is precisely the same, whether the traffic travels 30 or 150 miles between its points of origin and destination. But in the one case these terminal costs have to be covered by the rate for 30 miles; in the other case they can be spread out five times as thin over the whole 150 miles. Let us take an actual instance and see how it works. From London to Tring is 30 miles. The maximum rate which the North-Western Railway is allowed by statute to charge for Class C traffic, which includes grain and other important staple commodities, is 6*s.* 11*d.*; and this is probably just about the sum which the company does actually charge. The charge is made up of 2*s.* 8*d.* 'statutory maximum 'terminals' and 4*s.* 3*d.* 'statutory maximum for conveyance.' The total amounts to 83 pence, which, for 30 miles, is approximately 2·8 pence per mile. Now suppose that the traffic was carried 150 miles, and that the same conveyance rate was charged (which in practice it would not be, as the rate per mile always decreases as the mileage increases), the conveyance rate would then be five times 4*s.* 3*d.*, or 21*s.* 3*d.*; and adding 2*s.* 8*d.* as before for terminal charges, we should have a total rate of 23*s.* 11*d.*, which is equal to 1·9 pence per mile against 2·8 pence. This single instance sufficiently shows the important effect of length of haul on the average rate, and proves that English rates can never be brought down to the level of Continental countries. English traders, however, can console themselves by the fact that it is better for them to pay 2·8 pence a mile for 30 miles than 1·9 pence a mile for 150 miles.

Length of haul may then justify a higher rate in England than in the rival countries; but it cannot explain rates double those of France and Germany and three-and-a-half times those out of which the United States railways make a living. And here we come to the root of the matter. We can only approach the standard of rates charged in other countries when we approach their methods of doing the business. And this in England means nothing less than a railway revolution. Everybody has heard American visitors express their amused surprise at our toy trains. Most people have seen goods trains in France and Germany and have noticed that their length is very different from what we are accustomed to at home. Many people have seen the enormous American freight trains

with their never-ending procession of colossal cars. But the average English trader who still consigns his traffic by the hundredweight would probably be startled to learn that trains with 4000 tons of net load are not uncommon in the United States, and that one single modern American coal car carries a load much heavier than that of an entire English goods train. American rates have only been made possible by American methods—the largest possible cars, loaded to the fullest possible extent, put together in the longest possible train that the most powerful possible engine can draw. Thirty years ago the average American car only held some 15 or 20 tons, and the average train load was somewhere about 170 tons. To-day the smallest car built can carry 40 tons, while the largest will take 100; and the train load has gone up to 500 tons. Simultaneously the rate, which even in those days was only ½*d.*, has dropped by 33 per cent., with the wonderful result that, taking the average of all traffic, the railways make a profit on carrying three tons for 1*d.* a mile; while individual coal lines, such as the Norfolk and Western, are rich beyond the dreams of avarice as the result of carrying five to six tons for 1*d.*

The average load conveyed in an American freight car is about 22 tons. Prussia has not revolutionised its methods like America, but it makes full use of its small old-fashioned equipment. The Prussian system of rates penalises small senders so heavily that fully 95 per cent. of the total traffic is sent in full truck-loads. The average capacity of a Prussian truck is 12 tons, and the average load is 75 per cent. of the normal capacity. But the Prussian train-load is only 246 tons, or half that of America; and the Prussian ton-mile rate, largely because the train-load is so small, is double the American.

What the corresponding figures for England are it is difficult even to guess. The English truck is supposed to hold ten tons. It is safe to say that the normal load of merchandise which it carries is not more than 25 per cent. of the nominal capacity, while, if anyone were to assert that the average English goods train—for coal traffic not even a guess is possible—carries as much as 70 tons, he would probably be guilty of considerable exaggeration.

We can never get serious reduction in goods rates in this

country until we have much better truck-loads and much better train-loads. To carry such a reform into effect means nothing short of a revolution. The essence of the English system has been small consignments and rapid delivery. If traders want cheap rates, they must abandon their belief that a railroad is only a glorified carrier's cart. They must consign in large quantities, and they must be content to allow two or three days for the goods to reach their destination, instead of expecting them to arrive next morning. Nor is this all. Goods-sheds and goods-yards, and traders' private sidings, and colliery-screens and shunting-necks, and turn-tables, and so forth, will have to be altered and reconstructed all over the country. It will cost a good deal of money, and involve a great deal of disturbance ; but it will be abundantly worth while. Yet it can only be done if there is a strong compelling force behind the movement.

To expect the separate companies to do it on their own account is out of the question. A reform of this kind can only be carried through as a whole. A single general manager who lagged behind the rest and failed to give whole-hearted and energetic support to the movement, still more a manager who deliberately set out to obtain traffic from his rivals by falling in with the natural desire of the traders to be allowed to keep to the old methods, would suffice to block the whole scheme. There would be companies, too, who would lack the financial strength to fit their lines to cope with the new conditions. From this point of view alone it is clear that the thing can only be done by the railways organised as a combined system. But there is more than this. If the companies were bold enough to attempt so drastic a change unsupported and on their own account they would certainly fail, and be forced to surrender to the opposition of the traders and their vested interests. There may have been a time in the dark ages of railway history when what is called the 'railway interest' had a powerful influence in Parliament. But nowadays, as recent history has abundantly shown, the railways are powerless to contend against the influence of Chambers of Commerce and other similar organisations in the press and in Parliament. If our antiquated and extravagant methods are to be modernised, the active support of the Government is absolutely essential.

There is more than this. We have on the railways of this country about 600,000 or 700,000 private coal wagons, belonging partly to the colliery companies, and partly to coal merchants. Conceive what this means. A train of fifty trucks starts for London from some gathering-ground in Derbyshire or Yorkshire. When it gets to London it has to be sorted for a dozen different local distributing points; then the wagons have to be sorted again to go back each to their own colliery to be reloaded, though the wagons making up the train are practically identical, and any wagon of the lot would do as well as any other, if only it happened to have the right name painted on it. The waste, in blocked lines and sidings, in extra shunting, in empty running, is simply appalling. And it is no small additional point that, speaking broadly, private owners' wagons are less well maintained than those belonging to the railway companies, and consequently break down much more frequently, not often causing but always risking serious accidents, and resulting in numerous obstructions to the rest of the traffic on the running lines. Here again the companies are powerless, unless the Government supports them. The coal-owner has a statutory right to run his own trucks; and though it may not be in the general interest of all the coal-owners that each owner should continue to do so, it is distinctly in the interest of each individual coal-owner to do so while his neighbour does it, and still more if his neighbour does not. For thereby he not only advertises his own business, but secures, when trade is brisk and trucks are at a premium, that at least his own trucks are available for his own exclusive service.

The pages of this review are not a suitable place to discuss in detail the economies that might be effected by insisting on consigning in bulk and on the abolition of private wagons. It is safe to say that no one who knows the facts will doubt that a good many millions might be saved. It should be added that it is not only operating expenses that would be reduced; there would also be an immense saving in future capital outlay. The operating units on a railway are the truck and the train. Nowadays we are hardly likely to build new railways to any great extent. The new capital goes into widenings of existing lines, construction of relief lines and sidings, and the enlargement of terminals. A full truck with

ten tons in it takes no more room in a shunting-yard than a truck with two tons in it. A train of twenty trucks occupies a whole block section, and a train of eighty trucks occupies no more. If we were to double the load per truck we should halve the number of trucks that have to be accommodated in shunting-yards and sidings. If we could double the load of a train, we should halve the number of trains, and there would be little need to talk any more of widened and relief lines till the indefinite future.

There is another matter that must be faced by the Government before the railways are handed back. Competition, as has been said, is for all practical purposes dead. Combination and agreement have taken its place. And this being so, two things follow. Some of us may

> . . . 'grieve that e'en the shade
> Of that which once was great has passed away';

but at least let us not pretend that the shadow is the substance, and let us do away with the shadow. And secondly, let us appreciate the self-evident truth that a system of State regulation which sufficed when the main regulative force was that of competition will not suffice for the control of a non-competitive system, and let us act accordingly. To the new system of regulation required we must return later on. Meanwhile a word as to the meaning of the words 'abolition of 'competition.'

France has never allowed competition. From the beginning of railway history France has been divided into six districts, each the monopoly of a single company. Five of the districts radiate from Paris; the sixth, the Midi, is in the far south and south-west. If we are to secure the advantages in economy and simplicity which the abolition of competition ought to bring, we must follow the French example. Great Britain lends itself excellently, from a geographical point of view, to a similar system of districting. There would naturally be, radiating from London, a south-eastern system composed of the South-Eastern and Chatham with the addition of the Brighton Company; and an enlarged Great Western absorbing the South-Western and serving the whole of the South-West and West of England and Wales as far north as a line drawn roughly from London to Shrewsbury. The North-Western,

Midland, and Lancashire and Yorkshire combination would take everything else west of a line drawn from London through Manchester to Carlisle. The Great Northern, Great Central, and Great Eastern united would cover the rest of England as far north as the line of the Humber ; while the North-Eastern would practically keep the same territory as at present. The five Scotch companies would be combined in a single system. Of course the far-stretching antennæ of some of the existing companies would have to be cut off. The North-Western, for instance, and the Midland, would release their hold on Cardiff and Swansea ; and the joint line of the Midland and Great Northern would cease to compete with their partner, the Great Eastern, for traffic to Yarmouth and Cromer. Further, the small companies which still remain as *enclaves* in the territory of their great neighbours, the Cambrian, the North Staffordshire, the Hull and Barnsley, and a host of smaller fry, would have to be bought up outright and absorbed in the surrounding systems. And thereby the righteous soul of the railway reformer, who vexes himself from day to day because the directors' fees of some score boards of petty companies absorb perhaps £20,000 out of a total revenue of £140,000,000, would attain great peace.

All this, needless to say, would take time and imply much financial readjustment. There cannot be a better opportunity for carrying it out than a time when the old financial system is in abeyance, and when the shareholders are for the moment disinterested in the results of ordinary railway operations.

At this stage not a few readers will doubtless say :

> ' What is the use of making two bites at a cherry ? If the Government is to take the responsibility proposed ; if it is to carry the burden of substantial railway deficits for an indefinite number of years to come ; if it is to stand behind the companies in revolutionising all the methods of railway business ; if it is to undertake a complicated and difficult series of rearrangements and amalgamations, with all the readjustments of capital that this implies, is it not much simpler to take over the railways outright and work them as a State institution like the Post Office and the telegraphs and telephones ? '

Undoubtedly it is simpler. It is always simpler to cut a knot than to untie it. But when one comes to fastening up the parcel again and finds the string too short, one often

wishes that one had adopted the slower but in the end more satisfactory method.

It is impossible within the limits here available to discuss the *pros* and *cons* of State Ownership of Railways. Thirty-five years ago a famous Royal Commission in Italy exhaustively investigated the question. President Hadley,* of Yale, has summed up their conclusions in the following words :

'1. Most of the pleas for State management are based upon the idea that the State would perform many services much cheaper than they are performed by private companies. This is a mistake. The tendency is the other way. . . . The State is much more likely to attempt to tax industry than to foster it. . . .

2. State management is more costly than private management. . .

3. The political disadvantages would be very great. Politics would corrupt the railroad management, and the railroad management would corrupt politics.'

Much railway history has been made since 1881. Italy herself, having failed satisfactorily to adjust the relations between the railways and the State, in a fit of what might almost be called petulance, nationalised her railways in 1906. Switzerland has done the same. More recently the French Government has taken over the system of the Western Company. The State systems of Australasia and South Africa have greatly increased in importance. But an impartial study of the railway history, not only of the countries mentioned, but of State ownership all over the world, shows little to invalidate and much to confirm the conclusions of the Italian Commission.

One fact, and it is of vital importance, stands out pre-eminent. In every country with a democratic constitution 'politics corrupt the railroad management and the railroad 'management corrupts politics.' Everywhere wages are the sport of politics. They are regulated quite as much by the voting power of the employees as by their reasonable rights and their technical qualifications. Belgium offers a *locus classicus*. One fine day in June 1912 there were sent out by telephone from the cabinet of the Minister of Railways orders that a substantial advance in their wages was to be made to a large number of employees. The advance was antedated

* 'Railroad Transportation. Its History and its Laws.' By Arthur T. Hadley. New York ; Putnams. 1886. p. 228.

to the previous 1st of January and was paid that very day. The following day the elections took place. The result, which had been regarded as doubtful, was that the ministerial majority was re-elected.

A matter which is if possible even more important is the business of fixing the railway charges. A large number of people argue that, because the State runs the Post Office, the telegraphs, and the telephones—though with very qualified success—it can therefore run the railways. This is a fundamental error. In the Post Office business there is no question of varying charges. The charge for a letter is one penny from Lombard Street to Charing Cross, and one penny from Land's End to John o' Groat's. Nor has anyone ever claimed that a universal provider sending out 100,000 circulars should have a reduction in the postage charged because of his wholesale quantity. But if the cost of a postage stamp were a serious amount, we may be very sure that long ago there would have been an irresistible demand for a tariff, varying according to distance, and differentiating between wholesale and retail consignments. And this is essential to railway working. The famous Prussian Finance Minister, von Miquel, did indeed declare that differential tariffs were inadmissible on a State railway system, and the Prussian rates are in a large measure based on this idea. But a sheer mileage tariff, charging forty times as much for 400 miles as for 10, is an impossibility in this country. It would divert the whole of the long-distance traffic to the coasting vessels, and bankrupt the railways. The whole trade of the country has grown up round a system of differential tariffs, taking account of quantity, trade conditions, competition between various points of origin and destination, and so forth. And not all the power of the Government would suffice to fit English trade into the Procrustean system under which the very modern commerce and industry of Prussia have grown up.

In fixing and adjusting differential tariffs a political minister would, by the law of his being, be inexorably bound to regard political considerations. In the words of an official memorandum presented to the Cape Government in 1907:

'influential persons . . . make representations to the ministerial head of the Government, supplemented by such pressure, political influence, or other means, as are considered perfectly legitimate in their way, and which are best qualified to attain the end the

applicants have in view. . . . It is by no means unknown for the requests to coincide somewhat with a critical division in Parliament, present or in prospect; or otherwise something has occurred which is regarded as irritating to the public or embarrassing to the Government; and the desire to minimise the effect by some conciliatory act is not unnatural. . . . The fictitious and often transitory importance which a community or district manages to acquire obscures the consideration of the railway and general interest of the whole.'

It is frequently said by advocates of State ownership that interference on political grounds can be got rid of by placing the actual management of the railways under the control of an independent or semi-independent Board of Commissioners to whom the power of fixing and altering rates would be entrusted. How impossible this is will be appreciated by anyone who reflects on the tendencies in our own parliamentary history. Even a humble body like the Road Board, entrusted with the prosaic task of subsidising road improvements of local authorities, which fixes no rates, and treads on no trader's personal toes, is attacked in the House of Commons year by year because it is not directly responsible to Parliament. Australasia has been dealing with this very question for the last thirty years. State after State has found that the politicians were running its railways upon the rocks; has set up a Commission as a shock-absorber between Parliament and the railways; and then pulled down the Commission again, or emasculated its powers, precisely because it displayed the independence which was the object of its creation. And indeed, in the nature of things, it cannot be otherwise. If the State owns the railways, the State must manage them in accordance with the public opinion of its citizens. And the constitutional organs for expressing that opinion are the Parliament which the people elect and the Minister who has the confidence of the Parliamentary majority. A rate-fixing despot, appointed for a fixed period to act in the light of his own expert knowledge, honesty, and intelligence, regardless of the wishes of the electors and their representatives, may be an ideal to dream of, but there is no place for him in a democratic Parliamentary system.

Such is, in the baldest outline, the case against State ownership. Of course the case has not here been proved. Within the limits of space available, it is only possible to make assertions, and to indicate the grounds on which these

assertions are based. After studying the available evidence with such impartiality as we are able to bring to bear upon it, it is our firm conviction that, while State ownership in some countries may answer, and in some may even be desirable, such a policy would be disastrous for this country. The railways would certainly corrupt politics, and politics would with equal certainty render impossible the efficient and economical management of the railways.

Nevertheless, it cannot for one moment be supposed that the State will make considerable financial sacrifices, and incur even larger financial liabilities in connexion with the railways, and then hand them back to the companies to manage, with the same large measure of irresponsibility which they enjoy at present. If the State is to nurse the companies back to financial prosperity, it must claim in return the right to obtain and retain the ultimate control over their broad policy. Railway history shows only one method in which the idea of giving the State responsibility for a general policy, while leaving to the companies full control of the normal conduct of the business, has been successfully worked out. The field of operation was, curiously enough, Mexico, a country not, perhaps, to be regarded as a pattern of organisation at the present moment. Before the Diaz régime collapsed, the Mexican railways had for a good many years been successfully managed under a system initiated by Mr. Limantour, the brilliantly able Finance Minister of the Republic. The Government was the majority stockholder in all the companies of any importance, with the single exception of the old original Mexican railway from Vera Cruz to the capital. The Government had obtained this position through the acquisition at a nominal figure of a sufficient amount of deferred ordinary stock to control the general meetings of the shareholders. This stock was issued to the Government in return for its guarantee of prior securities and for other substantial concessions. The directors were responsible for the management of the company, and were free to deal as they thought best in the interest of the shareholders with their staff and their customers, but subject always to this consideration—that, unless their policy ran broadly on lines of which the Government approved, the Government proxy would be used to turn them out of office at the next general meeting.

In practice the Government never appeared openly upon the scene at all. The directors were re-elected year after year very much as in any ordinary company. But we may assume that behind the scenes the representations of so important a shareholder received considerable attention.*

It is a far cry from Mexico to England; but it would not be the part of wisdom to say that, because a scheme has worked in Mexico, therefore it cannot work in England. Indeed there seems every reason to think that some such scheme might be profitably adopted here. That the railways must be partly controlled by the State we are all agreed. That State control from outside, through Parliament, the Board of Trade, and the Railway Commission, has not been very successful in the past is commonly admitted. In any case, it is inadequate under the new conditions that have now arisen. On the other hand, the objections to direct State operation under a Minister responsible to Parliament are most serious; and most devices for the interposition of a non-political buffer between Parliament and the railways have broken down under political pressure. The system of indirect control by the State acting as shareholder has not hitherto been tried in a democratic State. If the State, as in the Mexican example, owned more than half the shares, the directors would be in effect the nominees of the Government, and thus the evils of complete State control would arise afresh under another form. But it is open to question whether a plan could not be devised for giving the State some representation on the board of directors and some corresponding share in the profits of the concern without putting the Government in a position to enforce political methods of management.

This at least is certain. The railway problem is not the least important of the reconstruction problems that will have to be faced after the war, and it is high time that public attention should be directed to its solution.

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* This system is successfully applied in Germany to the management of the 'public utilities,' gas, electricity, tramways, and other similar public undertakings, in many of the great cities. The management is in the hands of a company in which the city is a large shareholder, and on whose Board the Corporation is represented by one or more directors.

ENGLISH BANKING

OF one effect of the war upon many of us there can be no doubt. Upon a somewhat uncritical community the critical spirit has descended. So far as this phase of mental activity has been well informed and judiciously employed it may be welcomed, but it is to be feared that the greater part of contemporary criticism is very badly informed and very injudiciously introduced. The amateur strategist in things naval and military, the amateur diplomatist, and the amateur financier are all very much in evidence, and were it not that they cancelled out one another's opinions they might be dangerous. Quiet folk go unconsidered in such times as these, but it is they rather than the critics who make the strength of a nation in time of war. It is a nice point how far a government is the better for a vigilant and outspoken criticism, but a daily dose of nagging, parliamentary and press, is an unmitigated evil. It is too often informed by ignorance and inspired by vanity.

It is not, however, governments only that suffer. We are all 'very conscious of one another's infirmities.' It is the fashion to find fault. In our present mood every interest, however legitimate, and every business, however well conducted, has its critics. The shipowner, the coal-owner, the wheat importer, the flour miller, and even the unfortunate butcher and baker are under the harrow. But the particular criticism with which the present article is concerned is the attack made upon English bankers on account of their alleged failure to assist traders, manufacturers, and farmers on the lines adopted by German bankers. To a small extent this criticism may be presumed also to apply to Scottish and Irish banks, but the main attack is directed against English and especially against London bankers.

Criticism, so far as it is just and discriminating, ought never to be resented, but much of the current criticism overlooks the most elementary considerations. It is therefore necessary to give some account of what English banking really is, and upon

what principles it is based. Of one thing the critics can be assured. To be adventurous is the easy thing, to be prudent the difficult.

English joint-stock banks have been established upon the principle of a comparatively small paid-up capital, the shares, however, bearing a large uncalled liability. Thus it is common to find bank shares of some such denomination as £50, with only some such proportion actually paid up as £10, the whole of the remaining balance of £40 being a liability of the shareholder upon which the depositor with the bank can count as a security for the repayment of the moneys he entrusts to its keeping. In addition to the capital paid up and this very large uncalled liability of the bank's shareholders, every bank of standing has kept back from time to time from the distribution of its profits considerable amounts in order to build up a reserve fund, not infrequently as large in total as the amount of its paid-up capital. This *security for the depositor* is the outstanding feature of the English joint-stock banking system.

But above and beyond this is the use to which the depositor's moneys are put. When it is considered that three English banks have deposits of well over £100,000,000 each, and two others of slightly under that figure, it will be seen that the employment of such moneys is a vital consideration, not only for the domestic management of the banking institutions themselves, not only—though this is the paramount consideration—for the due repayment, as and when required, of its depositors' moneys, but for the support of traders by way of accommodation. It is just as such support is wise and safe that it is justified from the point of view of the bank, of its depositors, of the traders to whom loans are given, and from the point of view of the general good of the community. These are the most elementary considerations—bankers, at least, have them ever in mind.

The criticism that has been directed against the management of English banks is not that they are insufficiently safe, but that they are too safe! In their conduct of their business—and by this is connoted their loanings to traders—they are said to have been too timid. A little more adventure would have been desirable. Now this may be a perfectly fair criticism. It is at least gratifying that the fault of the banks, if fault there be, is allowed to be on the side of care and

prudence ; but it may be admitted that even care and prudence can be carried to such lengths that they become a fault. It is the main object of this article to examine this particular charge.

There are two main trade divisions with which bankers are concerned, home and foreign. The nation's imports and the home trades are included in the first or 'home' division ; its exports in the second or 'foreign.' This is a very broad definition, and only accurate in a broad sense. A trader may, for instance, be both an importer and an exporter. A manufacturer may import as well as manufacturing and exporting. But for the most part, though with many exceptions, the importer, the manufacturer, and the exporter are different persons. The manufacturer, so far as he is engaged in the home trade, belongs, with the importer, to the home division ; so far as he is manufacturing for export he belongs, with the exporter, to the foreign division.

Let us deal firstly with the supposed failure of English banks to finance the exporter, for this has been made by many critics the gravamen of their charge. It is alleged that while the German banks have done everything necessary to support their nationals' export trades, similar business has been checked or prevented in this country by lack of banking facilities. Strange to say, this charge, though made in numberless newspaper and review articles, has never, so far as the present writer is aware, *been supported by any evidence whatsoever.* No individual, no firm, no joint-stock company, engaged in export trade, who may have required banking facilities and been refused, has ever brought forward a case in point. It may quite well be that such a case could be stated and even made good. Bankers are not infallible, and advances are sometimes refused, as they are sometimes given, unwisely. But it is significant that it is always as a general proposition, and not with the aid of specific evidence, that the charge is made. The charge, let it be said quite bluntly, is ludicrously untrue, and can be proved so. To justify this statement it is necessary to examine somewhat exhaustively what is done day by day, the year round, up to great amounts in total, in the precise business which, according to the accusation, is hindered by lack of banking support.

Our principal export trades are coal, cotton and woollen

goods, and hardware—the last a very inclusive title. We will first consider the case of exporters alone—that is, persons who buy these commodities in this country with the object of selling them abroad thereafter, often, of course, upon orders received. Firms and individuals in such export business range, as in all businesses, from wealth to very moderate means. But, none the less, banking accommodation may be required by all, at times and seasons, according to the magnitude of the trade undertaken. As purchases from the home manufacturer of the goods to be exported can be more profitably made for cash than for credit, it may pay an exporting house to employ its own capital in the first instance and in addition, if necessary, to borrow from its banker for the ready money to make such purchases. The proceeds of the sales, when received from abroad, eventually repay the bank advance and recoup the capital—in times of peace. This process applies both to the strong and to the less wealthy firms—accommodation being extended to both in their degree. More will be said upon this point later, as upon the very important considerations of the terms of sale and the status of the foreign buyer.

To take our first example, coal. As can be seen by the export figures of a normal year, say 1913, South Wales alone exported coal to the value approximately of £24,000,000. The principal purchasers were France, who took coal to the value of £5,796,000; South America, £4,704,000; Italy, £4,452,000. It is impossible, of course, to say to what extent these exports were financed by bankers, but it is certain that such finance was of large amount, for every bank in the ports of South Wales is giving accommodation daily for just such business. This is given in two main ways, among others. First, where the strength of the firm is great, the banker makes a loan without necessarily asking for the actual handing over to him of the shipping documents for the coal exported; secondly, where the capital of the exporting firm is only moderate, the lodgment of these documents is required. Alternative security may be tendered, in either instance, by the lodgment of other cover, such as debentures, guarantees, etc., but we are specially concerned, in explaining the *modus operandi* of financing exports, with those cases where bank advances for the coal sold abroad are made upon the direct security of the shipping documents—especially the outward bills of lading.

Bills of lading, as perhaps it is unnecessary to explain, are the shipowner's or shipmaster's receipt for the goods he has received and stored in his holds, and which he has undertaken to carry, in exchange for an agreed amount of freight money, to a certain destination—say a Brazilian port. Coal goes in large quantities to such destinations. The Brazilian Government for its railways, and private firms for their own needs or as distributors, import largely from South Wales. The South Wales shipper having paid for his coal, having secured shiproom for his cargo, and having duly received his receipt or bill of lading and arranged the appropriate insurance (if that has not been effected by the South American buyer), and, where necessary, having obtained certain consular and other certificates, attaches the whole of these documents, together with his invoice, to a draft drawn upon his foreign customer. With these documents in his hand he goes to his banker and applies for an advance of the money which he expects to receive, so that he may proceed at once to further buying and further exporting. As has been said, such advances are freely made. To give the further detail which is necessary if the whole process of such business is to be fully understood, it may be stated that the drafts upon the Brazilian coal importer are generally at ninety days' sight. This means that the importer does not pay for his coal cargo in cash, but undertakes to pay ninety days after his acceptance of the draft drawn upon him. Long before the ninety days expire the coal has been delivered, for upon the importer's acceptance of the draft the whole of the accompanying documents are given up to him, and by presenting them upon the arrival of the ship he is able to obtain immediate delivery of the coal. The documents which had been deposited with the English bank were promptly forwarded by that bank to its correspondent bank in Brazil, with instruction to surrender them against the acceptance of the draft. It will be seen that the English bank has parted both with the coal and with the documents. It trusts to the due payment of the Brazilian firm's acceptance at a future date for the means by which its advance is to be repaid. But suppose the Brazilian firm has met with misfortune and fails to meet its liability ; in that event the lending English bank has lost the material security of the coal cargo which has been sold and distributed and consumed long before the acceptance of

the draft has fallen due, and has nothing to show for its advance but a worthless piece of paper in its Brazilian agent's hands. The bank, in such case, has recourse to its customer, the exporter, to whom naturally responsibility attaches throughout. If the customer can bear the loss, the bank is repaid—if not, not.

In the case of cotton goods, the process is not dissimilar. There are the same documents, the same or very similar conditions of sale, but certain special features which should be noted. A Manchester shipper to India, Ceylon, and the Far East often, when buying cloth, has to seek bank accommodation to pay for it. But unlike coal, which is shipped as delivered, the cloth may be bought in its roughest form and will require to be bleached or printed. These processes require considerable time before the finished article can be shipped, a bill of lading be obtained, and a draft drawn and despatched by the lending bank to its Indian or Chinese or other Eastern correspondent for collection of the payment due. How then does the lending bank which has given the loan upon the grey cloth preserve to itself a lien thereon when, of necessity, the borrower has himself to part with the goods for bleaching or printing and, possibly, packing? In practice, a great amount of such advances is made upon the character and standing of the bank's customers until such time as the goods are actually shipped and the bills of lading obtained. In certain cases, what is termed an hypothecation of the rough material is required, and a charge is taken covering the goods from the time they are deposited with the bleachers until the shipping documents are obtained. This is believed to be valid without registration as a bill of sale, as all the time the goods are in the hands of third parties for the various treatments of the goods—a decision of the Courts in a well-known case having established the validity of the banker's lien in such circumstances. When, after such necessary delay, the shipment is in fact effected, there may be a very similar course of collection to that which has been described in connexion with coal exports. But there may be even more elastic terms granted by the shipper to his Eastern buyer, longer specified credit, and even credit for such unspecified time as may elapse until the importer shall himself have sold the goods, and received payment therefor. In such cases it may be stipulated that the goods shall be stored in

independent warehouses or 'godowns,' so that a check shall be kept upon their custody and sale.

Manchester has several strong and ably managed local banks, together with the branches of most of the great joint-stock banks whose head offices are in London, both alike thoroughly conversant with the whole course of such trade. Many millions of pounds provided by these banks are constantly employed in financing the great export cotton goods trade of Lancashire. Perhaps less care has been accorded by these banks in replying to anonymous complaints than may have been advisable. The first-hand knowledge of the immense amount that has been and is being done predisposes to a disinclination to discuss matters of which the complainants do not so much as know the first elements of the situation.

The woollen goods trade, largely centred in Bradford, supplies another striking example of the use of bankers' funds for the encouragement of foreign trade. Here, as in Manchester, several local banks, as well as the branches of the larger joint-stock banks, have financed a great volume of the export trade —much of it to Germany. A detailed account of the methods employed is hardly required. The general system will be understood from what has been said above, but probably in this trade a greater proportion of goods is sold without the drawing of drafts. 'Open account,' that is to say the sale of goods from (say) Yorkshire to Germany, for payment on certain specified dates, was common—and here, it will be noted, no tangible security (unless other cover were required and obtainable) could attach to bank advances. The goods passed, no acceptance was received, a lively expectation of the due receipt of proceeds on the prompt date alone remained. It is right to say that it was seldom disappointed. The European buyer paid promptly, for the shrewd Yorkshireman sold wisely. But to say that there was any hampering of the Yorkshire woollen trade by the withholding of banking facilities is simply untrue. If proof be required, it is to be seen in the large amount of German bills unpaid and open accounts undischarged when war broke out; both being in large measure still carried by bankers until such time as a settlement can be arranged.

The hardware trade, a description which includes a multitude of articles from costly machinery to the cheapest wares, is

carried on very largely in Birmingham and the Midlands as well, of course, as in countless places all over the country. In a trade with so many ramifications, it is impossible to indicate the many different courses and methods of foreign sales. The credit given may be long or short, bills may be drawn or open credit arranged, but in every kind of such trade the assistance of the banks is called for and freely given.

In taking the foregoing four leading examples of British export business, the methods by which they are carried through, and the extent of banking facilities extended, it is necessary not to overlook the almost countless varieties of other trades which are financed by means of banking moneys. One of the greatest is the export of raw materials. We have an enormous trade in unmanufactured jute, hemp, cotton, and wool. These commodities are either shipped to British ports and then re-shipped abroad, or are shipped direct from the port of origin to foreign ports. In both cases the financing of the trade is arranged in this country, as a direct consequence of the facilities given by English banks. The number and variety of our other export trades are legion. We send herrings to Russia, codfish to Spain, steel rails and rolling stock to half the world, needles and thread, mustard, biscuits and sauce, ploughs and traction engines, toast-racks and bedsteads, axes, tools and anvils, jewellery, timber, and a hundred other commodities to every part of the globe. Year in and year out British manufacturers and merchants and brokers are engaged in this multifarious and world-wide business, ever with the friendly co-operation of the bankers to whom they are known and by whom they are fully trusted. For if the banks are of use to their clients, it is equally true that the clients are of value to the banks—the service is mutual, and nothing is of greater satisfaction to both than the establishment of such connexions, resulting, in innumerable instances, in the building up of individual firms, of partnerships and limited companies from small beginnings to positions of financial strength and world-wide reputation.

Before leaving the subject of foreign trade, there is one important remark to be made which bears upon all that has been already said and which may have emerged from the particulars given. Foreign trade has its peculiar difficulties and dangers, and its finance requires care and foresight. The

cataclysm of war—universally overlooked prior to August 1914—the elementary considerations of honesty and ability to pay on the part of foreign buyers, the possibility of broken contracts and rejections, the length of credit, the intricate question of 'exchange,' and many other difficult problems must always be in the minds of exporters and no less of their bankers. Here are three or four instances of cases known to the writer, which are examples of what may easily occur in export business. It is not for a moment contended that they are other than exceptions, but they have their lesson and their warning.

A merchant, in a European country, ordered a quantity of nuts from an English fruit dealer and exporter at the price of £200. The parcel was shipped and duly arrived at the foreign port. The conditions of sale were 'cash against 'documents,' which means that the goods were to be paid for before delivery. The foreign merchant refused to pay, on the ground that, having sampled the nuts, he found they were largely bad. But he offered to buy at £100. The English exporter knew that his nuts were in good condition, but that the expense of bringing them back to England and the risks of his market might well result in an equal loss. He was only prevented from accepting the offer by a sense of resentment. Rather than submit to injustice he brought back his nuts, paying the return freight and insurance, and by good fortune succeeded in selling them in this country at a greater profit—even after two freights and other expenses had been incurred—than he would have obtained if the foreign buyer had made payment. The nuts were in perfect condition! In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred a considerable loss would have been made.

Another case, involving a much greater sum than the trifling sale price of the nuts, concerned coal cargoes. These were ordered for shipment abroad, and were so despatched and landed in the distant port. The foreign buyer repudiated his contract on the ground of quality. To engage shipping and bring back the cargo would have involved very heavy expense, and the seller determined to sell his coal by auction where it lay. The result of the auction (so called) was that the original buyer became the purchaser at a very much lower price than he had contracted to pay, his fellow coal merchants

conveniently standing aside from bidding—no doubt for a consideration.

A third case—all these three incidents occurred in European countries—illustrates the more or less unanticipated dangers which may accompany foreign trade. A cargo of timber shipped abroad arrived at its destination in advance of the bill of lading. The port authorities took charge of the cargo, and on the arrival of the delayed letter containing the bill of lading, less than a week late, claimed £5/600 for their trouble! This loss fell on the English shipper, by whom, admittedly, the documents should have been forwarded in time to meet the incoming cargo. But so monstrous a charge by the port authority for doing, in effect, just nothing, was equivalent to a 20 per cent. loss upon the price of the timber. This ridiculous charge was eventually halved as an 'act of grace,' but it turned the transaction from a small profit to a considerable loss. Nor was the fault, in fact, upon the part of the shipper. A delayed mail was the simple and unavoidable cause of the late arrival of the bill of lading.

The foreign trade of this country is vital to its welfare, and, difficulties and dangers notwithstanding, must be maintained. Its position is stronger than some of our newspaper critics imagine. For example, certain so-called 'captures' of our foreign business have been brought about by the deliberate refusal of our exporters to cut prices, and to extend the terms of credit in competition, say, with German firms. In this they were not remiss, as is so often complained. They were entirely right in refusing to take undue risks for the barest profit, and it is within the writer's knowledge that in granting such terms the German exporter lost money in the particular business so 'captured.' It is to be hoped that the English exporter will not undertake risky foreign business merely because the traders of other nations are foolish enough to do so. On the other hand, failure upon the part of our traders to meet the legitimate requirements of foreign buyers, by sending out intelligible price lists, by adapting the goods to the buyer's demands, and by the employment of thoroughly equipped agents and 'travellers,' may have had a distinctly adverse influence upon our foreign trade.

Though Scotch and Irish banks have not been specially named in connexion with the great trades specified above, it is

important to state that they are also doing their part equally with their English confrères. Glasgow and Belfast have not attained their greatness apart from foreign trade, and no traders and no bankers are at the same time more enterprising and more prudent.

Banking facilities are forthcoming in other quarters than these. The South African, Canadian, Australian, Eastern, and South American banks, with head offices or agencies in London, have an immense volume of foreign trade transactions—such business indeed being, unlike the foreign trade of the purely English banks, probably the chief part of their activities. The absurdity of the charge that any support is lacking to legitimate foreign commerce could in no way be more easily demonstrated than by the knowledge of the funds employed by these institutions in this precise direction. They, too, have the same knowledge of and interest in just such business, and, equipped as they are with their own foreign branches and their own very capable managers therein, compete not unsuccessfully with the joint-stock banks at home. So far from its being the case that the exporter cannot obtain adequate banking assistance, it were truer to say that there is keen competition among bankers to get his custom.

But even this is not the whole story. Beyond the ordinary bankers there is a great body of merchant bankers who undertake foreign business to an extent that can only be guessed, but which is certainly immense. This is not the place to explain the peculiar and vitally important business activities of the great Accepting Houses—or, more correctly, 'Merchant Bankers'—of the City of London. Perhaps no men have done more than they have to establish the wealth, the good repute, and the adaptability of London as the money centre of the world. Notably well informed, of large means, and of the highest integrity, through their hands largely has passed the finance not only of British export and import trades, but of the trades of the world. So much, indeed, was this the case that the outbreak of war necessarily inflicted a severe shock to an activity so far-flung and so delicately poised. In the opinion of the present writer, few things, if any, are more to be desired in the interests of this country's commerce than the unimpaired maintenance of those facilities for trade which the Accepting Houses of London were able to give, and skilled in

giving, in the days of peace. The bankers of England are of one mind in desiring that the useful activities of the Accepting Houses may continue and extend.

So far, then, as foreign trade is concerned, the above considerations show that English bankers have done their duty, and if any critics are unsatisfied they may fairly be asked to translate their complaints from the vague into the concrete.

The alleged inadequacy of the banking facilities for handling our home trade is, in the present writer's experience, a charge less frequently urged. It would, if true, be much more serious. If English banks could not, or would not, encourage home industries wherever such encouragement was legitimate, they would deserve the severest criticism and ought to be forced to amend their practice. But the worthy people who make this allegation seem to be labouring under the strange misconception that they are able, looking on from outside, to form a better judgment as to what banking accommodation should or should not be accorded to third parties than the bank managers, to whom the responsibility attaches for the decision given in each case. A specimen of this type of critic is furnished by the Major (retired) who, with true military intrepidity, wrote to the newspapers to say that there was no reason why any borrower from a bank should be charged more than 1 per cent. This naive proposal, if carried out, would enable us all to borrow from our bankers at 1 per cent. and invest in Government securities at $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and so increase our incomes to the extent of our borrowing facilities. There is also the entertaining 'Economist' who wants to enrich everybody by unlimited credit. Such critics need not be taken too seriously. But no banker who is worth his salt has any objection to criticism based upon knowledge and good judgment; such criticism is always valuable and welcome.

Have the banks, then, been remiss in supporting legitimate home industry? Have they, considering that the funds they employ are trust funds, been unduly timid in their use? Have they lacked knowledge of business considerations? The answer to these questions might be summed up in one comprehensive reply. *It is the experience of all banks that the number of their loan refusals is very small indeed in proportion*

to the number of their assents. Obviously this connotes as good judgment on the part of borrowers as, it is hoped, upon the part of the banker—but it is a very significant fact. An honoured banker, head of one of the greatest of the provincial banks, used to lay it down as a principle that a customer's application for accommodation should never be refused if at all reasonable. It is true that such a dictum might leave a pretty wide door of escape, but it was meant in the spirit as well as the letter. In effect, it was a truism. No banker lightly refuses a request for a loan. He is there to lend; unless he lends he can earn nothing; it is by lending wisely that he makes a profit. But judgment there must be, and somewhere and sometime, inevitably, a too large or too hazardous application meets with a refusal. A mythical hero of the banking world is said to have been able to produce the same grateful acquiescence by his negatives as by his affirmatives. One fears his secret has died with him, for few are the rejected applicants who concur in a refusal. This is only human, but not seldom has the would-be borrower had reason to be subsequently grateful that he was not assisted to embark upon a transaction which in retrospect he sees would have been unsound.

A complete examination of the monetary support given to our home trade would require the quotation of endless statistics. But let us instance a few of the great trades of the country and the methods of financing them. It has been shown how the cotton goods exporter is assisted; but before he appears on the scene the importer of the raw cotton from America, Brazil, Egypt, and India must be financed, and then, next in order, similar assistance must be given to the manufacturer in his mill. Cotton importing is a seasonal trade: that is to say, the produce is despatched from abroad and received in this country at certain seasons only, and not throughout the year. This connotes very large purchases during a few months for the whole year's stock, and involves a demand for large immediate advances repayable over a considerably extended period. Such requirements are met by bankers who accept drafts for, or advance cash to, their customers to enable them to make their heavy seasonal purchases. The customer's liability to the bank is discharged at leisure, as and when the produce is sold to and paid for by the spinner. He, in turn,

may require financing to enable him to buy the cotton and carry it until such time as he has been able to complete the conversion of the raw material into yarn or cloth and to sell it to a purchaser. Great sums of money are required for these purposes and are freely available. Our enormous imports of food—wheat, meat, bacon, fruit, etc.—also involve great monetary demands on the part of importers, and these demands are similarly met. No single article of our commerce, from hemp and jute to pepper and canary seed, from castor oil and rubber to fish and tinned peaches, is brought into this country without, in part, becoming the security for a bank advance. The writer of this article has financed the importers of and dealers in all of these things and a hundred others. Pulp, sugar, oils of every kind, fruit, timber (a great trade), wool, rum, wines, nitrates, furs—to what a length would the catalogue extend !

Follows the retailer. He too, in turn, requires his banker's aid to stock his warehouse or his shop. If he is honest and careful he is as readily helped as his larger neighbour, and here again it is well to remember how frequently such small traders have attained a high degree of prosperity by just such timely aid from their bankers. It can confidently be said that no trader of good repute, willing to disclose his whole position to his banker—'confidence for confidence'—is ever refused proper accommodation if his position is sound. Why, indeed, should he be ?

More important still stand the great manufacturing concerns of this country, large joint-stock companies, in many cases, turning out the steel, the rolling stock, the rails, the machinery, the tools, the ships, the metals, the chemicals, the foodstuffs of our gigantic home and foreign trade. They, too, at times, as is disclosed in their published balance sheets, obtain those banking facilities which no trade, however great and important, may not from time to time require. Such facilities are at their beck and call, for they are the strong ones of the earth, and bankers are eager to gratify their great requirements.

But the enumeration of these things grows tedious. Everywhere and always, where there are capacity, good repute, and a reasonably sound position, both the large and the small borrower are assured of banking support. The present writer

claims that he has written of his own knowledge and given real evidence. And he ventures to think that no criticism that is merely vague and general can stand against a careful and detailed presentment of the bankers' case.

What the policy of English bankers has effected in the late difficult days is known to all economists, and, we believe, to all thoughtful men of affairs. The locking up of funds supposed to be liquid inevitably brings its own nemesis, and it was well for this country, for its government, and for its business that English bankers had made it their practice to observe the old clear distinction between legitimate lending and the 'adventurous' banking advocated by outside critics.

A London Banker.

THE RE-EDUCATION OF DISABLED SOLDIERS

I

SINCE September 1914 men have been discharged from the army under a variety of formulae, but mainly for two reasons, either because they are 'physically unfit for 'further service,' or because they are 'unlikely to make efficient 'soldiers.' Unlike the casualties of previous wars, these men for the most part are not 'old soldiers,' with the military habit and the military mould of mind resulting from years of service; they are civilians drawn from every stratum of society and from every sort of occupation. Their military service has been an interlude, after which they will return to take up their interrupted tasks or to find other tasks more suited to their altered capacity.

In the meantime profound changes have taken place at home: the industrial world that they knew has changed and is changing. Industrial conditions, Mr. Lloyd George has told us, are in solution. For the moment the State is the great employer and abnormally high wages prevail in the 'unproductive' employment of munition making. In spite of the influx of women and juveniles into the labour market, there is abundance of employment for men, even though they may be lacking a sound man's full capacity. This condition is temporary, but while it lasts labour has a fictitious value and the partially disabled man is faced with a temptation to take what in another connexion is called 'blind alley' work at a good wage rather than to fit himself by training for a permanent occupation.

It is into this unreal industrial world that a steady stream of men of every degree of physical or mental disability is pouring. In no previous war has there been such an appalling variety of casualties, and this not only because of the vastly greater efficiency of the means employed to destroy life, but also because those means have been employed against men whose nerves and constitutions have not been hardened by years of preparation and familiarity with military machinery. We have thus, not only physical disabilities resulting from

bullet and bayonet, but the far more obscure though equally disabling effects of shell shock and nerve strain and gas poisoning. Trench warfare and exposure have led to much disablement from rheumatic, bronchial, and pulmonary complaints. Many men have broken down and been discharged during their period of training in this country, and though most of these doubtless may be expected to recover their full health, some at least must be placed among the disabled.

Of the men discharged through inability to become efficient soldiers, it may be said that probably most of them were never very efficient citizens. Without any definite disability, they are physically or mentally below par. They are among the great number of unskilled who have probably, as boys, gone into blind alley employment, and have reached manhood without training and without discipline. When trade is bad they are the unemployed, when trade is good they are casual labourers going from job to job, always the first to be put off and the last to be put on. We have been tempted to invent for them the term 'unemployable,' and to write them off as social failures for whom little or nothing can be done. In former times we have said 'if only these young 'men could be subjected to military training and discipline 'for a time and taught a trade they might be saved.' We are meeting them now, after a few months' training, still inefficient and not likely to make good soldiers. But it is by no means certain that with longer training for civil life they might not be made useful citizens. They are not, strictly speaking, 'disabled,' since they were never able, but through their enlistment in the army we have the very opportunity of training them that we so much desired. I shall return to this later.

The following table shows the civil occupations of 250 discharged soldiers on the books of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Help Society in a big industrial city in the north of England. All these men were discharged as physically unfit or as inefficient. The table indicates roughly the proportion of unskilled to skilled workers. Labourers must in general be taken to mean men with no trade and accustomed to more or less casual employment.

Labourers . . .	84	Agriculture, including gardeners, etc. . . .	18
Miners	30	Clerks, agents, and travellers	12

Skilled workers, engineering trades	39	Shop assistants	4
Skilled workers, building trades	23	Hawkers	3
Tailors and clothing trade	13	Seamen	6
Shoemakers and boot trade	10	Miscellaneous, including a dentist, a postman, a policeman, two waiters, and a hairdresser	8

Most of these men became personally known to me. A few of them were so disabled by wounds or disease that the question of employment did not arise. In the majority of cases the men had sufficient physical capacity for some form of useful employment, and of these it is safe to say that the greater number could have increased their capacity by training had greater facilities for training existed, and had the men themselves been willing. On the whole, however, the attempt to place the men to what seemed their own advantage was disappointing. There were two main causes of this.

The first was the uncertainty with regard to pensions. Men who had already been awarded a pension feared to take work lest they should lose it, or suffer a reduction to a lower rate on revision; men who had not received a pension were loth to relinquish their hope of getting one, and feared to weaken their claim by exhibiting earning capacity. The system of awarding pensions in accordance with an assumed loss of earning capacity was probably sufficient to account for this. It has recently been announced that this system is to be altered, and that in future pensions will be awarded irrespective of earning capacity. It is also to be hoped that a further alteration will remove the hiatus between the date of discharge and the pension award.

The second cause was the abnormal condition of the labour market referred to above. High wages could be earned in temporary employment, and the present gain was more acceptable than the offer of training for a more stable future.

As to these two main causes there seems to be no doubt whatever. Evidence from all over the country points the same way.

But this evidence refers in the main to men who have received their discharge and have returned to their homes only to enter upon a period of uncertainty. The extreme

pressure upon regimental paymasters resulted in frequent delay in settling a soldier's pay account. It was often not until weeks after discharge that a final settlement was made, and owing, doubtless, to some complexity in army accounts which baffled the civilian soldier, these final settlements were frequently disappointing—the expected arrears of pay dwindled to nothing, sometimes even to less than nothing, the account showing a debit against the soldier. There was often long delay before a man knew whether he was to get a pension or not, whether it would be permanent or temporary, and at what rate it would be assessed. In numbers of cases, also, the allowance for children was not at first included—papers had to be returned, and further delay occurred. That these difficulties were due to unprecedented pressure was not fully appreciated by men who suffered considerable hardship from them. In places where local representative committees, voluntary societies, and later the local committees under the Statutory War Pensions Committee were efficiently and sympathetically worked, these hardships were to a great extent removed. But here again there was an element of uncertainty, and in some places efficient committees were not promptly formed.

That the Government and the country have intended from the first to deal generously with the disabled is certain, but there has been an unfortunate hesitancy as to means and methods which has obscured this intention, and the resultant feeling on the part of the men has increased the difficulty of carrying the intention into effect. It is, perhaps, a truism to say that you cannot help a man unless he is willing to second your efforts with his own; you certainly cannot train him if he is unwilling to learn, and he will not be willing unless you first secure his trust and confidence, and make it perfectly clear that a definite responsibility is recognised for his re-instatement in civil life and for the adequate maintenance of himself and his family until he is able to earn sufficient for the purpose himself.

II

From the experience that has been gained during the past two years it is possible to suggest some general principles which should guide our attempt to fulfil this responsibility.

In the first place, the conclusions arrived at by Sir George Murray's Committee in May 1915 must emphatically be endorsed: that the care of the sailors and soldiers disabled in the war is a duty which should be assumed by the State, and that this duty should include:

(*a*) restoration to health where practicable;

(*b*) the provision of training facilities (if the disabled man desires to learn a new trade);

(*c*) the finding of employment for him when he stands in need of such assistance.

With regard to (*b*), I should be inclined to leave out the condition in brackets. For many reasons, some of which I have tried to indicate, the psychology of the returned soldier requires the most careful and sympathetic consideration. The desire to learn is frequently absent, and the stimulation of this desire must be part of the man's treatment. It is not enough to put before him an opportunity and leave him to take it or not, and this perhaps applies specially in cases where training is most necessary.

The principle of State responsibility does not exclude voluntary effort. On the contrary, the magnificent work which has already been done by voluntary organisations, to some of which I shall refer in detail later, deserves every encouragement and must continue. The objection to what is sometimes contemptuously termed 'charity' is valid only when charity is spasmodic and inefficient. The Royal National Lifeboat Institution is charity, but it is not alleged that either the heroic seamen who man the boats or the shipwrecked crews that are saved are humiliated by their connexion with a voluntary organisation. The disciplined mood or state of mind which is charity must indeed be the moving force of all our efforts to repair the broken lives of those who have given so much and fought so gallantly for us and for our country. But the State should assume the duty of co-ordinating these efforts, and including them all in one complete and comprehensive scheme. The second principle is that of continuity of treatment and control.

It would appear that in the men's own interests discharge from the forces should take place, not when they have been proved unfit for further military service, but when they have been made as fit as possible to resume civilian service. Some

measure of military discipline should accompany training, and should be regarded as a necessary part of the curative treatment.

I return here to a point made above. May we not take advantage of the opportunity which the patriotism of many and the conscription of some has given us, and attempt the training of the unable as well as of the disabled? These historic days call for wide thinking and for great measures. The old social problems—products of past errors—will recur sooner or later, and among them the problem of the unemployed and the unemployable will vex and perplex us again with its sordid accompaniments of want and demoralisation and 'relief.' Why not insist that *every* unskilled man about to be discharged as 'unfit' or 'inefficient' should be retained for a further period of discipline and special training in accordance with such aptitude or inclination as he possesses?

The third principle is that of recognition of individuality. Before a man can be re-started in life with any reasonable prospect of success, it is necessary to understand that he is not merely a discharged soldier but a complex of moods and characteristics which are as baffling and as contradictory as those of any other human being. The greatest care should be taken, therefore, to select a trade or a kind of training which is likely to suit the man. This will not necessarily be the trade he will choose when his suggestions are first invited. Many a town-bred man will express a longing to go on the land without the least realisation that the 'loneliness,' and the early hours, and the weather will disillusion him in a month. And many another man, if he stands it himself, will find his home life ruined because his wife has the town temperament.

Into this question of selection there must come a careful consideration of a man's previous civil occupation and surroundings and family circumstances. A further question arises with regard to the locality in which a man is going to live. Though he may express no preference, the question is still important. The general rule should be undoubtedly to re-start a man in the neighbourhood he knows. Local patriotism may be sub-conscious, but it is extraordinarily strong and it is extraordinarily local. Leeds and Bradford, for instance, are, geographically, very near together, but in another sense

they are worlds apart. Attempts to get men in Leeds to go to a workshop established in Bradford have met with no success.

Another point in connexion with the mentality of convalescent wounded is of great importance. The period of convalescence in hospitals is sometimes long and tedious. During this period the men have little to occupy their minds. Everything possible is done for their physical comfort and well-being, and much for their amusement. But we have not developed in this country the idea of re-education which in France is an essential part of the patient's cure. We have paid attention to the body, but we have neglected the mind. Many weeks and sometimes months are wasted which might be used for the preliminary stages of vocational training. During those weeks or months of enforced idleness there is a liability to progressive mental deterioration, which may well react upon the patient's physical state and retard his cure. When he is at last discharged he has grown so unused to the idea of work and of mental application that he is seriously handicapped in starting. It is hard to say that we are too kind to our wounded; that, indeed, we cannot be. But it is possible that our kindness has been something lacking in thought for the morrow.

III

It is difficult to offer anything like a complete survey of the work that has been done in this country for the restoration of the disabled, inasmuch as it consists of a large number of unrelated experiments from which at present no final system has emerged, though the sum of the experience thus gained indicates clearly enough the principles upon which future action should be based. In one instance at least these principles seem to have been most admirably anticipated. The care of the totally blinded is, in a sense, a separate problem. The comparatively small number involved and the terrible completeness and finality of the disability are factors which have made it possible to do something more than experiment in this connexion. The work at St. Dunstan's Hostel for Blinded Sailors and Soldiers, Regent's Park, owes its initiation to Sir Arthur Pearson. Part of its success is due to the

excellent system of communication between the military authorities and the Hostel which enables a representative of the Hostel to visit every blinded man while he is still in hospital. As a result the patient is brought into touch at the earliest possible moment with the means to be taken for his future welfare. The visitor discusses his prospects with him and kindles at once the sparks of hope and ambition. Some little task is immediately given him to occupy his mind and encourage him in the effort to acquire a new form of usefulness. On discharge from hospital he proceeds to St. Dunstan's, where everything that ingenuity can suggest and generosity provide is done to lift him from the mental gloom of his affliction. For his amusement, there are concerts, dances, and entertainments. The house and the grounds are so arranged that he can move about freely without danger. The subjects taught are Braille reading, typewriting, leather work, basket work, rug making, and poultry keeping. The men remain until they are proficient, and are then assisted in various ways to make the entry into their new life. One young man who was visited on his return home had received the gifts of a typewriter, a set of boot-making tools and a stock of leather for repairing work, and a grant of money to purchase the goodwill of a small boot-repairing business. Even a blind man's watch had not been forgotten. He was intensely cheerful, and described himself, his treatment, and his prospects as 'champion.' St. Dunstan's has accommodation for about 140 patients, and is supported partly by private contributions and partly by a grant from the National Relief Fund.

Men who have suffered amputation of one or more limbs receive some industrial training at Queen Mary's Auxiliary Hospital at Roehampton and at Queen Mary's Workshops at Brighton. The supply of artificial limbs has been centralised at Roehampton for England. There is a similar institution at Kelso for Scotland, and there are two in Ireland. The procedure adopted is for the men to spend a period of convalescence at Brighton—generally six to eight weeks—during which they may attend the workshops. Here there are courses of instruction in electrical work, carpentry, and the mechanism and management of the motor-car. In the electricity shop, the men learn the fixing of bells, lights, telephones, and the

management of a switchboard, and should become competent to execute repairs in ordinary domestic installations.

The men proceed to Roehampton for the fitting of artificial limbs, and here there are further courses of instruction on similar lines, with, in addition, some general commercial training. Book-keeping, typewriting, and business correspondence and office methods are taught. There are spelling and writing classes for those who wish to brush up their general education. Leather bag making is taught by a firm which guarantees to give employment at a starting wage of £1 a week after one month's training. An employment bureau has been started at the hospital, and employers willing to take partly disabled men are invited to apply. Some hundreds of men have been placed by the bureau. On leaving the hospital after acquiring some facility in the use of their new limbs, the men are advised to continue their education as far as possible. The hospital is in close co-operation with the Polytechnic Institutes in London and with Clark's College, and these institutions make special provision for continued training. Queen Mary's Hospital has also received subsidies from the National Relief Fund.

The period of training at Roehampton is necessarily very short. Large numbers are awaiting admission, and there is a considerable delay before gaining entrance. This delay—when the time is spent at home with nothing to do—is exceedingly bad for the men, apart from the trial of their patience. No doubt there are advantages in this centralisation, but the disadvantages are so serious and so likely to increase that the matter needs careful consideration. It is hard to see why arrangements could not be made in most of the big cities for the supply at least of artificial legs—which are considerably less complicated than arms. Local makers accustomed to hospital work would, no doubt, be ready to submit to the necessary inspection of the completed work by competent local medical boards.

An attempt is being made to provide training and employment on an extensive scale by the 'Lord Roberts' Memorial 'Workshops.' The first of these workshops was opened by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Help Society after the South African war. Funds are being raised to extend this work as a memorial to Lord Roberts. In addition to the factory in London,

branch workshops have been opened in Birmingham, Liverpool, Bradford, Colchester, and Brookwood. Others are in contemplation. The general plan adopted is to manufacture for the wholesale trade, principally wooden toys and dolls, furniture, basket work and household articles. On entering the workshops the men receive a starting wage of 20*s*. per week, irrespective of the amount of their pension. As they become more proficient their wages are increased. Women and girls—generally soldiers' relatives—are also employed in the workshops, and this is said to have a good effect upon the men.

The idea here is not to train men for re-entry into the ordinary labour market, but to set up a new industrial undertaking in which they will be permanently employed. Already a very considerable business is done in the sale of manufactured goods, especially toys—a trade which has hitherto been mainly in the hands of Germany and Austria. The various branch workshops are under local management, but the whole scheme is under central control with a view to complete co-ordination. Thus, while each branch manufactures and sells completed goods, there is also some degree of specialisation for the benefit of them all. Birmingham, for instance, would be a metal-working branch making leaden soldiers and other metal toys, and at the same time turning out hinges, bolts, dies, and the metal parts required for the completion of wooden toys and goods made in London. At the Bradford branch it is intended to do all the printing of catalogues, posters, etc., required by the other branches, besides executing outside orders. The main difficulty at present appears to be to secure the men. In the future, when economic conditions return to the normal and the undertaking becomes subject to trade competition, other difficulties will obviously arise. Apart from any profit on trading the institution depends solely on voluntary contributions.

At many if not at most of the military hospitals, voluntary effort has provided useful occupation, and in some cases definite training, for the patients. At Netley, for instance, where there are considerably over 2000 men, the services of a qualified lady instructor from the South Kensington School of Needlework have been obtained. The men are taught embroidery, worsted work, toy and basket making and leather work, and

are said to avail themselves very freely of these opportunities. Poultry raising and gardening are also taught at some hospitals. At some of the larger military hospitals it is hoped to erect workshops where carpentry and other trades may be taught.

Local Committees under the War Pensions Act are entrusted, among their other duties, with the provision of suitable training for disabled officers and men. It does not appear, however, that very much has yet been done, though many education authorities co-operate by offering instruction in technical classes, especially in the use of the lathe etc., for the purpose of enabling men to take work in munition factories.

The shortage of agricultural labour and the necessity of increasing the home production of foodstuffs point emphatically to the settlement on the land of discharged service men. The Departmental Committee appointed by the Board of Agriculture in July 1915 presented an interim report in the following September, recommending that a free course of training at an agricultural college should be given to fifty disabled sailors or soldiers. This was acted upon, and the selected men were sent to the colleges at Holmes Chapel and Harper Adams. The result of this experiment has been so far satisfactory that, of fourteen men who have completed their training, the majority have obtained employment on the land and one has been appointed a sub-inspector under the Board of Agriculture. The remaining men continue their training and are said to show considerable aptitude.

In their final report the Departmental Committee recommend the acquisition of land by the State for the purpose of establishing colonies of about one hundred tenant holders and their families. They point out the necessity of extremely careful selection of the men, and they do not overlook the fact that much depends also upon the suitability of the wife. They consider that inexperienced men may acquire sufficient knowledge by training to succeed as small holders. This training, they recommend, should be given in colonies, the men receiving weekly pay as employees until they are judged sufficiently experienced to succeed as tenants.

In the case of disabled men, the Committee say: 'We are 'strongly opposed to the segregation of disabled men, or to 'anything like the establishment of colonies for cripples. In 'our view it will be far better for the men themselves that

'they should as far as possible take their place among the 'ordinary population of the country, instead of being treated 'as a class apart.' The Committee have no doubt that the openings for disabled men in agriculture are considerable. Such men can act as shepherds or cattlemen, and can do many forms of farm work, i.e. hoe turnips, work in the hay and harvest field, help in threshing, repair fences, scour ditches, etc. They can also do much of the work on a fruit or market-garden holding, and can attend to pigs and poultry. Men with a mechanical turn might be employed in connexion with the use and repair of agricultural machinery.

The return to the land is a familiar phrase— it has been an aspiration for long. Yet few things are so beset with difficulties. Agriculture is something more than art—like poetry, it is a state of mind. If it be true that you *cannot* make a poet, it is very nearly true that you cannot make an agriculturist. Mr. Maurice Hewlett has recently been writing about the peasant volunteer. He would have the labourers from the land who have served in the army returned to the land and enabled to farm for themselves. They must return, he points out, to the land they know. It would be useless to expect a Sussex man to take up farming in the Shires with either heart or hope. Mr. Hewlett understands the psychology of the peasant, and the illustration he gives indicates some of the difficulty. But if a Sussex peasant cannot be turned into a Buckinghamshire small holder, is it likely that a Cockney car conductor can be trained into a successful farmer? The fact is that modern city life has created a type of mind that can no more live in the country than a fish can live out of the water. There are exceptional minds which have resisted the city influence, and where you find in man and wife two such minds, there you have a potentially successful small holder—but not otherwhere. The cities have taken and subdued to their will captives from the land—they will never give them up. Against this it is said that the tremendous experience of service in this greatest of wars will result in a sort of re-birth —a profound unsettlement and temperamental change which will lead men to desire a complete change of occupation— which will break the shackles of habit. It may be. At present there is little evidence to support such a view. To me it seems false psychology. Habit is not broken—even thus.

IV

The French system of re-education of the disabled by means of 'mechano-therapy' and other treatments has been carefully examined by medical and other commissions from this country, and the announcement has recently been made that the system is likely to be widely adopted in connexion with our military hospitals. The Zander method of treatment of stiff limbs and deformities, and the substitution of machines for hand manipulation, are not unfamiliar. Zander institutes have been in existence here for some years. The idea has, however, been developed with admirable ingenuity in France, and the exercises have been made to serve a double purpose in at once treating the disability and educating the patient. Professor Guermonprey, of Lille, has been a pioneer in the scientific re-education of the disabled, and he was among the first to perceive the intimate connexion that might exist between curative treatment and industrial training. He introduced various apparatus at his hospital at Calais soon after the war began. By means of these, stiff limbs are exercised, malformations corrected, the degree of disability scientifically ascertained, and the soldier's treatment continued with a definite relation to the physical effort required in the occupation the man hopes to resume.

There are now more than 50 re-educational establishments in France, most of which receive some form of Government subsidy as well as support from municipal authorities and private subscriptions.

The Grand Palais, Paris, was taken over and converted into a military hospital in January 1915. It now has about 2500 beds and is the central 'Dépôt de Physiothérapie' to which soldiers are sent from the other military hospitals for the various forms of treatment which are being carried out under the direction of Professor Jean Camus. These include electrical treatment, *eau courante* or whirlpool baths, massage, mechanical exercises, etc. The results obtained have been remarkable. In one month (October 1915) 420 men were returned to active service in the army who otherwise would have been pensioned as permanently disabled. This obviously represents a very considerable saving to the State in pensions alone. There is an out-patients' department for officers.

The hospital at St. Maurice has accommodation for 700 patients, and in connexion with it is the Vacassy Institute, which provides industrial training. A large number of trades are taught, including boot-making, tailoring, basket-making, printing, bookbinding, tinsmithing, harness-making, etc. Voluntary instructors are sent to the Institute by the different Guilds of the city of Paris. The Fédération Nationale des Mutilés de la Guerre, Paris, has established both residential and non-residential workshops for the disabled. Men who live at home receive a wage of 4 francs a day and their dinner. Men 'living in' are all found in every way, and receive a proportion of the earnings of the whole establishment.

The Anglo-Belgian Hospital at Rouen receives Belgian soldiers requiring special treatment by the new methods of *physiothérapie*. The hospital was established on the site of a vocational school and the fact that the mechano-therapeutic apparatus required for the extensive installation which it now possesses was for the most part manufactured in the workshops by the disabled themselves is an admirable instance of ingenuity and resourcefulness. At this hospital the men receive the beginnings of re-education entirely under medical direction; they are then passed on to the complementary establishment, which is mainly industrial. This is the Institut Militaire Belge at Vernon (Eure), and is described by Mr. W. M. Dobell, of the Canadian Military Hospitals Commission, as the most interesting establishment of the kind which he had seen. There is accommodation for about 1200 men, and the Institute is not only self-supporting, but it has paid back to the Belgian Government the entire capital cost of installation. The cost per man per day is only 2.05 francs, and this includes the usual pay of the Belgian soldier of 43 centimes per day. Forty-three different trades are taught, covering every imaginable occupation. There is a large farm in connexion with the establishment on which wounded horses are cared for and made useful. The workshops provide for instruction in book-keeping, shorthand, typewriting, telegraphy, moulding in clay, wood-carving, drawing and designing of all descriptions, wall-paper designing and painting, the manufacture of motor vehicles and all kinds of electrical machinery, tinsmithing, plumbing, tailoring. Poultry and rabbit farming are taught, and also fur curing, dyeing, and trimming.

The land on which the establishment is built was originally forest. A saw mill was erected, and the forest thinned out on scientific principles, the timber being converted either into lumber required for the buildings or such as would be saleable in the open market. Large quantities of pickets and stakes of all descriptions required by the Belgian Army were manufactured, and also large wickerwork shields, which were used for laying on swampy ground under gun-carriages, so as to prevent them from sinking.

The buildings cost 450,000 francs, and the equipment and plant for the workshops 300,000 francs. All of this has been repaid to the Belgian Government out of profits on lumber and the produce of the workshops. Most of the work has been done for the Belgian War Office, and this has enabled the Government to get their supplies very much more cheaply than they were doing from other sources. Thus fuse-boxes which were being made in the United States at a cost of 30 francs apiece were subsequently made and delivered by the Vernon workshops at 10 francs apiece, which still left a profit of $2\frac{1}{2}$ francs to the establishment. The workshops make all their own tools, as well as a large number for the Belgian army. A great deal of Government printing work is also done. The men are paid, in addition to their army pay, from 5 to 20 centimes per hour, according to the work they do, and the surplus profits are now being funded for the benefit of the men.

While in the workshops the men are still mobilised and under military discipline. When a man is considered efficient in his trade and able to earn his own living, he is allowed to take his discharge on condition that he first takes three months' furlough and that he then has suitable employment to go to, or that he is going to start business on his own account with a reasonable prospect of success. In this case he is given a complete outfit for his trade, together with a sufficient stock of raw material to make a start. The Vernon establishment is 'fed' from the Anglo-Belgian Hospital at Rouen, so that men are only admitted after they have completed actual hospital treatment.

Mr. Dobell points out that among the causes which have contributed to the remarkable success of the Vernon scheme are the facts that the men are still soldiers under military control, and that the population of Belgium was the most highly

trained industrial community in Europe, the great majority of the men having a thorough knowledge of some trade, and very few being illiterate.

To illustrate the scientific spirit in which this problem is being approached in France, it is worth while to quote from a paper written by Professor Jules Amar, Directeur, Laboratoire des Recherches sur le Travail Professionnel, Paris, and published in the Special Bulletin of the Canadian Military Hospitals Commission :

'At the outset one notices that the future of the wounded man depends upon the directing of his activities to some particular trade. The greatest care must therefore be taken in determining the best occupation for each individual, the director being guided not only by the man's previous experience, but by his tastes and by his physical and psychological capacities. . . . Let us imagine a wounded man who, previous to the war, exercised the trade of machine erector. A third of his right arm is now amputated. The physical and psychic examinations show us that he is in good health, gifted with average intelligence, and fairly well educated. An experimental analysis conducted according to the technics of the physical laboratory reveals a perfect state of mobility of the stump and the possibility of fitting to him that artificial limb which will best suit his vocational requirements. Under these conditions the man might and should be directed towards the trade of a machinist. Re-education will develop motive powers in the left arm, and the artificial right limb will more often fulfil the rôle of supporter : that is, will prove a static force rather than a directory power ; and if it be properly fitted one has the right to expect from the individual a rapidity and precision of movement which will be sufficient for all practical purposes.

'Let us imagine, on the other hand, an individual possessed only of moderate intelligence and clumsy in other respects. We should direct him towards the trade, for example, of basket-making. . . .

'Also one must endeavour to overcome tendencies towards indolence. The disabled man must be made to understand, and he will easily grasp the fact, that work alone is the regenerator and sole fortifier of his body and his mind ; it alone furnishes material sources for a livelihood, and those moral resources which, in him especially, excite our admiration. A too prolonged stay in hospitals and convalescent homes is the true cause of idleness, which is moreover accentuated by the atrophied condition of the stumps there condemned to inaction. The re-education of the joints and the muscles, followed by exercise in his trade, so harmonised as to assure for the individual the maximum of his output, must begin in the convalescent home before medical treatment is finished. . . .

'But it is asked what is the proportion of the mutilated who are capable of recovering their working and social value by a re-educa-

tion conducted on these lines? How many are capable of being re-educated and how many doomed to be assisted? By consulting former experience, and on the faith of the soundest proof, 80 per cent. of the maimed are capable of re-education. They may be divided as follows: 45 per cent. totally, that is to say that they may succeed in earning normal salaries, on condition that 10 per cent. among them specialise. The direction in which they specialise should always be, as has already been said, within the limits of their former trade. Twenty per cent. may not arrive at a full working capacity, as their re-education is partial, but still it gives an appreciable output. The directing of men of this class towards their proper profession involves a series of scientific observations for the purpose of providing employers with exact knowledge as to the value of each man's output and capacity. Finally, 15 per cent. will have to practise subordinate trades (*petits métiers*) in which production is small, their re-education being entirely fragmentary. Whereas the 65 per cent. representing the first two classes may be put into ordinary workshops or establish themselves as "workmen in their own rooms," the last 15 per cent. must work in workshops organised for this purpose, where in any case they can earn a bare livelihood. The majority of the 20 per cent. not capable of being re-educated are dependent upon relief institutions for work; nevertheless a very small minority attain sufficient productivity to be useful in the workshops.'

These condensed quotations from a paper of extraordinary interest and value show that in France the relation of temperament to capacity has been recognised more clearly than with us. The importance of the psychological condition of the patient is insisted upon. This is another way of saying that if you seek to make a man you must build up his character as well as his body.

V

A few words may be of interest with regard to the experience of the Canadian Medical Service.

In most of the Provinces of the Dominion, Vocational Officers have been appointed to organise the training of the disabled at the various convalescent homes where they are still undergoing medical treatment. Classes have been established in these homes for carrying out simple technical training. There are courses in mechanical, architectural, and freehand drawing, French, English, arithmetic, elementary book-keeping, typewriting and stenography, and poultry raising. Each soldier receives individual instruction, and the classes

are carried on each morning of the week, except Saturday, between the hours of 9 and 12 o'clock. Attendance at the classes is voluntary, and from 25 to 30 per cent. of the men avail themselves of them. This attendance is not considered satisfactory, and compulsory attendance has been seriously contemplated. Workshops have been fitted up to carry out wood-working and sheet-metal working. The goods made by the men are sold and the profits returned to them.

The work was undertaken mainly for the purpose of providing occupation, and only secondarily with the idea of increasing the industrial efficiency of the men. Deterioration of character and will power and progressive indifference to the future were noted as an accompaniment to a long stay in hospital. On the other hand, given reasonable occupation, the men improved. A correspondent, writing in July 1916, said :

' In many cases of neurasthenia the men have improved mentally through an interest they have developed in creating some object with their hands—such as little articles of furniture, etc. The handwork itself is of great value in getting many of the men into such a state of mind that they are willing, and in many cases capable, to return to industrial life instead of dreading their discharge from the convalescent home and being compelled to go to work again. In some cases this educational work in the convalescent home has been of such value to the men taking it that they have secured positions that pay them 50 to 100 per cent. more than the ones which they filled prior to enlistment.'

VI

This brief summary of experiments that have been made in this country, in France, and in Canada suggests that we are wrong in taking a limited view of a problem that is at the same time medical, educational, and industrial. It is not merely a question of restoring as far as may be the health and strength of soldiers disabled in the war. It is rather the much larger question of how one may seize the opportunity of increasing the skill and productivity of a considerable proportion of the industrial population. In the interests of the State it is necessary that every industrial unit should be brought to the highest possible point of efficiency. After the war there will be a period—probably a long period—during which arrears of production will have to be made up and the destruction

wrought by war repaired. There will be fewer men to do the work, and the numbers cannot, ought not, to be entirely made up by women. Many women will have enough work to do in their own homes.

In the interests of the individual one might offer the gift of education, that those at least who have the will may also have the means of increasing their economic value and earning the competence that skill commands instead of the bare 'living wage' of labour. We should have accomplished much indeed if we could but say hereafter that we had mobilised labour in the defence of the principles of liberty, and demobilised an army of skilled workmen that liberty might be enjoyed in the full exercise of heightened capacity. It is my belief that we could go a great way towards this ideal.

In the first place, the re-education of the disabled should begin by a primary selection and classification in hospital. When hospital treatment ends, convalescent treatment with continued industrial training should begin. During this period the patient's probable limit of capacity and his particular bent will reveal themselves. A final selection of trade or occupation may be made. Some men may soon be ready to take up their employment. For others there should be ample facilities for further education in technical classes, continuation schools, and the technological departments of universities. Owing to the widely different degrees of education among the men of the new armies, the whole educational facilities of the country might well be thrown open to them. There should be complete co-operation between the military authorities and educational bodies. Convalescent homes would in effect be re-educational depots, with advisory boards upon which the expert knowledge of the doctor, the educationist, and the industrial expert would be concentrated. The soldier entering such a depot should remain a soldier, with a soldier's pay and family allowance, until he left. He should not leave until he had attained a reasonable profic ency in the trade selected and until he had employment to go to. Men whose disability precluded them from more than a limited degree of efficiency would be mainly dependent upon their pensions, but there would be few for whom some employment could not be found.

If this were done for the disabled, something of the same

kind could be done for the 'physically unfit' and for the 'inefficient.' It is hard to draw a line between the 'disabled' and the 'unfit,' except it be by an assumption that the 'unfit' were disabled before they were passed into the army. Really there is little distinction between the two terms, and it is neither fair nor economically wise to disclaim responsibility for men whose productive value is small and who for the remaining years of their lives will be potential burdens upon the community. These men, too, should be retained at army rates of pay for a period of re-education, in the hope and with the probability that the majority of them would increase their capacity for service and their value to themselves and to the community; and if these, why not the comparatively small number of inefficients?

The threefold problem is one difficult indeed to deal with, but very dangerous to neglect.

L. V. Shairp.

THE WORK OF THE SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' FAMILIES ASSOCIATION

NOT the least among the problems created by the sudden outbreak of war was the provision to be made for the families of our fighting men. It was recognised from the outset that the allowances granted to the wives and children would fall short in many cases of what was necessary, whilst many hard cases would arise in connexion with other dependents, such as widowed mothers and invalid parents. To meet these and other needs the National Relief Fund was established, and the appeal to the public for support met with a very generous response. The question then arose as to the best agency for distributing the sums collected.

The common complaint of our unreadiness for a great European conflict usually refers to our military forces, but it might apply with equal justice to the unorganised condition of our civil population and the absence of any satisfactory arrangements for dealing with the dependents of our soldiers and sailors. A European war was looked upon as so unlikely that this work had never received adequate attention. But such a war was sufficiently possible to compel the upkeep of an army and navy, and their existence implied that there ought also to be a properly organised system for the benefit of the dependents of the fighting men, so that as the men joined up their wives would go automatically on to the pay-sheets for their allowances. The omission of such organisation was the more inexcusable in so much as that it was well understood that in the event of war we should have largely to depend on the men in the Army Reserve and the Territorials, all of whom would be called from civil life and would necessarily leave their wives and children dependent on the army allowances. In peace-time army allowances are paid through the Paymaster's Department, but that was quite unsuited to the new problems which the outbreak of war created. Thus we had a centralised and under-staffed office attempting to make financial arrangements by correspondence with women who

probably had never written a business letter in their lives, and who had no knowledge of how to decipher official documents.

No wonder the paymasters complained of receiving letters without the writer's address, or marriage and birth certificates without any intimation of the source from whence they came, or that they got information about all matters except that for which they asked. The whole thing would have been simple if men had been required to declare their dependents at the time of enlisting, and then and there to produce marriage and birth certificates. The officer in charge would then have been able to certify that the matter was in order, and the recruit would have taken the paper to his commanding officer for the insertion of the regimental number and other particulars. After this it would have been forwarded to the man's paymaster, who would thus have been in a position to send the remittance to the woman. Had this fairly obvious plan been carried out the remittance would have reached the woman within a week or so of the man's enlistment. The absence of any such plan produced a state of confusion which completely overwhelmed the Paymaster's Department. Meanwhile many soldiers' families were in a condition of the utmost distress. The question of relief was urgent, and the organisers of the National Relief Fund turned to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association as the only body in existence with experience in ministering to the needs of the families of our soldiers and sailors. But this Association was only on a peace basis, and was limited to dealing with hard cases not covered by Government allowances; it had no framework ready for expanding sufficiently wide to meet the requirements of such a war as the present. All that could be done was to build upon its very limited foundations such a structure as was possible at the moment.

It is desirable to explain a little more fully how the difficulties arose and how they were dealt with. The first effects of the war were to depress trade and to make unemployment general. The industrial outlook became very black. The resulting economic pressure, combined with real patriotism, brought recruits to the army in such numbers that the Paymaster's Department was utterly unable to cope with the mass of correspondence and the multitude of claims. The wives and children of the men of the new army were left

without any Government support for many weeks. In the numerous cases where the men had been unemployed for some time before enlistment their homes were already distressed and relief was needed at once. To make matters worse, those who had been always used to a weekly allowance out of the husband's weekly wage were given monthly drafts. As the arrears of payment accumulated the muddle in the Paymaster's Department grew steadily worse. In this emergency the War Office, which had usually looked upon all civilian efforts with jealousy or contempt, now adopted a very friendly attitude towards the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association. That organisation, acting on behalf of the National Relief Fund, made advances to the women to enable them to carry on until the separation allowances came through. But the delays in the Paymaster's Department were so great that the burden of these advances began seriously to deplete the National Relief Fund. To meet this difficulty the War Office, towards the end of 1914, agreed that the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association was also to act as the official agent of the War Office in making weekly loans to the soldiers' wives until their allowances were ready to be paid. Wherever such loans were made the War Office undertook to recover the money from the arrears of payment due to the women. In this way the same money was used again and again, and the great drain upon the National Relief Fund was checked. At the same time the women were protected from any inconvenience caused by the delays of the paymasters.

Notwithstanding that the Post Office had been successfully used in connexion with the Old Age Pension Act for making the weekly payments to the aged pensioners, the War Office had not foreseen the advisability of enlisting this agency for the payment of army allowances. Indeed weeks of war had passed before the War Office could be persuaded to pay its allowances weekly through the Post Office.

Perhaps the greatest difficulties were those created by the constant changing of regulations and the amounts of the allowances by the Government, who were vainly attempting to grope their way through the fog of war to some satisfactory system which should have been quietly and successfully thought out in days of peace. At first allowances were only granted to wives and children. Where a man had married

a widow with children, the latter were excluded from army allowances, as they were not considered the children of the soldier; widowed mothers and invalid parents were also excluded. By the spring of 1915 the Government was made to see that it had drawn the line too tight; then it jumped too far the other way, for it not only brought in all children and other dependents of the soldier, but it opened the door to fictitious claims, and the system became so lax that the only real test of dependency was plausibility—the greatest liar getting the largest allowance. Even now vast numbers of able-bodied men in regular employment, earning far in excess of pre-war wages, are drawing weekly Government allowances through the Post Office on the ridiculous ground that they have suffered some financial loss by their sons having joined the colours.

Similar dishonesty has been rendered possible by the failure of the War Office to consult the Poor Law Authorities. Here is a case in point. The parents of two sons applied to the Poor Law Authorities for out-relief, and when asked what support they derived from their sons pleaded that neither son could render any help, as they could scarcely meet the cost of their own maintenance. A few months later one son enlisted, and the parents successfully claimed that this particular son was their main support. Again a few months passed, and the other son also enlisted, when the parents claimed, with partial success, that this son also was their main support. A relieving officer attached to the West Ham Union recently remarked that previous to the war he rarely found sons who helped their parents, but when they enlisted they all appeared to be good sons.

The following case has also come under the notice of the present writer. A man in regular employment had three sons. Before the war he would have scorned to have had it said that he made any profit out of them. After the outbreak of war one son left home to earn a living elsewhere; a second got married and went to his new home. In neither case did the father allege that he suffered any loss. But when the third son joined the army the parents at once put in a successful claim against the Government for taking away their good son, on whom they were partly dependent.

These claims from able-bodied parents not only involved

a great waste of national funds, but they overwhelmed the Paymaster's Department again just at a time when it was beginning to straighten itself out after the first shock of war. The allowances to the wives and children were made in accordance with a scale, and therefore involved no inquiry beyond the establishment of the fact that they were the dependents of the soldier, which could be readily proved by the marriage and birth certificates. But the claims from able-bodied parents, which simply poured in, required a separate inquiry in each case, and each claim, if accepted, had to be specially assessed, thus placing an intolerable strain upon the staff which had to deal with the claim, and also upon the Post Office, which had to make the weekly payments. The separate inquiries naturally caused long delays, thus adding to the labours of those who undertook the provision of temporary assistance. Fortunately the wave of patriotism which swept through the country in the early days of the war brought an unlimited number of voluntary workers, as most people with leisure felt that they ought to do something to assist with war work. It was remarkable to see how readily those who had never before been called upon to do useful work settled down to the drudgery involved in office work and in the work of investigation. The duties were arduous and exhausting, yet they were accepted without a murmur although the staffs were in almost all cases entirely composed of volunteers. Every volunteer had to undertake any duty, however unpleasant or monotonous. The offices of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association were often open from nine or ten in the morning until the corresponding hours in the evening, whilst Sundays were largely devoted to accounts and other homework. Outside the office the duties largely consisted in visiting and investigating. It was here especially that the field lay open to vast possibilities for good, but everything depended upon the *personnel* of the visitors. Some visitors were content to do their actual duty by making the requisite inquiries and paying over the allowance due; but the majority took advantage of the opportunities which were offered and became real friends to the women. It was not the patronising lady who had called to give some little charity. War had wiped out, or had deadened, that pride of class. The new army recognises no class distinctions; the risks and honours are

common to all, whether officers or men, and the officers' wives, having breathed something of this same spirit, have—sometimes at the request of their husbands—thrown themselves whole-heartedly into the work of helping their poorer sisters. Often has the officer's wife, after receiving the communication which tells her that she has become a widow, bravely dried her eyes and gone out to give sympathy and help to some private's wife who has received the same dread message. Those who enter upon the work in this spirit have a wide and varied field for their labours.

How fully the value of their kindly work is appreciated by the responsible authorities the following painful illustration shows. A soldier in France had been shot by order of court-martial. The official at the War Office charged with the duty of sending the information to the widow mother, instead of despatching it at once, very humanely delayed the message a little so that arrangements could be made for a lady to visit the poor mother, to break the terrible news to her, and to be present when the official communication arrived.

In many cases a real friendship has arisen between the visitors and the soldiers' wives on their lists. The help of the visitors is sought in connexion with such subjects as may be in dispute with the Paymaster; they are asked to assist in filling up official forms, in obtaining letters for hospitals or institutions, in finding suitable employment for boys and girls, in dealing with landlords or tradesmen who appear to be acting harshly. In this latter respect a great deal of trouble has been experienced with hire-purchase firms. Some of these firms take advantage of the hirer's temporary inability to keep up the periodical payments, and remove the article, confiscating the payments already made, notwithstanding that the purchase may have been almost completed. On the other hand, it has been, at times, a pleasant surprise to find that money-lenders—a class who generally have a reputation for hard bargaining—have been ready, at the request of district officers of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association, to settle claims in a manner most favourable to the soldiers' wives.

Among the administrative difficulties that have to be dealt with, the following may be mentioned:—If a soldier's wife is taken to an infirmary or other rate-aided institution

her separation allowance ceases during the period she is there; but her children who remain outside become entitled to the motherless rate of five shillings per week each. The principle that a woman should not be drawing an army allowance whilst living at the cost of the rates is a good one, but in practice the enforcement of the regulation is hardly worth the candle. In most cases the woman would only be taken to the infirmary owing to serious illness, and often without any request of her own. She would only remain for a short period, until she was sufficiently recovered to get out again. But as soon as the separation allowance ceases the husband's compulsory allotment to his wife also stops. Therefore it becomes necessary not only to get the War Office to pay an allowance to the children at the motherless rate, but also to get into communication with the husband and to induce him to make his allotment direct to the children. There remains the difficulty of the home, for the rent must still be paid. In fact, when provision has been made for the children and for keeping up the rent it is generally found that there is a greater expense than in normal times. Thus the cost of any saving, at the expense of a good deal of confusion, that the Government may have made by observing a pious principle has to be borne by the National Relief Fund. In addition the making of the necessary arrangements, including the protection of the children and the home, has often unduly taxed the energies of the local officials of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association.

Among the cases dealt with by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association, those requiring the most delicate handling have been cases of 'unmarried' wives. In many districts where such cases were numerous a special sub-committee was formed to deal with them, or they were handed over to experienced visitors. Visitors who were acquainted with Friendly Society work already knew that there were large numbers of these cases, but the results shown by the war were something of a revelation. During the first year 3470 of these unmarried cases were dealt with in the County of London alone. In the great majority there was a previous marriage on one side or the other which prevented the legal tie, but in many the marriage ceremony was merely ignored. When it was found that the marriage lines were necessary to obtain

Government allowances, many of the men returned and gave their women this qualification, but when later the allowances could be obtained by simply proving dependency this desire to marry became less on the part of the women as well as of the men. The most remarkable feature of many of these irregular unions is the undoubted faithfulness of the 'wives.' Generally their homes and children are above reproach, and their neighbours have no knowledge that they are unmarried. The object of the visitor is to give the necessary relief without revealing the secret of the home. The lives led by these people do not compare unfavourably with those of an equal number of married people drawn from a similar class and surroundings.

In the earlier days of the war there was a section of the public which considered that these 'unmarried wives' should not be helped either by the Government or by the Relief Funds, but this opposition collapsed when the authors failed to show how they would assist either morality or religion by breaking up respectable homes, forcing the women to a lower plane, and starving the children, whilst their fathers were gallantly fighting in defence of their country. One man put his case thus: 'My wife took to drink and deserted her 'home and two children about six years back. I wanted a 'housekeeper for my home and a mother for my children; I 'had only a wage of 27*s.* per week, and my home contained 'but two bedrooms. What could I do? I found a woman 'who has ever since proved a good mother and a good wife. 'We should have been married years back if the law had 'allowed us.' The valuable experience gained in connexion with these cases should not be allowed to be lost. It will be of the greatest value when the question of our divorce laws comes to be reviewed, as it must be, after the war.

In this connexion it is worth while to call attention to the somewhat excessive zeal for getting other people married which some of the workers of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association have displayed. These ladies apparently assumed that wherever a child was expected marriage was imperative, regardless of the circumstances of the case. That their action in many cases was wholly beneficial those who know the facts will be the first to testify. Through their helpful activity men were brought back from the Front on short leave, special

licences were obtained, cakes were bought and every help given, the expenses being paid by the voluntary workers. So long as these efforts were confined to suitable cases they were all for the good; but when later it was sought to arrange such marriages in any and every case, without consideration as to the suitability of the people concerned, and when the numbers were paraded much in the same way as Red Indians parade the scalps of their victims, the whole movement became fraught with the gravest risks. In many cases the results of these ill-considered marriages will be domestic conflict and misery for both parties, leading inevitably to the divorce court or to the police court, or perhaps even to the scaffold.

It was largely owing to the action of these enthusiasts for legal marriage at all costs that the Government were induced to depart from their very sound rule not to recognise marriages made after enlistment. This departure not only placed a tremendous financial burden upon the country—a serious matter in itself—but it has also been productive of great hardships in the cases of widowed mothers and invalid parents, who were receiving dependency allowances from the Government on account of their soldier sons. Immediately the son marries the allowance goes to the wife and the parents' allowance ceases. This very important fact seems to have been constantly overlooked by those who press the soldier to enter into a life union with a girl whom he may have known only for a few days, perhaps only for a few hours, and who may be utterly unsuited to him. From the point of view of true morality the son's obligation to his aged parents is certainly greater than his obligation to a girl who may have deliberately set herself—as some girls undoubtedly have done—to seduce the first soldier on whom she could lay hands. The problem of the abandoned parents is in many cases a very serious one. The legal dependency on the son has permanently ceased in consequence of his half-forced marriage, and in many cases there is nothing to be done but to appeal to the Poor Law Authorities.

No section of the work of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association has received greater care and attention than the protection of soldiers' children who have lost their mothers, either by death or because the mothers have proved unfit to have the care of them. Time and money have been freely

expended on such cases, and where necessary temporary or permanent homes have been found. The fathers have generally insisted on the homes being temporary, so that they might be able to claim their children again after the war. The numerous and generous offers coming from individuals, associations, institutions, and even poor neighbours to provide homes for these poor little mites have been most encouraging. They have done much to restore one's confidence in human nature, which at times had become somewhat shattered by the spectacle of the large number of unnatural mothers who have neglected their children whilst their husbands have been away facing the risks of war.

London has always been the great centre of activity for every phase of relief work arising out of the war, not only on account of its size and the resulting vast number of soldiers' dependents comprised within its boundaries, but rather because it is the headquarters of the great Government departments and public associations mainly concerned in the matter, namely the Admiralty, the War Office, the National Relief Fund, and the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association. Women who have been unable to find a remedy for their own particular grievance in their own districts have turned their steps towards London, and have often created a new problem by arriving without either money or friends, and with no knowledge of what they were going to do or where they were to find a shelter. One such case was that of a Canadian woman, who, on hearing that her husband was lying wounded in a hospital in England, worked herself up to such a degree that in desperation she started off with her child and with just sufficient money to pay her passage. Even this was partly obtained by drawing her separation allowance in advance, a practice only allowed by the Canadian authorities, and only allowed by them in special cases. She arrived in London absolutely destitute, without any knowledge of where to turn for food or shelter. Frequently also the London workers of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association receive requests from provincial towns to meet women and see them safely through the metropolis on their way to visit their severely wounded or dying husbands. In this respect the Travellers' Aid Society has ever been ready to co-operate. The results have been highly satisfactory. Poor women who dreaded the journey across the metropolis

have found it made as pleasant and easy for them as was possible under the sad circumstances, and where it has been necessary for such women to stay temporarily in London they have found the Union Jack Hostel a priceless boon.

The duties connected with this form of relief work are often varied and novel. For example, a Maltese girl, in native costume, was found crying outside one of the London stations and was taken to the nearest office of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association. There, after a good deal of trouble owing to her very imperfect knowledge of English, it was discovered that some time previously a soldier stationed at Malta had married her; that he had afterwards gone to France, where he had been wounded; that he was now in a military hospital somewhere in England, and that his mother lived in the London district. The girl was taken to her mother-in-law's house, there only to find the most wretched hovel and a not very warm welcome. She begged not to be left there, and as it had by then been ascertained that the soldier husband was in hospital near a provincial town, arrangements were promptly made for the young wife to stay there under the care of the local Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association. In another case investigation showed that the wife of a non-commissioned officer was conducting herself very badly, and as she had two young children the husband was brought home from the Front. His first desire was to get his two children away from the mother, and to save a scene at the house it was decided to kidnap the two little ones as they were on their way to school. This was successfully done, the father taking one and the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association worker the other. A message was sent to the mother as soon as the children had been removed to a place of safety.

In addition to all this work most divisions of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association have undertaken the administration of other funds in the interest of the soldiers' families, such as the Royal Patriotic Fund grants to widows and orphans whose husbands and fathers have been killed in the war, employers' grants to the dependents of their employees, thrift funds, dental funds, coal and clothing funds, and also the distribution of miscellaneous gifts. Some divisions have also kept an employment register. In most districts the doctors very generously consented to give free

medical treatment to deserving cases, and for this purpose special medical books were prepared; but unfortunately this kindness was in many cases greatly abused. Some people—perhaps through sheer misunderstanding—seem to have thought that mere dependency on a soldier or sailor gave the right to free medical treatment regardless of the person's means. The medical scheme has therefore had to be somewhat modified and hedged round with further safeguards.

In order to deal with the necessarily complicated accounts of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association, a board of audit control was formed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants, so that the accounts of every division might be audited once in three months. The divisional auditor passes on his balance sheet to the auditor for the district, whose business it is not only to audit the accounts of the district office, but also to consolidate all the divisional accounts in the district and pass them on in turn to the county auditor, who audits the county office accounts and consolidates the district accounts into one account for the whole county. That is sent on to the board of audit control, who consolidate the county accounts into one account for the whole country. By these means there has been established a complete form of audit control such as has never before existed in connexion with war relief work. Thus the contributors to the National Relief Fund have every guarantee that their money is being properly spent for the purpose for which it was given. For this great service a debt of gratitude is due to the large number of chartered accountants who have so generously undertaken this voluntary work.

There are indeed some people who think that the investigations have been too strict. They forget that those who are responsible for the distribution of public funds would be false to their trust if they did not take every reasonable care against mismanagement and fraud. There is no desire to make unnecessary inquiries, and, so far as the wives are concerned, the system of giving advances on account of separation allowances, recoverable through the Army Paymaster, involves only such inquiries as may be necessary to prove the number of children, and to establish the fact that the husband really had enlisted and was living away from home. To secure this information a scheme was adopted in the London districts under which a representative of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Associa-

tion attended at each of the recruiting stations, by consent of the military authorities, and handed to each married recruit a printed postcard for him to sign and send to his wife, showing that he had enlisted and giving his regiment, station, and number. In the case of dependents other than wives a more strict investigation was necessary, as many of those who made claims were unable to prove dependency, and in such cases, if advances had been made, the money would have been lost, as there would have been nothing to recover against. It was also necessary to make such investigations as would prevent unscrupulous persons imposing on the funds in one district and then repeating their action in other places. Where grants were asked for in special circumstances it was necessary to prove those circumstances. Some women would send their friends to appeal for them instead of making a personal application ; others would send letters ; whilst even the telephone has been used for this purpose. The following case will show how great is the need for care. A call came from a public telephone office from the wife of a Canadian soldier, who said she urgently needed assistance. The applicant was invited to make a personal visit to the office, but failed to put in an appearance. About three weeks later the same lady made a further application over the telephone, and was again invited to call at the office the next morning. This appointment she kept and turned out to be a flighty little person with impressively golden hair, who found it more pleasant to follow her new husband from place to place wherever his duties took him than to do any kind of work. The Canadian Government had refused to grant a separation allowance, as the couple had been married contrary to rules. A little investigation showed that the lady had already received loans from the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association in other districts which had not been repaid.

Much discussion has taken place at different times with respect to the effect the war has had on the financial position of soldiers' wives. Where the husband, previous to enlistment, was in irregular and badly paid employment, the wife's monetary position has undoubtedly been improved by the substitution of the regular weekly payments by the War Office in place of irregular earnings, though the recent great rise in the cost of living has robbed the woman of a considerable part of

the original value of the allowances. On the other hand, where the husband in civil life was in regular and well-paid employment the wife has often suffered greatly by the reduction of her income. In civil employment a man is paid in accordance with the standard wage of his trade; thus the man with the small family has the advantage. The scheme for the payment of Government allowances reverses this principle of equal payment for equal work, and fixes the scale in accordance with the number of children. The allowance is: for the first child five shillings per week, for the second three shillings and sixpence, and for each subsequent child two shillings. That large numbers of women have actually benefited by their husbands' enlistment is beyond question. As a piece of incidental evidence it may be mentioned that in an outer London district a man who had before the war obtained a living by buying up old boots, and, after repairing them, selling them at the week-end from a barrow in the street, claimed assistance from the National Relief Fund for civil distress owing to the loss of his business through the war, because the soldiers' wives had got so prosperous that they now bought new boots.

In addition to the many difficulties inseparable from such a large scheme of national relief work undertaken without notice at the outbreak of a great war, those responsible for the direction of the work have been continually harassed by the uncertainty arising from the proposals to set up, by legislative action, some new machinery to undertake this work more or less under parliamentary control. To forward this movement a cry was raised that the National Relief Fund ought not to be used to assist military cases, because the money had been raised to assist civil cases both during and after the war. As an example of the cynical indifference to facts on which this agitation was based, it may be mentioned that a weekly paper in its editorial notes asserted that it was the duty of the Government to look after the families of the soldiers and not to impose on the Prince of Wales' Fund, which was only intended for cases of civil distress arising out of the war. Yet in the news column of the same issue of the paper there was an appeal to the public to support the National Fund to their utmost, and so help the families of the men who were so gallantly fighting in our defence.

That any responsible Government should have been

deceived by an agitation so palpably unfounded illustrates the kind of danger that arises when politicians begin to interfere in the direct handling of difficult social problems. The Government ought to have realised that the only foundation of this clamour was class bias. Of necessity the work of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association was undertaken by persons of the leisured class, for they were the only people who had the necessary time to devote to it. The only question for the Government to ask should have been whether the work was being properly done, not what was the social position of the persons doing it. It may be admitted that in some districts the system adopted for giving assistance played into the hands of those who were manipulating this agitation. In these districts 'almoners' were given certain amounts of money—for which, of course, they had to account—and with this in hand they visited the families on their lists and gave such assistance as they thought fit, afterwards reporting to the local office what had been done in each case. This method was well enough in peace times, when dealing with the few cases that required charitable assistance, but it was wholly unsuited to the new conditions created when the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association became, not the distributors of a private charity, but the accredited agents of the War Office and the National Relief Fund. The retention by certain districts of this system of 'almoners'—a most unfortunate name—to serve out doles at the houses of the poor gave the work an appearance of charity, and provided a plausible case for those who so vigorously denounced the 'vicious system.'

The method of working varied a good deal in different districts, but perhaps that which came nearest to perfection was the one in which a Central Committee was responsible for the general control of the whole district. A number of sub-committees were formed, all working from the one office. Each member of the sub-commitee investigated all cases arising in certain streets which were allotted to him or her, but was not empowered to give out any assistance, or to pledge the committee to any expenditure. All applications had to be made at the office, and particulars of name, address, etc. were entered on a case paper, and this was sent to the investigator for that particular street. In urgent cases the office was allowed to give some assistance pending the meeting

of the sub-committee, at which every case would come up for consideration and the amount to be granted or lent would be decided upon. The women then called at the office for their weekly allowances in the same way as they called at the post office for their Government allowances. Thus there was no personal favour involved, and nothing that could savour of charity; the whole matter was treated as a business transaction. Nor was the investigator open to attack if the committee did not fulfil the expectations of the applicant. The plausible person who might make some impression on a sympathetic lady visitor with a bag of money for disposal lost any such advantage when the case had to be reported for decision to a committee.

As a result of political pressure the Government were induced to obtain the passage through Parliament of a Bill to set up a Statutory Committee which was to take over the work with respect to the provision of pensions, grants, and allowances made in connexion with the present war. But no sooner had the Government surrendered to this clamour and so made itself responsible for the relief work, at a time when its hands were already more than full, than it began to meet with overwhelming difficulties. At first it was proposed that the controllers of the National Relief Fund should have representation on the Statutory Committee provided they allowed a certain amount of their funds to be used for this work; but this scheme fell through as they properly refused to surrender the control of the money entrusted to them by the public. The Government was therefore compelled to find the money for the new Committee, but insisted that appeals should also be made for public subscriptions to assist in providing supplementary grants. Few people outside political circles were surprised when the public failed to voluntarily subscribe to a concern for the expenditure of which the Government was responsible. Any such subscriptions given would have been equivalent to a voluntary increase of the income tax. The million pounds set aside by the Government in the first instance was quickly swallowed up, and though million after million has since followed there seems no likelihood of satisfying the rapacious appetite of this new Committee.

The Government wisely insisted that the expenses of management should be provided by the local authorities. Under the voluntary management of the Soldiers' and Sailors'

Families Association the expenses were extremely small. In some districts they were provided by the workers themselves, whilst paid assistance was almost unknown. But no sooner was the charge put upon the rates than this economy was thrown to the wind. Those who had insisted most loudly upon keeping their districts on a voluntary basis, and who refused paid labour when it was offered, lost no time in sending in their application for rate-aided assistance, and, having secured a paid clerk, immediately applied for further help.

The local authorities responsible for these management expenses are already standing aghast as the total mounts up, and are now urging that the Government should take over the responsibility. Such a transfer of expenditure from the rates to the taxes would be no protection against waste, for those who have dipped deep in the local treasuries will not be likely to hold their hands if they are allowed free access to the national exchequer. Moreover, all local inducements to economy will be removed. If this vast increase of expenditure meant greater efficiency in the work there might be something to place on the credit side, but bold indeed would be the person who dared to claim that the same standard of efficiency that prevailed under voluntary management is now being maintained.

Although the Act setting up this Statutory Committee was passed in December 1915, the members of the Committee were not ready to take up their duties even in London until June 30th 1916, and at a much later date in many other places. Had not the voluntary workers been actuated by motives of pure patriotism and a desire for the continuity of the work they could have repaid the Government's ingratitude by giving notice, on the passing of the Military and Naval Pensions Bill, that in three months they would withdraw from the work and leave it to the new body. If they had done so, indescribable confusion would have followed, causing such horrible suffering as would have undoubtedly involved the fall of the Government. So impossible was it found to replace the voluntary workers that, after nearly six months of vain effort to set up the necessary machinery, the Statutory Committee was still in a hopeless position. The National Relief Fund had given notice that they would cease to finance the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association for this work after the 30th of June 1916, and the Statutory Committee had to send out an S.O.S.

message to all Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association offices asking for assistance. The voluntary workers very largely went to the rescue, and in most cases, as their work under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association was ceasing, they went over to the Statutory Committee ; but many have since fallen out owing to the irritating and needless restrictions on the one hand and the wilful waste on the other. A prominent official connected with one district, asked how they were progressing, remarked ' Oh, it is the same workers, and ' the same office ; it is only the name that is changed.' In another district a gentleman who had gone on to the local committee under the new arrangements, asked if they were experiencing much internal friction, answered ' No, we are ' working very smoothly ; the lady who was previously secretary ' for the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association is now our ' secretary, and she knows everything from A to Z, and of course ' we know nothing of the business, so we leave all to her.' But there are not many districts where a committee which knows nothing of the business acts so sensibly, and consequently internal friction is rife.

One of the worst effects of the change has been to introduce the unhealthy atmosphere of local politics into the relief work. Unfortunately also some of the delegates from working-class associations are too class-conscious to be a success in any judicial position. Working men, when administering their own funds, show a very careful regard for economy, but when administering public money some of them appear to think that virtue only lies in open-handed benevolence.

The Statutory Committee had not proceeded far before the Government found out, what others had foreseen, that it had set up an authority which could indulge in almost unlimited expenditure of public funds with little or no control from Parliament or elsewhere, and which, instead of unifying the administration of pensions and grants, had only added to the number of bodies engaged in this work, and consequently had increased the confusion and delays.

A Ministry of Pensions has therefore been established to take over the powers and duties previously exercised by the Admiralty, the Royal Hospital for Soldiers at Chelsea (other than in-pensions), the Army Council, and the Secretary of State for the War Department, with respect to pensions and grants

to persons who have served as officers or men, and to their widows, children, and other dependents, and persons who have been employed in the nursing service of any of His Majesty's naval or military forces, other than service pensions.

The Statutory Committee is to be subordinate to the Ministry of Pensions and will perform its duties under the control and in accordance with the instructions of the Minister of Pensions, and must render such advice and assistance as that Minister may request. This control is also to extend to the local committees which the Statutory Committee has established under the powers conferred by the Naval and Military War Pensions Act, 1915.

The claim of the municipal bodies to have the expenses of these committees transferred from the local rates to the Treasury thus receives additional weight, so that the political pressure, already being exerted in this direction, must soon become irresistible.

With the Ministry of Pensions asserting its full legal status and the Statutory Committee attempting to retain something of its former powers and authority, friction and jealousy will naturally follow, which will compel the Government to recognise that, having kicked the bottom out of voluntary service, it must accept as an inevitable consequence the establishment of a purely State paid and controlled service. The more this work is brought under State control the more difficult will become the administration of supplementary grants. However carefully rules may be drawn, there will always be hard cases, for a scale which may be even generous in nine cases will not meet the needs of the tenth. The adjustment is easy so long as there is a voluntary service administering private or semi-private funds, but when State servants are administering public money all applicants are equal, and it is not easy to show why such grants should be given to one and not to others. There will also be the danger of political pressure being used for the purpose of obtaining additional grants for political friends and supporters. There are already indications that an attempt will be made to find a solution by making the allowances higher than are necessary in the nine cases so as to meet the needs of the tenth, and this at a time when the nation will find a difficulty in meeting its expenditure.

PRUSSIA, POLAND, AND IRELAND

1. **L'Esprit Public en Allemagne.** Par HENRI MOYSSET. Paris. 1911.
2. **La Crise Politique de l'Allemagne Contemporaine.** Par WILLIAM MARTIN. Paris. 1913.
3. **Das Polnische Gemeinwesen im Preussischen Staat.** Von L. BERNHARD. Leipzig. 1907.
4. **Preussen, Deutschland, und die Polen seit dem Untergang des Polnischen Reichs.** Von HEINRICH GEFFCKEN. Berlin. 1907.
5. **England und Irland.** Von CARL PETERS. Hamburg. 1915.
6. **Poland.** By W. ALISON PHILLIPS. London, n.d.
7. **Discoverie of the True Causes why Ireland was never entirely subdued.** By SIR JOHN DAVIES, Knt. 1612.
8. **A Short History of the Irish People.** By A. G. RICHEY. Dublin and London. 1869–70.

THE Polish problem has entered upon a new phase. So much, but only so much, is certain. It is possible to exaggerate the significance of recent events; it is possible to minimise it; but to ignore it would be something worse than affectation.

On November 5, 1916, General von Beseler, the German Governor of Warsaw, issued a proclamation which may possibly prove to be historic. Professedly, it announced to the Poles the re-establishment of Poland as an independent State, and the guarantee of a Constitution under an hereditary monarchy. The essence of the proclamation is contained in the following paragraph:

'To the Inhabitants of the Government of Warsaw.—His Majesty the German Emperor and His Majesty the Austrian Emperor and Apostolic King of Hungary, sustained by their firm confidence in the final victory of their arms, and guided by the wish to lead to a happy future the Polish districts which by their brave armies were snatched with heavy sacrifices from Russian power, have agreed to form from these districts an independent State with an hereditary Monarchy and a Constitution. The more precise regulation of the frontiers of the Kingdom of Poland remains reserved.'

A proclamation in similar terms was on the same day issued at Lublin by the Austro-Hungarian Governor. Simultaneously the late Emperor Francis Joseph made a further announcement in reference to a fresh concession to his Polish subjects in Galicia. After referring in sympathetic terms to the 'many 'proofs of devotion and loyalty' which during his reign he had received from Galicia, and to the 'great and heavy sacrifices 'which this province, exposed in the present war to a fierce 'enemy assault,' had had 'to bear in the interests of the eastern 'frontiers' of the Empire,' the late Emperor proceeded as follows :

'It is therefore my will, at the moment when the new State comes into existence and coincident with this development, to grant Galicia also the right to manage independently its own internal affairs in as full a measure as this can be done in accordance with its membership of the State as a whole and with the latter's prosperity, and thereby give the population of Galicia a guarantee for its racial and economic development.' *

It may be said at once that, taken by itself, there would be nothing in the proclamation of the Austrian Emperor to excite surprise or suspicion. On the whole, the record of Austria in regard to the treatment of its Polish subjects is or was much cleaner than that of the other partitioning Powers. This fact is admitted and indeed emphasised by Dr. Friedrich Naumann in his recently published *Mitteleuropa*. 'We may,' he writes, 'state frankly that however imperfect are the results of hand-'ling nationalities in Austria and Hungary, there is, never-'theless, much more real understanding there of this type of 'problem than with us.' † Hence, if it had not been for the sinister conjunction of the proclamation of General von Beseler at Warsaw, the words of the Emperor Francis Joseph might have brought a real ray of hope to the Galician Poles. It is not, however, with Austrian policy in Poland that this article is concerned.

The German proclamation wears, by general consent, a very different aspect. It has been assumed in this country and elsewhere that it must be interpreted as one of the many signals of distress which the Central Empires have lately put

* The Times, November 6, 1916.
† Central Europe, p. 79.

out; that it indicates an exhaustion of the available man-power in Germany, a desire to regularise the raising of a large force of Poles, and to induce the Polish recruits to embrace with ardour the cause in which they will be called to fight. That such considerations have weighed heavily with the statesmen of the Wilhelmstrasse is beyond dispute; it may even be that no other motives have inspired this latest move in the development of Prussian policy in Poland; but there is a possibility that reasons rather less obvious have been operating.

The proclamation issued on the 5th of November by order of the German Emperor was addressed to the 'inhabitants of the 'government of Warsaw'—the centre of the Polish districts which had been 'snatched from Russian power'; it is those districts which are to be 'formed into an independent 'State,' and the 'more precise regulation of the frontiers 'of the Kingdom of Poland' is specifically and ominously reserved.* All this may be deemed to be confirmatory of the interpretation commonly placed upon the matter in countries outside the Central Empires. Nevertheless, no critic who is at once candid and informed can ignore the fact that, quite apart from a desire to conciliate the newly-conquered Congress Kingdom of Poland, apart from anxiety to recruit her exhausted armies, Prussia has at least one strong reason for a new departure in her Polish policy. That policy has disastrously failed. For the last forty-five years Prussia has been administering to her own Poles successive doses of coercion, each dose appreciably stronger than the previous one. Each and all have failed to either cure or kill the patient. The Prussian Poles are no more 'Germanised' to-day than when Bismarck embarked upon the policy of intimidation in 1872. No one could be more candid in admitting and deploring this characteristic failure than the influential publicist already quoted:

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* Since these pages went to press the Tsar Nicholas has in the Imperial Order of the Day specifically and solemnly pledged himself to the 'Creation of a free Poland, from all the three at present dismembered provinces.' The Western Allies have also plighted afresh their troth to Poland.

'Prussia,' writes Dr. Naumann, 'took compulsion in one hand and material prosperity in the other, and demanded mental adhesion in exchange. She brought about much material good, but discovered no way to the heart of the Polish people. . . . The German schools have made them useful and industrially capable bilinguists, but not Germans. A Pole remains a Pole, very often even when he goes to live in Berlin or Westphalia. Even as a travelling workman he retains his national character and dreams of other things than the German inspectors who allot him his work.' *

Candid critics are not less numerous in England than in Germany, and among them there are some who have consistently maintained that the treatment of the Poles by Prussia finds a close parallel in English policy in Ireland, and that England, therefore, cannot cast a stone at Prussia. It is superfluous to add that every effort is made by German publicists to disseminate this reading of political history,† and that, in consequence, the doctrine that Ireland is England's Poland is widely accepted in Germany.

No words written in this Review are likely to carry any weight with German readers to-day. But, for the sake of English readers whose consciences may be troubled, it seems worth while to inquire, with such dispassionateness as circumstances permit, how far the suggested parallel can be sustained. To push home that inquiry is the purpose of the pages that follow.

Geographical conditions suggest a preliminary parallel. The temptation to the annexation of West Prussia after the union of the Duchy of East Prussia with the Electorate of Brandenburg was, we may admit, irresistible. Equally certain was it that the Norman adventurers, having conquered England, would, in course of time, attempt the conquest of the isolated island to the west. But between William the Bastard's conquest of England in the eleventh century and Henry the Second's conquest of Ireland in the twelfth there was a striking contrast. The Norman conquest of England was a 'clean job,' and was accomplished in four years. The so-called 'conquest' of Ireland was to the last degree superficial, and was imperfectly accomplished at the end of four

* *Op. cit.* pp. 79–80.

† Cf., for instance, 'England und Irland,' by Carl Peters, cited at the head of this article.

hundred years. The reasons for the divergence have never been more brilliantly analysed than by Sir John Davies, Attorney-General for Ireland in the reign of James I., and to his illuminating book any curious reader may be referred. A couple of sentences, which go to the root of the matter, must here suffice for quotation :

'The first attempt to conquer this Kingdom was but an adventure of a few private gentlemen. . . . We cannot conjecture this army to have been so great as might suffice to conquer all Ireland, being divided into so many principalities and having so many Hydra's heads as it had at that time. For a barbarous country is not so easily conquered as a civil, whereof Cæsar had experience in the wars against the Gauls. A country possessed with many petty Lords and States is not so soon brought under as an entire Kingdom governed by one Prince or Monarch.'

In brief, Ireland was not yet enough of a unity, either social or political, to be susceptible of rapid or complete conquest. The premature attempt proved equally disastrous to the semi-conquerors and to the semi-conquered people. The result was the establishment on the east coast of Ireland of an Anglo-Norman settlement known as the 'Pale': a settlement which, in Mr. Lecky's fine imagery, 'acted like a 'running sore, constantly irritating the Celtic regions beyond 'the Pale and deepening the confusion which prevailed there.' Had the attempted conquest been deferred for two or three centuries the Irish tribes would almost certainly have evolved some semblance of political unity. The planting of a fragment of feudal England on the other side of St. George's Channel served only to arrest spontaneous internal development. The Anglo-Normans were never in sufficient force to conquer the whole island ; the Irish tribesmen were too disunited to expel the Anglo-Normans. A hopeless situation was consequently stereotyped. The Anglo-Normans found Ireland in the tribal stage in the twelfth century ; in that stage it remained in the seventeenth. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the 'Pale' maintained a precarious and ever diminishing hold upon Ireland, by the end of the fifteenth century it was almost extinct.

The Tudors had consequently to confront a difficult problem. The support given to the Yorkist pretenders in Ireland compelled the reluctant attention of Henry VII. ; Sir Edward Poynings was sent over as Deputy ; and the statute known by

his name for the first time defined the constitutional relations of the two countries. The Parliament of Ireland became in 1476, and until 1782 remained, entirely dependent upon the English Privy Council. Henry VIII. made a characteristically vigorous attempt to Anglicise Ireland, and might perhaps have succeeded but for the fatal blunder of attempting to force an essentially 'Anglican' Reformation upon an unprepared and intensely Catholic Ireland.*

From that day onwards the English rulers of Ireland were confronted with an ecclesiastical problem.

Upon the ecclesiastical problem there was soon superimposed an agrarian problem. Throughout a great part of the reign of Elizabeth Ireland was in a state of rebellion. Those rebellions were due in part to the intrigues of the Catholic Powers of the Continent; in part to the ecclesiastical unrest in Ireland; but chiefly to the fear of the Irish tribesmen that they were to be driven from the soil they loved. The fears, though exaggerated, were not wholly groundless, for the 'plantation' of Ireland had now become a fixed policy with English statesmen. Not until the very end of Elizabeth's reign were the rebellions stamped out, and by that time Ireland, as we learn from the terrible description of Edmund Spenser, was almost a desert.†

To this desert the Stuarts succeeded. The reign of James I. was memorable for the plantation of Ulster with English, and, still more predominantly, with Scottish colonists. Thence sprang the Ulster problem, which still baffles British statesmanship. The reign of Charles I. is associated in Irish memories mainly with the names of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford. Strafford was, in many respects, the type of ruler whom the Ireland of the seventeenth century sorely needed: energetic, firm, and essentially enlightened. He repressed aristocratic disorder; he did much for the Church and for education; he gave an immense impulse to the material prosperity of the island. But the 'rule of Thorough' was hateful to the most powerful classes in Ireland, and he secured no permanent pacification. Six months after his execution, the Catholics

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* For Tudor policy in Ireland cf. Richey, 'Short History of the Irish People,' and Bagwell, 'Ireland under the Tudors'—both admirable.

† Cf. Spenser, 'View of the State of Ireland' (1596).

of the North rose in rebellion and massacred every Protestant within their reach.

For that massacre terrible vengeance was ultimately exacted by Cromwell. But Cromwell was no mere avenger of blood. He carried to a logical conclusion the policy of 'plantation'; he abolished the Irish Parliament; he gave to the Irish constituencies representation at Westminster; he admitted Ireland to full partnership in England's trade. His reforms ended with the Commonwealth. The Restoration gave a new turn to the wheel of Ireland's fortune; Cromwell's policy was upset, and after the Revolution of 1688 Ireland had to be again reconquered.

The Treaty of Limerick ushered in the worst period of Anglo-Irish relations. Whig policy in Ireland rested upon a triple foundation: political ascendency, commercial exclusiveness, and the rigid proscription of the Irish Catholics. The assertion (by the declaratory Act of 6 George I.) of the right of the Parliament of Great Britain to legislate for Ireland deprived the Irish Parliament of such remnants of independence as had been left to it by Poynings' Law. The generous commercial policy of Cromwell was reversed, and, by a series of protective measures passed in the interests of English manufacturers and English agriculturists, Ireland was excluded from the English market, and deprived of the right to compete with England in neutral markets. By this means the incipient prosperity of Ireland, noticeable in the seventeenth century, suffered a rude check in the eighteenth, and was never again manifested until at the end of the nineteenth Ireland was economically remade by Sir Horace Plunkett. The cruel proscription to which, in the eighteenth century, the vast majority of the Irish people were subjected under the provisions of the Penal Code is notorious. Burke's fervid denunciation of that code contains no exaggeration:

> 'I must,' he wrote, 'do it justice; it was a complete system, full of coherence and consistency, well digested and well composed in all its parts. It was a machine of wise and elaborate contrivance, and as well fitted for the oppression, impoverishment, and degradation of a people, and the debasement in them of human nature itself, as ever proceeded from the perverted ingenuity of man.'

To capture the three strongholds of Whig policy, the new Irish Party, led by Flood, Grattan, and Charlemont, was

formed. Thanks to the defeat of England in the war of American Secession; thanks to the enrolment of a large force of Protestant volunteers in Ireland; and thanks, not least, to the eloquence of Flood and Grattan, remarkable success attended the agitation, and by 1782 a large part of the programme of the new Irish Party had been triumphantly carried out.

But the movement in the main only affected the Anglo-Irish colony. It hardly touched Celtic Ireland. By the legislation of 1780 Ireland had obtained a considerable instalment of commercial freedom; by that of 1782–3 the chief restrictions upon the independence of the Irish Parliament were removed. The Parliament of Great Britain renounced its right to legislate for Ireland, and the Irish Parliament repealed Poynings' Law. Two of the stumbling-blocks were thus removed; but the third—the political proscription of the Irish Catholics—still remained to trouble Grattan's Parliament.

The experiment of legislative independence lasted from 1782 to 1800. It was very far from being a success. Perhaps the conditions under which it was tried made success impossible. The failure to settle the Catholic question; the suspicion aroused by Pitt's honourable and courageous effort to give Ireland complete commercial equality with England; the hopes aroused by the appointment of Lord Fitzwilliam and the dismay caused by his sudden recall; the excitement engendered by contemporary events in France; the treasonable negotiations of the 'United Irishmen' with the French Republic; the repeated attempts on the part of the French Directory to land troops in Ireland and to sustain an Irish rebellion against England; the outbreak and collapse of the rebellion; the measures taken to stamp out its embers—all these things would have rendered the success of Grattan's experiment exceedingly dubious even had the constitution which goes by his name been a monument of political wisdom and ingenuity. As a fact it was precisely the reverse. It could hardly have lived in a calm sea; in the storms which it encountered it was certain to founder.

The admitted failure of the constitutional experiment in Ireland, coinciding as it did with a serious crisis in the external relations of Great Britain, drove Pitt to the expedient of a

legislative union. That union was at first bitterly opposed by a large section of the Irish people; but the owners of the boroughs which were deprived of representation were generously compensated; the Catholics were induced to acquiesce by a promise of complete emancipation; and the industrial community received a *quid pro quo* in the removal of all restrictions upon Irish trade. As Pitt perceived, the success of the Union depended on a prompt acknowledgment of the Catholic claims. But the prejudices of a half-insane monarch defeated the wisdom of the minister, and Pitt, amid the wreck of his Irish policy, resigned office.

Twenty-nine years later, Daniel O'Connell extorted from the fears of Peel and Wellington what Pitt would have conceded to the claims of justice. Spontaneously offered in 1800, Catholic Emancipation might have added a union of hearts to the union of parliaments. Conceded as a preferable alternative to civil war, after thirty years of suicidal procrastination, a healing measure might well fail to heal. Such ameliorative properties as it might still have possessed were dissipated by the concomitant legislation. The Emancipation Act was immediately followed by an Act disfranchising about 174,000 county electors out of a total of 200,000. These 40-shilling free-holders created by the landlords for their own purposes could no longer be trusted to vote in accordance with instructions.

Then nature came to the assistance of the British legislature. Population, artificially stimulated by landlords, by priests, and by potatoes, at last justified Malthus by outstripping the means of subsistence. A considerable proportion of the overgrown Irish population had long been on the verge of starvation; it succumbed to the disaster of 1846.

The Great Famine is the most important single event in the economic and social annals of modern Ireland. Its significance may, however, be summarised in a sentence. When George III. ascended the throne there were about two-and-a-half million people in Ireland; at Queen Victoria's accession there were eight millions; at her death there were four and a half. Of the eight millions living in 1846, four, it is estimated, depended for subsistence upon Raleigh's 'lazy root.' The root suddenly gave out. Between 1846 and 1851 over a million people emigrated from Ireland, and nearly a million, despite the

utmost efforts of the Government and people of Great Britain, died at home. A further million emigrated in the decade between 1851 and 1861. The emigration conferred a twofold benefit upon Ireland. It relieved hopeless congestion and it succoured those who remained. It is estimated that in the seventeen years following the famine £13,000,000 was sent home from the United States. But the famine affected not only the peasants but the landlords of Ireland. Fully one-third of them were hopelessly ruined, with nothing before them but the cold comfort of the Encumbered Estates Court. This court, set up in 1849, initiated an agrarian revolution, the final stages of which were reached in the Land Purchase Acts associated with the names of Ashbourne and Wyndham.

This agrarian revolution is not only of great intrinsic significance ; it affords also a striking contrast to the agrarian policy pursued by Prussia in Poland. On both grounds it demands something more than a passing reference.

Celtic Ireland had never been really feudalised. The tribal system survived well into the seventeenth century, and was only broken up by the plantation policy of the early Stuarts and Cromwell. The new ' proprietors ' were mostly Protestants ; but, contrary to intention, the native tribal owners, Catholics to a man, remained upon the soil as ' tenants.' These tenants continued to cherish the tradition that they were at least part-owners of the soil they tilled ; and the growth of a tenant-right custom, notably in Ulster, encouraged the idea.

The change in the proprietorship of the land, necessitated by the ruin of the old landlords and facilitated by the Encumbered Estates Act, embittered the relations between tenants and landlords ; for the latter were ' new men ' who had purchased the land on a commercial basis and for commercial purposes.

Agrarian discontent was intensified by the Repeal movement, by the agitation against tithes, and not least by the fiasco of the ' Young Ireland ' rebellion in 1848. Sir Robert Peel, recognising the urgency of the land question, had in 1841 appointed a strong Commission, under the chairmanship of Lord Devon, to ' inquire into the law and practice in respect ' to the occupation of land in Ireland.' The Devon Commission reported in 1845, and a Bill was introduced to give the tenant

compensation for unexhausted improvements. But the Bill met with strong opposition; the Peel ministry fell; and not until 1860 did an English ministry find time to return to a question which was in reality the core of the Irish problem. In that year Mr. Cardwell, one of the most capable of Peel's disciples, attempted to apply Free Trade principles to Irish land tenure. The Act, though well intentioned, was a dead failure. In 1870 Mr. Gladstone passed an Act which was intended to put a stop to capricious evictions; to give the force of law to the Ulster custom of tenant-right wherever such custom was recognisable; to secure to an outgoing tenant compensation for unexhausted improvements; and to facilitate the purchase of holdings by cultivators. The last object was dear to the heart of Mr. Bright, who knew much more about the Irish land system than his chief, and the clauses intended to effect it were known by his name. The purchase scheme was, however, clogged with conditions so complicated as to render it practically inoperative, and the Act, as a whole, did little to solve the land problem. Then came the period in Ireland, as in England, of agricultural depression. Tenants got into arrears with their rents; evictions took place on a large scale; Parnell launched the Land League; outrages multiplied, and in 1881 Gladstone again tried his hand at the land question. The Act of that year was based upon the 'three F's'—free sale, fixity of tenure, and fair rents, to be determined by a land court. It was drafted in defiance of the best Irish opinion and attempted to do the right thing in the wrong way.

The principle of dual ownership, which the Act of 1881 was intended to sanctify and perpetuate, was fundamentally unsound, and until that principle was frankly abandoned no real progress towards a solution of the problem could be made.

The Unionist party, on coming into office in 1885, adopted the principle of land purchase; and Lord Ashbourne's Act, enlarged and elaborated by the Acts of 1888 and 1891, has gone far to transfer the soil of Ireland from big landowners to cultivating owners. Two-thirds of the Irish tenant farmers are now, or will shortly become, owners of the land they till. At last, therefore, the most difficult and the most intimate of all Irish problems is in a fair way towards a satisfactory and permanent solution.

The land question is, however, only one of a sheaf of questions

which in the aggregate constitute the Irish problem. Ecclesiastical, educational, and constitutional questions have demanded, and received, hardly less attention at the hands of the Imperial Legislature.

From the days of Queen Elizabeth to those of Queen Victoria the religious question loomed large on the horizon of Irish politics and baffled the statesmanship of England. Down to the sixteenth century Ireland was less ultramontane in its Catholicism than England ; but the clumsy efforts of the Tudor statesmen to impose Protestantism upon a country utterly unprepared for it served to convert the mass of the Irish people into zealous ' Papists.' The peasantry clung to their traditional creed as they clung to their ancestral soil, partly out of sheer affection, but partly also in opposition to their English rulers.

The 'Orange' policy initiated by the victories of William III. —the penal laws, the proscriptions, the proselytising, and the bribes held out to converts from Catholicism—did little to wean from their faith the mass of the Irish peasants. Gradually the rigours of the Penal Code were relaxed, but the Act of 1829 came, as we have seen, too late to conciliate the Irish Catholics. The grievance of tithes still remained unremedied, and Protestants still held a position of ascendency. The former grievance was removed by the Tithes Commutation Act of 1838; while the Protestant ascendency was finally destroyed by the Disestablishment Act of 1869.

There remained the constitutional problem. Whether, as Lord Rosebery suggests, the legislative union might have solved it had Pitt's intentions been carried out, who can tell ? The fact remains that whereas the working of the Scottish Union very soon dissipated the suspicions with which the measure had, on both sides of the Tweed, been originally regarded, the Irish Union served only to inaugurate a period of more or less persistent agitation. That agitation has not been entirely quenched by the settlement either of the ecclesiastical or of the agrarian problem. Whether the Home Rule Act, now on the Statute Book but not yet in operation, is destined to solve the problem is more than doubtful.

No fair-minded critic can, however, deny that, for at least a century, the British people have been making sincere if somewhat blundering and belated efforts to find a solvent, or a

series of solvents, for the problems with which Ireland has presented them. That it was not always so is a thesis which might be maintained with some plausibility. But the advice of one of the greatest of Irishmen may, in this connexion, be recorded and adopted. 'I have always held,' writes Sir Horace Plunkett, 'that to foster resentment in respect of 'these old wrongs is as stupid as was the policy which gave 'them birth; and, even if it were possible to distribute the 'blame among our ancestors, I am sure we should do ourselves 'much harm, and no living soul any good, in the reckoning. 'In my view, Anglo-Irish history is a thing for Englishmen to 'remember, for Irishmen to forget.' It is finely said. One Englishman has in the foregoing pages endeavoured to recall, for the benefit of Englishmen, some salient facts in the story of Anglo-Irish relations. His own conviction is that the brief recital suggests, on the part of England, not deliberate malignity, still less persistent brutality, but much characteristic unimaginativeness, some crass stupidity, and, above all, a curiously pervasive irony.

'There have been divers good plots devised, and wise counsels cast already about reformation of that realm; but they say it is the fatal destiny of that land that no purposes whatsoever which are meant for her good will prosper or take good effect; which, whether it proceed from the very genius of the soil or influence of the stars, or that Almighty God hath not yet appointed the time of her reformation, or that He reserveth her in this unquiet state still for some secret scourge, which shall by her come into England, it is hard to be known, but yet much to be feared.'

Thus wrote Edmund Spenser, himself one of the colonists of Munster, in 1596. His words are as suggestive at the beginning of the twentieth century as they were at the end of the sixteenth.

To return to the question with which we started. How far does English policy in Ireland supply an appropriate *tu quoque* to Prussians who seek to vindicate their own treatment of Poland?

The earlier relations between Prussia and Poland were recently examined, by the present writer, in the pages of this Review.* The acquisitions of Prussia in the three partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795; the dismemberment of the Prussian

* Edinburgh Review for April 1915.

Kingdom by Napoleon at Tilsit ; the formation, largely at the expense of Prussian Poland, of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw—these matters call for no further commentary. A word, however, must be said as to the treatment of the Polish question at the Congress of Vienna. The Tsar Alexander was, in 1815, master of the situation, and turned it with great adroitness to the advantage of Russia. Prussia was obliged to acquiesce in the establishment of the 'Congress Kingdom'—virtually Napoleon's Grand Duchy of Warsaw—under the rule of the Tsar, and thus to relinquish the greater part of the acquisitions secured by her in the second and third partitions. She managed, however, to retain, not only her share of the partition of 1772, but in addition Posen and Gnesen and the great fortresses of Thorn and Danzig.*

Thanks mainly to Lord Castlereagh, there was inserted in the *Final Act* of the Congress a stipulation which was intended to secure to all the Poles some measure of autonomy. It ran as follows: 'The Poles who are respective subjects of Russia, 'Austria, and Prussia shall obtain a Representation and National 'Institution regulated according to the degree of political 'consideration that each of the Governments to which they 'belong shall judge expedient and proper to grant them.' The Treaty of Vienna concluded (3rd of May 1815) between Russia and Prussia further guaranteed the economic unity of Poland. Article 28 of that treaty ran:

'In order to promote agriculture as much as possible in all parts of ancient Poland, to encourage the industry of its inhabitants and to insure their prosperity, the two High Contracting Parties have agreed that . . . the most unlimited circulation for the future and for ever of all articles of growth and industry shall be permitted throughout their Polish provinces (as it existed in 1772).'*

Finally, as regards Prussian Poland (with which alone we are now concerned), we have the rescript addressed by King Frederick William III. to his subjects in the Grand Duchy of Posen on the 15th of May 1815:

'You are incorporated,' it ran, 'in my monarchy, but you need not, therefore, renounce your nationality. You will enjoy all the advantages of the constitution which I mean to grant to my loyal subjects, and you will receive, like the other provinces of

* Hertslet, 'Map of Europe by Treaty,' i. 113.

my kingdom, a provisional constitution. Your religion shall be respected and its ministers shall receive an endowment suitable to their status. Your personal rights and your property shall be placed under the protection of laws which you will yourselves, in future, have a share in making. The use of your language shall be permitted, equally with German, at public meetings, and you will, each according to his capacity, be eligible for official posts in the Grand Duchy.' *

The sequel will show how far these promises have been fulfilled.

For the first fifteen years after the Congress of Vienna the Prussian Poles had little to complain of. Frederick William III. manifested during that period a real desire to conciliate them. Prince Antony Radziwill, a great Polish nobleman, was nominated to the Viceroyalty of the Grand Duchy of Posen ; Zerboni di Sposetti, also a friend to the Poles, became the first Oberpräsident of the new province ; a large share in local administration was left to the native aristocracy ; the liberal policy of Stein and Hardenberg, by which the serfs of Brandenburg and Prussia had been converted into peasant proprietors, was extended to Posen in 1823, and by 1837 no less than 21,334 peasant freeholds had been created.† Finally, in 1824, a local legislature or Diet was established in Posen.

A sinister change was, however, observable after 1830. The French revolution of that year aroused considerable excitement in Germany. Neither Prussia nor Austria felt the repercussion, but there were outbreaks in Göttingen, in Cassel, in Dresden, in Leipzig and in Brunswick, and not a little ferment in the Liberal south. Metternich dangled the red spectre of revolution before the eyes of Frederick William III. and induced him to embark upon a reactionary policy. Another cause contributed to his fears. In November 1830 a revolution broke out in the Congress Kingdom, and, although there was no actual insurrection in Prussian Poland, some 12,000 Prussian Poles went to the assistance of their brethren in the kingdom. Their action was, needless to say, in no way countenanced by the King of Prussia. On the contrary, the attitude of Frederick William III. was of considerable assistance to the Tsar, and,

* Gesetzsammlung für die Koenigl. Preussisch. Staaten, 1815, p. 47, ap. Moysset, p. 5.

† Phillips, 'Poland,' p. 182.

according to the most recent historian of Germany, 'contributed 'directly to the recovery of Warsaw by the Russians.'*

The consequences of the abortive rising of 1830 were hardly less grave for the Prussian Poles than for those under the rule of Russia. The Viceroyalty—the most conspicuous emblem of the quasi-independence hitherto enjoyed by Posen—was abolished; and Zerboni was superseded as Oberpräsident by Eduard Heinrich von Flotwell, who was sent to Posen to carry out a policy of thorough Prussianisation. Flotwell lost no time in getting to work, and for ten years (1830–1841) he ruled his province with a rod of iron. The native nobles were deprived of all share in local administration; the bureaucratic methods dear to the Brandenburger were on all sides introduced; the convents and monasteries were suppressed and their property secularised; heavily encumbered properties were bought on a large scale by the government, only Germans were accepted as purchasers, and a deliberate policy of expropriation was initiated.

The accession of Frederick William IV. (1840) brought some relief to the Prussian Poles; but the concessions then made did not survive the upheaval of 1848. The spirit of '48, with its appeal to the nationality principle, could not leave the Poles unmoved. The outbreak of the March revolution in Berlin gave the signal for an insurrectionary movement in Posen. A 'national' army of 25,000 men was organised; a provisional government was set up, and a formal demand was made for the fulfilment of the pledges given, in 1815, by Frederick William III.

The Polish cause evoked a good deal of sympathy among the German Liberals and even in Prussia itself. Nor is this remarkable in view of the fact that Poles were in the forefront of the battle for political liberty in many parts of Germany, and indeed of other countries. The influence of the Poles of the dispersion upon the movement of 1848, as Mr. H. A. L. Fisher has pointed out, has been curiously ignored. They were to be

'found in the Saxon riots of '48; in the Berlin barricades; in the struggle for the Republic in Baden; in the Italian and Hungarian wars of liberation. . . . Homeless and fearless, schooled in war

* Sir A. W. Ward, 'History of Germany,' p. 232.

and made reckless by calamity, they have been the nerve of revolution wherever they have been scattered by the wind of misfortune.' *

This being so it can occasion little surprise that the Prussian authorities should have hastened to repress the insurrectionary movement in Posen—still less that Bismarck should from the very outset of his career have regarded Poland with a jealous eye. 'No one can doubt that an independent Poland would 'be the irreconcilable enemy of Prussia, and would remain so 'until they had conquered the mouth of the Vistula and every 'Polish-speaking village in West and East Prussia, Roumania, 'and Silesia.' Thus wrote Bismarck as far back as 1848. His conviction was not weakened by the abortive insurrection which broke out in the Congress kingdom in 1863. 'The Polish 'question,' said Bismarck in that year to Sir Andrew Buchanan, 'is a matter of life and death to us.' The help afforded by Bismarck to Russia during the Polish insurrection of 1863 laid the foundation of his whole diplomatic edifice. Not only was it 'a matter of life and death' to Bismarck that the Russian Poles should be suppressed; it was not less important that Russia should be laid under an obligation to Prussia. The fruits of the friendship then established were gathered in Schleswig-Holstein, at Sadowa, and at Sédan.

Not until those fruits were safely garnered had Bismarck leisure to deal with his own Poles. His Polish policy wears more than one aspect. One is suggested by a story told by M. Moysset. A Polish *grande dame* visiting a sick peasant was amazed to see side by side the portraits of Pope Leo XIII., Kosciusko, and Bismarck. 'Is Bismarck,' she asked, 'held in equal honour in your house with the 'Holy Father and our national hero?' 'Certainly,' was the reply, 'for that is the great man who has revealed to 'me, a poor peasant, that I have indeed a Polish fatherland.' †

To Bismarck more perhaps than to any other single man the Prussian Pole owes the realisation of the fact that the Poles possess a real national unity, a real national identity. How did Bismarck succeed in evoking that sentiment?

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* 'The Republican Tradition in Europe,' by H. A. L. Fisher, p. 213.

† *Op. cit.* p. 30—an admirable study, to which my obligations are numerous and heavy.

It was evoked by persistent persecution. The attack was first directed against the religion and the education of the Poles. 'The necessity for starting the *Kulturkampf* * was 'imposed upon me,' Bismarck himself confessed in his 'Recollections,' 'by the Polish side of the question.' His ultimate aim was to Prussianise and to protestantise the soul of Poland. He began, therefore, with the schools. A law of the 11th of March 1872 took away the inspection of schools from the clergy and placed it in the hands of government officials. In 1873 the German language was made the exclusive medium for secular instruction, and even for religious instruction, when the pupils were sufficiently advanced to understand it. Two years later attempts were made, though without success, to prevent the use of the native tongue at public meetings. But the curious combination of nationalism and ultramontanism proved too strong even for Bismarck. 'We will not go to Canossa,' he had boastfully announced, 'either in the flesh or in the spirit.' Pope Leo XIII. was no Hildebrand; yet in the end Bismarck found himself in the neighbourhood of Canossa, though by a circuitous route, and a compromise was effected. The agreement with the Papacy brought no advantage to the Poles. On the contrary, it enabled Bismarck to take further steps towards the Germanisation of the Polish children. After Bismarck's fall the pressure was relaxed owing to Caprivi's need of the support of the Polish parliamentary party in carrying the Army Bills. But the relaxation was only temporary. The formation, in 1894, of the *Deutscher Ostmarken-Verein* announced the initiation of a fresh attempt to Germanise the Eastern marches of the Empire. Association has, however, been countered by association. The use of the Polish tongue, so far from being abandoned, has ominously increased. Polish names are more than ever conspicuous on the sign-boards of the shops. Even the children have been driven into revolt. In 1902 the members of the Prussian Landtag learnt, to their disgust, that Polish children had been cruelly flogged for refusing to say the Lord's Prayer in German. In 1906 German was rein-

* Cf. Martin. *op. cit.* p. 171. 'La question polonaise, c'est le culturkampf, qui, sous une forme nouvelle, se survit depuis vingt-cinq ans.'

troduced as the medium for religious instruction ; as a result, 400,000 children went ' on strike.' The attempt to capture the schools in the interests of ' Germanisation ' has proved, therefore, not merely a failure, but a ridiculous failure. Contrast the policy of the British Government which pays considerable sums for the teaching of the Irish language, and even bribes Irishmen with State scholarships and prizes to learn the language of their ancestors.

Economic experiments in Poland have met with no better success than educational. Since the year 1886 Prussia has expended some £60,000,000 in an attempt to plant Germans on the soil of Poland ; nearly 1,000,000 acres of land have been acquired, and about 450 new villages have been built. But if the effort of the Germanisers has been prodigious, they have been more than countered by that of the Poles. The latter met the policy of colonisation by a policy of co-operation. The work of the *Ansiedelungs-Kommission* was more than matched by that of the Polish Agricultural Unions, Land Banks, and Credit Societies. The intrusion of the Government into the estate-market sent up the price of land ; some Poles took advantage of the artificially-inflated price to sell out and invest the proceeds either in trade or in land elsewhere ; but most of the land purchased by the Government was acquired from Germans who were anxious to escape from an ineligible neighbourhood ; with the final result that there are said to be more Polish landowners to-day than when Bismarck embarked on the ' plantation ' policy in 1886. Well might a Pole declare, 'C'est un vaudeville ' historique ' ; not without reason did the Polish peasant put Bismarck side by side with Kosciusko and the Pope. The result is a triumph for moral as against material forces. As M. Martin has admirably put it :

' C'est en Pologne surtout que la question sociale est une question morale. Ainsi s'explique, mieux que par les secrets d'une organisation savante, mais fortuite, et à laquelle les allemands peuvent opposer d'autres forces efficaces, la défaite de l'argent prussien par le patriotisme polonais.' *

Can the same thing be said of England and Ireland ? I submit, on the contrary, that Anglo-Irish relations present not a parallel but a contrast.

* *Op. cit.* p. 193.

British gold has been poured out in order to transform the Irish tenants into occupying owners and thus root them permanently in their native soil; Prussian gold has been lavishly expended in a futile effort to expropriate the Polish landowners and to plant Germans in their place. England, during the last hundred years, has been making amends for the blunders of the past by admitting Irish Catholics to full civil rights; by endowing Catholic seminaries; by establishing a Catholic University; by disestablishing and disendowing the Church of the Ascendency. Prussia has been engaged in a *Kulturkampf* which in its origin was admittedly aimed at the Catholics of Poland. The British Government has subsidised the teaching of Irish in Irish schools; the Government of Prussia has done all in its power to eradicate the use of the native Polish tongue.

That England's past record in Ireland is clean no candid student will affirm; but the attempt to find a parallel with Prussian policy in Poland must, to be successful, involve remote historical research. There was 'plantation' in the seventeenth century; there were persecution and proscription in the eighteenth; but the nineteenth was in the main devoted, sometimes with lack of tact, though never of good will, to the task of atonement and reparation.

So far Prussia has not even pretended that she means to embark upon a similar policy in Poland. The failure of Bismarckian ruthlessness has never been acknowledged. The Kaiser has not announced any reversal of his Polish policy. All that the proclamation of the 5th of November does is to promise some form of independence to Russian Poland under a German monarch. The status of Prussian Poland remains unchanged.

J. A. R. Marriott.

FRENCH AND ENGLISH GENIUS

1. **Jean-Jacques Rousseau et les origines du Cosmopolitisme Littéraire. Étude sur les relations littéraires de la France et de l'Angleterre au xviiie siècle.** Par JOSEPH TEXTE. Deuxième édition. Paris: Hachette. 1909.
2. **Bolingbroke and Voltaire in England.** By PROFESSOR CHURTON COLLINS. Murray. 1886.

IN a well-known passage of his 'Littérature Anglaise' Taine says:

'There are different varieties of men just as there are different varieties of bulls and horses, some brave and intelligent, others timid and limited, some capable of superior creations and conceptions, others reduced to rudimentary ideas and inventions, some more particularly adapted to particular occupations and more richly provided with certain instincts—just as we see some breeds of dogs better endowed than others for coursing, fighting, hunting, for the guardianship of houses and flocks.' *

For Taine these varieties of humanity were ultimately, if not exclusively, determined by differentiation of race. The Italian was passionate and lyrical, the Frenchman pleasure-loving and positivist, the Englishman proud and bilious by the action of the same causes as those which make the greyhound swift or enable the collie to count sheep. It is the fashion not to take Taine too seriously to-day. One of his own compatriots has said of him that, though he was a magnificent pointer, he unfortunately lacked scent.

This, like most epigrams, is an exaggeration; but it is the exaggeration of a truth. Taine's objectivism was at times very naively personal, and he was essentially an *esprit simplificateur*. The world contains various kinds of men, but, on the whole, races are more mixed than aptitudes. Race is no doubt an important factor in the constitution of the various groups of men, and in certain matters, as we shall see, a dominant factor. But there are others. Political and climatic conditions, to mention nothing else, have a great deal to do with the variations of aptitude observable. Nevertheless, these

* Introduction of La Littérature Anglaise.

variations, however we analyse them, are, at all events in our present state of development, ultimate facts which we can in no way evade: with which we must inevitably reckon in that exploitation of experience which in some form or other is our proper function.

If reason guided the collective energies of humanity the different varieties of men would co-operate for this purpose. 'L'exploitation complète du globe terrestre exige le travail 'combiné des hommes blancs, jaunes, noirs,' * says Anatole France. As things are, difference begets sometimes only indifference, but frequently hatred. We dislike our neighbour because he is taller or shorter, darker or fairer, than we are. We dislike him because he takes his meals at different times, because he drinks wine instead of tea for breakfast, because he worships other gods than ours. Individuals may overcome this dislike by the use of reason, but it has to be overcome. It is an instinctive feeling, and strong in proportion to the weakness of the individual's mentality. Politicians coerce this instinct in the national interests by alliances and treaties with foreign nations, by means of which danger from the hostility of other foreigners may be guarded against. Thus in Europe we used to have the 'balance of Power.' Alliances are usually geographical in basis and purely political in object. Sometimes, however, they spring out of some more genuine affinity often due to mixture of race between the parties, or to similarity of policy, religion, or idea. The Anglo-French alliance, which has been so often broken and renewed and which stands to-day on so firm a basis, has in its time reflected all these characteristics. It has been at one time merely political, at another merely ideal, and on occasion both.

On April 29, 1572, Charles IX. signed at Blois, on the advice of Coligny, a treaty with Elizabeth of 'confederation and 'alliance' by which the two sovereigns promised each other 'un secours mutuel contre toute attaque faite sous n'importe 'quel prétexte sans exception.' The treaty of Blois was directed against the European hegemony of Philip II. Coligny explained to the English agent, Middlemore, that 'ce prince 'n'avait d'autre but que de s'emparer de la monarchie uni-'verselle de la chrétienté.' Elizabeth, however, would not hear

* Sur la Pierre Blanche, p. 230.

of the French seizing the Low Countries. She was only willing to co-operate with them against Philip on the distinct understanding that the Low Countries remained Dutch. The French indeed with their immense coastline on the Atlantic had no need of the Low Countries, and it was then as ever since essential for England that no great maritime power should be established opposite her on the shores of the North Sea. The independence of Scotland rendered this consideration even more imperative in those days. The Anglo-French Alliance was renewed by Henry IV. whom Elizabeth assisted in the days when he was conquering his throne.

Europe was in fact dividing itself into two groups of nations: the Austro-Spanish group under the leadership of the house of Hapsburg and supported by the Pope, and the Anglo-French group which represented progress and was the effective obstacle to the ambition of the Spanish King. It is interesting to note that while the Austro-Spanish group was essentially religious, it was the human and secular interests of the French and the English that held their alliance together in spite of religious differences. France, after a good deal of internal disturbance, was making up her mind for the definite rejection of Protestantism, and England, under her excommunicated Queen, was becoming less Catholic every day.

In 1585 Elizabeth declined the Crown of the Netherlands offered her by the States-General. She underlined by this judicious refusal the indication of policy which she had given Coligny in 1572. The Netherlands were to remain independent of either the French or the English Crown. In July 1593 Henry of Navarre signed his profession of Catholic faith and became King of France. But he could not have kept himself on his throne, even if he could have attained it, without the help of England, the Low Countries, and the German princes—in fact of the Protestant group. That this help was generously given was greatly due to Elizabeth, in spite of her personal disapproval of Henry's change of religion.

Richelieu, who became Prime Minister of France in 1624, remained in principle faithful to this policy, i.e. the *entente* with England, the independence of the Low Countries, and resistance to the hegemony of the house of Hapsburg. But in order to destroy the pretensions of the Protestant nobility, who formed a serious obstacle to the unity of France as he

conceived it, he found himself obliged to quarrel with England. Mazarin, who succeeded him in 1643 as minister to Anne of Austria and the infant Louis XIV., and who brought to a final and successful issue the long contest with the Hapsburgs, renewed the English alliance.

It is not our purpose to dwell at length on the history of the merely political relations of France and England. So much as has been said concerning the first Anglo-French *entente* of modern times is perhaps not without interest in the light of the present alliance of the two countries. Once more, as in the days of Elizabeth, we are allied with France with a strange similarity of object—the independence of Flanders and the destruction of the claim of one racial group to overshadow the liberties of Europe.

When, by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, Louis XIV. condemned to exile 400,000 Frenchmen, he was doing something which produced consequences on the world in general as well as on his own country, which he was no doubt far from foreseeing. The revocation, apart from its sectarian bias, was an attempt to preserve the national spirit from foreign admixture. Protestant ideas were foreign ideas. Although the French were a mixed race, by no means without a Germanic element, the form of their civilisation as well as their strongest racial constituent was Latin, and Protestantism was not a Latin idea. The effect of the revocation was in fact strangely different. The exiles took French culture abroad with them, and, by this bridge, the French mind, hitherto completely self-contained, entered into communication with England described by Madame de Stael as 'la plus illustre des nations germaniques'—and subsequently with Germany. The refugees played the part of interpreters between Germanic Europe and Latin Europe. The result was a transformation of the French mind, which by the middle of the eighteenth century had already made itself unmistakably felt. Garat, in his 'Mémoires sur 'Luard,' writing about that date says 'Dès longtemps, il n'y 'avait plus aucun moyen de douter que les croisements des 'races perfectionnent toutes les espèces végétantes et vivantes, 'et l'épreuve faite depuis trente ans sur une seule nation voisine, 'l'Angleterre' haddemonstrated the fertility resulting from the 'croisement des esprits qui ont aussi leurs races.'

Garat's sentiment would have been unintelligible to a

Frenchman of the *grand siècle*. Both English politics and English religion were then odious in France. 'Nation coupable 'et plus agitée en sa terre et dans ses ports que l'océan qui 'l'environne,' was Bossuet's verdict. In 1654 Père Coulon, a Jesuit, wrote the first French guide-book for travellers to England under the title of 'Le Fidèle Conducteur pour le voyage 'de l'Angleterre.' This work reflects with amusing fidelity the popular feeling towards England :

'Elle a été autrefois le séjour des anges et des saints, et à présent elle est l'enfer des démons et des parricides. Mais pour cela elle n'a pas changé de nature, elle est toujours en sa place, et de même que dans les enfers la justice du Tout-Puissant y est accompagnée de miséricorde, ainsi dans cette île abominable tu pourras remarquer les vestiges de l'ancienne piété, et les remuements et les bouleversements de la brutalité d'un peuple enragé, quoique stupide et septentrional.'

After this geographical anticlimax the good Father continues for the encouragement of his readers :

'Puisque Jules César eut bien autrefois le courage et la curiosité de s'embarquer sur les rivages de Calais, pour aller chercher un monde nouveau au delà de nos mers, et joindre à son empire des provinces que la nature a séparées de nos terres par un autre élément, notre voyageur ne doit point appréhender de passer en Angleterre et de suivre les vents et la fortune, qui ont autrefois conduit heureusement ce maître de l'univers au port de Douvres. . . . Je ne conseille pas à un voyageur de s'engager bien avant dans ce pays, que la nature a mis sous un climat fâcheux, et comme aux extrémités du monde, pour nous en fermer l'entrée. Il vaut mieux reprendre la route de la France.'

The English language was only known in France as a barbarous jargon. Corneille showed his friends as a rare curiosity an English version of the *Cid* which he kept in his library next Turkish and Slavonic translations of the poem. In 1665 the 'Journal des Savants' could not find a correspondent capable of translating the *Proceedings of the Royal Society*. 'Les 'Anglais ont beaucoup de bons ouvrages : c'est dommage que 'les auteurs de ce pays-là n'écrivent guère que dans leur langue,' says Le Clerc. La Mothe le Vayer was almost unique in his knowledge of English—a peculiarity explained by the no less unusual fact that his wife was Scotch. Very few English books had been translated by 1700 ; Bacon, whose Essays were translated by a certain Jean Baudouin in 1611, some works of

Hobbes, and the ' Arcadia ' of Sidney, were among them. Saint-Evremond, exiled in London, though he does not mention Shakespeare speaks in a letter to Mme de Mazarin of Ben Jonson, and refers to the English drama ' qui donne trop aux ' sens ' as containing novel and strong beauties of which French literature is incapable. Saint-Evremond was an almost solitary exception. The France of the seventeenth century was as a whole closed to ' Germanic ' literature. The map of literary Europe was bounded for the French by the Alps, the Rhine, and the Channel. Louis XIV. asked De Comminges, his Ambassador at the Court of St. James, whether there were any writers or learned men in England.

The Ambassador replied :

' Il semble que les arts et les sciences abandonnent quelquefois un pays pour en aller honorer un autre à son tour. Présentement elles ont passé en France et, s'il en reste ici quelques vestiges, ce n'est que dans la mémoire de Bacon, de Morus, de Buchanan, et, dans les derniers siècles d'un nommé Miltonius qui s'est rendu plus infâme par ses dangereux écrits que les bourreaux et les assassins de leur roi.'

It may be doubted whether, if the French had known our literature better, they would have appreciated it. The famous quarrel of ' the Ancients and Moderns ' was merely a quarrel between Rome and Paris. There was no quarrel as to principles, no desire to substitute a novel for an old-fashioned conception of man. The disputants in that famous debate were merely discussing whether progress was possible on the lines of the models of antiquity. No one dreamed of the impiety of suggesting other models. It is this limitation that makes the weakness of the moderns in the controversy. To oppose the literature of Racine and Corneille to the works of antiquity was in reality to do no more than oppose antiquity to itself. The purest genius of such moderns was still the genius of antiquity. Of a literature free from classical influence, grown spontaneously on its own soil—in a word, of a purely national literature—they had no idea. The forms of their intellectual expression, great as their intelligence was, were the traditional forms of the Latin spirit, which imprisoned their minds as the exquisitely damascened *seicento* corselets confined their bodies, in accordance with what had already almost become an archaic tradition of the classical art of war. But the world was on the point of change.

As already stated, the principal effect of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 was to form colonies of Frenchmen outside the limits of France, in England and the Low Countries. There was a strong dose of rationalism in French Protestants. They would not have been Protestants if they had not had inquiring minds; and although their theory of Biblical inspiration and authority was no doubt strictly parallel to the authority of the Church invoked by Catholics, it worked out very differently, except in very special circumstances. Documents, whatever the abstract sanctity attached to them, could not fetter minds for long. Moreover, while Protestantism was nothing but a religion, Catholicism was a great deal more. The Church, the strongest and most authentic embodiment of the Latin spirit, had penetrated during its long domination every part of life, and its tendency in every direction was conservative. The vast corpus of Canon Law was still the most important part of the Law of the Kingdom; there existed a definite Catholic point of view even on the most purely non-religious subjects. It is this, perhaps, that explains—what to Protestants is so inexplicable—that curious and quite sincere attachment of profoundly irreligious persons to the Church. Catholics, as such, do not like changes of any sort. Protestants, on the other hand—in those days, at all events—were out for spiritual adventures. They welcomed the novel intellectual conditions of the countries of the exile.

England became the home of most of these refugees. Some authorities place the number of refugees in England as high as 80,000. Before the Revolution they were not so numerous. Neither of the last two Stuart kings liked Protestants or was given to the practice of the Catholic works of mercy. But after 1688 they crowded to London, where they found shelter, pensions, and places. And well they paid for the hospitality they received. They became the impassioned advocates of the new sovereigns before Europe. They united with the Whigs and raged mightily against Sacheverell. In 1709 their friends obtained their naturalisation from Parliament. It is in this Protestant colony of London that we must look for the beginnings of that cosmopolitan spirit which was to play so great a part in the Europe of the eighteenth century. The men who were informed by it—'esprits moyens, mais sin-'gulièrement informés et remuants,' says M. Texte—were not

filled with much original genius. It was rather their 'indefatigable mediocrity' that made them as successful as they were. Many took to writing in English, such as Pierre Antoine Motteux who founded—with a self-confidence which we may hope was rewarded by success—a monthly journal called 'The Gentleman.' Motteux also wrote plays in English for the London stage. The refugees frequented the Rainbow Coffee-house in the rustic suburb of Marylebone, which became in consequence a sort of clearing-house for the Continent of information on English affairs. The president of the circle, Pierre Dandé, a Clerk of the Treasury, was a fervent Baconian, and passed for the supreme authority on English philosophy and theology. The Rainbow was the scene of constant discussion on every imaginable subject. The refugees were historians, journalists, playwrights, and theologians. They had the facile tendency to omniscience among their limitations. Desmaizeaux—publisher, translator, compiler, journalist—is a typical specimen of their intellectual activity. He became the biographer of Bayle, Saint-Evremond, and Boileau; contributed to all the journals of Holland as well as London; corresponded officially with the 'Journal des Savants' and with Leibnitz. He wrote in English the lives of Chillingworth and Hales, and produced the unpublished works of Newton, Clarke, and Collins—not to speak of an enormous private correspondence still buried in the archives of the British Museum.

The first task of the refugees was to popularise English philosophy. Locke published several of his writings in the *Bibliothèques* of Le Clerc. Pierre Coste published the first translation of the 'Essay on the Understanding,' in 1700. Coste assisted the philosopher on his deathbed. The Dutch papers, managed and written by French refugees, openly undertook the propagation of his ideas. The political ideas of England also appealed to them. They spread in Europe the knowledge of the British Constitution. The 'Journal Littéraire,' published at the Hague, abounded in praises of William III., and stigmatised France as an 'impure Babylone notre marâtre 'patrie.' On all questions of reform in France, they were naturall yon the revolutionary side. Rapin-Thoyras published in 1724 at the Hague a history of England in eight volumes, which became a classic. The book, which is really a history of the development of Parliamentary institutions in England, is the first

attempt at a philosophy of English politics. Tindal, a nephew of the Deist writer, translated it. It is doubtful whether any book has ever done more to make England known to Europe.

So persistent an effort could not fail of success. Little by little a public opinion favourable to the new England was formed in France. The majority of Frenchmen no doubt still sympathised, through political and religious tradition, with the Stuarts; but gradually Jacobite sympathies lost ground. Fénelon, informed by Ramsay of the details of the British Constitution, dreamed of a government which should leave kings 'all-powerful for good and powerless for evil,' an ideal which the British Constitution had perhaps hardly reached. After the death of Louis XIV., the Regent concluded an alliance with England, and pro-English sympathies became the fashion of the day in France.

The refugees had done a great deal, but more was needed to conquer completely the sympathies of France than the buzzings of the busy beehives of Marylebone and Amsterdam. A man of genius was wanted. One of the very greatest was waiting to come on the stage of literary Europe. But in his enthusiasm for England Voltaire, as befitted the Messianic role which he enjoyed so much, had a precursor who was also a man of genius. The Abbé Prévost, whose literary fame is mainly founded on his immortal 'Manon Lescaut,' was the author of many other works which at the time enjoyed a greater success than that piteous tragedy. In 1728 he broke with the Church, having been forced to leave the Abbey of which he was an unworthy monk, and fled to England. The Church's loss was the world's gain. Prévost, established as a secretary in the house of an English lord, appears to have greatly enjoyed his first visit to England, which lasted some three or four years. A scandal—the susceptible creature was always getting into trouble through his affections—obliged him to leave his pleasant post somewhat abruptly for Holland, whence he returned in 1733 accompanied by a young woman. The pair were but coldly welcomed at the Rainbow; the refugees were only *libertins d'esprit*. Prévost, however, braved their frowns and settled down with his young friend to write the novels of cosmopolitan life that soon acquired him an immense reputation in France. The most interesting of these is the 'Mémoires 'd'un homme de qualité,' which may still be read for its vivid picture of the English life of the period. Few books have

contributed more, in the author's words, 'à faire connaître 'parmi nous un pays qui n'est pas aussi estimé qu'il devrait 'être des autres peuples de l'Europe parce qu'il ne leur est pas 'assez connu.' Prévost truly said that he laboured for the destruction of 'certains préjugés puérils, qui sont ordinaires à 'la plupart des hommes, mais surtout aux Français, et qui les 'portent à se donner fièrement la préférence sur tous les autres 'peuples de l'univers.' The Spanish and Oriental scenes among which the *homme de qualité* wanders are not of any particular merit, but the pictures of English daily life, drawn as they were from nature, are admirable and arresting. Its pages are full of little *tableaux de mœurs* surely and lightly touched in by the hand of a master. We are shewn a masked ball at the Haymarket, what Prévost calls 'un combat de gladiateurs, 'ou plus exactement une partie de boxe suivie d'un combat 'au sabre, espèce d'école où la jeunesse va se former à l'intré-'pidité, au mépris de la mort et des blessures'; we follow the hero on an English tour which gives occasion for any amount of fine and exact observation. There is an amusing and valuable description of Tunbridge Wells in which we learn that chocolate and coffee were sold on the Pantiles for six sous a cup; that at the balls one met 'grisettes à côté des duchesses,' and that gallant adventures were the order of the day. 'Si ce lieu 'charmant avait subsisté du temps des anciens, ils n'auraient 'pas dit que Vénus et les Grâces faisaient leur résidence à 'Cythère.' This was a new view of the English character for the French public, and it is to be feared that the amiable weaknesses so charmingly recounted by the exiled Abbé won favour where the solid political and social virtues that formed the topic of the learned tomes of the Protestant refugees had failed to create more than a somewhat chilly respect. Prévost does not however deal solely with the lighter side of English life. He speaks of the poets, quotes Milton, Spenser, Addison and Thomson, and notes that the drama flourishes. His opinion here seems a little exaggerated. He declares that he has read nothing in Greek or French to equal the works performed on the English stage 'pour la beauté des sentiments, soit tendres, 'soit sublimes, pour cette force tragique qui remue le fond du 'cœur et qui excite infailliblement les passions dans l'âme la 'plus engourdie.'

His most enthusiastic pages deal with the national character. Everything pleases him and primarily the atmosphere of per-

sonal liberty. 'Quelle leçon de voir, dans un café, un ou deux 'milords, un chevalier baronnet, un cordonnier, un tailleur, 'un marchand de vin, et quelques autres gens de même trempe,' all seated round the same table and familiarly discussing, pipe in mouth, public affairs! 'Les Cafés'—unlike their degenerate descendants the public-houses of to-day—'sont comme le siège 'de la liberté anglaise.' His enthusiasm for the English character is thoroughly exploited in his 'Philosophe anglais 'ou Histoire de Monsieur Cleveland fils naturel de Cromwell,' which appeared before 1739. Cleveland is an absurd and impossible person who wanders over oceans and continents as a sort of missionary of progress without his philosophy once failing him. He suffers from only one weakness, 'le spleen, 'espèce de délire frénétique qui est plus commun parmi les 'Anglais que parmi les autres peuples de l'Europe . . . c'est 'la plus dangereuse et la plus terrible des maladies.' He however triumphs over the haunting temptation of suicide caused by *le spleen* as an English philosopher may be expected to do.

In process of time Prévost returned to France and as chaplain to the Prince de Conti, by means of whose influence he had become a secular priest, continued the remarkable journal 'Le Pour et le Contre' devoted to the diffusion of English ideas in France which he had commenced during his exile. 'Le 'Pour et le Contre' was a sort of encyclopædic review of everything English. The foreword promises 'un ouvrage périodique 'd'un goût nouveau, dans lequel on s'explique librement sur 'tout ce qui peut intéresser la curiosité du public.' He proposes to satisfy the recently formed taste of his compatriots —he had largely created it himself—for precise, varied, abundant information. Among his proposed topics, two take important places, 'le caractère des dames distinguées par 'le mérite' and 'les faits avérés qui paraîtront surpasser le 'pouvoir de la nature.' He is chronicler and gazetteer, gives prescriptions against smallpox and apoplexy, discusses volcanic eruptions, Egyptian mummies and giant aloes, and sweetens his pages with erotic verses and 'échos mondains.' He never forgets his principal object.

'Ce qui sera tout à fait particulier à cette feuille, je promets d'y insérer chaque fois quelque particularité intéressante touchant le génie des Anglais, les curiosités de Londres et des autres parties

de l'île, les progrès qu'on y fait tous les jours dans les sciences et les arts, et de traduire même quelquefois les plus belles scènes de leurs pièces de théâtre.'

Certainly Voltaire's way as an interpreter of England to France was made straight before him.

It was during the first year of the publication of 'Le Pour et 'le Contre' in London that that illustrious man's 'Lettres 'Anglaises' appeared. Of this important work, M. Texte says :

'À tous égards, les "Lettres Philosophiques" ou "Anglaises"—car Voltaire a employé les deux titres—sont une œuvre capitale. D'elles datent la campagne ouverte contre le christianisme qui va remplir le siècle : d'elles enfin, et surtout, cet esprit nouveau, dédaigneux des questions d'art, réformateur et raisonneur, batailleur et pratique, plus soucieux de politique ou de science que de poésie ou d'éloquence, curieux pardessus tout d'une littérature d'action et de propagande d'esprit du siècle, qui se cherchait depuis trente ans, s'est reconnu dans ce livre. Les "Lettres Anglaises" sont les lettres de majorité du xviiie siècle.

'Elles marquent aussi, dans le développement de l'influence Anglaise, un pas décisif. Il faut en croire ici les contemporains : "Cet ouvrage, a dit Condorcet, fut parmi nous l'époque d'une révolution ; il commença a y faire naître le goût de la philosophie et de la littérature anglaises, à nous intéresser aux mœurs, à la politique, aux connaissances commerciales de ce peuple, à répandre sa langue parmi nous." Du moins Voltaire eut-il le mérite de redire avec esprit, verve et cynisme quelques vérités éparses chez ses précurseurs, et qui n'étaient pas encore du domaine public.'

M. Texte is certainly right in discounting Condorcet's excessive estimation of the intrinsic originality of Voltaire's propaganda. The effect of that propaganda can hardly be estimated too highly. In those days practically everyone who could read, read Voltaire, and much that in the works of his precursors would have speedily been forgotten lost its heaviness and pedantry and acquired new life when reproduced by his magic pen.

Voltaire disembarked at Greenwich on May the 30th, 1726. The day was Whit-Monday. The Greenwich Fair was being held and it happened to be the King's birthday. The weather, as he notes, was beautiful and he observed with the liveliest interest the two lines of merchant ships drawn up to salute the royal barge which, rowed by men in gorgeous liveries and preceded by boats containing the Court musicians, floated

slowly by. The bosom of the Thames presented a scene of unbroken pageant and on every side could be discerned the signs of freedom and prosperity. It was a pretty welcome from England, in which even the climate was persuaded by the Muses to join, to the man who was to take knightly service on her behalf in the field of letters. Voltaire had plenty of money in his pocket; he was in good spirits, having just been liberated from the Bastille. Still young—he was thirty-two—he was also enjoying one of his brief respites from the ill-health which pursued him all his life. He was to dine that night with Bolingbroke, whose friendship he had already acquired during Bolingbroke's exile at La Source, and he had also a letter in his pocket from Horace Walpole the elder to Bubb Dodington the great patron of literature among the Whigs.

While in England he enjoyed and extended these advantages. He frequented politicians both Whig and Tory and succeeded in collecting £2000 in subscriptions for the 'Henriade,' which he completed during his English visit and dedicated to Queen Caroline. He was, however, more interested in savants and men of letters than in politicians. In 1727 he assists at Newton's funeral and makes friends with Mrs.Conduit, the great man's niece. He frequents the meetings of the Royal Society and also Quaker meetings at Hampstead. He reads the English philosophers, Bacon, Locke, Hobbes, Cudworth, Berkeley, Woolston, Tindal. With some of these he becomes intimate, as also with Clarke, whose 'metaphysical imagina-'tion' alarms him. He makes friends with Pope, Young, and Gay. Although he never mastered English for purposes of conversation, he acquired it sufficiently to write and publish an 'Essay on the Civil Wars of France. And also upon the 'Epick poetry of the European nations from Homer down to 'Milton,' a copy of which work presented by him to Sir Hans Sloane, the president of the Royal Society, may be seen in the British Museum. Of these essays Mr. Churton Collins says that they are composed 'not in such English as we should 'expect to find written by one who had acquired the language, 'but in such English as would in truth have reflected no 'discredit on Dryden or Swift.'

Considering the brevity of his sojourn among us—not quite three years—and that during that time he also completed and published the 'Henriade,' collected notes for his 'Charles XII,'

wrote his 'Brutus,' the first act of which was sketched in English prose, not to speak of the 'Lettres Anglaises' themselves, his activity seems to have been perfectly super-human. He possessed like so many Frenchmen that enviable quality *le travail facile*. Also he never digs below a certain depth, and his brilliant nimble intelligence was not prone to hesitation. No doubt he played the 'sedulous ape' to thinkers like Bolingbroke and Clarke—'picked up' innumerable philosophical perquisites from their conversation. Yet he was no mere plagiarist although his vanity prompted him to conceal his 'sources.' Everything that passed through his mind was transformed in its passage. Truisms as they flashed through his brain became epigrams, his lambent wit flickered round the dry bones of theological controversy till they arose and positively danced with vitality in his crisp and caustic pages. On his arrival in England he found the controversy between the Deists and the apologists of Christianity at its height. The great champion of eighteenth century orthodoxy, Bishop Butler, was still to come, and for the moment the Deists had the best of the fight.

Anthony Collins' 'Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of 'the Christian Religion' had appeared in 1724 and had made an enormous impression on the public mind. It furnished much matter for denunciation from the pulpit and even for acrimonious discussion in the press. In 1725 appeared the first of Woolston's 'Six Discourses on the Miracles of Christ.' The book was dedicated to the Bishop of London and made an even greater sensation than Collins' attack. Voltaire became intimate with Woolston and gave in the 'Dictionnaire Philo-'sophique' a long and enthusiastic account of his labours, and when Woolston was imprisoned and fined for his heterodox views Voltaire made himself responsible for a third of the fine.

No doubt it was not from the English that Voltaire learned his doubts of Christianity. Their scepticism was already to be found in Fontenelle and Bayle, not to mention his own early works. But he found in the English deistic controversy not only encouragement for his own ideas but also an open, serious, methodical and argumentative exposition of them. There were indeed plenty of anti-religious arguments in Bayle, but they were hidden under rhetoric and commonplace. A favourite disguise of the early French free-thinkers was to pose

as extravagant advocates of the dark and mysterious certitudes of faith. After you had shown that all observation and all reasoning led to sceptical conclusions, you wound up by remarking that the orthodox belief so irrefutable and widely held could only owe its vigour to the supernatural virtue of faith depending not on the feeble efforts of human reason but on a direct infusion of supernatural grace. The pages of Fontenelle's 'Histoire des Oracles,' in particular, abound with this trick. The attitude of authority in France armed with the Bastille may have justified, as it certainly explained, this strategy. In England, although Deists were occasionally fined and imprisoned, the appeal was ostensibly to discussion and argument. Dissenters from Christianity spoke out their mind clearly and indeed crudely.

'La liberté de penser, quelque répandue qu'elle fut en France, n'y faisait point partie, comme en Angleterre, de l'esprit public, évitait de s'étaler ouvertement, et ne prenait pas d'allures aussi aggressives. Voltaire trouva donc, sur ce point, l'Angleterre en progrès sur la France. Et de même, il trouva dans les livres anglais toute une philosophie nouvelle, très affirmative et très précise, dont Bayle lui-même ne renfermait que le germe, et qu'il vulgarisa parmi nous. . . . En ce sens donc, l'Angleterre a fait de Voltaire, sceptique, mondain et bel esprit, un philosophe qu'il n'était pas. La philosophie anglaise a donné un corps à son incroyance. Suivant le mot de M. John Morley, "quand il quitta la France, c'était un poète ; quand il y revint, c'était un sage."'

Montesquieu in his 'Notes de Voyage' says that there is no religious belief in England, that if a man mentions the subject, his hearers burst into laughter. Montesquieu obviously exaggerates. Nevertheless both the intellectual and moral standards of the Anglican clergy had fallen very low, the elimination of the Nonjurors, who held fast to the high church doctrines and lofty spirituality of the great Caroline divines, had had a disastrous effect on their spiritual character and popular prestige. Apart from a few praiseworthy exceptions the Georgian bishops with their huge incomes differed but little from other great Whig nobles except that they were rather more assiduous courtiers and sycophants. The Free-thinkers of the first half of the century, on the contrary, were remarkable men. They were thoroughly sincere, having nothing to gain and in many cases everything to lose by the expression of unpopular opinions. They had immense energy and a truly

apostolic zeal for their propaganda. They came from all classes. Collins and Tindal were men of the people, always in touch with their readers and using their language. The works of Shaftesbury and Bolingbroke appealed to a more cultured audience. The arguments of the Deists to-day seem flimsy enough, they were in truth finally disposed of in the terms of the controversy by Bishop Butler, but in spite of their inadequacy, in spite of their ultimate defeat, they kept alive in their day a spirit that is infinitely precious. They stood for liberty and the rights of the mind, for the intelligibility of opinions, for the conscientious use of those great words which the well-paid defenders of the Anglican Zion were only too ready to degrade to the controversial necessities of their official position. Voltaire with his amazing *flair* for the actual detected the spiritual quality of these men and was rewarded by the privilege of its absorption as far as was possible to his mobile, mercurial, so essentially different nature. This is why, however much there may be to criticise in him both as a man and a writer, he remains for ever so important a figure among those who have won for us the liberty of the mind. Under his most prejudiced diatribes, and he is at times the most unfair disputant imaginable, under the veil of fanciful petulance that so often disfigures his pages, a critic worth his ink can always perceive the passion for mental clarity, for the righteousness of the spirit. The effect of the ' Lettres Anglaises ' was immediate in France. Public opinion, prepared by the Protestant refugees and by Prévost, was carried off its feet. The next ten years assured the success of English ideas in France.

That success was so great and lasting that it is not too much to say that the French owed to England the great change that produced itself in their literature and their ideas during the second half of the eighteenth century. In large measure that change was due to the respect for the experimental sciences which commerce with English ideas had introduced. Since the seventeenth century, England had been the home of the experimental sciences. The name of Bacon symbolised all the aspirations born of the spirit of observation of nature—all those aspirations so magnificently realised by Newton. It is not surprising that the man who maintained that ' discoveries ' should be sought in the light of nature rather than in the ' darkness of antiquity ' should have been described by

D'Alembert in the preliminary discourse to the Encyclopædia as 'the greatest, the most universal, and the most eloquent 'of philosophers.' What Bacon aspired to, Newton realised. As Voltaire with flippant wit remarked, the heavens declared the glory of the Author of the 'Principia' and the 'Laws 'of Optics.' English science, widening every day its scope, produced on the contemporaries of Voltaire the effect of the greatest renovation of the human spirit since antiquity. The experimental method—the method of Bacon—triumphed over the abstract ideas of Descartes. As early as 1732 Le Clerc wrote :

'Je crois que le monde commence à revenir de cet air décisif que Descartes avait introduit en débitant des conjectures pour des démonstrations, et on ne voit pas un habile homme qui soit autant systématique, pour ainsi dire, qu'il était. Les Anglais surtout sont ceux qui en sont les plus éloignés.'

The moral and social ideals akin to the scientific spirit developed *pari passu* with its development both in England and in France. Thirty years later, in 1763, Voltaire could write to Helvetius :

'Nous avons pris des Anglais, les annuités, les rentes tournantes, les fonds d'arrondissement, la construction et la manœuvre des vaisseaux, l'attraction, le calcul différentiel, les sept couleurs primitives, l'inoculation. Nous prendrons insensiblement leur noble liberté de penser, et leur profond mépris pour les fadaises de l'école.'

That England happened to be at war with France from time to time did not affect the deeper *entente* that was not of the flesh but of the spirit. Their governments might fight, but the two nations, pioneers of progress of every description, walked arm in arm, like the great Twins who protected of old the civilisation of Rome. Certainly whatever we may say about the discoveries of Newton, this union of mind between France and England has been the most significant phenomenon of the modern world. No doubt both countries have at times faltered in the path of progress. A stupid king and incompetent ministers lost a large part of a continent to English rule. Nor in more recent days have our 'little wars' always been waged on philosophical principles. The French know better than we do their own errors and the explanation of them. It is not given to nations any more than to men to

be always consistent. But the spirit of liberty has always been with us both—more honoured in theory perhaps in Republican France, and in practice in monarchical England—but inevitably presenting itself to both nations as the authentic mainspring of their political and social activities.

To-day, when French and English soldiers fight side by side in the mightiest struggle for liberty that the world has ever seen, it has perhaps not been inopportune to recall, briefly and inadequately as we have been able to do it, an important stage in the formation of that fund of sentiment which is common to both nations. It would be idle as well as hopelessly pedantic to attempt to estimate the precise indebtedness of one nation to the other. French was the *lingua franca* of the Europe of the eighteenth century, and of that century Voltaire was the prophet. Without the aid of that illustrious and indefatigable *colporteur* English ideas would hardly have reached, would certainly not have conquered, in so short a time the European mind. The alliance of France with England, initiated after the close of the Middle Ages and their tiresome dynastic disputes by the most farsighted of British sovereigns to which we drew our readers' attention in the opening pages of this essay, was purely political and military in scope. It reflected no common ideal of life, no common principle of growth. Yet, purely the work of statesmen as it was, it saved the principle of small nationalities and broke the power of Spain. Since those far-off days Frenchmen and Englishmen have come to know each other, and are fighting with conscious agreement of purpose on those battlefields of Flanders on which the blood of their forbears has so often mingled. The spirit which the French Encyclopædists and the great Englishmen of the eighteenth century fought so successfully in the battles of the mind, the spirit of intolerance, injustice and cruelty, of the lust of power, of the contempt of the rights of the human soul, has returned and challenges in every sphere those victories that were so perseveringly and gradually won, it seemed for ever. And indeed they have been won for ever. It is to prove this to the world definitely, finally, that England and her Allies are fighting their common foe.

ALGAR THOROLD.

FOOD PRICES: A WARNING

SINCE the war began the country has passed through various economic phases, each of which while it lasted seemed to be extremely serious. At the outbreak of war there was for a brief period a dislocation of employment, and the Press and the Government shared the idea that there was grave danger of general unemployment and poverty. Funds were hastily raised to provide relief, and the local authorities were urged by the Government to take steps to grapple with the problem. Within twelve months an entirely new problem had revealed itself. The demand for labour had outstripped the supply; the wage-earning classes were enjoying a condition of unprecedented prosperity, and their increased consumption was adding very seriously to the difficulty of financing our imports from abroad, and to the difficulty of financing the war. The most urgent problem in the autumn and winter of 1915 was how to diminish consumption. Thrift lectures were organised all over the country; taxation was somewhat increased; and steps were taken to check the import of certain classes of goods. How serious the matter seemed at the end of 1915 can be gathered from the manifesto drawn up by the principal bankers of Great Britain. It is worth while to quote a few passages from this important document, which was published in the newspapers of December 23rd, 1915:

'At this time of great national danger it is imperative that every citizen should realise the vastness of the work which Great Britain has to perform, and should so act that the full strength of the nation may be put forth. . . .

'The task of finding the greater part of the immense sums needed by the Allies is the special duty of the British people, for they in particular possess the necessary financial resources. . . .

'No one can realise the vastness of the task before the nation without becoming keenly conscious that it demands the strenuous co-operation of every man and woman, youth and maiden in the country; that the nation's energies must be completely concentrated upon the production of really essential things; and that the production of all non-essentials must be wholly stopped. Moreover, not only must the nation avoid the consumption of all non-essentials, but must even restrict the consumption of essentials to the limits of efficiency.'

The whole of the above argument is as true as when it was written more than a year ago; but during the past three months the newspaper press and the House of Commons have been mainly discussing, not the need for economy in consumption, but the duty of the Government to provide cheap food for the nation. The importance of the food problem can hardly be exaggerated; but there is at least a danger that the new ministry may be harried by a popular outcry into taking measures which will intensify the trouble and may even provoke grave national disaster. It is significant that Mr. Walter Runciman, one of the most level-headed members of the late Cabinet, found himself compelled by political pressure to adopt measures which were in direct conflict with the sound economic principles which he had previously laid down. He unfortunately reversed the order of action which, apparently, must be followed by any man called upon to serve an impatient democracy. In a country governed by platform orators and half-penny newspapers a minister is in a stronger position for doing what he knows to be right if he first lays himself out to win the applause of the people by saying what he knows to be wrong. *Populus vult decipi*—but let it be deceived for its own good.

The food problem is likely to be with us for many months to come—unless, perchance, the much more serious food problem in Germany should compel an early peace. Except on that hypothesis there is no reason to expect that staple foods will become cheaper: they may become very much dearer. It is therefore worth while to consider what are the main principles involved in a problem which has suddenly been presented to a people long accustomed to low prices for all the staple articles of consumption.

The idea that the high prices of food-stuffs are due to the malevolent machinations of persons called profiteers need not be seriously discussed. This silly platform cry has just one element of truth behind it: that every person who earns a living by dealing in food-stuffs naturally tries to secure as wide a margin as possible between the price at which he buys and the price at which he sells. This is as true of the coster who sells vegetables from a barrow as it is of the Chicago speculator who deals in wheat by the shipload. The coster's percentage of profit is, as it happens, necessarily larger than that of the Chicago wheat-king. If the coster is to earn enough to live upon he must make fifty or a hundred per cent. profit on the

barrow-load of stuff he pushes through the streets; the man whose daily dealings run into thousands of pounds sterling can do very well for himself if his average profit is even as low as one per cent. But neither of these profiteers can do just what he likes. If the coster holds out for higher prices than his public is willing to pay he will be left with his stock on his hands; exactly the same danger threatens the Chicago wheat-dealer. In the coster's case the stock perishes and the earnings of a whole week may disappear. The wheat that the Chicago dealer tries to hold up will not perish; but while he is holding it he is losing interest every day on his capital, and he is risking the chance of a fall in prices that may leave him a bankrupt. For these reasons the coster and the wheat-king both tend to take a moderate profit as soon as they see it.

Similar considerations affect all the other persons in the long chain between the farmer who grows the food and the housekeeper who buys it. No one in that chain can—except for a very brief period—by his own action force an arbitrary rise in the price of a staple commodity. It has to be remembered that every man in the chain between producer and consumer is quite as much interested in buying cheap as in selling dear. When the external forces are in favour of cheapness each person in the chain uses his power to squeeze the person from whom he buys, and in turn is squeezed by the person to whom he sells. On the other hand, when the external forces make for dearness, the direction of the squeezing is reversed.

What, then, are the forces which finally determine the tendency of prices? They are the primary facts of supply and demand. If the world enjoys a bountiful harvest at a time when there is no special growth in the general scale of consumption the farmer will be squeezed by the dealer to whom he sells, and so right on through the chain till the housewife is reached. She will obtain her loaf or her flour at a low price—perhaps even below the cost of production—through the action of those very profiteers whom socialist orators love to abuse. If, on the other hand, there should be a partial failure of the world's harvests at a time when the general scale of consumption has been enormously enhanced, then the farmer will stand out for the maximum price he can squeeze from the local dealer, and he in turn will squeeze the dealer next beyond him. Each person in the chain will seek his profit by selling dear rather

than by buying cheap, and the consumer at the end of the chain will have to pay the price piled up against him.

The distribution of the increased price among the various persons in the chain will depend upon their relative skill in the art of bargaining and upon external factors, such as the difficulties of transport. But this distribution is a matter of indifference to the ultimate purchaser. There is no reason to believe that he would obtain his food cheaper if one or other of the persons in the chain voluntarily accepted a lower rate of profit. The benefit of that act of forbearance would only accrue to somebody else in the chain. Or, conceivably, it might accrue to some person who, tempted by the offer of goods below the market price, stepped in to buy up all he could, to sell again at a profit. There is, in fact, no way of escaping from the eternal law that when a commodity is scarce and the demand for it active the price will rise.

It does not follow that all measures to prevent a rise in the price of food-stuffs are to be condemned. What does follow is that those measures must be so framed that they will harmonise with the essential conditions of the law of supply and demand. An engineer who attempted to design a bridge in defiance of the law of gravity would be laughed at by the whole world ; but a politician who pretends that he can design a scheme for lowering food prices in defiance of the law of supply and demand is applauded by the House of Commons and by three quarters of the nation.

The two factors which are now forcing up food prices are, first, a reduction in the world's supply of food in consequence of the diversion of millions of food-producers to the work of war, and secondly an increase in the world's demand for food because many men, who as civilians could only afford to eat sparingly, are, as soldiers, able to eat heartily ; while in addition—in Great Britain, at any rate—the majority of the civilian population is also eating more. Either of these factors would alone have caused a rise in food prices ; added together they inevitably produce a great rise. If, then, we wish to secure a reduction of food prices we must approach the problem through these two factors. We must try to increase the supply of food-stuffs ; we must try to diminish the present rate of consumption. Very tardily the Government of this country has begun to consider the first point ; its dealings with the second have been ludicrous. The late Government made frantic appeals

to the general public to eat less, while simultaneously stimulating them to eat more by arbitrarily lowering prices where—as in the case of sugar—it has had the power to do so, and by raising the wages of vast numbers of fairly prosperous people. Moreover at the end of its career the late Government was clearly leaning towards a general policy of restricting prices by legislative or administrative action.

That has been the policy of the German Government since the early stages of the war, and it has hopelessly failed. On the one hand, the German peasant-farmers have hidden their stocks rather than sell at the official price ; on the other hand, wealthy consumers have surreptitiously paid five or six times the price fixed by authority. If these things are done in a closed country like Germany, where administrative machinery is all-pervading and the respect for authority is inbred in the people, it is easy to imagine the collapse that must attend any attempt on the part of the British Government to fix maximum prices for a population which draws its supplies from every part of the globe, and has a traditional dislike of government interference. So far as imported articles are concerned, if we refuse to pay the top market price the commodities we want will be sent to other countries or remain to be consumed in the country of origin ; so far as home-grown foods are concerned the attempt to fix maximum prices will only operate to limit production, and thus to diminish future supplies. We cannot begin to deal with the problem of food prices until we recognise that the solution of the problem can only be retarded by any attempt to fix maximum prices. A high market price is in fact the best of all remedies for the diseases of which it is the symptom. On the one hand, it tempts producers all over the world to increase to the uttermost their output ; on the other hand, it checks consumption and so makes the available supplies go farther.

To this reasoning there is one plausible answer—namely, that high food prices though they are only a moderate inconvenience to the well-to-do involve cruel suffering for the very poor. That is perfectly true ; but the fact of the present suffering of the poor is not an argument for taking foolish measures which will ultimately make that suffering worse. Even for the very poor it is better that food prices should rise than that the nation should be left without food at all.

The truth of the matter is that the problem of the very poor

is one which ought to be dealt with by special measures directed to the relief of extreme poverty. In one respect this has been done. The late Government decided to increase old-age pensions from 5*s.* to 7*s.* 6*d.* in cases of need. The principle of that decision was perfectly sound; but on administrative grounds it would have been far better if, instead of placing a new burden upon the National Government, the local authorities had been authorised to supplement old-age pensions out of the rates wherever the need existed and to the full extent necessary. Apart from this administrative question the principle of helping the very poor, as represented by old-age pensioners, to meet the increased cost of food in a national emergency is both just and humane.

The principle is capable of very wide extension, and in many cases could be applied without any administrative difficulty. The Government is at the present time the employer of a very large proportion of the population. When food prices began to rise seriously, the obvious course was to deal specially with the worst paid employees. Everywhere the lowest wage ought to have received the largest increase. In the case of the Civil Service this principle was to some extent adopted. In June 1916 a general bonus was granted to all the less well paid grades of civil servants, including postal servants. This scheme gave a bonus of 4*s.* a week to male civil servants earning up to 40*s.* a week, and 3*s.* a week to men earning between 40*s.* and 60*s.*, half these rates to women, and 2*s.* a week to young persons of either sex under eighteen. On the other hand, the railway servants of all grades have been given two successive bonuses of 5*s.* a week all round, the well-paid man thus receiving the same grant as the really poor man.

Broadly speaking, the poorer a man is the greater will be the proportion of his income spent upon food; therefore, a measure designed to relieve the hardships caused by high food prices should give the largest grant to the poorest man. Workmen earning wages which bring them well above the poverty line ought to receive no allowance at all on account of the increased cost of food. It is in the national interest that they should be compelled to economise in food as in other forms of expenditure. Yet the late Government by giving men in this category an increase of wages on the ground that food prices had risen was virtually bribing them to go on spending as freely as before to the injury of the poorer members

of the community. The comfortable classes, whether manual-workers or brain-workers, ought to be willing to meet the inconvenience of high prices out of their own resources. It is only when real poverty exists that the State is justified in incurring expenditure out of public funds to assist private consumers.

But while it may be necessary to make further provision for meeting the hardships of the very poor the most urgent matter at the present moment is to diminish the general average of food consumption and to increase the supply of food-stuffs. Instead of attempting to limit prices the primary duty of the Government is to increase taxation so as to reduce the spending power of those who are well above the poverty line. Tea, sugar, cocoa, coffee, wine, beer, spirits, tobacco, matches, dogs, motor-cars, petrol, postage rates, male and female domestic servants may be mentioned as a few of the items of private expenditure which the State could further restrict, or alternatively obtain revenue from, by means of taxation. With the possible exception of alcoholic drinks, where the hours of sale can be restricted without serious administrative difficulties, it is in every case better to check consumption by means of taxation than by an official restriction of supplies.

This is a point which is constantly overlooked. On the surface it seems as if a tax on an article of popular consumption, such as sugar, must be more onerous to the poorer classes than a restriction of supplies based upon the theory that the restriction is to apply to all classes alike. The answer is that in practice these official restrictions never do apply to all classes equally ; they fall most severely on the very poor. This general truth has been amply illustrated by the way in which the late Government handled the sugar problem. As soon as a serious shortage of sugar was threatened the Treasury, which had acquired control of the whole supply of sugar entering the country, instead of raising prices to check demand, adopted the policy of restricting supplies. Dealers and grocers were allowed to have a percentage of the supply which they had been in the habit of requiring. This regulation ignored the insuperable difficulty that a grocer who is short of supplies of such an essential article as sugar will consider first the requirements of his best customers. The consequence is that as soon as the shortage began to be felt, the poor found that they could buy no sugar at all, while

the rich had but little difficulty in getting as much as they wanted—and in getting it at the arbitrary low prices fixed by the late Chancellor of the Exchequer. A poor woman would certainly prefer to pay even a shilling a pound for a small quantity of sugar than to be turned away from the shop, prevented by the supreme wisdom of Cabinet ministers from obtaining a single ounce. At the same time, all the confectioners' shops in London and provincial towns were doing a roaring trade in expensive sweetmeats. If Mr. McKenna had followed the common-sense course of increasing the price of sugar sold by the Government—or what amounts to the same thing, increasing the tax upon sugar—there would have been considerable economy in total consumption, the extravagant would have been compelled to pay more for their luxuries, while the poor would at any rate have obtained some sugar.

It may be argued that the hardships of the very poor could have been avoided by a more scientific system of rationing, giving each individual the right to draw a specified quantity of sugar each day or each week. People who talk light-heartedly about rationing have apparently never paused to reflect upon the hardships which all classes would suffer if a strict system of rationing were attempted. In a country which is in a state of siege like Germany these hardships may be inevitable. But a country which is able to import in one month, as we did in the month of December 1916, food, raw materials, and manufactured articles to the aggregate value of £75,000,000 is not in a state of siege, and it would be sheer madness voluntarily to inflict upon ourselves the hardships which the British Navy and the German bureaucracy are together inflicting upon the German people. The mere economic waste of the German system is alone appalling to contemplate —long queues of people who ought to be at work waiting instead for hour after hour for the chance of receiving some minute ration of food. The attempt to establish any real system of rationing in the United Kingdom at the present time would certainly provoke dangerous rioting in all the principal centres of population.

In a community enjoying a high average of prosperity and traditionally disinclined to submit to official regulations the only workable way of limiting the consumption of staple commodities is to raise prices. If market conditions do not

themselves operate sufficiently in this direction it is the duty of the Government to aid the market by imposing heavy taxation so as to compel—as far as possible—all classes to cut down their current consumption of commodities, which may in the future be even scarcer than at present. At the same time pecuniary assistance ought to be given to the really poor, so that they may be able to procure the necessaries of life. By this double operation demand is reduced and revenue gathered in, without the infliction of excessive hardship on any class.

The question of increasing supplies is more difficult. In view of the activity of German submarines we must anticipate still further difficulties in the importation of food-stuffs from abroad, and some writers have rather hastily jumped to the conclusion that we must therefore concentrate all our efforts on increasing the supply of home-grown food. Taken by itself that would be a counsel of despair. It is quite impossible to produce within the British Isles the whole of the food necessary to feed our present population. Therefore, measures for facilitating the importation of food are quite as important as measures for increasing home production : both are essential. The question of imports is to a very large extent a problem for the Navy. It may be assumed that our naval officers are doing their utmost to hunt down German submarines by every available method. But our losses in ships are admittedly heavy, and therefore we are compelled to build new ships as rapidly as possible. Very wisely the new Government has set to work upon the construction of standardised steamers which can be turned out rapidly and at a reduced cost. The difficulty here, as in almost every direction, is the labour problem. So many men have been absorbed by the needs of the Army that it is not easy to find enough skilled engineers to build the ships required.

The same difficulty arises in a more extensive form in connexion with the work which ought to be undertaken at once for the increase of our supply of home-grown food. Here the problem is not to get skilled labour but to get a sufficiency of unskilled labour. A very great deal of the work which has to be done on the land is work which any man or woman or child can learn in a few hours. It may not be out of place here to record an experiment made last year in planting twenty acres of land with potatoes. Small schoolgirls, who had never

been on the land before, were employed in two batches, each working for only half a day and paid 4*d*. an hour. The work was very rapidly done, and at no greater cost to the farmer than in previous years when men had been employed. Although thousands of women drawn from all classes are working as hard as they can—some, indeed, probably much too hard—there remain many women who are doing little or nothing in the way of actual work. This is by no means always their fault. Old-fashioned prejudices which have limited in the past the range of women's work are still operative and prevent patriotic women from doing work which they would gladly undertake.

Beyond this is the question of wages. Agricultural work is exhausting and often unpleasant. Therefore, if women are to be attracted to it they ought to be offered a decent wage. But there is no point on which the average English farmer is so emphatic as in his dislike to any departure from the custom which condemns agricultural labourers to receive lower wages than almost any other class in the community. Even those farmers who have been forced by economic pressure to raise the wages of the men they employ, still boggle at paying a moderate wage to women. Admittedly for most farm work women are inferior to men ; but there are certain forms of farm work, such as milking, which in the judgment of many farmers can be better done by women than by men. Yet a farmer, who will frankly admit the excellence of his women milkers, is content to pay them 14*s*. a week for seven full days' work. Simultaneously, the Government is offering to any kind of girl clerical work in London at a minimum of 25*s*. a week, plus overtime payments and easy-going discipline. In passing it may be remarked that the country has not yet realised the enormous waste of public money and female energy daily going on in the gigantic hotels which the Government has taken over for the use of the multitudinous new bureaucracies which it is building up. It would be far better if many of the girls now playing at clerical work in these great offices were employed instead upon the land. But it is unfair to expect young women to undertake heavy farm work under unpleasant conditions for the miserable wages now offered.

Unfortunately the late Government by fixing a maximum price for milk has provided farmers with an excuse for continuing to offer low wages to women employed in the dairy industry,

with the result that the necessary labour is not forthcoming. The milk industry is one of the most important of our home industries, and there is no reason in the nature of things why it should not be conducted on such lines as will enable it to pay adequate wages to the persons employed. Neither in peace time nor in war time is it just to ask women to work for 2*s*. a day in the cowshed in order that other women employed in factory or office at double or treble that wage may be able to buy cheap milk. The real difficulty in this case arises with the children of the very poor who suffer if they cannot be supplied with a sufficiency of fresh milk. Here again we come back to the problem of poverty. In passing it may be remarked that so far as farm wages rise they tend to force up the wages of other underpaid classes in the community. But such tendencies may work very slowly. In the meantime the problem of supplying cheap milk to the children of the very poor has to be faced, and probably the best way of dealing with it is by authorising the local authorities to supply milk to necessitous families at a reduced price, the difference being met out of rates. The essential point is to do nothing arbitrarily to depress prices. Not only does the producer of milk require an increased margin of profit in order to meet the necessity for raising farm wages, but the price of all feeding stuffs is rising rapidly, and if the farmer cannot pay the increased prices he will not get the feeding stuffs. Already indeed as a reply to the fixing of milk prices and the proposed fixing of prices for other home-grown food the farmers are demanding that the prices of feeding stuffs and fertilisers should also be fixed. In the case of imported commodities this is impossible—unless the Government is to constitute itself the sole importer, and after buying outside at the top market price is to sell at home at a loss.

This indeed is what the French Government has done in the case of wheat. In order to keep down the price of bread, maximum prices were fixed for home-grown wheat, with the result that some farmers used wheat for feeding their stock, others grew less wheat than before, while the additional wheat required for the consumption of the French people has had to be imported by the French Government and sold at a heavy loss. Socialists in this country, who contrast the steady price of bread in France with the rise here, are probably

unaware that the simple explanation of the phenomenon is that the French taxpayer is subsidising the French bread-eater. It may be legitimate, as urged above, that the very poor should be helped in the present grave emergency with a subsidy to enable them to cope with war prices; but it is sheer folly for the State to supply the rich and the well-to-do with bread below cost price. In the present condition of French finance this piece of political eye-wash makes a heavy addition to the burden of debt which will rest upon future generations of Frenchmen.

Unfortunately there is reason to fear that the new Government of the United Kingdom is inclined to proceed along a similar path. The most important proposal yet made by Mr. Prothero, the new Minister of Agriculture, is that the State should buy up all wheat grown in the United Kingdom in the current year at the fixed price of 60*s.* a quarter for wheat of a specified standard. A similar bargain is offered to British and Irish farmers for the oats and potatoes they grow. It may be said at once that this proposal is at any rate better than a crude fixing of maximum prices. There is indeed no necessary conflict between such a proposal and the law of supply and demand. In its essence this scheme is a gigantic speculation by the State with the money and credit of the nation. It may turn out well; it may turn out badly. But already the terms of the proposed bargain have been subjected to very serious criticism. At the very time when Mr. Prothero is offering 60*s.* a quarter for wheat grown in the coming harvest, wheat is selling in the market at 80*s.* Many farmers have already expressed with emphasis their opinion that the offer is not good enough. In particular it is pointed out that though 60*s.* would doubtless be a profitable price on good wheat land it will not suffice to recoup the farmer in one year for the cost of breaking up new land. From this point of view there is much more to be said in favour of the scheme, attributed to the committee appointed by the late Government, that the State should guarantee to British and Irish farmers a price of 45*s.* for five years. Similar criticisms are made of the terms offered for oats and potatoes. In the case of potatoes it is argued by farmers that the price offered by the Government will hardly cover the cost of seed. Such criticisms are inevitable the moment the Government enters into the market as a speculator.

Nor, even if the farmers of the United Kingdom were satisfied with the terms of the proposed bargain, is the problem of our daily bread solved. We import at present about four-fifths of our wheat. The utmost exertions of our farmers in the current year will hardly decrease that proportion below three-fifths, and even if so much is accomplished it will be partly at the cost of a reduced home production of meat and milk. There remains the vast stock of wheat we must import —three-fifths, or for simplicity let us say half our consumption. At what price is that to be imported? Doubtless the Board of Agriculture has looked ahead and tried to make satisfactory bargains with Canadian and other farmers abroad, but so far as these bargains tend to depress prices, they have the very effect which a wise Government would above all things avoid —they check supply. The very best means of assuring the food supply of the United Kingdom in the difficult months that lie ahead of us is to allow prices to soar as high as they will so that the whole world will be tempted to grow as much wheat as possible and to risk the new perils of the deep in order to bring it to our shores.

This does not mean that the Government can do nothing. It can do, and already is doing, much. The scheme of the Board of Agriculture for hiring out motor tractors to farmers is an admirable example of State enterprise, and offers great possibilities of a reduction in the cost of tillage. Much also can be done by the Government to help farmers by organising the employment of German prisoners and of British soldiers not immediately wanted by the Army. In addition the Board of Agriculture can through its influence and organisation greatly facilitate the employment of more women upon the land. That Board can also with the aid of parliament take measures for preventing the destruction of good food caused by foxes and pheasants and other beasts and birds who are allowed to multiply for the sake of sport. If, while taking such measures as these to increase the supply of home-grown food, the Government, by means of heavy taxation, cuts down the demand both for food and for other commodities that use up labour or tonnage, it can greatly help the nation to surmount the coming crisis.

EDITOR.

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MIGRATION WITHIN THE EMPIRE

1. **Dominions Royal Commission: Final Report.** Chapter 8: 'Migration.' 1917.
2. **The After-War Settlement and Employment of Ex-Service Men in the Oversea Dominions.** Report to the Royal Colonial Institute by Sir RIDER HAGGARD. 1916.
3. **Report of the Conference of the Australian Governments on the Settlement of Returned Soldiers.** Melbourne. 1916.
4. **Official Report of the Emigration Conference of the Royal Colonial Institute.** 1910.
5. **An Untamed Territory: the Northern Territory of Australia.** By ELSIE R. MASSON. 1915.

THE report of the Dominions Royal Commission on migration within the Empire summarises and in some respects controverts the conclusions which have been arrived at by those who have examined the question afresh during the last ten, and more particularly during the last two years. It is an authoritative examination of a problem which can, from its nature, never be finally solved; and its value lies less perhaps in the actual recommendations—many of which have in fact been anticipated by expert opinion—than in the collection of a body of evidence and detailed statistics which furnish the basis for its conclusions. This evidence, it is true, deals almost entirely with the position as it was before the

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war; but unless that is taken into account no general statement of the question as it now stands can be adequate.

During the forty years before the war there was a steady exodus of population from the United Kingdom, a large and increasing proportion of which found its way to the Dominions. This exodus grew larger after 1899, when Canada had begun her immigration policy; it fell again in 1908, when the American crisis checked the development of the West, but it was still larger in that year of depression than in an average year a decade before; and from that time onwards it increased very rapidly, owing to Australia as well as Canada encouraging immigration. The outward stream of population reached its maximum in 1912, but there was no perceptible decline in its volume until the outbreak of war.

But despite this growth of emigration, which in Scotland and in parts of rural England excited some natural alarm when it was found that the population of certain districts was actually declining, the increased emigration by no means checked the general increase of population in the United Kingdom. Although the bulk of emigrants were young men in the prime of life, and either married or of marriageable age, and although this movement reached its height in the decennial period 1901–11, the total increase of population during that period was greater than at any previous time in our history. Taken as a whole, emigration during the last forty years has absorbed only 27 per cent. of the natural increase of the male population, and less than 22 per cent. of the increase of the female population: figures which should effectually silence those who complain that emigration is gradually depopulating these islands.

During the war this wave of emigration was first checked, then suspended, and finally the tide turned the other way; but it is clear that the check is only a temporary one. The toll which death has taken of our people in battle has indeed been heavy, and it has necessarily increased since we took the offensive against the enemy. But in spite of that distressing sacrifice, and a slight increase in the normal death-rate of adult civilians, there is every indication that the population of the British Isles will be larger at the conclusion of peace than at the outbreak of war. If therefore the abnormal circumstances which we had come to look upon as normal in

the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were exactly restored—I mean an expanding industrial and a diminishing agricultural population—we could not look for any diminution in their constant accompaniment, an emigration that declines indeed in good times and increases in bad, but which in the most prosperous periods carries off only some thousands and in times of bad trade some hundreds of thousands a year.

But normal circumstances will not return. We have made up for the drain of war on our adult manhood by employing female labour and juvenile or adolescent male labour on a large scale. The former has been generally satisfactory and seldom overpaid, the latter—if we may judge by the testimony of employers and the police courts—generally unsatisfactory and overpaid. The tendency of employers will therefore be to refuse peremptorily, as soon as they can, to pay inefficient boys of seventeen a man's wages, but to continue to employ women in cases where they have done their work properly. And this extension of female labour into new trades will be in many ways to the national advantage. It will add to the producing power of the country, it will increase many household budgets, and it will give a very large number of idle women an occupation and an independence which they have hitherto lacked. Many women indeed who took up work for patriotic reasons will continue to work for personal reasons, because they like it, or at least because they like the money which it brings; and where employers and employed are at one in a matter of this kind the path is plain. As compared with the actual war period there will be a large exodus of women from industry when demobilisation brings men back to civil life, but as compared with the pre-war period there will certainly be a large increase of women in industry.

A considerable number of men who are now in the Army are assured of their situations when they return to civil life; most large employers of labour have acted in this way towards their staff. A number too will step naturally and easily into the first job that comes along. But it is clear that this will by no means account for every returned soldier. A few whose situations were guaranteed to them on their return will find that their firms have disappeared in the interval, by one of the ordinary casualties of commercial warfare; more perhaps will find a changed management, uncongenial conditions,

and prospects of promotion less bright than before. Some definitely cut the painter when they enlisted—there were unpatriotic firms that kept men back and dismissed those who did their duty—and others had no definite employment when they joined and have no settled prospects when they leave the Army. There are also undoubtedly large numbers of men who have been thoroughly unsettled by active service, and who do not desire to return to their previous sedentary or monotonous employment, even though it be permanent and well paid. If wages fall, as they are likely to in some trades, the impulse to emigrate may well become still greater. Even if no account were taken of altered social conditions at home—alterations which must be profound and may possibly become permanent—the mental unsettlement and physical excitement engendered by the conflict would alone be sufficient to produce the unrest which in these islands always takes the form of an exodus. We must therefore facilitate emigration for those who wish to emigrate, in order to see that the men who are lost to England are not lost to the Empire.

After the Napoleonic Wars it is known that more than half of those who crossed the Atlantic went directly to the United States; and of those who went to Canada about half also crossed the international frontier a few years later. Again, of the quarter of a million men who left Great Britain in the year following the Boer War, about half went to the United States. Now we do not want to people the United States with Englishmen while Canada is invaded by Americans. But the only way to prevent these things is to foresee the problem, and to prepare the remedy in advance. Those who oppose emigration as a policy will not succeed in stopping it as a practice; they will at most succeed in ensuring that the British Empire loses some of the emigrants.

It does not seem to be everywhere understood that those who are discussing the whole question of organised emigration and systematic colonisation do so, not with the intention of urging men to go who do not want to go, but with the intention of seeing that the right men go, and that they have a place to go to. That is the modern attitude towards emigration, and it is admittedly a changed attitude. In the past we deported our failures and left our successes to look after themselves, with the singular result that the State populated

some British territories with convicts, while private enterprise took the sound Scottish ancestors of General Mackensen to Prussia. There came a time when the colonies protested vigorously against the Home Government's obstinate belief that cargoes of criminals and prostitutes were the proper foundation for an Imperial policy, and of late years they have rather turned the tables on us. Their lecturers have toured our countryside with photographs and pamphlets, urging Hodge to stretch out his hand for the fortune awaiting him in the Far West or the Antipodes, and their seductive propaganda has drawn considerably on our strong rural stocks. We cannot in fairness complain ; we sent them what we wanted to be rid of, they retorted by bidding for what they wanted. Nobody who has looked into the past history of the Empire can have failed to notice that unsuitable emigrants have often been sent out, sometimes with unhappy and even disastrous consequences, merely in order to be quit of them ; nobody who is familiar with the present colonial attitude towards the newcomer, particularly the newcomer on a large scale, can have failed to notice the demand that the colony and not the mother country shall decide who shall or shall not come. The reason is obvious, the stipulation just. Precisely as unsettlement at home leads to settlement overseas, so the emigrant here becomes the immigrant in the colonies. For us the problem is ended when the vessel sails ; for them it is only beginning.

This inevitable divergence of aim can only be overcome, as the Dominions Royal Commission agrees, by co-operation. It does not however in the least follow that it is wise to set up a Central Emigration Authority with 'power reserved to it to 'limit, or prohibit the emigration of men, particularly men of 'military age, from the United Kingdom, except to destinations 'approved by the authority.' A board of this kind, which is suggested but not definitely recommended by the Commission, smacks rather of Prussia than of England, and even in Prussia, where the Government has definitely objected to emigration for many years, similar restrictions have not been altogether successful. Any attempt to enforce such a system in this country, except in the event of a very definite national peril after the war, would certainly lead to widespread opposition and evasion. Incidentally the Commissioners, in their zeal

for regulation and restriction, seem to have forgotten that Magna Carta—in its forty-second chapter—provides that 'It shall be lawful in future for anyone (excepting always 'those imprisoned or outlawed in accordance with the law of 'the kingdom, and natives of any country at war with us) to 'leave our kingdom and to return, safe and secure by land and 'water, except for a short period in time of war, on grounds of 'public policy, reserving always the allegiance due to us.' An Emigration Authority which endeavoured to prohibit emigration might find that Englishmen still preferred their ancient liberties to modern bureaucracy.

Fortunately there is no sign that this is the sole, or even the main object aimed at in the Committee recently set up by the Colonial Office in conjunction with the Agents-General of the Dominions 'to report on the measures to be taken for 'settling within the Empire ex-soldiers who may desire to 'emigrate after the war,' although it is true that the terms of reference mention the 'constitution of a central authority 'to supervise and assist emigration.' This committee wisely includes not only representatives of the Colonial States, but also the Emigration Commissioner of the Salvation Army. There are, however, several other private or semi-private emigration organisations in existence, ranging from the philanthropic society at one end of the scale to the commercial company which makes its profit out of transport or the sale of land at the other, and many of these bodies have a right to be consulted. Some—by no means all—are quite excellent; they have an organisation already in existence, a fund of accumulated experience, and they are adapted for a particular class of work which no other body could accomplish quite so successfully. It would be a mistake to ignore or override their efforts; and centralisation, the one and only remedy of the official mind, would deprive these associations of their individuality and consequently of their driving power. What is needed is to secure that they do not overlap; to crush them out in order to secure the whole ground for an official enterprise that is not yet formulated would be a grave blunder.

In these days when the fashion is all for State action, and private enterprise is at a discount, it is wise to remember that the British Empire owes far more to private enterprise than State action. The State discouraged free settlement in Australia, and

refused to take any action in colonising New Zealand ; private enterprise, after fighting the Colonial Office, founded Victoria and South Australia, and Wellington, Dunedin, and Canterbury in New Zealand. Private enterprise has given Canada more than one transcontinental railway ; State action has not yet completed the first Australian transcontinental line. Had an Emigration Authority with powers to prohibit emigration been in existence in 1583, when the first definite attempts were made to plant English colonies, there might indeed have been a British Empire, but it would have been very different from the one that grew out of voluntary effort. James I. opposed the Virginia Company, and Charles I. the Puritan emigration which led to the foundation of New England ; both would certainly have used the Central Emigration Authority to defeat those schemes. Two hundred years later the British Government held that Australia was an unsuitable country for free settlers, and did its best to reserve that continent to those who had the privilege of entry by way of the Old Bailey. A Central Emigration Authority with power to prohibit emigration was in fact in existence, so far as the Antipodes were concerned, in those days, but it broke down before the efforts of private citizens, conspicuous among whom were Macarthur and Gibbon Wakefield. Had such an authority been continuously in existence, we should certainly have had the transportation settlements at Barbados under Cromwell and at Botany Bay under George III., but our annals would have been innocent of the Pilgrim Fathers ; nor would they have been inscribed with the deeds of the Anzacs, the descendants of the free settlers who went to Australia and New Zealand when the transportation system broke down.

There is indeed room for several forms of colonial enterprise, so long as they do not get in each other's way and all conform to the elementary rule that they pick the right men for the work and put them in the right place. It does not seem antecedently probable that a Central Emigration Authority, to be constituted after the war and necessarily new to its work, will succeed better than organisations such as the Australian States, the Canadian Pacific Railway, and Dr. Barnardo's Homes, which have already a wide experience and personal knowledge of the problem. Doubtless there is

room for, and some need of, an advisory board which shall correlate the work of the various emigration societies and secure that each works to the best advantage; but there is no demonstrable need for an official organisation with power to override the work of every existing association and, if it pleases, prohibit their activities altogether in order to centralise the whole machinery of emigration in Whitehall. If all emigrants to the British Dominions are compelled to pass through an official sieve which accepts or rejects them at pleasure, then some of the most active and enterprising men who object to the delays and formalities inevitable under a system of bureaucratic control will go to the United States, and the very policy which we are attempting to forward will be defeated.

The Commission next discusses in some detail the difficult and delicate question of female emigration. It is common ground that we want to emigrate families rather than single men, and there are few cases indeed in which the married man should not have the preference over the bachelor. To do otherwise simply accentuates the social difficulty at both ends: it increases the already grave excess of women over men at home—an excess which the war has unhappily emphasised; it also re-establishes the excess of men over women in the colonies, which was in process of elimination.

There remains the problem of the emigration of single women. The Commission recognises that these should be encouraged to settle in the Dominions, so long as they can be persuaded to settle in the rural rather than in the already over-crowded urban centres; and it advises that women, who should be drawn from a larger class than that which is accustomed to engage in domestic service, should be given some simple training for this career, remarking that such training can be given better in the Dominions than at home. Unfortunately the report does not deal with the initial difficulty of selecting suitable women for this work. It is to be regretted that in treating this branch of the subject the Commissioners' work is less adequate and original than in dealing with the emigration of men and children from the United Kingdom to the Dominions. The vagueness of their recommendations, and the fact that they fall back on the women's emigration societies which already exist instead of recommending that the Central Emigration

Authority should deal with female as with male emigration, prove either that the Commissioners have not much faith in their proposed Central Authority or that they are afraid to grasp the difficult problems of female emigration.

The machinery therefore which will deal with emigrants from this country after the war remains uncertain : it may consist either of the individual associations which have done such good work in the past, or of a brand-new authority which will occupy one of the few remaining London hotels with officials or turn the Athenaeum Club into an Emigration Bureau. But as regards the location of intending settlers, something more definite has been accomplished, albeit through non-official channels. The final word, of course, rests with the various Colonial States concerned.

The information collected by Sir Rider Haggard in his mission of inquiry round the Empire last year shows in which colonies men are wanted, and also shows how far the work of preparing for immigrants has progressed. The full details of his investigation must be read in his report to the Royal Colonial Institute ; but, broadly speaking, the results are as follows.

In the Commonwealth, Tasmania will provide land for three hundred British soldiers, or for a very much larger number if financial arrangements can be made by the British Government. Victoria will give British soldiers the same advantages as Victorian service men. Queensland will set aside a million acres for ex-service men from the British Isles to be selected by the Queensland Government, providing the necessary funds can be raised. New South Wales, which also insists on the right of selection, contemplates providing for at least a thousand British settlers. West Australia, while so far without any definite scheme, will give the same conditions to United Kingdom men as to West Australians. South Australia will do the same. New Zealand, whose available land is more limited, will give preference to British soldiers and sailors and their families over other immigrants, ranking them immediately after the Dominion's own returned service men.

In Canada, where the question of land grants devolves partly on the Dominion, partly on the provinces, and to some extent on the great railway corporations, no general summary can be attempted, but it was generally agreed that the Dominion requires men, that the various authorities should

plan their schemes in concert—the first steps to this end were taken in January last in a conference with Sir Robert Borden at Ottawa—and that they would welcome British ex-service men, provided they have the right of choosing suitable immigrants. The Canadian Pacific Railway, which has the most definite scheme of settlement, insists that the soldier selected should be a married man with previous agricultural knowledge,—this last provision being one which past experience has rendered very necessary.

In the Union of South Africa the Government will not undertake any immigration or settlement policy, and what is done must be done by private enterprise. In practice, only settlers with private capital will find any opening. The Chartered Company, on the other hand, has offered half a million acres free to approved soldier settlers, and will provide expert advice and supervision for these men ; but the location of the grant has not been defined, nor the terms—size of farms, whether irrigated or not, etc.—on which it will be available.

It is clear therefore that there are large areas of land available for settlement, and that whilst the Governments of the territories concerned insist on choosing their settlers, the settlers also have a choice of territories. There remains the question of financing this movement ; but the cost, when divided among the various parties to the transaction, is so small compared with the colossal figures of current war expenditure, that one almost feels it necessary to apologise for dwelling on a trivial matter of at most a few million pounds. Most of the emigrants will not be monied men, and one may take it that they will retain their own small personal resources for personal needs and sudden emergencies. Somebody must advance money to cover the cost of passage, the cost of any cultivation, irrigation, or other advance preparation which the land allotted to the immigrant has undergone, also the cost of any buildings erected or implements supplied, and the cost of seed or stock provided. Such advances, with interest added, ought to be repaid by annual instalments in from five to fifteen years, or whatever other terms in exceptional cases were found to be equitable. In calculating the rate of repayment one wants to avoid, on the one hand, too heavy a tax on the early and leaner years, and, on the other hand, the danger of allowing the transaction to drag on for

a lifetime. With reasonably good settlers on a reasonably good soil, the whole debt ought to be cleared off in twenty years.

By whom shall the money be advanced? In some cases no doubt satisfactory arrangements will be made by the associations already referred to, and by private companies formed for the specific purpose of land settlement, of the type which has been so successful in the past. But the bulk of the work in the present condition of the Empire must be done by the self-governing States and provinces of the great Dominions, and they will undertake the direct financial responsibility of the settlement (with the United Kingdom as guarantor in the background), and that for two reasons. The colony cannot have full freedom to choose its men unless it takes the responsibility of financing them; he who pays the piper calls the tune. And when the emigrant becomes the settler repaying his debt, it is the colony in which he has settled that is concerned with him; the Queensland Government can deal with a man in Queensland, but the British Government cannot.

Let us put the cost of establishing each settler at £200, and reckon that any number between fifty thousand—a figure that is certainly too low—and five hundred thousand men—a figure possibly too high—will wish to emigrate after the war. Then a minimum of ten and a maximum of a hundred millions sterling would be needed for this purpose—a sum which represents the cost of the war from two days to three weeks. But this colonisation loan would differ from most other loans in the fact that in the second or third year the capital would begin to be redeemed, and by the twentieth year at the outside it should be wholly paid off. Can it be contended this is an excessive amount to spend on a policy which would strengthen the whole British Empire by reducing the pressure on its heart and carrying blood to its extremities? Let those who doubt study the intolerable hardships and the heavy burden of poor relief after the Napoleonic Wars.

It is clear from Sir Rider Haggard's report that the number of men whom the various colonial States can absorb depends in many, and probably in most, cases on financial arrangements being made for that purpose. In addition to the renewed demand for capital for development purposes which drove up the rate of interest for some years before 1914—

a demand which will certainly not be less when urgent projects that are now hung up again come forward,—there will be the demand for capital for industrial purposes at home and reconstruction work on the Continent. The rate of interest for the British Government is now over 5 per cent ; it will certainly not be less for competing colonial governments after the war. There would probably be some saving in interest if the British Government raised this suggested colonisation loan, and advanced the money to the various colonial States concerned in proportion to the number of soldiers that each arranges to take. The colony would repay the British Government an annual sum as the instalments from the settlers came in, and the transaction would be closed by, say, 1940. In any event the whole question of inter-Imperial finance will have to be considered either now or immediately after the war, in connection with the recent loans made by the Imperial Government to the Dominions,* and this would probably furnish the most convenient occasion for discussing the financial arrangements connected with the policy of emigration and systematic colonisation urged in this article.

But while the control of emigration to the Dominions must be mainly in the hands of the Dominions themselves, the question of settlement in the tropical colonies must be mainly in the hands of the Home Government, both because the administration of most of these colonies is directly controlled from Downing Street, and also because our present ignorance of the conditions of tropical colonisation makes it necessary to collect from every source information bearing on that problem, to systematise it and to modify our practice by experience. In one sense this question is not at the moment urgent, since it is not directly connected with demobilisation after the war ; but it is directly connected with the future of the British Empire, and in the development of so vast a property as we possess it is necessary to look well ahead, and to lay our plans firmly for the constructive work to be undertaken in the long years of security for which we hope when the war is ended.

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* Few details of the loans to Dominions and Allies have been made public, but the loans to the Dominions and to the great Allies apparently bear interest, as those loans which do not bear interest were definitely specified by Mr. Asquith. These were to Belgium and Serbia.

We possess large territories in the tropics, some of which we have held for two centuries or more, but mostly of rather recent acquisition. Some of these countries are partially developed; a few are almost wholly undeveloped; none are developed to their full extent, although the West African colonies have made very rapid progress in the last few years. Their chief commercial value is that they produce raw material for our manufactures. In many cases there is already a large native population, and there is no room for the white man except as official, planter, or missionary. But in other instances the native population is small, there is ample room for white settlement, and the neighbouring white colonies desire that these empty territories shall be developed not by white overseers and coloured labour, but by white overseers and white labour. The Northern Territory of Australia and the sub-tropical districts of West Australia and Queensland are the most conspicuous cases in point.

In the long run we cannot hold a country that we do not populate. Nature itself, particularly human nature, is against it; the old British contention in colonial disputes, that effective occupation, not discovery, is the only title to possession, is against it. The Dutch, and possibly the Spaniards before them, discovered Northern Australia; neither occupied it. The British have held Australia for more than a century; but in 1913 the white population of the Northern Territory, which covers more than half a million square miles, was less than four thousand, of whom only seven hundred were women. With the exception of deserts and the arctic regions, this great country is perhaps the most sparsely populated district in the world. The neighbouring sub-tropical region of Western Australia runs it close, with a total of little more than five thousand men and women after the country has been open for settlement for forty years. In comparison with these vast empty territories, tropical Queensland, with over fifty thousand white men and women, the population of a second-rate English country town, spread over a country much larger than England, seems densely crowded.

Yet these lands are by no means deserts. They contain large tracts of fertile grass land comparable to the best country in New South Wales; they will support great flocks and herds and grow almost any tropical produce; they are as rich in mineral wealth as in tropical foliage. A great new Australia

awaits development here, and those who know the country best are most confident of its brilliant future. The dreary record of its past, a history of successive failures, may seem to belie this optimism; but the failures were due to the same ignorance of the conditions of life in the tropics that led to the Darien failure, the Mosquito Coast failure, the loss of a British army in Hayti from fever, and the death of every white man on the first British expedition to Nigeria. It is this fact which above all others distinguishes tropical from temperate colonisation. In the temperate zone a settler may suffer hardships, and may indeed in certain exceptional circumstances die of starvation, but he is not more likely to be stricken down suddenly by some fatal disease than in England. In many parts of the tropics, on the other hand, there has always been the possibility, and in some places almost the probability, of severe sickness or premature death; and this steady toll of life has prevented tropical colonisation in the ordinary sense of the word.

In the worst cases, as in certain parts of West Africa, the danger has become proverbial; but in no part of the tropics, so far as can be ascertained, have English families been able to acclimatise themselves and rear their children on a large scale during several generations. The apparent exceptions to this general proposition melt away on close examination. Our great Anglo-Indian families, who have established themselves in the East for a century past, may live in India, but they rear their children in England. In the West Indies there are old English families which have held the same lands from the time of the original proprietor in the time of Charles I. But most of them have spent part of their lives in England, have sought their wives in England, and brought up their children in England. In a careful examination of available West Indian genealogies, I have been unable to find one family which has for any long period chosen its wives from white women born in the West Indies, and reared its children on the soil, without renewing its strength in England. There may be such instances, but they do not exist on a sufficient scale to prove that English people have successfully acclimatised themselves in the tropics.

If these conditions were to be permanent the attempt to colonise the Australian tropics with white men would be fore-

doomed to failure, and the White Australia policy, so far at least as it applied to the north, a noble but impracticable ideal. But in the last twenty years the advance in the study of tropical medicine has begun to revolutionise our notions of what is possible for white men in the torrid zone. The work of Sir Patrick Manson, Sir Ronald Ross, and the late Sir Rubert Boyce, in conjunction with the Schools of Tropical Medicine in Liverpool and London, has successfully combated many of the plagues which formerly attacked settlers in the tropics. Yellow fever is now a thing of the past. Malaria has been enormously reduced. The cause of sleeping sickness has been ascertained. Panama was once a death-trap; it is now a prosperous community. The place which Sir Richard Burton condemned as 'the Foreign Office grave' is now famous as the health resort of Nigeria. West Indians in the eighteenth century came to England to recuperate; in the twentieth century London doctors are beginning to recommend the West Indies as a sanatorium.

We know now the reason why the old tropical settlements were so often deadly. No care was taken to see that they were planted in healthy localities; we were ignorant of the very alphabet of tropical sanitation. Colonies were founded in undrained districts, in the neighbourhood of swamps; stagnant water, the breeding ground of mosquitoes, was allowed to accumulate; and under these conditions disease had a natural advantage. The conditions being abolished, disease has disappeared; where neglect has allowed the old conditions to return, disease has returned with them.

It is important not to exaggerate what has been done. We know that white men can not only live in the tropics under proper conditions, but that they can do manual labour for many years without harmful results. There is evidence also that white women can live in the tropics, run their households efficiently, and bear children; but this evidence is naturally less conclusive, because there are fewer white women than men in these settlements. So far as it goes, however, the evidence is not unsatisfactory. There is evidence also that the children so born are healthy, that their mental and physical powers are not less than those of children born and reared in temperate countries; but this evidence is even less conclusive, both because numbers are small and because there has not

yet been sufficient time for these children to grow up and prove their capacity. The question of the white man's fitness to colonise the tropics will not be finally settled until the tropic-born children of the present settlers have reared their own tropic-born children, and found them not inferior to others born elsewhere; but we cannot wait fifty years to settle that question, and unless we proceed with tropical colonisation on the affirmative assumption we shall not settle it at all. It is at least possible that time will rank this among other exploded superstitions, such as that Londoners and Australians become extinct in the third generation, or that there is a natural tendency to insanity among those who live in the Antipodes.

We have to attempt organised tropical colonisation by white men if we are to hold certain of our tropical possessions at all, and under the new conditions we may hope to attempt it with every prospect of success. But two considerations arise in this connection, which cannot be overlooked by those who are charged with the work.

I. Our knowledge is still necessarily defective. Year by year more information becomes available from various parts of the world as to the measures necessary to ensure success. This information, which has a direct bearing on future political developments, should be collected and pooled; one would like to see an information department formed in the Colonial Office for this purpose—a department that would be in close touch with the Schools of Tropical Medicine, in contact with the Crown colonies and Protectorates (nearly all of which are in the tropics), in communication with the great mercantile firms doing business in these countries, and ready to advise any legitimate enterprise, whether of private or State origin, formed to develop tropical industry or settlement. A small department of this kind would not attempt in any sense to supersede or control or even supplement the work of existing institutions; its whole duty would be to collect, collate, and distribute the results of their work among those responsible for the government of tropical colonies.

II. The second consideration is economic. Granted that white men can acclimatise themselves in the tropics, they have still to live in the tropics by their own labour if the White Australia policy is to be fulfilled. Now white labour is costly

in comparison with black all the world over, and white labour in the tropics will certainly not be less costly than in the temperate zone. Therefore the produce of white labour in the tropics will be more costly than the produce of black labour; nor does it seem likely that this handicap can be neutralised by the use of labour-saving devices, because any fresh machinery that may be introduced for that purpose will also be available to planters whose estates are worked by coloured labour, and would lower their producing costs correspondingly. Therefore the produce of tropical white labour cannot compete in the world-market, or even generally in the more restricted but still ample market of the British Empire. This is not a matter of free trade or tariff reform, for while the free trader will not grant a preference at all, the tariff reformer, who is anxious to encourage empire-grown produce, is not prepared to put a higher duty on Jamaican sugar because it is negro-grown than on Australian sugar because it is grown by white men.

But this consideration is for some time ahead not altogether relevant. So far from the Australian sugar-planter exporting his crop, he cannot yet fully supply the Commonwealth market. Within that market he receives a substantial advantage, and that advantage is likely to be more permanent than most fiscal regulations, because it is based, not on a transient desire to benefit a particular industry, but on the intention to maintain the White Australia policy. The last few years have shown that the industry can be carried on in Queensland by white labour, and therefore capital invested is secure, at any rate until Australian tropical produce outstrips the growing Commonwealth market.

A third consideration, in the case of the Australian tropics, is political. There can be no doubt that the country has suffered from divided control. For many years the Northern Territory was administered by South Australia; the good citizens of Adelaide were at first enthusiastic over their new possession, then indifferent, and finally they came to regard it as a white elephant. But at no period of their control did they understand its requirements, and in any event their resources were insufficient to its development. It is now ruled by the Commonwealth, as is also the Territory of Papua; but the northern part of West Australia, which has a precisely similar climate,

soil, and industries—if the word can be applied to the activities of its scanty population—is under the control of the West Australian Government, which with its headquarters far away at Perth labours under much the same disadvantages as South Australia did with the Northern Territory. The northern district of Queensland is governed from Brisbane, which is less remote from Cape York, and it can hardly be a mere coincidence that this country is, on the whole, somewhat more advanced than the Northern Territory and tropical West Australia.

There is a strong case for considering whether the time has not come for a new political alignment, cutting off the whole of Northern Australia from coast to coast at the southern latitude of the Northern Territory, or preferably at the Tropic of Capricorn. The new State thus created would include the present Northern Territory, or most of it, West Australia north of the Ashburton River, Queensland north of the Diamantina and Rockhampton, and probably Papua, with the addition of what was once German New Guinea. This new State would be under the general control of the Commonwealth; its citizens, no longer divided among three provinces with different laws and capitals, would become a natural nucleus for the tropical white Australia of the future, and consideration could then be given with some prospect of success to the great problems of development which have yet to be faced. Those problems are, firstly, the drainage and damming of the rivers, which at present run to waste, and cause alternative floods and droughts, and consequently disease; secondly, the provision of a line of steamers round the northern coasts, which would give more adequate communication with the outside world, and carry northern produce to the southern ports; thirdly, the surveying of the best route for a future tropical transcontinental railway and its eventual construction; and, fourthly, the establishment of proper land settlement regulations suitable to the country. All save the last would cost money, but it is money that in the long run will be richly repaid, both in actual profits and in the strengthening of the Commonwealth, always provided that the work is properly carried out in accordance with our growing knowledge of tropical conditions.

A. Wyatt Tilby.

PRESIDENT WILSON'S PEACE PROGRAMME AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE

1. **Enforced Peace.** Proceedings of the First Annual National Assemblage of the League to Enforce Peace, Washington, May 26–27, 1916.
2. **Recueil de Rapports sur les différents points du Programme-minimum.** Published for the Organisation Centrale pour une Paix Durable by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague. 1916.
3. **The Monroe Doctrine.** An Interpretation. By ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, Professor of the Science of Government in Harvard University. Duckworth. 1916.
4. **America's Foreign Relations.** By WILLIS FLETCHER JOHNSON. Eveleigh Nash. 1916.

SPEAKING in May 1916 President Wilson said: 'If 'this war has accomplished nothing else for the benefit 'of the world, it has at least disclosed a great moral necessity, 'and set forward the thinking of the statesmen of the world 'by a whole age.' This, he added, had been made clear by repeated utterances of the leading statesmen of the nations now at war, which imply that 'the principle of public right 'must henceforth take precedence over the individual interests 'of particular nations, and that the nations of the world must 'in some way band themselves together to see that right 'prevails, as against any sort of selfish aggression.' In his address to the Senate on the 22nd of January last, the President again enlarged on this theme, with all the weight of authority belonging to the head of a great nation speaking *ex cathedra*. He claimed, indeed, that the tradition of the American people gives them a peculiar right and duty to share in the work of laying 'afresh and upon a new plan the foundation of peace 'among the nations.' But it was only on certain conditions that they would take part in the 'universal covenant' by which alone peace and justice could be guaranteed throughout the world. The peace that shall conclude this war must be 'not 'merely a peace that will serve the several interests and imme-'diate aims of the nations engaged'; its elements must 'engage

'the confidence and satisfy the principles of the American 'Government.' Especially it must recognise the absolute equality of rights between the nations, great and small; and, to safeguard this equality, 'Right must be based upon the 'common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the 'nations upon whose concert peace will depend.' For 'mere 'agreements' would not make peace secure.

'It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected, that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organised major force of mankind. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organised rivalries, but an organised common peace.'

So far as the general principle involved in this programme is concerned, President Wilson is right in claiming that it has received the endorsement of some of the leading statesmen of the nations now at war. At the banquet given in New York, on the 25th of November 1916, by the American League to Enforce Peace a cablegram was read from Viscount Grey, then British Foreign Secretary, strongly supporting the objects of the League. 'I sincerely desire,' he said, 'to see a league of nations formed 'to secure peace after the war; I regard such a league as the best 'promise of preserving treaties and saving the world from 'aggressive wars.' On this and subsequent occasions messages of sympathy were also received from responsible statesmen in Germany and France, as well as from Denmark, the Netherlands, Japan, Switzerland, and Spain. And though the proposals of the League to Enforce Peace are, as we shall see, much less far-reaching and revolutionary than those formulated by President Wilson, they rest upon the same basic principle.

Long before this, in a speech delivered in Dublin in the early months of the war, Mr. Asquith had committed himself to the same principle. Taking as his text Gladstone's words that 'the greatest triumph of our time would be the enthrone-'ment of the idea of public right as the governing idea of 'European politics,' he declared that this meant, when translated into practice, 'the substitution for force, for the clash of 'competing ambition, for the groupings and alliances and a

'precarious equipoise, of a real European partnership, based on 'the recognition of equal rights and established and enforced 'by a common will.' In his speech to his constituents at Ladybank, on the 1st of February last, Mr. Asquith called fresh attention to this pronouncement in the course of an eloquent and sympathetic reference to the 'fine ideal' set forth by the President in his address to the Senate, adding :

'I am not sure that there is any substantial difference between President Wilson's ideal and the one which I thus endeavoured to depict, except—and this I admit is a large step in advance—that he would blot out the geographical limitation of Europe, and associate the United States and indeed all civilised peoples in the same peace-preserving fraternity.'

While thus committing himself to the ideal of a 'universal 'union' Mr. Asquith was careful, with the acumen characteristic of the legal mind, to introduce a saving clause. The ideal ought to be realised, but the process of its realisation might be 'slow and gradual.' Unfortunately saving clauses are apt to escape the notice of the ordinary man, who is inclined to take the utterances of politicians and diplomatists at their face value, without inquiring too carefully into their motive, which may be purely opportunist. On a thousand platforms throughout the English-speaking world it has been proclaimed that this is 'a war to end war.' The leading statesmen of the nations at war have, with varying degrees of sincerity, encouraged this idea and done at least lip-service to the ideal of the effective 'organisation of peace,' without troubling to explain how this organisation is to be made effective, or what sacrifices of cherished national liberties it may involve. The general atmosphere of somewhat nebulous idealism thus created is not favourable to clear thinking, and out of the resultant confusion of thought certain tendencies full of peril to our commonwealth are taking shape. These tendencies are often fundamentally opposed, though the mass of people do not realise the opposition. A passionate nationalism is in the same persons combined with a sentimental cosmopolitanism, and the essential antithesis is either not perceived or is glossed over with some dialectical subtlety. Yet the antithesis is there, and the recognition of its existence will force our people, when the period of reconstruction shall come, to choose one of two alternative principles on which this reconstruction is to

proceed. The necessity and nature of this choice were foretold by Disraeli, forty-five years ago, in his great speech at Manchester on the ideal of British Imperialism. 'The time is at 'hand,' he said, 'when England will have to decide between 'national and cosmopolitan principles, and the issue is no 'mean one.'

This is the issue, fateful for the whole future of the world, which is raised in President Wilson's address to the Senate of the 22nd of January and again in his inaugural speech of the 5th of March. There can be no doubt that these pronouncements—which, though primarily addressed to the American people, were intended for the ears of all the world—have given and will yet give a great impulse to the propaganda of 'cosmopolitan 'principles,' and it would be foolish to minimise their weight and significance. The President is not, indeed, the first head of a mighty State to put forward the establishment of a perpetual and universal reign of peace as a scheme of practical politics; for in this he was anticipated by the Emperor Alexander I. of Russia more than a hundred years ago. But he is the first of contemporary statesmen to announce his adherence to the principle of the 'universal union' in more than general terms, the first to define the conditions on which alone the nation he represents will enter such a union. Moreover, the President's high character, and the obvious sincerity of his idealism, raise him above the suspicion which, under similar circumstances, fell upon the Emperor Alexander. The whole world realises that, whatever else may be said of the President's programme, it certainly does not represent an attempt to 'disguise under the language of evangelical self-abnegation 'schemes of far-reaching ambition.' It is precisely this fact, and the effect which so weighty a pronouncement, made from such a quarter, is likely to produce upon the minds of men, that make it the more necessary to take the President's programme seriously and to examine it with care, in order to see what would be involved for the British Empire and the world at large were it carried into practice.

It may be remarked, to begin with, that though the realisation of the unprecedented misery and waste caused by this war has undoubtedly led to a demand, more vocal and more widespread than ever before, for some system that shall make wars henceforth impossible, it is not by any means for the first time

that this 'great moral necessity' has been disclosed to the world. Nine hundred years, indeed, have passed since the conscience of medieval Christendom awoke to the moral necessity of putting a stop to feudal war, and devised the 'Truce of 'God,' which was to be safeguarded by oaths, to be taken by all under penalty of excommunication, and by an armed league to enforce peace. It may be added, as not without a moral for this generation, that the objection of Bishop Gerard of Cambrai to this movement, on the ground that it would lead to universal perjury rather than to universal peace, was more than justified by its results.* In more recent centuries every great general war has been followed by a reaction against war and by attempts to formulate 'projects of peace.' In such projects the eighteenth century was particularly prolific. The fashion was set by the 'Projet de traité pour rendre la paix 'perpétuelle' of the Abbé de St. Pierre, published in 1713 immediately after the Peace of Utrecht, and it was to St. Pierre that the Emperor Alexander owed the inspiration of the project of peace which he submitted to Pitt in 1804 and later developed into the Holy Alliance. It is interesting to note that the language used by the Russian Autocrat in 1804 is substantially the same as that used by the American President in 1917. The Emperor insisted that, for the purpose of 'fixing on firm 'and lasting foundations, the future peace of Europe,' the forms of government to be established in the various countries 'must 'everywhere be founded on the sacred rights of humanity,' so as to make them 'incapable of acting save in the highest 'interests of the peoples subject to them.' The internal order of the States having thus been founded on 'a wise liberty,' their relations to each other as members of the 'European 'Confederation' should be defined in a general treaty in which the prescriptions of the Law of Nations would be re-established and re-defined on clear and precise principles.

Pitt's reception of the Emperor Alexander's proposal was no

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* Hoc ergo decretum periculosum esse omnibus, omnes videlicet aut jurare, aut anathemati subjacere, omnes enim peccato communi involvi, si commento hujusmodi uterentur. Cessit nihilominus Gerardus Episcoporum et aliorum adhortationibus, invitus: ita tamen ut quod ante reclamabat, postea eventus probaverit, cum paucissimi perjurii crimen evaserint.—Gesta pontificum Camera-censium, ascribed to Baldric of Thérouanne, lib. iii. cap. 27.

whit less sympathetic than that given by Mr. Asquith to the programme of President Wilson. He ignored, indeed, Alexander's suggestion that the abstract 'rights of humanity' should be made the basis of the future league to enforce peace, and substituted the legal principle of prescriptive rights. But, with this significant modification, the Tsar's peace project was actually embodied in a secret article of the Treaty of St. Petersburg signed between Great Britain and Russia on the 11th of April 1805. This article ran as follows:

'Their Majesties, who take the most lively interest in the discussion and precise definition of the law of nations and in the guarantee of its observance by general consent and by the establishment in Europe of a federative system, to ensure the independence of the weaker states by erecting a formidable barrier against the ambition of the more powerful, will come to an amicable understanding among themselves as to whatever may concern these objects, and will form an intimate union for the purpose of realising their happy effects.'

Thus the idea of a league to enforce peace, hitherto a dream of idealists, took shape as a scheme of practical politics. The opportunity for putting this particular agreement into force, it is true, never arose; but the principle underlying it was revived in 1815, after the final downfall of Napoleon, and formed the basis of that experiment in the collective government of Europe which has been denounced ever since by liberal opinion as the tyranny of the 'Holy Alliance.'

This experiment is full of instruction for those who believe that peace will be secured if international law be enforced by an 'international police.' It was argued by pacifists, even before the war, that the changed conditions rendered possible a project for which Europe had not been ripe in 1815. The result of the war will probably be still further to change the conditions in the direction of national and international stability. But the objections to a 'universal union' formulated by the present writer in 1913 * will not have lost their force. The only conceivable basis of an international juridical system is the *status quo* as defined in treaties. Therefore the new League to Enforce Peace would, like the old Holy Alliance, be committed to stereotyping political systems which, though reasonably satisfactory at the outset, might not remain so.

* The Confederation of Europe, p. 293 *seq.*

It might be possible for a coalition of Powers of superior strength to enforce against would-be disturbers of the peace principles unanimously acknowledged and defined in treaties, i.e. to apply the principle which the Grand Alliance directed against France, that of a coalition *ad hoc*. But if an attempt were made to expand this coalition into a 'universal union,' charged with a general right of supervision and the power to coerce its refractory members—what becomes of the sovereign independence of nations?

Under such a system the independence of the smaller States would be especially prejudiced; for though international law recognises in theory the sovereign equality of all States, no international system which should attempt to translate this theory into practice would survive. If, on the other hand, the voting power in the central 'directory' were to be apportioned according to the size and importance of the constituent States, the result would be precisely such an hegemony of the Great Powers as was exercised by the Grand Alliance after 1815.

The new League, like the old Holy Alliance, would begin by repudiating the principle of intervention in the internal affairs of the constituent nations, only in the end to find itself compelled to intervene; for, in new forms, the old difficulty of drawing a sharp distinction between external affairs and 'internal affairs having an external effect' would be sure to emerge.

President Wilson's attitude undoubtedly constitutes to some extent a new fact; for it may well be argued that the ideal of perpetual peace is brought a long step nearer when the United States proposes to emerge from its jealous isolation and to become a party to the 'universal union.' It becomes necessary, then, to examine very carefully the President's proposals, in order to see whether they do in fact represent any such changed conditions as would deprive of their weight the objections stated above.

The President claims—and the claim will carry weight with pacifists—that in making his proposals he is acting strictly in accordance with the tradition and policy of the United States as a nation, and in fulfilment of all that it has 'professed and 'striven for.' The United States, in short, is held up as the pacific nation *par excellence*, and as such entitled to take the

lead in the projected league to enforce peace. This belief is not confined to Americans. 'Perhaps historians will look back 'to the United States,' says Mr. Delisle Burns, 'as an example 'of a nation which has not been formed by war, so much at 'least as earlier nations have.' * So far as the internal development of the nation is concerned this is doubtless true; there has obviously been no such welding together of the conflicting elements in the American people by 'blood and iron' as has proved so fatally effective in the case of Germany.

But so far as the territorial expansion of the United States is concerned it is profoundly untrue. The United States owed its very being to conquest; it was nurtured in warfare—with the Indians, with the Dutch, with the Spaniards, with the French; by bitter war with the Mother Country it won the right and power to walk alone; and its mighty growth has throughout been made possible by war or by the threat of war. It preserved its unity by one of the bloodiest wars in all history.† The Monroe Doctrine, according to President Wilson, is the doctrine 'that no nation should seek to extend its polity over 'any other nation or people, but that every nation should be 'left free to determine its own polity.' He does not, indeed, in this respect claim an absolutely pure record for his country. 'Like other nations,' he said in his address to the League to Enforce Peace, 'we have ourselves no doubt once and again 'offended against that principle when for a little while con-'trolled by selfish passion, as our franker historians have 'been honourable enough to admit.' Once and again! The truth is that nearly the whole history of the territorial growth of the United States, from the Louisiana Purchase to the most recent adventures in Central America, is that of its expansion

* The Morality of Nations, p. 17.

† The moral of the Civil War is a perplexity to certain American advocates of a 'universal union' founded on democratic principles; for, as Professor Guerard points out, 'the right of free secession 'is correlative of the right of free federation, and both of these are 'forms of democracy,' Recueil de Rapports, p. 33. Professor Grant Showerman says, 'We must not advocate the right of 'secession at will from long established national existence. This 'would invite instability always pregnant with danger,' ib., p. 40. This is, of course, very true; but it was the argument of Metternich when he tried, in vain, to bring the question of the insurgent Greeks under the jurisdiction of the 'Holy Alliance.'

at the expense of neighbouring peoples and States. Even the original, pure doctrine of Monroe was not put forward in the spirit of international altruism, and its abiding significance is accurately defined by Senator Lodge:

'We stand by the Monroe Doctrine for the same reason that England upholds Afghanistan and takes the Shan States from China, because it is essential to our safety and defence. The Monroe Doctrine rests primarily on the great law of self-preservation.'

But whatever the doctrine of Monroe himself may have been, it has gone through a series of the most remarkable transmutations to fit the *Real-politik* of successive Presidents and Secretaries of State, until at times it has assumed the character not of a doctrine of peace but of a doctrine of conquest. Its latest American historian, with honourable if disconcerting frankness, draws attention to 'the contrast between the 'principle that foreign nations must not annex American 'territory and the equally well-established principle that the 'United States may annex what she pleases.' * On this latter principle the United States has consistently acted from the beginning. There never was a more startling assertion of 'the right to hand peoples about from potentate to potentate 'as if they were property,' which President Wilson denounces, than the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. Though the French First Consul was the seller, the annexation of Louisiana was, says Professor Bushnell Hart (p. 15), practically an enormous expansion of the United States at the expense of Spain.

'Once started in this direction, two other provinces seemed desirable. West Florida was annexed by military force in several instalments from 1810 to 1814. East Florida was ceded by the treaty of 1819. . . . The administration felt strong enough to refuse the boundaries claimed by Spain in West Florida and Texas, and to make the most of the so-called purchase of East Florida from an unwilling vendor.'

It was, however, with the inauguration of James K. Polk as President, on the 4th of March 1845, that the Monroe Doctrine became in the minds of Americans definitely a doctrine of conquest. To quote Professor Hart again (p. 112):

'Instead of the peaceful doctrine that America ought to remain as it was, the United States now began systematically to re-arrange

* 'The Monroe Doctrine,' by Professor Bushnell Hart, p. 368.

the map of North America at the expense of her neighbours, and to maintain with all her might that there was a mysterious thing called the Monroe Doctrine which prevented any one from interfering with the Latin-Americans—except ourselves.'

Texas was annexed in 1845; war with Mexico followed in 1846, and ended in 1848 with the annexation of New Mexico and California. In 1846 the Oregon dispute with Great Britain was compromised and the vast territory of the North-West added to the United States. It is no wonder that in the years to come 'the spirit of the country was honestly for ex-'pansion, and against recognising too many rights of weaker 'neighbours.'*

In all this process there was no pretence of consulting the populations concerned; and when in 1844 John Quincy Adams urged in Congress that 'there was no power to transfer the 'inhabitants of one country to the sovereignty of another 'without their consent,' he was overruled on the ground of the universal practice of nations, it being pointed out that Adams himself had not consulted the people of Florida when he annexed that territory. The contrast between the theory and the practice of American politics could hardly be better illustrated. As for the pacifist ideal championed in more recent years by American statesmen, a sharp light was cast on its limitations early in 1913 by the reply of President Taft's Government to the demand of the Colombian Government that the whole question at issue between it and the United States should be submitted to arbitration. The American Minister at Bogotá, Mr. Du Bois, was instructed to inform the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs

'that the Government of the United States could not submit to arbitration the questions relating to the separation of Panama, considered in its political aspect, though ready to accept arbitration in questions of a juridical nature arising out of it, because the people of the United States would never consent to submit to an arbitral judgment such transcendent acts of international policy, a thing which no country in the world had hitherto done.'†

President Wilson did not, and could not, reverse this decision after his inauguration in March of the same year;

* Hart, p. 128.

† Boletin del Ministerio de Relaciones Esteriores. Bogotá, 1913, tom. iv., num. 13 and 15, p. 981.

and though the limitations defined in it were done away with in the Wilson 'pacific settlement' treaties for which the late Secretary of State, W. Jennings Bryan, was largely responsible, these treaties are only valid for a term of years, and might therefore be dropped by any future American Government. In view of the history of the relations of the great Republic with her neighbours, from the Louisiana Purchase to the acquisition of the Canal Zone and the ill-omened interventions in Mexico, it is not surprising that the Latin-American nations have remained extremely suspicious of 'Monroismo' and of 'Yanqui' idealism generally.*

In making these comments on the true character of American foreign policy in the past there has been no intention of condemning this policy, which has been, on the whole, amply justified by its beneficent results for the United States and the world at large. But the true issue, as between the standpoints of idealism and realism in politics, has been confused by the fact that the United States has obtained these results without developing great military power. Now this has been due, not to her pacific spirit, but to the peculiarity of her geographical position; and the sanction of force behind her policy has been no less real because it was potential rather than actual. 'The action of the United States in her quarrels with 'her neighbours,' says Professor Bushnell Hart (p. 325), 'has usually been of writing-paper mixed with possible blood,' and if writing-paper alone has so often prevailed, this has been because no other Power has hitherto thought it worth while to accept a challenge thrown down by a nation with such vast and inestimable reserves of strength. The policy has been justified so far, not only by its results, but in its means. But the realisation of its nature justifies us also in scrutinising very closely any declaration of American policy, no matter by what lofty sentiments it may be inspired. President Wilson has made an offer to the world, but the offer is conditional. What are the conditions? and in what way would our acceptance of them react upon us and upon our ideals?

We may note at the outset, as highly significant, the fact that the President, even in his address to the League to Enforce

* See the writer's article 'The New Monroism' in the EDINBURGH REVIEW for January 1914.

Peace, laid down as conditions, on which alone the United States would adhere to such a League, principles which find no place in the programme of the League itself. This programme was carefully constructed, with the aid of some of the most able diplomatists and international lawyers in America, as a basis on which all nations, without any sacrifice of their particular interests or principles, might find it possible to come to an agreement. In the words of one of the speakers at last year's meeting, it proposes no more than the establishment of an International Vigilance Committee.

'This is the programme of the League to Enforce Peace—not a proposal to disarm, not a proposal to organise an international government, not a proposal to create an international police, not a proposal to enforce decrees, but simply a proposal that the nations shall join in enforcing a delay in the declaration of war until an impartial court and the public opinion of the world have had a chance to examine the asserted cause of war.'*

Thus the utmost the League suggests is an agreement to enforce a principle which has already been consecrated by solemn treaties between various Powers, notably by treaties negotiated by the United States herself.

But the 'indispensable conditions' formulated by President Wilson go far beyond the project formulated by the League.

In his address to the Senate, the President declared that the doctrine of Monroe must become 'the doctrine of the world,' and that in the new world-union 'every nation should be 'left free to determine its own polity,' adding that 'no peace 'ought to last which does not recognise the principle that 'Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of 'the governed.' On the face of it this condition postpones the realisation of the world-union to the Greek Kalends; for its fulfilment would involve, as a preliminary step, the break up of every existing Empire, including the American. † But,

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* Edward A. Filene, Director of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Enforced Peace, p. 47.

† The Sinn Féiners, e.g., appeal to this principle, which they point out has been endorsed by British statesmen, as implying the separate representation of Ireland at the Peace Conference, with a view to the recognition and guarantee of her independence by

granted that the Peace Congress would be able to lay anew the foundations of the nations so as ' to engage the confidence ' and satisfy the principles of the American Government,' how are these foundations to be secured save by giving the right to the Universal Union to watch over the democratic orthodoxy of its constituent States, that is to say, the right to meddle in their internal affairs ? The Holy Alliance began by repudiating the principle of such intervention—continued indeed to the last to repudiate it in theory ; but it soon found itself compelled, in the interests of the European *status quo*, to intervene in ' internal affairs having an external effect.' Great Britain from the first protested against this claim ; and its continued assertion in spite of her protests led ultimately to her formal withdrawal from the Alliance. It was the threat of the extension of this claim to the New World that led to the counterblast of the Monroe Doctrine.

Professor Ramsay Muir, among others, has argued that an objection which applied to the autocratic Powers of the Holy Alliance has no application to democracies, and that there need have been no intervention had Alexander I. insisted at the peace settlement on the carrying out of his principle that the Governments should be made ' incapable of acting save in the ' interests of their subjects.' * This argument does not carry conviction. The autocratic Powers intervened to crush revolution, or even the first movements towards revolution, not on any abstract principles of divine right, but because from the experience of twenty-five years of war they believed revolutionary principles to be dangerous to the peace of the world and to their own safety. What reason is there to suppose that the new Holy Alliance, *mutatis mutandis*, would act otherwise ? that it would suffer undisturbed, let us say, a reaction in any one of its constituent States against those fundamental democratic principles on which the world's order would *ex hypothesi* be held to rest ? or in the long run refrain from endeavouring to check movements which they should conceive as possibly tending to such a reaction, and

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' Europe and America.' See ' The New Ireland,' vol. iii. No. 16 (24th Feb. 1917) ; also the solemn resolution of the Limerick Pork-butchers' Society, in ' Nationality ' for the 10th of March 1917.

* Nationalism and Internationalism, p. 167.

therefore as dangerous to the common peace? As Mr. Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labour well says: 'Until democracy is more nearly universal, until 'democracy becomes a social and economic fact as well as a 'political catchword, a League with power to enforce *decisions* 'would almost certainly become the repressive tool of the 'reactionary and privileged forces of the world.'*

But would a true social and economic democracy be less repressive? To judge by the tendencies of organised labour it would be more so. For illustrations of the probability that President Wilson's doctrine would lead to constant occasions for new wars, we need only to turn to the attitude of the United States towards the sister republics of the New World. President Wilson's action in respect of General Huerta's Government in Mexico was in effect a revival of that very principle of the Holy Alliance against which the original Monroe Doctrine was a protest, that is to say, the principle that a State or a combination of States may, not in their own particular interests only, but in those of a general principle of public law, seek to impose a particular model upon another State. From the international point of view there is no difference whatever between the refusal to recognise as legitimate any but a Government *ab antiquo*—which was in general the attitude of the Holy Alliance—and a refusal to recognise any Government not based upon the will of the people 'properly expressed and registered,' which is that championed by President Wilson. Moreover, this doctrine is not quite a new development of American policy due to President Wilson's particular idealism; it was proclaimed with equal force so long ago as 1861 by William H. Seward, then Secretary of State. Its introduction into the public law of the world, to be enforced by 'the organised 'major force of mankind,' would be the logical deduction from the premisses laid down by the President as essential to peace.

The first condition, then, of America's adhesion to the Universal Union is, according to President Wilson, that this Union should undertake to impose the American ideal upon its members, or—what amounts to the same thing, if the

* Enforced Peace, p. 114.

Union is to be effective for its purpose—should refuse to admit any State to its fellowship which does not conform to this ideal.

The second condition laid down by the President is also set in an ideal light; but it none the less embodies a political principle which the United States has from the first, in her own interests, strenuously maintained and we, in our interests, have as strenuously opposed. 'The paths of the sea,' declares the President, 'must alike in law and in fact be free. The 'freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality, 'and co-operation. . . . The free, constant, unthreatened 'intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of 'peace and of development.' Now this principle of the 'freedom of the seas' must not be confused with that of the *liberum mare* for which Grotius contended, in his protest against the claim of certain Powers to a monopoly of vast stretches of the ocean. It is the doctrine first formulated by Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War and made by Catherine II. of Russia in 1780 the basis of the League of Armed Neutrality against Great Britain, that 'free ships make free 'goods,' * which developed into the principle that in war-time enemy private property at sea should be respected as, in theory, it is on land. In short, it is a doctrine which, had we been irrevocably committed to it, would have hopelessly blunted the sharpest of our weapons against our present enemies.

It is admitted by friendly Americans that the British command of the sea has been, on the whole, to the advantage of the world. Thus the 'New Republic,' which is supposed to interpret the views of President Wilson, says in its issue of the 10th of February last:

'In spite of the fact that the United States has protested against the British maritime police power, the American people have been one of its chief beneficiaries. . . . The settlement of the American continent and the building up of the American nation . . . depended upon the emancipation of travel by sea. In the work of emancipation Great Britain has always played the major part. She has given security to the world's highway and to those nations which could only be approached by the world's highway; and

* This principle was embodied in Art. XII. of the treaty concluded in 1785 between the United States and Prussia. Text in Willis Johnson, ii. 428.

under the shadow of this security not only has the British Empire carried free British institutions to many parts of the world, but the American nation has been allowed to grow unvexed and unretarded by any but its own domestic difficulties.'

That is to say, that—as Professor Rowland Ussher has also pointed out—the effective sanction of the Monroe Doctrine has throughout been British sea-power.

According to the 'New Republic,' the objection of the United States to the British dominion of the seas would seem to be based, less even on the restraints placed upon American commerce during the present war, than on an abstract objection to the exercise of absolute power by any nation on the seas. In this respect the 'New Republic' holds that the Germans have a legitimate grievance, which must be taken into consideration; but it holds also that the form which has been taken by the attempt to redress this grievance, viz. unrestricted submarine war against all and sundry, has replaced, or will replace, 'maritime absolutism' by 'maritime 'anarchy.' It adds:

'When we are forced to choose between maritime absolutism and maritime anarchy, we choose for the moment the absolutism, particularly when we have better reason to trust the representative of maritime absolutism than we have to trust the representative of maritime anarchy.'

As for the future, it quotes an article in its issue of the 27th of May 1916, as follows:

'Sea power must not be deprived of its right to destroy commerce because if it were deprived of this right, the most effective weapon of resistance against aggressive militarism would be fatally weakened; but the power must be exercised only under conditions and on behalf of policies which can obtain official international approval.'

It is not intended here to discuss this doctrine from the point of view of abstract public right, but it is very germane to our subject to examine the practical issues involved in its adoption as one of the bases of an international union to which we should be a party. That it should be so adopted is, moreover, not an American view only; it is that of most pacifists, including our own. The Minimum Programme put forward last year by the Central Organisation for a Durable Peace, on the executive committee of which Great Britain is represented by Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson, lays down that 'in order to facilitate the

'reduction of naval armaments the right of capture shall be 'abolished and the freedom of the seas assured.' Among the *rapports* on the Minimum Programme invited and published by the Central Organisation are some which develop this principle with perfect logic to somewhat disconcerting conclusions. Among the proposals formulated by the permanent commission of the Office des Nationalités is the following :

'Les mers, détroits et canaux maritimes sont libres et neutres. Ils sont soumis, quant à la police, l'aménagement, et l'entretien, au régime d'internationalisation.' *

The American pacifist, Mr. D. Starr Jordan, defines more clearly what this would actually mean in practice.

'It would involve dismantling the fortresses which now guard the Dardanelles, the Bosporus, the Straits of Gibraltar, Aden, and Dover, as well as the defences of Suez, Panama, and the Kiel Canal.'

'The more completely force can be separated from commerce,' he adds, 'the better for civilisation.' †

This latter is a principle with which the present writer most cordially agrees. But will it be realised in practice merely by pooling the command of the seas? The truth is that the phrase 'the freedom of the seas' is meaningless—save as a convenient weapon for diplomatic fencing in time of war—so long as the nations continue to regard their frontiers as defensive lines to be fortified against hostile penetration by protective tariffs. This truth is but imperfectly recognised in the programme of the Organisation Centrale, which only suggests an agreement between the States for free trade, or at least equality of treatment, in their colonies, protectorates, and spheres of influence. In President Wilson's programme it is recognised not at all. He gives a whole-hearted support to the American doctrine of the freedom of the seas ; freedom of trade, which is certainly not an American doctrine, he does not even mention. Yet, as the Belgian economist, M. Henri Lambert, points out, 'freedom of the seas depends upon the general acceptance of 'freedom of trade.'‡ What use, indeed, would there be in

* Recueil de Rapports, p. 76. † Ibid., p. 24.

‡ M. Lambert developed this theme in a 'Lettre ouverte à Monsieur Woodrow Wilson,' which appeared in the 'Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant' for the 8th of October 1914, and has since been published separately.'

securing that the paths of the sea shall alike in law and in fact be free, if these paths be turned into a series of blind alleys by tariff walls across the ports of entry? Universal Free Trade is, in fact, the *sine qua non* of the establishment of a Universal Union, which would dissolve into its elements if its function were conceived as merely to keep the ring while the nations indulge in protectionist sparring. If, on the other hand, its functions were extended so as to embrace the effective securing of economic peace, whether by maintaining freedom of trade or by the regulation of tariffs, this again would involve intervention in the internal affairs of the nations. From this dilemma there is no escape; and we may well hesitate to commit ourselves to 'cosmopolitan principles' of which the carrying out would involve the supervision of our Customs by international commissioners and the garrisoning of Dover, Portsmouth, and Plymouth by an international police.

While we should keep our eyes open to the dangers of any hasty attempts to realise cosmopolitan ideals, we have need to be equally on our guard against a too violent reaction against them. As Mr. Philip Kerr says in 'For the Right' (p. 140), the main cause of the distemper of the times is an exaggerated nationalism. Mr. Delisle Burns insists in 'The Morality of 'Nations,' that the cure for this distemper must be sought in a changed moral attitude of the nations towards each other, which is the indispensable condition for the establishment of any international system. M. Henri Lambert rightly argues that the 'general liberty of co-operation between groups is 'the only possible foundation of that collective morality on 'which alone peace can be established.' * It is not the least of the crimes of Germany against humanity that she has, at least for the time being, hopelessly shattered the ideal of a peace securely founded on a hard-won universal consciousness of common interests. It has been shattered not only by the barbarous cruelty of the German methods of warfare, but by the amazing revelation of the extent to which our own generous policy of the 'open door' had been abused by the Germans

* 'La Morale et l'Échange Internationaux.' Recueil de Rapports, p. 28. He remarks profoundly, 'Il me semble que le grand Conseil supernational ait plus besoin de la paix que la paix n'a besoin du grand Conseil supernational.'

to serve the ends of their own long-projected bid for world dominion. We have realised, with a bitter resentment, the danger to which our policy had exposed us, and we have resolved that we will never lay ourselves open to a like danger again.

But in this realisation and this resolve there lies a fresh peril to which it is well that attention should be drawn. At the very time when our leaders are expressing their agreement with the 'cosmopolitan principles' of the League to Enforce Peace they are also preparing to close and strengthen the organisation of the British Empire on the basis of an Imperial tariff system. It is essential that we should realise the change which—unless we proceed with extreme caution and consideration for the legitimate rights of others—this policy is likely to make in our relations with the peoples not of our own household, and especially in their attitude towards the question of the freedom of the seas. The danger is painted with convincing clearness by M. Henri Lambert, in an 'open letter' in reply to an attack by Professor Brentano of Munich on British 'naval militarism.'

'The world has the most powerful reasons for desiring and willing that the command of the seas should be exercised by a Free Trade nation. This is a political axiom, almost a truism. It must, of course, be admitted that, since 1897, English Free Trade principles have manifested disquieting hesitations and compromising tendencies both in foreign and home politics; but it must also be recognised that England has remained the only great Free Trade nation.

'For the rest, the world for more than half a century past has had no cause to complain of the manner in which England has exercised her naval supremacy, so far as concerns the freedom and policing of the seas, or the respect and protection to be accorded to commercial navigation. . . .

'At the same time, had English policy succumbed, or were it still to succumb, to "Chamberlainism," tending to cut off from the world an immense economic domain and to exercise in it a protectionist and militarist imperialism, the other peoples would, in my opinion, have the same imperative reasons for combining against this gigantic British enterprise of monopoly and spoliation as they have had in combining against the present German enterprise of conquest and economic domination.' *

* Recueil de Rapports, p. 161.

It will be clear to all thoughtful people that this is not an opinion which we can afford to neglect in establishing the principles on which the British Commonwealth of the future is to be founded. In an article published in this Review in July 1915 * the writer pointed out how the claim had been made, and justly made, by British statesmen that the Imperial power of Great Britain had come to be regarded as held in trust, not only for the Empire and its members, but for the world at large. It is the recognition of the justice of this claim which, as M. Lambert points out, has in the present war ranged neutral opinion overwhelmingly on our side. Clearly, then, our Free Trade tradition has in this respect stood us in good stead, and the goodwill of the world which it has gained for us is certainly not an asset to be lightly thrown aside. The Cobdenite tradition is, for the time being, popularly discredited among us, and this discredit has postponed into a yet more distant future the possibility of realising the ideal of universal peace based on universal freedom of trade and intercourse. In the light of the revelations made since the outbreak of war, it may be necessary for us to protect ourselves against any repetition of the German abuse of our policy of the 'open door.' The development of submarine warfare may to some extent deprive us of the advantages of our insular position ; it may even convert that previous advantage into a disadvantage ; and therefore it may be necessary to take measures to make these islands, as far as possible, economically self-contained and self-supporting. Conceivably also on political grounds some sort of system of Imperial preference may prove desirable. But whatever protective system may be found necessary should be limited to ends which will be universally recognised as legitimate, namely, to what is absolutely necessary for the securing of our safety, the free development of our commerce and industry, and the strengthening of the ties that bind us to the British dominions beyond the seas. The danger to our future lies in the clamour that will arise for the protection of British industry against legitimate as well as illegitimate competition and the consequent substitution of a 'protectionist and militarist 'Imperialism' for that wide, humane, and generous principle on which our Empire has hitherto been based. Let there be no

* British Imperialism and the Problems of Peace.

illusion about the results of such a substitution. The British flag waves over one-fifth of the earth's surface, and this stupendous fact has, on the whole, been accepted with equanimity by other nations, because for a long while past this flag has been the symbol of the open door and of equal rights for all. They will hardly view it with the same complacency if it become the symbol of monopoly and exclusion.

It may be argued, with much show of reason, that we have a perfect right to do what other nations in their several spheres have consistently done. It is, however, not a question of right, but of expediency. The United States, building up a tariff wall round its vast territories and asserting a monopoly of interest in the whole Western Hemisphere, threw down a challenge to the world which has not been taken up. But, though the illusion of peace was preserved, this attitude was really a warlike one, based as it was on 'possible blood'; and numerous recent books by American publicists show that the opinion is rapidly growing that, if it is to be maintained, the United States must arm in its defence. The American attitude has, in short, been made possible partly by the preoccupation of the other Great Powers with more pressing interests, partly by the 'isolation' of the Americas—an isolation which, as President Wilson admits, no longer exists. The situation of the British Empire is wholly different. Its strength and its weakness lie in the fact that it is scattered over the whole face of the globe. Its continued security, then, depends on one of two things: the undisputed British mastery of the seas, or the willing acquiescence of the nations in its existence as a power held in trust for humanity. Now it is scarcely to be expected that, if the 'freedom of the seas' were to be placed under an international guarantee, the 'naval police' of the nations could be trusted to protect a 'gigantic British enter-'prise of monopoly and spoliation,' even if it could be trusted to protect the British Empire as it is. The monopoly, in short, would be based upon our sea-power, which sooner or later would be challenged, and the old race of competitive armament would begin anew, the blame for it being laid this time, not upon Germany, but upon us.

The moral which it is desired to draw from this is, not that we should refrain from protecting and promoting our own interests, but that we should continue to regard them—as in

the past we had learned to do—as very intimately bound up with the legitimate interests of other nations. So long as our Empire lasts we shall have to maintain our power to guard the highways of the sea, for these—as the Germans well understand—are the arteries through which pulses the very lifeblood of our body politic. 'We now perfectly understand,' wrote Lord Sydenham in a recent letter to 'The Times,' 'the meaning of the 'freedom of the seas in terms of German *Kultur*, and we shall 'never abandon one iota of our maritime rights unless and 'until it is certain that all war between Powers possessing naval 'forces has been rendered absolutely and finally impossible.' This is the only possible attitude for us to assume ; and it will be effective for our own security and for the peace of the world so long as we exercise our rights with the same moderation as in the past. That, within any measurable distance of time, the conditions will obtain which Lord Sydenham postulates as the *sine qua non* of the surrender of these rights, the present writer does not believe. Even if after the war the Great Powers were to accept and act upon the programme of the League to Enforce Peace, thiswould not—as the framers of the programme themselves admit—make war impossible or even improbable, but would at most greatly strengthen the chances of preserving peace. As for President Wilson's proposal for a Universal Union, the best possible comment on it, in view of the experience of the ages, is that contained in an answer made by Lord Castlereagh to the similar proposal made by the Emperor Alexander I. almost exactly a hundred years ago. 'The 'problem of a Universal Alliance for the peace and happiness 'of the world has always been one of speculation and hope, 'but it has never yet been reduced to practice, and if an opinion 'may be hazarded from its difficulty, it never can.'

W. Alison Phillips.

SWINBURNE

The Life of Algernon Charles Swinburne. By Edmund Gosse, C.B. Macmillan. 1917.

I

How were the roses so fresh and so fair !

'I do not suppose that anybody now alive (I speak of lovers of poetry) who was not alive in 1832 and old enough then to enjoy the first perfect work of Tennyson, has had such a sensation as that which was experienced in the autumn of 1866 by readers of Mr. Swinburne's "Poems and Ballads." And I am sure that no one in England has had any such sensation since.'

Thus wrote Mr. George Saintsbury, some twenty-two years ago, in a volume of 'Corrected Impressions': and it is certain that no one survives to-day to compare the emotional experiences of 1832 and 1866, to report to us. Indeed of the men who in 1866 were old enough to wage war over 'Poems and 'Ballads' the greater number pre-deceased its author, and by this time a very few remain. Mr. Saintsbury, who happily survives (but will not be called 'Doctor'), was an undergraduate in 1866. He tells us:

'The autumn must have been far advanced before [the book] *did* come out, for I remember that I could not obtain a copy before I went up to Oxford in October, and had to avail myself of an expedition to town to "eat dinners" in order to get one. Three copies of the precious volume, with "Moxon" on cover and "John Camden Hotten" on title-page, accompanied me back that night, together with divers maroons for the purpose of enlivening matters on the ensuing Fifth of November. The book was something of a maroon in itself. . . . We sat next afternoon, I remember, from luncheon time till the chapel bell rang, reading aloud by turns in a select company "Dolores" and "The Triumph of Time," "Laus Veneris" and "Faustine," and all the other wonders of the volume.'

The hubbub raised over 'Poems and Ballads' in 1866 still, after half a century, interrupts criticism with an echo too loud for its real importance, even for its historical importance. It was not, to be sure, a mere hubbub of the market-place, and

for much of it that sounded in the market-place Swinburne and his friends were largely to blame. The Pre-Raphaelites had a tribal way of shouting their wares before producing them. In Goblin Market ' Come buy ! Come buy ! ' habitually dinned as noisily as in any vulgar one, and Alexander the coppersmith could colourably plead, nine times out of ten, that he had not started the tumult. Dante Gabriel Rossetti in particular had always a nervous sense of the public opinion it was proposed to offend ; his own poems appeared in circumstances (creditable enough if hidden) which, made public, to an uncharitable world suggested *réclame*. There can be no doubt, we think (after reading many Memoirs); that his friends did Swinburne a little service with much disservice by puffing his book beforehand. ' Now we were told, first, that a volume 'of extraordinarily original verse was coming out ; now, that it ' was so shocking that its publisher repented its appearance ; ' now, that it had been re-issued, and was coming out after all.' Nor can it be said that, when the storm burst, Swinburne either handled his craft or comported himself in a way to make easy weather. The book *did* challenge the world : it *did* contain matter of offence—and he well knew it ; and, when we have allowed everything for the sensitiveness of a poet, it remains true that a man who throws down a challenge should be prepared to keep his head when the glove is taken up.

But the real marvel of ' Poems and Ballads ' lay, of course, in its *poetry*, as in that lay the real innovation. Other poets had been scandalous—plenty of them—before Swinburne ; and the possible changes that true poetry can ring on the libidinous are, after all, pretty few. But here was a man who, five hundred years after Chaucer, in the long line of descent which already boasted Shakespeare, Milton, Dryden, Pope, Wordsworth, Shelley, Byron, Tennyson, Browning—all so great and all so different—had suddenly discovered a new door and thrust it open upon what seemed endless vistas of beauty. Here was a man who, coming after these mighty inventors, could take the language in which they had wrought and convert it to a music as unlike any of theirs, as absolutely fresh and original, as it was patently the music of a peer. Swinburne constantly held that all great poets must be conscious of their greatness. He himself could be as arrogant as any one, when provoked ; but although self-centred, he was too noble a gentleman to be arrogant by habit—he was even

over-prone to abase himself before the greater gods of Parnassus: and in the following anecdote he is made to assert a claim which many will think not overweening.

'He was not disinclined, on occasion, to refer to himself with an engaging frankness, as if he were speaking of someone else. At Jowett's dinner-table R. W. Raper once asked him which of the English poets had the best ear. Swinburne replied with earnestness and gravity: "Shakespeare without doubt; then Milton; then Shelley; then, I do not know what other people would do, but I should put myself."'

Although our memory reach short of Mr. Saintsbury's, we can bring a small illustration of the sway this genius held over young men in 1880. The wave of enthusiasm had fallen into a trough with 'Bothwell.' The splendid choruses in 'Erechtheus' had lifted it a little; but 'Erechtheus' as a whole failed to 'amuse,' and the worshippers had an uneasy sense that their master was fumbling in an art for which he lacked instinct as well as tact; that, when prolixity should have warned him as the surest signal of a mark missed, Swinburne had not even the eyes to see that his prolixity was prolix. But in 1878, with 'Poems and Ballads, Second Series,' on the wonderful crests of such lyrics as 'The Year of the Rose,' 'A Forsaken Garden,' 'A Wasted Vigil,' and the supreme 'Ave atque Vale,' the wave surged up anew to its summit: and if we missed the adventurous feeling of naughtiness, that too was restored to us, after a fashion, in 1880, by 'Heptalogia'—for youth loves parodies, and to see fun poked at pontifical seniors. Memory recalls a night in the autumn of that year, a set of rooms in Balliol—but men dropped in from other colleges and stayed until close upon midnight—a voice chanting the 'Heptalogia' to wild shouts of laughter, the company taking fire and running back, like flame over stubble, to race through the audacities of 'Poems and Ballads' even back to the Circean choruses of 'Atalanta'—'hounds of Spring upon 'Winter's traces'—

'And Pan by noon and Bacchus by night,
Fleeter of foot than the fleet-foot kid,
Follows with dancing and fills with delight
The Maenad and the Bassarid;
And soft as lips that laugh and hide
The laughing leaves of the trees divide,
And screen from seeing and leave in sight
The god pursuing, the maiden hid.'

And then, almost suddenly—even in breasts that continued to echo the memory of it—all this enthusiasm had died down ; and while Swinburne went on writing, writing, of stars and love, and waves and flames that were deathless or breathless or tattered or battered or shattered, none of them mattered, none of them contained any longer any hope ; all were galvanic —reflex action of genius, after death.

That is the real tragedy which has to be explained in the biography of a man whose life yields the picturesque biographer very little—or very little that can be told—of incident for escape or resource. It would still be the real tragedy and kernel of the whole matter had Swinburne's life been crowded with spirited actual adventure. Swinburne was a tremendous force in poetry: the force died ; the man outlived it, and died, many years later, solicitously tended. He had in his day the hearts of all young lovers of poetry at his feet. He has left an indelible mark on English verse : and for this, to the end the younger generation venerated him as a great figure, a spent god and asleep under the pines (Putney). He was the last man in the world to leave a cause for a ribbon or a handful of silver. But he who had inspired parodists innumerable and many pale imitators, has left us no school of poets. Upon the literature of Victorian England he made an amazing irruption, and passed.

II

It is always a pleasure to read a book by a man who knows how books should be written, and Mr. Gosse's eagerly awaited ' Life of Swinburne ' tells the tale vividly, tactfully, adequately, in that excellent prose which, although one takes it for granted in the author of ' Father and Son,' still gives so much pleasure that it were ungrateful to omit the *benedicamus*. Moreover the tale not only gives truth of fact, so far as our knowledge enables us to test this, but by nicely apportioning the whole to its subject, and its casual with its more significant and important parts, conveys an impression of truth scarcely less valuable. It omits, to be sure, the one word (of five letters) which, if uttered, might have saved the skilful artist a deal of trouble ; but it does this in obedience to a tradition which makes, no doubt, for literary as well as for parliamentary decency ; and we shall amuse ourselves by copying Mr. Gosse's reticence.

The genius of Swinburne was something elvish, always and throughout. He had all the precocity of an elf, with no little of its outward guise. Like an elf, he never grew up. Like an elf, he suddenly gave signs of arrested growth, was an old man prematurely, and continued to be an old man for many years until the moment when he peacefully faded out. There was one reason which in ordinary men would account well enough for this arrested development, but it will not account for Swinburne.

Even his birth is an elfin mystery. Who could predict—who can account for—this child as springing from the union of a British Admiral with a daughter of the third Earl of Ashburnham? The ancient and honourable families of Swinburne and Ashburnham have nothing in their records which begins to explain him. He himself has stated that he was born 'all 'but dead, and certainly was not expected to live an hour.' Of this circumstance (probably apocryphal) exact memory can hardly be demanded of him; but again and again his most definite recollections of his childhood (given in later years in all honesty by one who abhorred falsehood all his life) are shown to be legendary, to say the least—'intimations of 'immortality' rather than slavish records of fact. The fact of importance is that his childhood alternated between two homes—his parents' at East Dene, Bonchurch, in the Isle of Wight, and Capheaton on the Northumbrian coast, where his Border ancestors had settled in the reign of Elizabeth, and where his grandfather, Sir John Swinburne, sixth baronet, kept house as head of the family. The seas off the Wight to swim in—the Northumbrian coast to gallop along, chanting verse against the rush of the wind in his face—chanting (say) 'Gastibelza,' 'the song of songs which is Hugo's'—these, heaven to the boy's childhood, were cherished by him to the end as his heavenliest experiences. Only the coasts of Cornwall (Tristram's coast) and of Sark ever competed in his affection with Bonchurch and Capheaton, where

> 'Through fell and moorland,
> And salt-sea foreland,
> Our noisy norland
> Resounds and rings.'

As he never swerved from these first loyalties to place and kindred, so, while pretending to grow up, he but altered, without

changing, the strange elvishness of his personal appearance. His cousin, Lord Redesdale, thus describes his first arrival at Eton (in the summer half of 1849) at the age of twelve :

'What a fragile little creature he seemed as he stood there between his father and mother, with his wondering eyes fixed upon me! Under his arm he hugged his Bowdler's Shakespeare, a very precious treasure bound in brown leather with, for a marker, a narrow slip of ribbon, blue I think, with a button of that most heathenish marqueterie called Tunbridge ware dangling from the end of it. He was strangely tiny. His limbs were small and delicate, and his sloping shoulders looked far too weak to carry his great head, the size of which was exaggerated by the tousled mass of red hair standing almost at right angles to it. Hero-worshippers talk of his hair as having been a "golden aureole." At that time there was nothing golden about it. Red, violent, aggressive red it was, unmistakable red, like burnished copper. His features were small and beautiful, chiselled as daintily as those of some Greek sculptor's masterpiece. His skin was very white—not unhealthy, but a transparent tinted white, such as one sees in the petals of some roses. His face was the very replica of that of his dear mother, and she was one of the most refined and lovely of women. His red hair must have come from the Admiral's side, for I never heard of a red-haired Ashburnham.'

Against this for a pendant, let us set Mr. Gosse's description of the mature man :

'Algernon Swinburne was in height five feet four and a half inches. He carried his large head very buoyantly on a tiny frame, the apparent fragility of which was exaggerated by the sloping of his shoulders, which gave him, almost into middle life, a girlish look. He held himself upright, and, as he was very restless, he skipped as he stood, with his hands jerking or linked behind him while he talked, and, when he was still, one toe was often pressed against the heel of the other foot. In this attitude his slenderness and slightness gave him a kind of fairy look, which I, for one, have never seen repeated in any other human being. It recurs to my memory as his greatest outward peculiarity.

'His head was bigger than that of most men of his height ; as Sir George Young tells us, when he entered Eton at twelve years old his hat was already the largest in the school. Mr. Lindo Myers, who came over with him from Havre in the autumn of 1868, writes to me that, Swinburne's hat having been blown overboard, "when we got to Southampton, we went to three hatters before we found one hat that would go on, and then we had to rip the lining out. His head was immense." In the late Putney days, when he became bald, this bigness of his head was less noticeable than when it had been emphasised by the vast

" burning bush " of his red hair, which in early days he wore very much fluffed out at the sides. . . . The orb of this mop reduced the apparent thickness of his neck, which, looked at merely in relation to his falling shoulders, was excessive, yet seemed no more than was necessary to carry the balloon of head and hair.'

But we must go back to Eton, where ' Grub ' Brown, the librarian, would point the boy out to visitors as one of the sights of the place, ' where he sat, day after day, in a gallery ' window of the library with a folio across his knees.' He devoured the English poets at this time—the Elizabethan and Jacobean dramatists with a quite amazing voracity. Years afterwards, in 1885, he wrote that the plays of Marston had dwelt in his memory since ' I first read them at the advanced ' age of twelve ' ; and in 1887 that those of so obscure a writer as Nabbes had been familiar to him ' ever since my thirteenth ' year.' Thirty years later, too, looking over his bookshelves, he took down a copy of Lamb's ' Specimens of the English ' Dramatic Poets ' and remarked ' That book taught me more ' than any other in the world—that and the Bible.'

There are some of us who hold (with all reverence for Lamb) that he—and Swinburne after him—in their enthusiasm have exalted these obscurer Elizabethans quite disproportionately and out of perspective, diminishing for the unlearned or unwary reader the true eminence of Shakespeare above them all. But we pass this by : the point for us, just here, being that in his literary loves, as in almost everything else, this fay-like creature never really grew up, never developed as other men develop. ' It is particularly important to notice,' says Mr. Gosse on p. 21, ' that almost all Swinburne's literary convic- ' tions were formed while he was at school ' ; and later (p. 288) we read, ' From the earliest record of his childhood to that ' of his last hours at Putney we see him unchanged by con- ' ditions and unaffected by opinion. This gives his career a ' certain rigidity. . . .' In 1894, when Tennyson's death left the laureateship vacant and Queen Victoria is reported to have said to Gladstone ' I am told that Mr. Swinburne is ' the best poet in my dominions,' Swinburne gave it as his private conviction that Canon Dixon, author of ' Mano,' had the highest claim for the post, and, failing him, Lord De Tabley. ' It will be observed,' Mr. Gosse points out, ' that each of these poets was older than Swinburne, who

' had little knowledge of the verse of men born after 1850, and ' even less curiosity about their careers.' His attitude to old men of genius was ' adorable in humility—to Victor Hugo, ' to Landor—even to old men of talent, such as Barry Cornwall ' and Wells of "Joseph and his Brethren" '; but he had learned to worship them at school and each lived to a ripe age to retain his loyalty. Of young men he was incurious : which begins to explain why this innovator never founded a school.

It was the same with his politics. He sang of Italian liberty, sitting at the feet of Mazzini. Sitting at the feet of Victor Hugo he cursed Napoleon III. as never man cursed save his master. He hailed the French Republic : to the end he could preach tyrannicide as a duty, like a schoolboy, academically wreathing his sword in myrtle bough. Yet again we come back upon ossification, both in hate and in hope.

' When Napoleon III. died, in pain and obscurity, at Chislehurst, having ceased for three years to be a power for good or for evil, France partly forgave him, and even Victor Hugo forgot him. Yet Swinburne neither forgot nor forgave, and to him it seemed as just to continue to execrate this miserable man six months after his death as it had been to abuse him six months before it. . . . The essence of the series of sonnet-curses, " Dirae," was ecstasy that " we have lived to say The dog is dead." '

So he could sing for Italian liberty like a very Simonides (' the emotion of the poet . . . gave to the noblest parts of ' " Songs before Sunrise " an intensity unique in English litera- ' ture, and probably to be compared with nothing else written ' since the Greeks produced cosmological hymns in the fifth ' century B.C. '), and, when that liberty was won, could drop all interest in Italy and Italy's future ; as, after passionately acclaiming the French Republic, he averted his face and took no further interest in what happened to France. Yet, after all, what worth is either a new monarchy or a new republic, save as an instrument for furthering new political hopes ?

III

Having to do with a genius so precocious and so prematurely ossified, we need make no apology for switching from Eton to Putney and back. Mr. Gosse opines that at Eton, where his physical strangeness invited it, ' he was preserved

' from bullying by a certain dignity and by his unquestionable ' courage.' His courage, then and through life, was beyond question, and indeed it would be strange if any scion of Swinburne and Ashburnham lacked *that* quality. Algernon Swinburne possessed it, at all events. At the age of seventeen he entertained a boyish notion of attaining eminence in life as a cavalry officer, and attempted the climb of Culver Cliff in the Isle of Wight (believed to be impregnable) ' as a chance of ' testing my nerve in the face of death which could not be ' surpassed.' He performed the feat, which had to be confessed to his mother.

' Of course she wanted to know why I had done such a thing, and when I told her she laughed a short, sweet laugh most satisfactory to the young ear, and said " Nobody ever thought you were a coward, my boy." I said that was all very well, but how could I tell till I tried ? " But you won't do it again ? " she said. I replied, " Of course not—where would be the fun ? " '

As a swimmer he was intrepid, and his rashness twice brought him near to drowning ; but on each occasion he saved himself, having no great strength of stroke, by his indomitable persistence. When he was an elderly man, some hulking poetaster, half-mad with vanity, who had sought in vain to drag Swinburne into a correspondence, waylaid him with a big stick on one of his lonely walks. ' The antagonist was a powerful ' man, his victim a sort of fairy ; but Swinburne cowed him ' by sheer personal dignity and serenely continued to walk on, ' with the blusterer growling behind him.' Theodore Watts-Dunton was alarmed, and took out a warrant against the man (had it been legally possible he would have done better to take out a warrant against a few London street-crossings, through the murderous traffic of which Swinburne would plunge and dance, heedless as a child, having a charmed life). Swinburne merely laughed at the affair : he did not even copy Dr. Johnson's procedure (with Macpherson) and write a letter to the bully—which was just as well, perhaps, for we very much doubt if the serenity shown during the actual incident would have translated itself in ink upon paper.

In spite, however, of his constant and unquestioned courage, evidence could be collected, we fear, that Swinburne *did* suffer bullying at Eton. The late Viscount St. Aldwyn, who had been his contemporary there, answered Mr. Gosse's application for

a few reminiscences with 'a horrid little boy, with a big head 'and a pasty complexion, who looked as though a course of 'physical exercise would have done him good': and he who has known the inside of a public school will ponder this unfaltering pronouncement and shake his head. Anyhow the little victim refused to play, preferring to read. He had a trick, too, then and all his life, of jerking his arms and fluttering his hands violently when excited. It resembled 'St. Vitus' 'dance,' and is not the sort of thing that makes sympathetic appeal to the average senior and stronger schoolfellow. His parents consulted a specialist, who 'after a close examination,' reported that these motions resulted from 'an excess of electric 'vitality.' Electric or not, as the boy grew and reached sixteen, this vitality put forth symptoms of turbulence and insubordination, and at the end of the summer half he was withdrawn from Eton 'in consequence of some representations.'

This happened in 1853. In January 1856—after two years and a half spent in out-of-door exercise and desultory private tuition—he went up to Oxford, matriculating at Balliol. Scott was then Master. Jowett, who had been passed over in the 1854 election for headship, was Regius Professor of Greek, but the heresy-hunters still laid their scent upon him and his plans for University and College reform. This persecution of one who became his wise and enduring friend may account in some part for Swinburne's dislike of Oxford, which became inveterate. He resided for three years and a half, and left without taking a degree or having (so far as his contemporaries tell us) excited any particular attention among dons or undergraduates. But:

'It is much to be observed that in later life, though he spoke often and in affectionate terms of Eton, Swinburne was never betrayed into the smallest commendation of Oxford. He was indeed unwilling to mention the University. . . . Long afterwards, in late middle life, he railed against Matthew Arnold for his "effusive Oxonolatry," and earlier he had contrived to analyse and commend "The Scholar-Gipsy" and "Thyrsis" without so much as naming the "sweet city with her dreaming spires" which is the very substance of those poems.'

He made friends—some good for him, some rather obviously the reverse: he competed for the Newdigate (subject—'The 'Discovery of the North-West Passage') and failed, having

sent in a composition far better than that which took the prize ; he learned to be a frantic Republican, bought a portrait of Orsini—would-be assassin of Napoleon III.—hung it up in his sitting-room, opposite that of Mazzini, and ' pirouetted in ' front of it in ecstasies of enthusiasm.' How much Jowett knew of this does not appear, nor how Swinburne managed to tolerate in Jowett (whose weakness, if he had one, was for apparent worldly success) a certain admiration for the third Napoleon. But there was never a break in their intimacy, which Swinburne after Jowett's death commemorated in a chapter of reminiscences, beginning :

' Among the tributes offered to the memory of an illustrious man there may possibly be found room for the modest reminiscences of one to whom the Master of Balliol was officially a stranger and Mr. Jowett was an honoured and valued friend.'

Other gracious seniors attempted to take the somewhat graceless young man in hand ; notably Dr. (afterwards Sir Henry) Acland, who asked Swinburne to his house. Acland was—we can corroborate Mr. Gosse's description—' the soul of urbanity,' but all the more and none the less an Acland.

' Swinburne was particularly annoyed because Acland, in his boundless sympathy, wished to share " the orgies and dare-devilries " of their little group ; and on one occasion they all fled to London, to avoid having tea in a meadow with Acland and his children. They behaved very badly, and like shy and naughty boys, to excellent Dr. Acland, whom they privately called, I do not know why, " the Rose of Brazil " ; but the biographer has to admit, with a blush, that Swinburne behaved the worst of all. On one occasion, when Dr. Acland was so kind as to read aloud a paper on Sewage, there was a scene over which the Muse of History must draw a veil.'

Against this we may, skipping forward a little, match an equally unhallowed scene of the year 1862 when Swinburne, preparing his ' Poems and Ballads ' for the press, was given to trying the effect of them on any private audience he conceived as likely to be sympathetic. The occasion of the following experiment was a visit to Monckton Milnes (Lord Houghton) at Fryston :

' In the summer of 1862 a distinguished party assembled at Fryston : it included Venables, James Spedding, the newly-appointed Archbishop of York (William Thomson), and Thackeray,

the latter having brought his two young daughters, afterwards Lady Ritchie and Mrs. Leslie Stephen. Lady Ritchie recalls for me that the Houghtons had stimulated the curiosity of their guests by describing the young poet. . . . On Sunday evening, after dinner, he was asked to read aloud some of his poems. His choice was injudicious; he is believed to have recited "The Leper"; it is certain that he read "Les Noyades." At this the Archbishop of York made so shocked a face that Thackeray smiled and whispered to Lord Houghton, while the two young ladies, who had never heard such sentiments expressed before, giggled aloud in their excitement. Their laughter offended the poet, who, however, was soothed by Lady Houghton's tactfully saying "Well, Mr. Swinburne, if you *will* read such extraordinary things, you must expect us to laugh." "Les Noyades" was then proceeding on its amazing course, and the Archbishop was looking more and more horrified, when suddenly the butler—"like an avenging angel," as Lady Ritchie says—threw open the door and announced, "Prayers! my Lord!"'

But our extracts run ahead of the story. In his third year at Balliol 'turbulence' again began to exhibit itself, and Jowett expressed a fear that his young friend might be sent down. To protect him from this disaster Algernon was consigned for a term to read history at Navestock in Essex with the Reverend William Stubbs, afterwards Bishop of Oxford and most renowned of historians, but then vicar of an agricultural parish and almost unknown to fame. Stubbs, who had a sly twist of humour and no mean capacity for telling a story, was used in later days to draw freely on his recollections of this amazing guest's descent upon his country cure. There is no doubt that he and Mrs. Stubbs made the stay a happy one; but soon after Swinburne's return to Oxford his landlady lodged complaint against 'late hours and general irregularities,' and on the 21st of November 1859 Swinburne left Oxford, as he had left Eton, prematurely. 'My Oxonian career culminated in total 'and scandalous failure.'

IV

At Oxford he had made friends with Rossetti, Burne-Jones, and Morris during their famous visit in which they painted frescoes around the Debating-hall (long since converted to Library) of the Union. They had gone back to London, and thither (after patching up the quarrel with his father, who was naturally incensed over the Oxford fiasco) Swinburne followed

them. There he fell easily into the Pre-Raphaelite circle and talked red-republicanism to them. They never doubted his genius or his capacity to express it in poetry if he would choose to try. Rossetti, then their real leader, took from the first the line of elder brother. He 'adopted, with a full and almost 'boisterous appreciation of the qualities of Swinburne, and a 'tender indulgence to his frailties, a tone of authority in deal-'ing with "my little Northumbrian friend," as he used to 'call him, which was eminently wholesome.' And Swinburne chose to try. In 1860, while writing at 'Chastelard,' he published his first book, 'The Queen Mother and Rosamond.' The insuccess of the venture was conspicuous. 'Of all still-'born books,' said Swinburne afterwards, 'it was the stillest.' Says Mr. Gosse, 'Nobody read it, nobody saw it, nobody heard 'of it.'

'The Queen Mother' might be turgid and 'Rosamond' a pale study in Pre-Raphaelitism, but the young poet meanwhile was mewing a mighty youth over such lyrics as 'The Triumph 'of Time,' and for a sample :

'I will go back to the great sweet mother,
Mother and lover of men, the sea.
I will go down to her, I and no other,
Close with her, kiss her and mix her with me;
Cling to her, strive with her, hold her fast:
O fair white mother, in days long past
Born without sister, born without brother,
Set free my soul as thy soul is free.

O fair green-girdled mother of mine,
Sea, that art clothed with the sun and the rain,
Thy sweet hard kisses are strong like wine,
Thy strong embraces are keen like pain.
Save me and hide me with all thy waves,
Find me one grave of thy thousand graves,
Those pure cold populous graves of thine
Wrought without hand in a world without stain.'

It was not until 1865, however, that, with 'Atalanta in 'Calydon,' he made a second attempt on the public. The Pre-Raphaelites indeed had made some impression by this time with their paintings, but as poets they and their friends had met with the chilliest of receptions. Meredith's first attempt in 1851, his second in 1862, Morris's in 1858, Swinburne's own in 1860, D. G. Rossetti's in 1861, had missed fire, one and all

and completely. It was not until 1862 that Christina Rossetti scored the first success with 'Goblin Market'—'Christina,' said Swinburne, 'was the Jael who led our host to victory.' So the publisher (Bertram Payne, of the firm of Moxon) had small confidence, rested his only hope on making the book beautiful in outward appearance, and, confining the first edition to a hundred volumes or so, spent pains to cover them in ivory-white buckram adorned with mystic golden spheres. It must have been a high moment in April 1865 for one or two who opened these covers and came, first, upon the Greek elegiac dedication to Landor—

'οὔποτε σοῖς, γέρον, ὄμμα φίλοις φίλον ὄμμασι τέρψω,
σῆς, γέρον, ἀψάμενος, φίλτατε, δεξιτερᾶς . . .'

and then upon the exquisite opening of the poem itself:

'Maiden, and mistress of the months and stars
Now folded in the flowerless fields of heaven . . .'

Here was writing truly Hellenic, of the right line of tradition, and we should despair of the future of our literature—watered as it has ever been and renewed from Mediterranean springs—if we believed that England will soon lack men of an intellect ready to recognise *that*, to hail and salute it. No such curse, at all events, had descended upon our nation in 1865. 'Atalanta,' and Swinburne with it, soared into sudden fame. It was a song before sunrise, a shaft of morning after long watches, lighting the hearts of the faithful with hope:

'And hope was strong, and life itself not weak.'

V

We have hinted at the rest of the story in the first pages of this article, and need not dwell on it here nor tell it at length. In particular we would skirt quickly around the throng which vociferated about 'Poems and Ballads' in 1866, because it not only missed infinite good for the sake of a little evil, but, even in so far as it happened to be right, mistook the symptom for the disease.

The true danger, for poetry, was not so much that Swinburne had fallen into bad courses, as that he might fall into pedantry. Now there is—as every student of literature, and especially

every student of medieval literature, must know—a pedantry which relaxes, as well as a pedantry which binds. The actual disease is a withering up of the man within, by which he loses sense of literature as a grace of life and comes to mistake it for an end in itself, even for life itself.

Now we make no doubt that Swinburne's way of life helped towards that ossification which overtook his genius. It *must* have acted so, since (as Burns knew and noted) the true tragedy of profligate living is that 'it hardens all within, *and petrifies the feelings*.' But we think George Meredith came nearer to diagnosing the real trouble when he wrote, 'I don't see any internal centre from which springs anything that he does. He will make a great name, but whether he is to distinguish himself solidly as an artist I would not willingly prognosticate.' Meredith touched the secret. In this elfin genius, when the rush of fire had spent itself over the twigs there was no log left, 'leaning back' in his master Landor's image with a male, slow, generating core of fire. Set apart 'Hertha,' that glorious poem, Swinburne's own best-beloved, and all the blazing rhetoric of 'Songs before Sunrise' falls short of convincing us that Swinburne ever understood that greatest of all maxims, 'Look into thine heart, and write,' or even that he had a real heart to look into. It has the fatal chill of a *parti pris*: it fails to persuade, having neither sap nor growth nor any fecundity: it neither kindles us, where it is right, to passionate assent, nor moves us to forgive where it is wrong. Over it all lies the coming shadow of pedantry.

So, to speak generally, it is with 'Bothwell' and with almost all his verse after 'Poems and Ballads, Second Series.' Pegasus seems to be at a gallop all the while, but his hoofs are for ever coming down in the same place: and while monotony (as in the 'Faerie Queene') can be pleasant enough, nothing in the world is more tedious than a monotony of *strain*.

Nor, in the middle years, could Swinburne search into himself, to criticise. Having written the opening scene of 'Bothwell' (1871) he gave it over to Jowett to read.

'Jowett pronounced it much too long. Swinburne was surprised, but having a great respect for Jowett's judgment, took the criticism very seriously. Accordingly next day—they were living in the hotel at Tummel Bridge—Swinburne stayed in bed

all the morning to work on the scene. He produced it triumphantly at luncheon, when Jowett dryly observed that it was three lines longer than it was before. . . . Later on, at one of Jowett's reading-parties at West Malvern, R. W. Raper saw Swinburne suddenly fling himself on the floor at Jowett's feet, and heard him say, " Master, I feel I have never thanked you enough for cutting *four thousand* lines out of ' Bothwell.' " '

Thus, while still essaying sustained work for which his genius —more and more declaring itself to be merely lyrical—was unfitted ; essaying work for which at least that genius should have been put to hard schooling ; he could never learn that a great poem requires structure based on stern preparation in anatomy, nor see the need of learning. For ' A Song of Italy,' as later for ' Balen,' he was capable of choosing a lyrical measure which, pleasant enough for a snatch of song, maddens the ear by repetition over seventy or a hundred or two hundred pages. His critical odes, such as the ' Song for the Centenary ' of Landor,' came to have no proportions at all, and ' Tristram ' itself (after the magnificent prologue) hag-rides the reader into utter weariness. Swinburne, who delighted to recite, or intone, his own works, could never understand that his auditor might at any point tire of listening. In 1895 he read ' Balen ' through at a sitting to the Dutch novelist Maarten Maartens, who ' did not unreservedly admire his delivery ' :

' It was too subjective an outpour, and wearisomely impassioned, like a child's jump against a wall. . . . At the first moment, however, when he ceased, I felt a poignant grief that it was over. . . . It had been very beautiful . . . all the difference between seeing a beautiful woman and feeling her embraces.'

When we read Keats's ' Endymion ' we sigh over the premature death of one who, had the gods seen fit, might have lived to build with his material. Swinburne lived and never built, never arrived at seeing that architectonic is necessary.

VI

In London, as at Oxford, Swinburne made friends good and bad for him. Among the latter must be counted the much-travelled Richard Burton, translator of ' The Arabian Nights.' ' Burton, a giant of endurance, and possessed at times with a ' kind of dionysiac frenzy, was no fortunate company for a

'nervous and yet spirited man like Swinburne'—who, it may be told, had already, by his excesses, superinduced a kind of epilepsy upon his habitual twitch.

'It took the form of a convulsive fit, in which, generally after a period of very great cerebral excitement, he would suddenly fall unconscious. These fits were excessively distressing to witness, and produced a shock of alarm all the more acute because of the death-like appearance of the patient. Oddly enough, however, the person who seemed to suffer from them least was Swinburne himself. The only real danger appeared to be that he would hit himself in his fall, which indeed he repeatedly and severely did. But his general recovery after these fits was magical, and it positively struck one—if it is not absurd to say so—that he was better after them, as after a storm of the nerves.'

So it happened again and again. The Admiral would be hastily summoned to London to take his son home to the country. In two days' time Algernon would be out and about, a 'good boy' chastened, affectionate, extremely docile. Then after some weeks would come the return to London, and in due course more 'irregularity,' more irritability, more quarrels with his best friends, another fit, another telegram to the Admiral, another swift recovery. It seemed to work out like a sum with a recurrent decimal; but actual life is less tolerant of recurrent 'irregularity' than is mathematics. In actual life you may expel nature with a thyrsus—*at non tamen usque recurret.* The crash came in August 1879. He had lost his father; he had alienated his friends; he had a fancy for a while to have nothing to do with his family, even with his mother. He lived lonely in his rooms in Great James Street, 'in a state of constant febrility and ill-health.' There an illness took him and carried him to the very doors of death, just outside of which Mr. Theodore Watts (afterwards Watts-Dunton) entered upon the scene and saved him.

VII

Mr. Watts, a solicitor of St. Ives in Huntingdonshire, had come up to London in the year 1872 or thereabouts with an ardent enthusiasm for the group of Pre-Raphaelites, and had been baffled in a first attempt to make Swinburne's acquaintance. Towards the end of the year, however, Madox Brown advised Swinburne, whose business affairs he knew to be in a

tangle, to place them in the hands of Theodore Watts ; which he did, with very happy results.

In September 1879, then, armed with the approval of Lady Jane Swinburne, Watts called at 3 Great James Street and, finding the poet in a truly deplorable condition, carried him almost by force to his own rooms, close by, and thence, after a week or two, to the upper storey of a semi-detached villa at Putney, hired for the purpose. Again Swinburne made an amazing recovery. By the middle of October he was able to resume his correspondence, to read, and even to walk out of doors. But he had been near enough to the grave to look into it : and henceforth he put himself into Watts's tutelage with a child-like and most pathetic trust. A lease was taken of 'The Pines,' Putney, and there the two lived together for nearly thirty years. Watts supervised the poet's food and drink, administered his moneys, kept away callers (with the help of an inexorable maidservant), and mapped out his days with almost mathematical precision. Towards the middle of every morning Swinburne, no matter what the weather, took a long walk 'generally up Putney Hill and over the 'Heath, but sometimes along the Richmond Road to the 'Mortlake Arms, and then through Barnes Common as far as 'Barnes Green and the Church.' At the corner-shop of the Misses Frost, going into Wimbledon, he bought his newspapers and ordered his books.

'In storm and rain, always without an umbrella, the little erect figure, with damp curls emerging from under a soft felt hat, might be seen walking, walking . . . so that he became a portent and a legend throughout the confines of Wandsworth and Wimbledon. He always returned home a little while before the midday luncheon, or dinner ; and at 2.30, with clockwork regularity, he "disappeared to enjoy a siesta," which sometimes lasted until 4.30. Then he would work for a while. . . . In the evening his regular habit was to read aloud. . . . In these conditions his health became perfect ; he developed into a sturdy little old man without an ache or a pain ; and he who had suffered so long in London from absence of appetite and wasting insomnia, for the last thirty years of his life at Putney ate like a caterpillar and slept like a dormouse.'

'Walking, walking,' for thirty years. But that which walked was the ghost of the poet who had written 'Atalanta' and 'Poems and Ballads.' It is pretty safe to say that Watts

had saved Swinburne's life : it is certain that he had averted a tragedy : and against this positive deed of friendship and thirty years of devotion little is set by sneering at Watts as 'a pedicure of the Muses'—which, we believe, was Meredith's phrase for him. It must be allowed, however, that Watts averted tragedy only by turning these thirty years into comedy, and rather absurd comedy. The worst was not that Watts, in the jealousy of his sway, allowanced the supply of other friends even more sternly than he cut down 'The Bard's' liquor ; nor that, as elderly ladies succumb to the wiles of the tramp, he and Swinburne, while mostly inaccessible to real authors, were given to open their door to any who oiled its key with praise of Watts's own preposterous novel 'Aylwin.' Nor was it even the worst that, happening in his own way to dislike such faulty but full-blooded poets as Byron and Walt Whitman, he drew Swinburne to abuse both, whom he had formerly admired, and recant noble praise in terms of scurrility. The unpardonable fault was that, admiring the rhetorical aptitude which had always been Swinburne's bane, he encouraged him to substitute rhetoric for poetry and rhetoric for prose : and so, while Swinburne wrote much in these thirty years—especially on Shakespeare—that was marvellous ; though Swinburne himself be to blame that the more he learned of Mary Queen of Scots the more it got in the way of poetry about her ; old lovers of his verse and prose cannot help feeling that 'the rest is silence' may be, after all, a better epitaph than 'the rest is—rhetoric.'

We will not quote for disparagement the worst passages which deal with Byron and Whitman in 'Miscellanies' and 'Studies in Prose and Poetry' (1891 and 1894) ; but we will append a passage on Byron, written in 1866, to show what a prose-writer was lost in Swinburne :

'His work was done at Missolonghi ; all of his work for which the fates could spare him time. A little space was allowed him to show at least a heroic purpose, and attest a high design ; then, with all things unfinished before him and behind, he fell asleep after many troubles and triumphs. Few can ever have gone wearier to the grave ; none with less fear. He had done enough to earn his rest. Forgetful now and set free for ever from all faults and foes, he passed through the doorway of no ignoble death out of reach of time, out of sight of love, out of hearing of hatred, beyond the blame of England and the praise of Greece. In the

full strength of spirit and of body his destiny overtook him, and made an end of all his labours. He had seen and borne and achieved more than most men on record. "He was a great man, good at many things, and now he had attained his rest." '

VIII

We have indicated what we think the worst to be lamented of those last thirty years, and, for all our debt to the memory of Mr. Watts-Dunton and our gratitude for the work Swinburne accomplished in those years, it remains lamentable. Desperate causes may require desperate remedies: the devotion which applied these and kept a friend alive and happy cannot, must not, be slighted. But as little can its effect be gainsaid—that a biography of Swinburne must, to be true, overbalance the end with the beginning and can hardly, to be told well, escape being told with a touch of ironic humour, of laughter amid tears for humanity and its ways. Mr. Gosse has written it so; written it with infallible tact; written it just as well as it could be written. But it is so, and the pity is it should be so. *How were the roses so fresh and so fair!* . . . This man, who succumbed to frailty, was a splendid poet, and his verse will yet avenge him on Time. Meanwhile—

'Who shall seek thee and bring
And restore thee thy day,
When the dove dipt her wing
And the oars won their way
Where the narrowing Symplegades whitened the straits of Propontis with spray?'

ARTHUR QUILLER-COUCH.

DEMOCRACY IN PARAGUAY

1. **Paraguay: Crónicas Americanas.** By W. JAIME MOLINS. Buenos Aires: Molinari. 1915.
2. **Brought Forward.** By R. B. CUNNINGHAME GRAHAM. Duckworth. 1916.
3. **A Vanished Arcadia.** By R. B. CUNNINGHAME GRAHAM. Heinemann. 1901.
4. **Latin America: Its Rise and Progress.** By F. GARCIA-CALDERON. T. Fisher Unwin. 1913.

THE best way of reaching the Republic of Paraguay, and the delectable city of Asuncion, is by river-boat from Buenos Aires. During the hundred and odd hours of the vessel's leisurely progress, there is time and to spare for profitable meditation. To watch the banks drift gently by, their straggling settlements and little clearings standing out pathetically, like brief glimpses of Arcadia, against the tangled wilderness of jungle and swamp; to mark the slowly changing features of the land and of the strangely interesting *mestizo* race, sprung from the admixture of Iberian and Indian blood; above all, to realise something of the stupendous force and fertility of subtropical plant life—an incalculable factor in the history of this part of the continent—this, surely, is the right way to pass from the bustling modernity of Buenos Aires to the silent places, haunted of dreams that never could come true, at the heart of South America. Furthermore, for those of studious bent, desirous of evoking the atmosphere proper to the better understanding of Paraguay and her remnant people, the leisure of these drowsy ship-board days may profitably be beguiled by reading Father Dobrixhoffer's 'History of the 'Abipones, an Equestrian People of Paraguay,' and Mr. Cunninghame Graham's 'Vanished Arcadia.'

From Reconquista, northwards to the River Bermejo, skirting the lagoons and thickly wooded shore of the Chaco Austral, there are long hours of sunshine tempered by cool winds, in which to dream and picture to yourself the life of this land in those far-distant days when, after the passing of the

Conquistadores, the Jesuits established their Arcadian commonwealth amongst the Guarany Indians, between the Paraná and the Paraguay rivers. Looking back across the misty gulf of two hundred years to the happy life of the prosperous Mission towns, which now lie swallowed up in the green sea of this fiercely hungry vegetation, one cannot help wondering what the Republic of Paraguay might have been to-day if the life-work of Alvar Nuñez, Ruiz Montoza and their brethren had been permitted to endure, if the wise priests had not been driven forth and their flocks scattered and despoiled by the political and commercial exponents of our restless civilisation. A pitiful tale this, of splendid ideals and efforts brought to nought, which he who runs may still read in the scattered vestiges of cultivation and the creeper-covered belfries of ruined churches, from Corrientes in the Argentine to Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil.

But of all this, of the hopes and fears and martyrdoms that lie deep buried in these deserted missions and in a few forgotten books, you will rarely hear a word spoken amongst the *estancieros*, commercial travellers and functionaries, who take their meals and play their never-ending ' truco ' and poker in the saloon of the river-boat. For the native-born, once you forsake the Europeanised life of the trade-marts of the Atlantic sea-board (whose intellectual capital is Paris), and lose the main current of European immigration, the country has no history earlier than that of the post-revolutionary period. Their interest centres habitually in the sordid struggles of the military dictators and political adventurers who, in the sacred name of Liberty, have since that period cultivated every noxious growth of tyrannical bureaucracy, and shown to what dire straits an undisciplined people may be brought by the despotism of a false democracy. The farther you penetrate into the inland fastnesses of the South American continent, the more sonorous become the periods of the politicians, proclaiming the fundamental rights of Man and the blessings of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity: the more conspicuous also the demoralisation of the peoples who have hearkened unto them.

Several causes have combined to make Paraguay the ideal hunting-ground of the demagogue and the most remarkable example of Democracy *pour rire—et pour pleurer.*

Its geographical and climatic conditions, in the first place, have naturally tended to foster the cheerful self-sufficiency, which readily accepted the dictatorship of Francia, the chauvinist dreamer, and followed the tyrant Lopez in his heroic, suicidal wars of aggression. But we must go down deeper, back to the days of the Spanish conquest, to find there, in social causes, a convincing explanation of the *mestizo* soul as expressed in Paraguayan politics, and of the gradual shrinkage of one of the noblest provinces of colonial Spain to its present narrow boundaries.

The state of society in Paraguay at the time of the Spanish conquest was rendered essentially different from that of Chile or Mexico, by reason of the simple fact that the followers of Mendoza and Irala brought practically no Spanish women with them, and therefore intermarried freely with the Guarany Indians. From the offspring of these marriages arose the ruling class. In the absence of new white immigration, they came in course of time to regard themselves as Spaniards and heirs of the Conquistadores; whereas, in the other provinces, the children of mixed marriages remained to all intents and purposes Indians. Moreover, the devastating wars waged by Lopez killed off (together with nine-tenths of the able-bodied male population) the little remnant that then remained in the country of pure-bred Spanish stock. Since those days, the decimated country, preserving its independence solely because of the mutual jealousies of Argentina and Brazil, has been the undisputed preserve of predatory demagogues, windy Jacobin preachers of false doctrines, who have made the spirit of revolution endemic. All the racial qualities and defects of the aboriginal natives have tended to dispose the *mestizo* product to accept with alacrity the political heresy which makes every man a despoiler, and never a supporter, of the public purse. Idleness, inbred by centuries of ease in a fertile land, comes naturally to this people; by the authority of imported modern Socialism it has been raised to a fine art, so that no self-respecting citizen works if he can avoid it, and all look upon the State as the milch-cow miraculous, the universal provider. Therefore, and also because no people can maintain itself permanently by taking in each other's washing, the Paraguayan dollar has steadily depreciated, until to-day it is worth some three or four cents in the world's

markets. But the native still describes it proudly as the *peso fuerte* (strong dollar), to distinguish it from the rival debased currency of Bolivia.

The country possesses, of course, a backbone of productive industry, without which all the hocus-pocus of the most plausible of politicians must speedily become flat, stale, and unprofitable. But the toilers are far afield, in the *yerba* plantations and *quebracho* forests of the interior, or on the cattle-ranches. In Asuncion, as far as the male population is concerned, it is nearly always afternoon, and the discussion of politics is ever their chief occupation. Here—as in Lisbon or in Pekin, and for precisely similar reasons—every enfranchised Republican is first and foremost the henchman of one or other of the ever-warring political factions, leaders and led conspiring to prey upon every form of productive industry. The bureaucrat has become all in all, revelling in the chaotic make-believe of his own bombastic rhetoric, thumping his empty tub and proclaiming the ultimate triumph of that creed which, even on our own side of the world, offers to every citizen 'ninepence for fourpence' in return for his vote.

Between 1881 and 1909, Asuncion has achieved and enjoyed six separate revolutions, each of which was loudly proclaimed at birth as an epoch-making crisis in the history of civilisation. Truly, as a sober Spanish chronicler declared long ago, 'the people of Asuncion only cease from political 'strife when a breathing-space becomes absolutely necessary'* Mr. Cunninghame Graham puts the matter more forcibly when he says: 'Even the overpraised citizens of Athens, at 'the time of Pericles, were not more instant in the Agora 'than the noisy mob of half-breed patriots who, in the sandy 'streets of Asuncion, were ever agitating, always assembling, 'and doing everything within their power to show to the 'world the perfect picture of a democratic State.' Alas for the Jesuits and their splendid dream of a land governed by benevolent wisdom for the peaceful welfare of the commonwealth!

One of the things that most impress the European traveller —unless already familiar with the social code and the relations

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* Dean Funes, 'Ensayo de la Historia Civil del Paraguay' (1816).

of the sexes in South America—is the way in which the men and women are kept severely apart. Aboard our river-boat the women—marriageable girls, young brides, and portly matrons with the usual quiver-full—sit at side tables, whilst the Captain's central table is occupied exclusively by men. The Rabelaisian character of the conversation conducted by these *caballeros*, priests, and cow-punchers alike, affords in itself an illuminating explanation (Moorish tradition apart) of many things which might puzzle the uninitiated. At every ' baile ' you will see the same thing: the women virtuously clustered together on one side of the room, and the men on the other. You may find it strictly observed in the travelling-booth of the humblest marionette-show playing to the peons and their families on some lonely *estancia* in the wilds. Even in the most sophisticated drawing-rooms of Montevideo and Buenos Aires, you will generally find that the same social code is imposed.

The position of the Captain aboard these river-boats is chiefly social and ornamental: he has little or nothing to do with the navigation of the ship. This is in the capable hands of ' praticos,' or quartermaster-pilots, supported by a large crew of leisurely and loquacious citizens. The vessel carries a postal clerk and two pursers: one for passengers and one for cargo. All three have smart uniforms and command the services of assistant autocrats; their duties (between frequent meals and *siestas*) consist largely in the discussion of politics and the playing of cards with the Captain and his guests, with occasional excursions down the primrose path of flirtatious dalliance. Such posts are naturally much coveted by the relatives and friends of Argentine politicians, with the result that Government interference in the machinery of navigation on the Paraná has at times reached such a point that shipowners have seen fit to transfer their business to the slightly less bureaucratic administration of Uruguay. But the ' praticos ' know their work, and their navigation on the whole is singularly free from accidents and delays, considering the erratic behaviour and changing shoals of the river. Even if delay should be incurred, say by running on a sandbank, neither crew nor passengers would be in the least disturbed at the prospect of adding twelve hours, more or less, to the journey.

More or less—*mas ó menos*—is a phrase that runs *mañana*

very close for first place in expressing the philosophy of this people. Here, as in the venerable East, men have discovered that time is *not* money unless, for their sins, men choose to make it so. After a few days in Asuncion, body and soul become attuned to the dilatory contemplative atmosphere of the place. Life is short, you say? Alas, señor, how true! But why make it also uncomfortable? So few things are worth a wise man's haste. Love and war, perhaps, but certainly neither business, nor religion, nor the pomps and vanities of polite society.

All the sights and sounds of the harbour of Asuncion and its approaches combine to produce an expression of time hanging gracefully on listless hands. Over yonder, as if in perpetual reminder of the futility of struggling against destiny, stands the unconquered wilderness of the Chaco. On this side, most of the outlying buildings that straggle down the foothills to the water, bear witness to the relentless inroads of tropical vegetation. Here a mill is gradually crumbling to picturesque decay; there, in a deserted clearing, a few melancholy orange-trees stand like derelicts above the tangled undergrowth. The Customs wharf itself is far gone into dilapidation, one of its main beams swinging limply 'twixt wind and water. In the harbour antique hulks, tugs, and strangely obsolete shapes of vessels, lie intermingled with able-bodied ships in various stages of raggedness. The navy of the Republic, consisting principally of an ancient collier converted to purposes of war by means of a conning-tower and sundry guns, lies over against the battered House of Congress; one of her boats' crews, all gaily apparelled, is engaged in conveying a party of resplendent ladies to the shore. In the shallows just beneath the barracks a troop of cavalry horses are being bathed; their riders greet the rowers of the ladies' boat with ribaldries of a raciness at which Sancho Panza would have blushed.

In June, which is her winter, Asuncion, city of gardens and orange-groves set upon a little hill, usually welcomes the traveller with genial sunshine; but when the wind blows from the south, there is a little nipping in the air, which makes the peon to shiver in his cotton shirt and the market-woman to tuck her *manta* more closely about her. There is an elusive, elemental charm about the place which grows upon you irresistibly, despite all prejudices and premonitions; a subtle influence, born

of the visions of old Moorish Spain, that greet you fleetingly at every street corner, struggling with the flamboyant democracy of the Republic's modernity on the one hand and with the tutelary spirits of a primordial race on the other. Even in the sorry ruins that mark the tracks of recent revolutions, in the perverse poverty of these dwellers in a land that was meant by nature to flow with milk and honey, there is something that evokes against all sober reason a spirit of kindly, contemplative philosophy.

Green grows the grass in the streets of Asuncion, even on to the ballast of the tramlines. Their pavement is of unhewn stones, loosely embedded in the loess mud, so that in wet weather the mules go stolidly splashing amidst ruts and holes, wherein the pea-soup water will lie for days. The city boasts few modern conveniences; neither water-works, nor drainage, nor telephones. If you would study its main artery of commerce and methods of business, go down to the Calle Montevideo, hard by the Custom House, where, at the water-front, ships and lighters discharge their cargoes into loud-creaking carts that look as if they had seen service under De Solis. A narrow road this, cut by the heavy traffic into a chaos of ruts and mounds, where the mules (six or seven to a team) flounder and strain at the traces in seas of mud or clouds of dust, as the case may be, and their drivers call heaven and hell to bear witness to their afflictions. There being no pontoons, the carts must perforce go far out into the shallows, so that the water comes up to the mules' shoulders. Even thus, no doubt, they handled the city's commerce two hundred years ago.

Go next to the House of Congress, where a bedraggled shield, bearing the Republic's motto of 'Paz y Justicia,' looks down on mildewed walls, all bespattered by revolutionary shot and shell. The building stands open to the winds of heaven; inside it, the bureaucracy is represented by a couple of weary warders and a slouchy youth, guardian of a mouldy collection of blue-books, which calls itself the Biblioteca Nacional. A door has been removed bodily from one of the side entrances, revealing a winding staircase within, which leads to the upper floor where, on occasions, the Conscript Fathers foregather. An emaciated dog lies scratching itself on a tattered fragment of matting. Over the way, across the Plaza, stands the theatre, also partially destroyed by gun-fire in the sacred cause

of Liberty. The town band, evidently trained by German methods, is discoursing Puccini for the benefit of a few children at play amongst the ragged flower-beds. A cavalry officer, in war-paint imported from the Fatherland, stands killing time (or making it, as they say here) at the entrance to the barracks. In a little while he will go, clanking his spurs, up Florida Street to the Club, where the *élite* foregather to talk politics after the *siesta*.

At the end of the Plaza, next to the cathedral, there stands a monument of the curiously ineffective kind that one finds occasionally in the Avenidas de Mayo and Plazas 'Independencia,' from Panamá to Paraguay, with a nondescript angel on top and electric lights festooned all over it. It is a sermon in stone for the moralist and the philosopher; for on its pillar, amidst the record of the proudest dates in the career of 'Paz y Justicia,' you will find the recent marks of rifle-fire and light artillery. The city, says the record, was founded in 1536; it heard the first small voice (*grito*) of Liberty in 1811; the Constitution was proclaimed in 1870, etc. But it makes no mention of the crowning achievement of Liberty, as accomplished by the Francia-Lopez breed of politicians. It does not tell the passer-by that in the Homeric struggle of Paraguay against Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil (1865–70), every male capable of bearing arms was driven to the slaughter; that the country went to war with a population of 1,340,000 and came out of it with 220,000, of whom only 28,746 were men. Yet this is the overpowering fact in the history of Paraguay, the results of which confront us to-day in every phase and aspect of the people's social, economic, and political life.

The present condition of the Republic is fairly reflected in its currency, which consists entirely of greasy paper. The Paraguayan dollar (*peso fuerte*) is worth, as I have said, between three and four cents gold, as times go. The average peon labourer can earn ten of these dollars (say, eighteenpence) a day. The bare necessities of life, including house-rent, are comparatively cheap; but everything of the nature of imported or manufactured goods is extremely dear. Boots, for example, are beyond the means of the working class; so that men, women, and children—every one, in fact, except politicians and policemen—go barefoot. Eggs cost fifteen dollars a dozen; a ride in a tramcar a dollar. Even largesse to a beggar or a bootblack

must take the form of a bank-note. Every Indian market-woman, in exchange for her fowls, fish, or fruit, goes home with a fat wad of this paper, to which each day's use adds its tale of ragged greasiness. The lowest note value is fifty centavos—roughly, three farthings. For the printing of these notes the Government has gone to the American Bank-note Company of New York, and acquired a very creditable specimen of steel engraving. It has probably never occurred to any market-woman, or indeed to any patriotic legislator, to inquire what proportion the cost of printing bears to the purchasing value of these scraps of paper, or to trace the connection between this sort of frenzied finance and the chronic insolvency of the Treasury. Such things are nobody's business. The little groups of gesticulating citizens, that discuss politics with such eloquent fervour on the sidewalks, allot their praise or blame to public men entirely by results, assessed in terms of loaves and fishes.

In a community where the 'emerged tenth' looks frankly to the State, expecting to be maintained in dignified ease from the public funds, it were churlish to reproach the general body of citizens either for their habits of cheerfully improvident indolence, or for their destructive methods of remonstrating with the powers that be, whensoever there are not enough loaves and fishes to go round. You cannot persistently inculcate the modern socialist doctrine of rights without corresponding duties, and then expect a lively sense of public service in the electorate. But, to give him his due, your Paraguayan, even when he sets out to wreck public buildings, as a protest against the words and works of public men, preserves something of the manners of a gentleman and a philosophic quality of urbanity. It is chiefly this quality, together with the humblest peon's complete lack of snobbery, which somehow compels one to a sneaking sympathy with him, even though we may know that he treats his womenfolk as beasts of burden and pawns his thirsty soul for *caña*. As you saunter through the streets of the sleeping town at midday (it takes its *siesta* from 11.30 to 2.30, be the weather hot or cold), gradually the earnestness of all our hustling, bustling civilisation, our cult of machinery and Mammon, seems charged with futility, and this people almost justified, if only because its individual soul (for what it may be worth) is still its own.

In such an atmosphere as this, it is not possible to maintain grimly protestant moods of moral superiority. Easier far, and possibly wiser, to let oneself drift unprotesting on the placid tide of *mañana* and *mas ó menos*.

This facile descent, this process of adaptation to environment, is frequently rapid, but rarely complete. A Chicago 'drummer' never attains to it, and a Frenchman seldom. Irishmen achieve it best, especially in the life of the 'camp,' because of the elementally human quality in the philosophy of the Celt—that something which enables him to sympathise instinctively with his primordial Paraguayan brother; and also because he himself has never wittingly yielded to the tyranny of the Time machine.

In this third year of the war, the German in these parts walks delicately—a very different creature from the boastful bully that strutted and gave himself all-conquering airs in the dark days before the battle of the Marne and again, for a little while, after the sinking of the 'Monmouth' and the 'Cape of Good Hope.' Now, from Pernambuco to Patagonia, even in places where German *Kultur* and the long-credit system have done their work and planted the *Pickelhaube*, even where local governments and press have united to assure the Teuton of a neutrality that is nothing if not prudent, Hans and Fritz move humbly enough and wear a chastened mien. For, let diplomacy and high finance say what they will, the German has become painfully aware of the fact that France is the spiritual home of the Latin republics of South America, and that in the coming day of France triumphant, the sons of the Fatherland in these parts will do well to keep very quiet. Even in their strongholds of southern and eastern Brazil, they have bid a long farewell to all their dreams of a new Fatherland overseas, that should stretch southwards to the River Plate. Not as rulers, but as strangers, must they continue to dwell in these lands; and as strangers, for many years to come, they will have to live down the infamies that have disgraced their nation in the eyes of every self-respecting peon. In Buenos Aires, last July, after the initial successes of the Anglo-French offensive on the Somme, the German flag was conspicuous by its absence in the celebrations of the republican centenary; and even in Rio, where every second merchant probably

owes money to some German bank, it is refreshing to observe how many worthy neutrals are now pleased and proud to assure you that they have never had any German connections.

In Paraguay, as late as the middle of 1916, a large proportion of the trade in Manchester goods, and other British goods, was still handled by Germans. It seems incredible that, after two years of war, British merchandise, carried in British ships, should continue to be consigned to Germans overseas; but the fact remains, and this despite the repeated protests and warnings of British merchants and officials on the spot. On the road to Villa Morra, Asunçion's fashionable suburb, there are many unmistakable signs of the prosperous Hun, in the shape of pretentious villas, redolent of Hamburg and Old Heidelberg. Coloured glass balls, terracotta *Dachshunds*, and porcelain gnomes—all suffering more or less from the climate—stand out in hideous incongruity against the stately background of bananas, oranges, and palms. Hans brings all these his fantastic lares to the New World, and, through good and evil report, he remains faithful to them, to his Gretchen and his sentimental traditions. Which things should perhaps be accounted unto him for righteousness of a kind.

Lest my description of the delectable city of Asuncion should lead the reader to wonder by what stratagems the Republic has contrived to this day to exist as an independent state, let me repeat that, in the great forests and cattle-ranches of the interior, the Paraguayans, male as well as female, are by no means incapable of fruitful labour. It is only when they come under the combined influences of demagogues and drink in the cities that the idea of industry becomes utterly unworthy of a freeborn citizen. The mainstay of the country's finances is the *yerba* industry (Paraguayan tea), and the backbone of that industry is a company called the 'Industrial Paraguaya,' at present controlled from London and locally managed by a Scotchman. If it were not for the inveterate tendency of the politicians to kill every goose that shows signs of laying golden eggs, the *yerba* trade might yet rescue the country from its financial troubles. The 'Industrial' owns 1200 leagues of land—that is to say, about a ninth part of the territory of Paraguay

Oriental. Its product is greatly superior to Brazilian *yerba*, and can be laid down more cheaply than coffee in the markets of Uruguay and the Argentine. But the trail of the politician lies heavy on the industry; want of roads and light railways, corrupt administration, illicit picking by roving bands of smugglers—small wonder if, contending with all these, the company has paid no dividends for several years. Yet the country is naturally rich; and if ever the day comes when capital can safely be invested in its proper development, the wilderness may yet be made to blossom as the rose.

In attempting to forecast the future of a country like this and the destiny of its people, there is little guidance to be obtained from trade returns, nor comfort from the clauses of a constitution; also remembering the fate of the Jesuits, we cannot pin our faith to the efforts of the most energetic missions. Here, even more than in Mexico, the immediate question which confronts us is that of the possibility of race survival, of the capacity of this ancient Guarany stock to adapt itself successfully, and in time, to the new conditions of life which economic pressure from the other side of the world must inevitably force upon it. It is therefore the soul of this people, the structural character of the race, that chiefly concerns us. Does it show signs of increasing national consciousness, of collective capacity, to emerge, through peace or war, from the category of beasts of burden? If one could bring oneself to believe the pompous poppy-cock of professional politicians, or the sorry stuff written for European consumption by subsidised oracles, there would indeed be no need to worry about the body and soul of the native-born: all would be for the best in the best of all possible worlds, and Utopia just around the corner. But for those who, with glimmerings of understanding, watch the struggle of inefficient primitive peoples against the modern forces of Mammon (as we have seen it in Turkey, in China, in Mexico, Portugal and the central Latin republics of South America) it is the soul of the man in the field that finally matters. After all, the chronic revolutionists of Asuncion are only a tenth part of the population of Paraguay, and here, as in other restless republics, when the politicians stir up strife, it is the common people that fights and pays. What prospect is there that the man in the field will eventually learn when to fight, and wherefore?

Looking dispassionately ahead, the prospect of survival for the Guarany race, or for the independence of Paraguay, is none too promising. The *mestizo's* primitive ancestors dwelt too long in the twilight of their slumbering gods. From a planetary point of view, and remembering that the entire population of Paraguay is about the same as that of the Borough of Kensington, some may say that it does not really matter very much. And yet, as Ireland proves and Poland, this question of race survival is not so much a matter of numbers as of national ideals. The sacred rights of the smaller nations, proclaimed with such fervour in the present world struggle, are not so simple, even on this continent of professed idealists. The abstract right appeals, no doubt, to that sentimental abstraction known as the conscience of the world; but history shows that, in practice, no small nation can long remain independent, unless it is geographically protected against attack or useful, as a buffer state, to other and stronger powers. The most ardent champions of the rights of humanity (even at Washington) have always shown themselves quite ready to accept with complacency the absorption by ' peaceful penetration ' of a helpless people such as the Koreans. As far as Paraguay is concerned, it has retained its national independence since 1870, simply because neither Brazil nor the Argentine has been prepared to fight for its possession, and both have therefore allowed it to remain a buffer state. To this fact only, the Paraguayans owe their proud privilege of sending thirteen senators and twenty-six deputies to the House of Paz y Justicia at Asuncion, and of paying each of them £300 a year to misgovern the country.

It is difficult for the foreigner in South America to form any permanently satisfactory idea as to the opinions of the average native of the working class concerning the future of his country or his own position as a member of the State. In Paraguay it is particularly difficult to obtain an intimate knowledge of the real relations existing between governors and governed or between employers and employed. As in Mexico, the Indian race has here developed, in the process of interbreeding, many characteristics of the Spaniard, whilst retaining at the same time unfathomable depths of primitive childishness. If it were not for the record of fanatical patriotism displayed by the

people in the wars of Lopez, the general attributes of the peon class, as one sees it to-day in the *yerbales*, might lead one to the conclusion that genuine national consciousness exists only in the fervid imagination of the official. The actual conditions under which the peon consents to exist are certainly indicative rather of medieval serfdom than of the fruits of an enlightened republican system; whilst the attitude of the average *patrón* suggests that, for him, the labourer is only a little higher than his cattle and a good deal lower than machinery of the latest pattern. The Indian nature persists in the peon in a strange admixture of doglike devotion (of which the Church has ever been ready to take full advantage for purposes of State) and impulsive suspicion of new things, if imposed upon him. It persists also in a temperamental lack of energy, as distinct from industry, in labour. The peon works here, as elsewhere in South America, much in the same way as Chinese coolies labour for hire—doggedly, with a stolid, even cheerful, acceptance of toil as part of the inevitable destiny of man, but without the craftsman's joy in achievement and without the spiritual satisfaction of 'something accomplished, something 'done,' which frequently stimulates the Anglo-Saxon. For him, as for the sons of Ham, the primeval labour curse of Eden is a sobering reality, though the nature of his struggle for life is very different. Upon the aboriginal Indian stock, the grafting of the virtues and vices of the Spaniard, followed by fantastic modern supergrowths of hybrid democracy, have produced a very complex type, in which the primitive copper-coloured Adam struggles fitfully with the gospel of modernity according to Liebknecht and Limehouse.

During the Golden Age—two centuries long—of the Jesuits' benevolent despotism in greater Paraguay, the peaceful well-directed industry of these Indians made them probably the most contentedly happy people on the American continent, and the mission territories the most productive possessions of the Spanish Crown. It is necessary to bear in mind this fact, and the character of a people which lent itself so readily to an ideal type of religious communism, in order to appreciate the subsequent tragedy of their history, since the introduction of Paz y Justicia, modern style. Even if the material benefits so lavishly promised in the name of Democracy were, by some miracle, forthcoming, it would still remain true (and all this history of South America proves it) that the Indian, to make

him a good citizen, must live by something more than bread alone, that he requires spiritual inspiration and direction. This fact may serve to explain the curious reverence which was felt, even by the victims of his tyranny, for Francia—a dictator who, with all his faults, at least contrived (like Diaz in Mexico) to maintain order and a rough-and-ready sort of communism. The Guarany people mourned Francia, after his death, because, in spite of what Carlyle calls his 'grim unspeakabilities,' he possessed qualities as a ruler which satisfied the spiritual side of the native mind. Indeed, as compared with their present lot, under the spasmodic garrulous rule of political charlatans, Francia's dictatorship appears almost beneficent and certainly dignified. For this 'Dominican ripe for canonisation,' this excellent superior of Jesuits' knew the saving grace of authoritative silence.

In considering the present characteristics of the Paraguayans and their probable destinies, we must not overlook a temporary factor directly resultant from the wars of Lopez—namely, the numerical preponderance of women throughout the country. At the close of that magnificent and perfectly futile struggle, there were five women to every man in the decimated Republic—and this although women had been slain by thousands. In a charming description of a festival of the Virgin, held at the old Jesuit Reduction of Santa Maria la Mayor, when peace had been restored to the wilderness, Mr. Cunninghame Graham touches lightly on this matter:

> 'Bands of boys—for in these days most of the men had been killed off in the past war—came trooping in, accompanied by crowds of women and of girls who carried all their belongings; for there were thirteen women to a man, and the youngest boy was at a premium amongst the Indian women, who, in the villages, where hardly any men were left, fought for male stragglers like unchained tigresses.'

The social and economic results of this dislocation of the balance of nature are just as unmistakable in Paraguay to-day as they were, *mutatis mutandis*, in California in the days when there were five men to every woman. From the social, as from the moral, point of view, it is not good for either man or woman to be an object of competition and at a premium, either for purposes of matrimony or of bread-winning. If the Paraguay peon's treatment of his women folk is something less than cavalier, if his wives and his sisters and his cousins and

his aunts are wont to play before him their humble parts as beasts of burden, we cannot in justice ascribe this to him as original sin, but rather to the brutal force of circumstances imposed upon him. No doubt but that, in process of time, nature and immigration will adjust the sex balance, and the Paraguayan woman may then cease to compete for the favour of these *fainéant* swains or to encourage them in idleness and the consumption of *caña*. As matters stand, the peon undoubtedly has things very much his own way as regards wine, women, and song. He gets a good deal more of all three than is necessary or good for him, and far more than his sires got in Francia's day. Also, being (as Father Funes observed) of a keenly imitative nature, he has come to take these gifts of the gods with something very closely resembling hidalgo nonchalance.

His fondness for *caña* (sugar-cane spirit) is probably the most dangerous symptom in his character and, if common report speaks truly this is a growing evil. In every enterprise where foreign capital is invested, and aboriginal morals supervised, in the interests of dividends, strict rules have had to be made, excluding all liquor from the premises. At the factory of the 'Industrial,' for instance, every window in the building is wired, so that *yerba* may not be passed out to the peons' ladies-in-waiting, or *caña* passed in by them. Moreover, on the ground floor, the lower half of the windows is boarded up; for it was found that wire was not enough to prevent the men from getting their liquor. Their faithful wives had learned to hold the *caña* up to the window in a *maté* bowl, and their lords to suck it through the wire by means of the 'bombilla.' In the sugar and tannin factories, here and in the Argentine, where Indians are employed, constant vigilance and many precautions are required to prevent pilfering; for the peon, like the Chinese coolie, is much given to the picking up of unconsidered trifles. '*Personne n'est 'très ladrone,*' is a Swiss manager's estimate of Paraguayan honesty; '*mais tout le monde est un peu ladrone.*' Which verdict may be almost universally applied.

In his emotional relations with women the Paraguayan is primitive, passionate, and as promiscuous as the Mexican. Released from the discipline and moral restraints that made him, according to the chroniclers, a very decent member of society under the Jesuits' dispensation, and encouraged in

his polygamous instincts by the superabundance of women, his love affairs are frequent and free. As a result, society and the law recognise three classes of offspring—legitimate, illegitimate, and natural. The 'naturals' are those born of the *liaison* of unmarried parents; they are frequently taken into the man's subsequently acquired legitimate family and brought up as part of it, the mother in such cases being provided for. Illegitimate children are those born of a man's irregular connections after marriage; these are by law entitled to claim participation in the father's estate upon his death—a condition of affairs which provides much material for scandalous chronicles and profitable work for lawyers. Philoprogenitiveness is strongly marked in both sexes, so that, as in the East, sterility in a woman is commonly regarded as sufficient justification for her husband's contracting new relations. For the same reasons home life is seen at its best in Paraguayan families when the children are young.

At the same time, and in spite of the promiscuity of the peon's relations with women, the Spanish strain in his blood often invests his love affairs with a touch of the Quixotic and romantic quality, in which chivalry and insouciance are fitfully blended, as amongst the Gauchos. Fierce homicidal jealousy is in his veins; black moods impel him to swift revenge when balked of his heart's desire. Most of the tragedies that stand recorded in rude crosses by the wayside are tales of passionate intrigues and vendettas; for life is cheap in the primitive wilds of the *yerbales*, and the arm of the law as short as the memory of man. Often, indeed, the law is so framed and administered that it serves as a direct incentive to lawlessness.

To cite a typical case in point:—Last year, at one of the distant stations of the 'Industrial,' a *mestizo* carpenter became enamoured of the *mayordomo's* sister and, following the customary etiquette, asked permission to pay court to the lady, *pour le bon motif*. The *mayordomo* not only refused his consent, but persuaded the manager to have the man transferred to another station. The carpenter begged and protested, finally promising to abandon his suit; but the order was upheld and he was told to go. Concealing the vengeful rage to which his passion now turned, he feigned compliance; but on the day of his departure, he bribed a small Indian boy, belonging to the *mayordomo's* household, to put arsenic into the family's midday food. The *mayor-*

domo died, and eleven other persons (his sister among them) barely escaped with their lives. The murderer went unpunished in the absence of direct evidence sufficient to satisfy the local *comisario*, who, as it happened, had a grudge of his own against the *mayordomo*. Thereupon the avenging of the latter's death was undertaken by one of the eleven victims, an Argentine of English descent, who promptly set forth in pursuit of the poisoner. Both disappeared into the silent depths of the wilderness. The *mayordomo's* brother took his place; his sister resumed her innocent glad eye and killing smile, and the tide of life flowed on, without a ripple of concern, over the scene of her devastating conquest. Incidents of this kind, that would furnish three days' headlines even in Chicago, scarcely evoke comment in the newssheets of Asuncion.

With all their sins of omission and commission, the Paraguayans, like most of the descendants of Spanish Indian ancestors, are nevertheless a sympathetic, not to say a lovable, race. Their morals, like those of many other people, are a matter of latitude and longitude—chiefly latitude. But their history proves clearly that, given good government administered by honest men, they possess the makings of very decent and useful citizens. Recognising this fact, and the obvious impossibility of their ever achieving either civic decency or economic progress under their existing social and political conditions, the sympathetic observer can only ask himself, What reasonable prospect is there of anything better being evolved out of the political elements at present active, or latent, in the State?

According to the politicians themselves, peace and prosperity await the nation at the cross-roads of the next revolution—it is always the next. But experience has proved them to be lying prophets; the record of the *caudillos* is one long-drawn tale of sordid ambition and useless strife. There has been vitality and to spare, and much bloodshed, but neither discipline, unity, nor organised effort of any kind. All that has been evolved out of political chaos, confusion and crime since 1870 is a parasitical bureaucracy, blind leaders of the blind. What, then? Dictatorship—in which South American writers like Garcia Calderon see the best hope of stability—can only afford temporary relief; it may repress, but can never eradicate, the permanent causes

of disorganisation. Even the strongest of dictators can never hope to re-make the society which has made him: at best, he may dominate it for a time.

Amalgamation with progressive Argentina would probably solve most of the country's pressing material problems, and if it were not for the vested interests of demagogues and politicians it might be possible to persuade the Paraguayan people that such a solution would be all to their advantage. As matters actually stand, however, the process of geographical and sentimental gravitation inclines rather towards Brazil, in which quarter there lies no possible hope of moral or material salvation.

Finally, there is the possibility of gradual improvement of the country's political and economic conditions by means of European immigration. Already there are some 15,000 Italian settlers, of the industrious agricultural class, in the Republic, and the Government perceives dimly that their productive industry should be a source of strength to the state. Yet these workers, and still more so the Anglo-Saxons (as the pastoral experiment of the 'New Australia' Colony has proved), have hitherto found that the attractions of the country, as at present administered, wane upon closer acquaintance. So long as Argentina and Uruguay offer better security for life and property, the fertile plains and rich forest lands of Paraguay are likely to continue in their present rudimentary state of development, for want of capital and labour. But the increasing needs of this congested planet in the matter of its daily bread, and the industrial world's fierce competition for raw materials, are such that, *pace* the Monroe doctrine and all other artificial obstructions, it is impossible to conceive that a land like this should continue to be much longer the barren stamping-ground for the wild asses of politics. Either by force of immigration or geographical gravitation it must be redeemed to purposes of economic usefulness. Will the Guarany people go under in the process, as Lopez would have had them go, fighting as driven slaves in the name of 'Liberty and Justice'? Or will they perish, slowly and silently, of *caña* and competition, leaving no memory of their race except the haunting music of their rivers' names?

J. O. P. Bland.

THE PERIL OF HUBRIS

ON the morrow of the war of 1870 Friedrich Nietzsche wrote :

' Of all the evil results due to the last contest with France, the most deplorable, perhaps, is that widespread and almost universal error of public opinion and of all who think publicly, that German culture was also victorious in the struggle, and that it should now therefore be decked with garlands, as a fit recognition of such extraordinary defeats and successes. This error is in the highest degree pernicious : not because it is an error—for there are illusions which are both salutary and blessed—but because it threatens to convert our victory into a signal defeat. A defeat ?—I should say, rather, into the uprooting of the " German mind " for the benefit of the " German Empire." '

We are now witnessing the fulfilment of this prophecy. Nietzsche shows that the degradation of Germany, revealed so catastrophically to the world by the events of August 1914, is a product, not of to-day or yesterday, but of gradual and far-reaching changes, perceptible nearly half a century ago. For the majority of Englishmen, with their thoughts concentrated on the present conflict, these changes raise no intellectual problem. They are the mark of the beast—and nothing more. It is otherwise for those who, in days gone by, learned to reverence the great masters of German thought. They have to face the question of reconciling their conviction of the past service rendered by those thinkers to civilisation with the equally strong conviction, born of the present war and its antecedents, of the moral and intellectual perversion of the German mind. How comes it, they needs must ask, that a people whose thinkers a century ago were pre-eminent in their disinterested passion for truth have been led to prostitute their spiritual energy to the gospel of national self-aggrandisement ?

It is unquestionably a gospel that has won possession of modern Germany. We speak of the Germans as Huns ; but the analogy scarcely does credit to our knowledge of history. The Germans, like the Huns, have strewn their path with destruction ; but, whereas the Huns were mere destroyers,

destruction for the Germans is a means and not an end. The Mahommedans, imposing the Koran by the sword, furnish a more felicitous comparison. To the student of history the alliance between the German and the Turk is the outcome of more than political opportunism. There is a real affinity between the motives prompting to the outrages in Belgium and the Armenian massacres. Doubtless there are those in Germany for whom war is an end in itself, as there are those whose aim in fighting is to win a monopoly of the world's markets, or to rid their country of menace from the Slav. But neither militarism nor lust of wealth nor dread of Russia suffices to explain the allegiance of thinking minds in Germany to a policy of national aggression. For them war is but an instrument to the triumph of German culture. They believe themselves to be fighting for an ideal. Their dream is of a European civilisation which shall flourish under the *pax Germanica* and move forward from strength to strength under the leadership of German literature, German art, and German science. The magnificent conception of a Catholic Empire, which dazzled the thinkers and poets of the Middle Age, shall at length be realised under the aegis of the Hohenzollern monarchy. What was then a theoretic vision shall presently be translated into fact.

Like all gospels, this of modern Germany has its prophets and its preachers. The world has been deluged in these latter days with propaganda, issuing not only from sources directly inspired by the German government, but from the universities and the public press, professors, pamphleteers, and journalists vying one with the other to herald the reign of German culture. The level of thought in these manifestoes rarely rises above mediocrity; being the work not of original thinkers but of disciples, they presuppose and reflect the opinions of an already converted public. We must look farther back for the true authors of the gospel. They are to be found principally in that school of historians which rose to eminence after the political crisis of 1848 and is known, from its uncompromising advocacy of the claims of Prussia, as the 'Prussian school' of history. Its most influential member, Heinrich Treitschke, was the prophet *par excellence* of modern Germany. The effects of Treitschke's teaching were strengthened from a very different quarter. Nietzsche, as can be clearly in-

ferred from the quotation made above, was no friend to the Prussian State and its dreams of European hegemony. But his insistence on the struggle for power as the law of life, his aristocratic ideal for society, and his call for a transvaluation of moral values and for the substitution of the 'Dionysiac' morality of the strong for the 'slave-morality' of the weak, could not fail, in concrete application, to direct the youth of Germany to the same goal. The genius of these two men was in large measure responsible for the new gospel which took possession of the German mind in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

But if we must go back thus far to explain the temper of modern Germany, why not farther still? Were Treitschke and Nietzsche after all original thinkers, and not rather in their turn disciples of the philosophers of an earlier age? Attempts have recently been made, especially by French writers, to trace a logical connexion between the new German gospel and the doctrines of the great thinkers who flourished in Germany a century ago. The process of affiliation has been pushed even farther into the past, beyond Hegel and Kant, to the religious and moral principles of the German Reformation. The sequence thus drawn out—Luther, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Treitschke, the Kaiser—makes an obvious appeal to popular intelligence. The public has ever been ready to visit on philosophers the sins of their generation, from the time when the Athenians put Socrates to death in requital for the political crimes of Alcibiades and Critias. Nor is the public entirely without reason in its suspicion. Speculative ideas are a two-edged weapon, as Plato recognised long since; they exercise deep and subtle influence both for the salvation and for the ruin of mankind. The French nobles who scoffed at the 'Contrat Social' as harmless theory learnt their error on the guillotine.

The great age of German philosophy lay between the publication of Kant's 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft' in 1781 and Hegel's death in 1831, a period of exactly half a century. It saw the appearance, in rapid succession, of the systems of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Herbart, and Hegel. It is not too much to say that within this period the business of European speculation was transacted in Germany. The common note of all these thinkers was their whole-hearted devotion to truth. They brought with them to the solution of the riddles of

metaphysics a singleness of purpose, a fearless confidence in reason, and a faith in the things of the spirit that reflect the noblest traditions of the German people. Throughout the Middle Age and at the dawn of the Reformation, Germany had been the chosen land of Christian mysticism. Now that she had awakened to self-consciousness, the same unworldliness inspired her philosophers. They knew that their true concern was not with the transitory and contingent, but with the absolute and eternal; and that, by the path of philosophy as by that of religion, the Kingdom of Heaven must be entered as a little child.

Of the modern German doctrine that subordinates the conscience of the individual to national efficiency, that posits the 'will to power' as the governing principle of the State and identifies public right with public might, we find in Kant's writings not a trace. His political ideal was a league of free nations for the maintenance of perpetual peace. He grounds this ideal expressly on the law of moral righteousness, a law valid for all rational beings independent of any national or temporal restriction. Its categorical command is sharply distinguished from the hypothetical counsels of prudence. He was the uncompromising foe of ethical and political utilitarianism. How could the gospel of a national culture and a national morality hold ground for an instant in face of the Kantian criterion, 'Act so that the maxim of thy will 'can always at the same time hold good as a principle of 'universal legislation'? The same is true, with certain reservations, of the philosophers who followed him. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, while they developed Kant's speculative principles to issues which he certainly never would have sanctioned, remained faithful to the essence of his inspiration. For Fichte, the world in its truth is the field of moral duty; while the burden of Hegel's criticism of Kant's ethics is not that he pitches the moral ideal too high, but that by denying to it actuality he severs the *Sollen* from the *Sein* and erects an impassable barrier between the world of nature and that of spirit. For Hegel the spiritual is the real; the ideal is actual, not by levelling down of the 'ought to be' to terms of temporal achievement, but by deepening of the import of reality until spirit is revealed to be its truth.

Fichte and Hegel were patriots as well as philosophers, and it is this fact which has suggested to superficial observers

a link between their speculations and the gospel of modern Germany. Certainly the writings of both philosophers, and particularly those of Hegel, contain eulogies of German character and German culture, which strike the reader as romantic and extravagant. Such passages are but excrescences on their serious philosophy. 'In dealing,' writes Hegel, 'with 'the Idea of the State, we must not have before our eyes 'a particular State, or a particular institution. . . . It is the 'theme of philosophy to ascertain the substance which is 'immanent in the show of the temporal and transient, and the 'eternal which is present.'

It is always possible by the method of arbitrary dissection to convict a writer of partiality and prejudice. The devil can quote Scripture to his own purpose; and modern Germans have not infrequently torn passages of Hegel from their context in order to lend weight to their own opinions. Alexandre Dumas *père* told a young author that the first condition of describing a foreign country was never to have seen it. We wonder how many of those critics who charge Hegel with truckling to the Prussian government have ever troubled themselves to read his works, or to reflect on the difference between the problems of German policy after Jena and those after Sedan. Fichte and Hegel passed the early maturity of their manhood in the throes of the struggle against Napoleon. The former threw the whole force of his enthusiasm into the cause of liberation, and in the event laid down his life in the service of his country. His 'Addresses to the German Nation' were potent to rouse his fellow citizens from lethargy to action. Every line of his appeal is inspired by a lofty idealism. If we seek an analogy to Fichte in the later history of the century, we shall find it, not in Treitschke, but in Mazzini.

Hegel, on the other hand, lived the life of a studious philosopher, in comparative detachment from contemporary politics. Yet he, too, was stirred by the impulse to German unity, born of the struggle for liberation. The note of national aspiration is most evident in his 'Philosophy of History,' where he was concerned with the expression of Absolute Spirit in the domain of temporal fact. It betrayed him at times to speak in a tone of extravagant panegyric, as though the German State were the culminating fruit of historical evolution.

Apart from the fact that such a doctrine is irreconcilable with the fundamental principles of his system, we must re-

member that the military ambitions of modern Germany were undreamed of for a generation after Hegel's death. In truth, it is as unjust to blame Hegel for the sins of twentieth-century Prussia as to hold Rousseau responsible for Napoleonic militarism. When Hegel, as the child of his age, turned from the truths of metaphysic to the actual Germany around him, he could not fail to be impressed by the prevalence of a visionary romanticism and the imperative need of a well-defined political organisation, if her national aspirations were not to dissolve in smoke. The power of the State was for him no instrument of aggression, but a strong tower of defence against anarchy and revolution. We may remark, on the other hand, that Hegel forecast the promise of the Russian and American races for the future of civilisation, and that among the Hegelians of the next generation were to be found not only conservatives and constitutionalists, but socialist leaders like Lassalle and Karl Marx. Men of all creeds and parties gathered 'fragments 'from the great banquet' of Hegel, though few, if any, penetrated the secret of his philosophy. Hegel himself, in his professorial chair at Berlin, chafed in the stifling air of Prussian orthodoxy. We find him writing towards the close of his life from Belgium that a time might come when he should seek a refuge from his adversaries in the universities of Liége and Louvain.

It is vain, therefore, to seek the sources of the German gospel in the philosophic doctrines of Kant and his successors. The glory had departed from German metaphysics long before the new preachers raised their voice. It survived, if at all, in the form of comment and interpretation, in which the German has at all times shown himself an adept, or in application to departmental sciences. It lingered latest in the domain of theology, but even here its influence was yielding, before the middle of the century, to that of historical and philological criticism. A new generation had arisen in Germany which knew not Kant or Hegel. This being so, we must look elsewhere for the intellectual antecedents of Treitschke and his associates. '*Tout se tient dans l'ordre des idées.*' The 'Prussian school' of historians had been closely associated with the political ferment of 1847–48. We shall expect to find the antecedents in question in the political aspirations of Germany in the middle years of the last century.

We have referred already to the war of liberation against

Napoleon. In this struggle the first signs of a common purpose were manifested in the disintegrated chaos of States composing the Germany of the Napoleonic age. When Napoleon broke up the Empire with the contemptuous outcry 'Cette vieille 'Europe m'ennuie,' he was touched to finer issues than he knew. The German race emerged from the conflict, enriched not only by new-won freedom, but by the vision of German unity. That ideal was worthy of a great people, as worthy as those of a united Italy or of the liberation of the Balkan Christians from the Turk. It was shaping itself in the mind of the nation before Hegel's death, and the next generation saw it ripen rapidly towards practical fulfilment. In 1848, the year of revolution, it dominated the political horizon of Germany.

It was easy to dream of German unity, but the difficulties that beset its realisation were enormous. Events showed clearly that Prussia alone could compass their solution. The intellectuals, scholars and historians, and Dahlmann, Treitschke's teacher, among the chief, tried their hand at devising a constitutional confederation at the Frankfurt Parliament of 1848, and retired baffled and discredited. Little wonder that the hopes of Germany were centred more and more upon the Prussian monarchy. Prussian soldiers and statesmen had forged the weapons of liberation in 1813–15; from the days of the Great Frederick Prussia had become the proverb for military and administrative efficiency. She seemed marked out to be the chosen instrument of Providence to accomplish the ideal of the German race. Others could see visions and dream dreams; Prussia and Prussia alone could act. Prussia, then as always, was eager to accept her part. She enacted it with her traditional vigour, finding in Bismarck a statesman ever ready to anticipate the expected blow, to strike first and strike hard, trusting in blood and iron and in the doctrine that *Macht geht vor Recht.*

The military triumphs of 1864, 1866, and 1870, and the consequent achievement of German unity under the Prussian sovereign, confirmed the German people in their confidence in Prussian leadership. Henceforward Germany was prepared to follow, with her whole energy and to all lengths, wherever the government might direct her way. Here and there men grumbled at autocracy, but since 1871 there has been no

serious dissension from the foreign policy of the Empire. A political opposition, like that familiar to us in England, has never existed in Germany. The reason is simple : in Germany ministerial responsibility and parliamentary control are a shadow, not a reality. If we press the question farther back and ask why this is so, the answer is that in Germany there is no public qualified by training and experience for participation in constitutional government. As in matters of speculation, so in politics, there is little intelligent public opinion outside the charmed circle of official experts. The government never really breathes the healthy atmosphere of public criticism. The German carries with him into politics his national instinct of obedience. If he airs his grievances, it is as an outside critic ; he is not responsible and does not want to be. Hence his readiness to place himself unreservedly in the expert's hands, and, like a sick man consulting his doctor, to rely with blind trust on the man who knows. Hear Bismarck's opinion of the members of the Prussian Parliament in the sixties :

'These chatterers really cannot govern Prussia. I must bring some opposition to bear against them ; they have too little wit and too much self-complacency—stupid and audacious. Stupid, in all its meanings, is not the right word ; considered individually, these people are sometimes very clever, generally educated—the regulation German university culture ; but of politics, beyond the interests of their own church tower, they know as little as we knew as students, and even less ; as far as external politics go, they are also, taken separately, like children. In all other questions they become childish as soon as they stand together *in corpore*. In the mass stupid, individually intelligent.'

A people of this habit of mind is dangerous equally in defeat and in success. If the government lands them in disaster, public confidence is shattered and the issue is panic and revolution. Such, for example, may prove to be the outcome of a victory of the Allies in the present war. The inability of the German to preserve his balance in times of prosperity is clearly evidenced in the period that followed the crowning victory of 1870. It is true that the full effects of victory on the morale of the nation were not immediately manifest. The first need of Germany was for recuperation, and so long as Bismarck held the helm of the Empire her policy was one of peace. The men who had fought three wars for German unity and had seen their efforts crowned by the

installation of the Prussian King as German Emperor, were not likely to forge new projects of national aggression. For them the German army was the strong shield, under whose protection the German people could digest the fruits of victory and develop their resources undisturbed. It was far otherwise with the generation which grew to manhood in enjoyment of material prosperity, in a time of industrial and commercial expansion, with the triumphs of 1870 to remind them that the Prussian army was invincible, but without the salutary experience of the efforts by which those triumphs had been secured. These were the men who had sat at Treitschke's feet and heard from his lips the proud story of Prussia's greatness. Bismarck's fall from power in the spring of 1890 marked the moment when their star rose to the ascendant. In the next two decades a wave of overweening self-confidence swept over Germany. The self-complacency and childishness, which Bismarck had noted many years before, beguiled her people along the pathway of illusion. Legitimate national aspirations gradually yielded place to the dream of a European hegemony, of a Germany which should stand to other nations as Prussia stood to the component members of the Empire. The victories won by Prussian soldiers and Prussian statesmen were construed into victories of German culture. The Germans were the chosen people, and their mission was to impose the blessings of their culture upon all mankind.

Such was the genesis of the gospel of modern Germany. There is nothing unusual in its history. It is but a fresh instance of the old story, that has ever constituted a great part of the tragedy of life, the story of moral infatuation. How often has not the achievement of legitimate ambition in politics, art, or commerce given birth to the temper of pride and self-aggrandisement! Our homely English phrases, 'his 'head was turned,' 'he was spoiled by success,' point to the frequency of this catastrophe. It is with peoples as with individuals. We are told of Bishop Butler that he was found meditating in his garden at Bristol on the problem whether nations could go mad as well as individuals. The idea might seem a paradox to so individualist and unhistorical an age as was the eighteenth century. Since Butler's day, the drama of the French Revolution, not to mention that of modern Germany, has proved this idea to be no paradox, but literal truth.

The history of ancient Greece affords an analogy still better suited to our purpose. We have all learnt how Athens, within a generation of her championship of Hellenic freedom against Persia, was mastered by the thirst for empire and strove to subject Hellas to Athenian hegemony. The claims of German culture are incommensurable with those of Athens, yet the maxims of German policy, the principles on which she defends her claim to power, are the same. The words of the Athenian envoys to Melos as recorded by Thucydides, or those with which Callicles in Plato's *Gorgias* advocates against Socrates the doctrine that Might is Right, strike the same note as Treitschke's lectures on *Politik*. Their logic is the logic of Germany to-day in the enslavement of Belgium and Serbia. The word *Hubris*—*ὕβρις*—is familiar to all students of the classics; but there can be few for whom the present war has not given it a clearer meaning. The Greeks signified by it the insatiable desire for power which drives a man or a nation headlong, as though possessed by a demon, to unbridled self-assertion. To this blinding passion, knowing neither bound nor reason, trampling alike on personal liberty and public law, they opposed the virtue of *Sophrosyne*, i.e. soundness of mind, the clear vision, born of self-knowledge and self-control, that enables an individual or nation, in the plenitude of power, to act with a balanced judgment. Where this saving wisdom is lacking, *Hubris* lures in a frenzy of self-confidence to destruction. 'An ancient *Hubris* ever breeds a fresh and 'active *Hubris* to add to the woes of man.'

φιλεῖ δὲ τίκτειν ὕβρις
μὲν παλαιὰ νεά-
ζουσαν ἐν κακοῖς βροτῶν
ὕβριν. . . . *

The same idea is expressed in the 'Antigone' of Sophocles:

'And through the future, near and far, as through the past, shall this law hold good: Nothing that is vast enters into the life of mortals without a curse.

'For that hope whose wanderings are so wide is to many men a comfort, but to many a false lure of giddy desires; and the disappointment comes on one who knoweth nought till he burn his foot against the hot fire.

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* Aeschylus, 'Agamemnon.'

'For with wisdom hath some one given forth the famous saying, that evil seems good, soon or late, to him whose mind the god draws to mischief; and but for the briefest space doth he fare free of woe.' *

Greek literature is full of such reflections; Nietzsche, a classical scholar, must have recalled them when he foreshadowed the 'uprooting of the mind' of modern Germany.

There is no need to dwell on the influences of this national intoxication upon the public policy of Germany. They are deeply graven on our memories by the incidents of the present war. Its effects upon her culture are less obvious, but quite as deserving of attention. A survey of that culture during the last half-century shows how the subtle poison has infected not only her soul but her intelligence. We must guard carefully here against the tendency to undue depreciation of her intellectual achievement. The war has provoked, in England and elsewhere, a reaction against the pretensions of German scholarship and German science as unmeasured and undiscerning as was our recognition of those pretensions in the past. This wholesale condemnation, voiced not only by the man in the street but in quarters to which we are wont to look for sobriety of judgment, is ominous, not so much because its manifest falsity blinds men's eyes to the real shortcomings of our enemies, but because it gives evidence of the want of mental balance and the complacent acquiescence in our national traditions which are the first steps on the path of *Hubris*.

In German culture, as in German policy, the signs of perversion have manifested themselves not all at once, but by degrees. Germany still can boast great scholars; names such as those of Harnack, Eduard Meyer, or Wilamowitz-Moellendorf are household words in European learning. She inherits a high tradition of scientific method. In the physical sciences, more especially in their application to industry and commerce, she still maintains her pre-eminence. Above all, in the organisation of research, be it historical or philological or scientific, her claim to leadership is beyond question. In no other country are so much thought and energy devoted to the systematic collection and co-ordination of material in every field of specialised inquiry. It is as though the genius for system,

* Sophocles, 'Antigone' (R. C. Jebb).

once so characteristic of her philosophy, had been transferred to the task of organising the minutiae of knowledge.

All this may be granted ; yet at the close of the survey we are left with a sense of disillusionment. The German mind in the last generation has been labouring on a different plane compared with that of the epoch which preceded. On the whole, with certain notable exceptions, it has been transacting its affairs with smaller coin. There are signs that the intellectual currency has been debased. Of this the present state of German philosophy affords striking confirmation. No longer can it be said, as of old, that the philosophers of Germany lead the speculative thought of Europe. They are admirable historians and critics ; they write learned commentaries ; Neo-Kantians and Neo-Hegelians build the sepulchres of their fathers ; but all their labour leaves the thought of the world very much as it was before. For more than half a century German philosophy has been characterised by mediocrity. For living metaphysics we turn elsewhere, to Bergson in France or to Croce in Italy not to mention living thinkers of original power in this country and in America.

The cause of the failure of modern Germany to recover its speculative vigour is to be found in the deadweight of national ambition which hangs round the neck of German culture. As Nietzsche wrote :

> ' A coalition between the State and philosophy has meaning only when the latter can promise to be unconditionally useful to the State, to put the well-being of the State higher than truth. . . . It would certainly be a fine thing for the State to have truth as a paid servant ; but it knows well enough that it is the essence of truth to be paid nothing and to serve nothing.'

The outcome of this subordination may be delayed but cannot be uncertain. Just as, earlier in the nineteenth century, the alliance between orthodox Lutheranism and the secular aims of the Prussian monarchy quenched the spiritual vitality of the national church, so now the subjection of the German mind to the German Empire is bound to issue, soon or late, in intellectual atrophy.

The Germans have at all times excelled in specialised research, and her scholars to-day are no less industrious and accurate than their forefathers, though, unlike their forefathers, they excel in little else. Even within this field of activity we

can detect symptoms of deterioration. Their labours in the aggregation of data and results have become increasingly mechanical. Less judgment is shown than heretofore in the selection of material for inquiry and publication. If we peruse the innumerable learned periodicals in the various departments of knowledge issued month by month in Germany, we find that much of their contents is of a stamp which no serious scholar in this country would dream of giving to the world. The German mind appears to be losing its power of discriminating between quantity and quality of output, between mediocrity and excellence of achievement. Moreover, the mind-power of the nation has of recent years been increasingly concentrated on the applications of science to problems of material well-being. Humane learning, whether in history, philology, or pure science, is still held in honour; but the centre of gravity of the German intellect has shifted elsewhere, to the furtherance of industrial and commercial enterprise. The mind of the nation has been gradually materialised to serve the purposes of national economy.

It is no mere coincidence that this absorption synchronises with the alliance between German culture and the German State. We have been told recently by Dr. Sadler that there has been a growing tendency of late years for the German Government to control the character of the professorial teaching in the German Universities. The scholar is content to treat the problems of practical politics as the close preserve of the official classes. It is for the latter to determine the course of national policy; his province is to mind his own business and not to meddle in affairs of State. Hence the absence of intelligent criticism on the policy of the government and the readiness of the professoriate to accept direction from the State.

The culture of Germany to-day presents indeed features analogous to those which prevailed in Europe when the Middle Ages were drawing to a close. We are confronted with a modern form of scholasticism in knowledge. Then, as now, learning was the monopoly of experts, and the outside public was debarred from participation and criticism. Then, as now, scholars busied themselves with the minutiae of their science, and ignored the great speculative problems which have a living interest for the world. Then, as now, thought was

subjected to authority, and heresy suffered persecution. It matters little that the instruments of repression are changed; that orthodoxy relies not on the thumbscrew and the stake, but on political prosecution and the exercise of official patronage. Freedom of thought is equally menaced; it may even be doubted whether the substitution of secular for ecclesiastical authority is wholly a gain to modern Germany. The Medieval Church had behind it traditions of unique significance for the human spirit. The Prussian State can point to no such hallowed antecedents; its record is not of martyrdom and sacrifice, but of the conquest of Silesia, the partition of Poland, the spoliation of Denmark and France, and the rape of Belgium and Serbia.

These reflections show how well-grounded was Nietzsche's foreboding that the victory of 1870 would prove in the event a signal defeat for German culture. Germany has forfeited her title to respect among the nations because she has been untrue to her high vocation. Her ambition to force a German culture upon the free peoples of the world is doomed by inherent contradiction. Catholicity is of the essence of truth: truth knows no national limitations. *Sic vos, non vobis* has been the note of intellectual progress in every age. To win knowledge, not for themselves, but for the world, was the goal of German thinkers in the past, and the world honours them for their service. The Germans of to-day have forsaken the truth of their fathers—forsaken a truth that is universal and for all mankind for a truth that is national and German, in other words, a truth that is no truth at all. It may be that, through defeat and disillusionment, they will gain the saving insight which alone enables a people to enrich the spiritual heritage of the world. But at present the promise of enrichment lies elsewhere. We turn from the tragedy of the German intellect to France, whose historic culture, compared with which that of Germany is but of yesterday, has ever been consecrated to the service of humanity; and to Russia, whose claim to labour in the same cause has found utterance in these noble words of Dostoieffsky:

'The significance of the Russian race is without doubt European and Universal. To be a real Russian and to be wholly Russian means but this: to be the brother of all men, to be universally human. To the true Russian, Europe and the affairs of the great

Aryan race are as dear as the affairs of Russia herself; because our affairs are those of the whole world, and are to be obtained, not by the sword, but by the strength of fraternity and by our brotherly effort towards the union of mankind. In the long run I am convinced that we, that is to say, not we, but the future generations of the Russian people, shall every one of us, from the first to the last, understand that to be a real Russian must mean simply this: to strive towards bringing about a solution and an end to European conflicts; to show to Europe a way of escape from its anguish in the Russian soul, which is universal and all-embracing; to instil into her a brotherly love for all men's brothers, and, in the end, perhaps, to utter the great and final word of universal harmony, the fraternal and lasting concord of all peoples in accordance with the Gospel of Christ.'

If we have read aright the story of German *hubris*, it behoves us to carry home its warning to ourselves. It shows that the perils of peace may be no less hazardous than those of war, and that the touchstone of a people's greatness is their ability, in the hour of triumph, to discriminate between illusion and reality. German statecraft is known as *Realpolitik*, but in truth its aim is the most fantastic and chimerical that has ever beguiled a great nation to its downfall. Through lack of self-knowledge and self-mastery, a people gifted beyond the common with energy of mind, with habits of industry and discipline, and with efficiency in organisation, has bartered its intellectual and moral birthright for the wild dream of European domination. We in England, moved by the visible fruits of German science to examine into our national traditions, are in danger of learning only half our lesson. In the application of scientific knowledge to national economy we are prepared to profit by Germany's example. We recognise that her fault lies not in the efficiency of her methods, but in the ends which these methods have subserved. But if it be true that England has been weak where Germany is strong, we must see to it that we are strong where she is weak. Let us not forget, when we emulate her efficiency, that the supreme interest of the State is to train its citizens to that 'right judg-' ment in all things' which alone can save a nation from moral and intellectual disaster when it is called upon to face the responsibilities of power.

W. G. DE BURGH.

THE JEWISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT

1. **Auto-emancipation.** By Dr. L. PINSKER. Berlin. 1882.
2. **Publications of the 'Bund' (Yiddish): I. What we demand. II. The National Question.** Geneva. 1905.
3. **The Struggle of the Austrian Nations for the State.** By RUDOLF SPRINGER. Vienna. 1902.

WHEN the reconstruction of Europe is undertaken on the basis of Mr. Lloyd George's Carnarvon formula—'one emancipated land from the Urals to the Atlantic'—many unsuspected national problems will reveal themselves Among these, the claims of the Jewish nationality, which has more or less silently developed itself in Eastern Europe during the last thirty-five years, will take a much higher place than is generally anticipated. In Western Russia alone there are close on 7,000,000 Jews, while in the adjacent territories to which a new political geography will have to be given are little short of another couple of millions. Thus, in magnitude they constitute a nationality only third in rank among the peoples which, in some form or another, will claim their share in the fulfilment of the Prime Minister's rare and refreshing promise. They are, indeed, outnumbered only by the Ukrainians and the Poles; they are 33 per cent. more numerous than the Czechs and Slovaks, and they are nearly three times as numerous as the Serbs, with all their *irredenta* added. Nor is their national consciousness less intense, or their national aim less definite than that of any other of the many races who constitute the ethnographic whirlpool of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Even if complete national emancipation should, for obvious reasons, not prove practicable for them, their national claims will still offer a perplexity to the peace congress. This may be seen in the single problem of the reconstitution of Poland, in which they figure with about 14 per cent. of the population of the Russian section alone, including 40 per cent. of the townsfolk and between 45 and 50 per cent. of the artisan and trading classes.

The Jewish national movement is, however, of profound interest to the political student, for more abiding reasons. It is the latest manifestation of national self-assertion in Europe, and its appearance is that of quite a new nationality, deriving its consciousness, inspirations, methods, and even language less from inherited tradition and ethnographic peculiarities than from the example and isolating conditions of its immediate environment. The Zionist wing of the movement is never tired of claiming that it expresses an unbroken national yearning of over two thousand years, but it is very doubtful whether this claim can be substantiated. From the time of Bar Cochba, who raised the flag of Jewish revolt for the last time in the year 132, to our own days, there is scarcely a trace of Jewish national feeling, in the political sense of the term, in Jewish history and literature. The truth is that the Zionists confuse eschatology with politics. The Jews were always primarily, and above everything else, a religious community, and their national life in Palestine was only a phase, a social expedient, of their greater history as a Church. The religion could live without politics, and did. The exiled people, filled with the religion, its duties, and its problems, soon lost their political yearning, and merged their hopes of national restoration with the Messianic teachings of their prophets and sages. It is, of course, true, as the Zionists do not fail to remind us, that the Jewish liturgy is full of prayers for the restoration to Jerusalem, but this is precisely because the restoration prayed for was not the satisfaction of a worldly craving, but the fulfilment of a divine scheme of human redemption. Had it been otherwise, it would assuredly not have formed, as it does, the staple of the English Prayer Book and the refrain of its most solemn litanies.

There were other and more practical reasons why the Jewish national nostalgia died out so completely. In a double sense, the European atmosphere was unfavourable to it. The oppression and persecutions from which the Jews suffered cut them off from everything that was virile in their European surroundings, while it still more directly sapped their own instincts of self-assertion. But, even had they not been so isolated and crushed, it is doubtful whether the national sentiment could have survived in them. They are instinctively the most assimilative of peoples, and, during the

Middle Ages, and for some centuries later, they lived in lands where nationality, as we know it to-day, did not exist. There were certain monarchical and oligarchical bodies politic, made up of classes or estates of the realm, and, after the Reformation, there were divergent groups of religious monarchies similarly organised; but, until the French Revolution, there were no self-conscious nations, properly so called, except perhaps, in a rudimentary form, in England and Holland. The Jews adapted themselves to this state of things, of which they almost became an integral part as an autonomous, but unrepresented, Fifth Estate. Now and again, a poet like Jehuda Halévi would sing of the past national glories of Israel, but he evoked no practical echo. Occasionally a pseudo-Messiah would appear on the scene, but he found few followers. It is true that one of these national leaders, Sabbethai Zevi, who made a sensational appearance in the Levant in 1660, did evoke a certain echo, and also found followers, but this was because his advent was regarded as Messianic, and not exclusively political. He was not so much a product of Jewish secular politics as he was a product, on the one hand, of the horrors of the Thirty Years War, and the consequent general belief that the reign of Christ on earth was at hand, and, on the other, of the frightful massacres of the Jews in Poland in 1655, and the widespread Jewish belief that this calamity, together with the ravages of the great war, were the appointed signs of the coming of a Redeemer. Moreover, Sabbethai was very widely excommunicated by the saner elements, both lay and clerical, in the Jewry of his time. At any rate, his squalid failure gave the death blow to any elements of secular nationalism that may have lingered among the Jews.

The effect was seen very clearly when the French Revolution created the French nation, and when Volney, Condorcet, Carnot, and Grégoire formulated the modern democratic doctrine of nationality. Not only did the Jews remain absolutely unattracted by the new doctrine, but they hastened, on their own behalf, to refuse to profit by it. When, as a result of the French Revolution, the Ghetto gates were for a moment thrown open throughout Europe, and Jews found themselves, for the first time, relatively free, they asked, not for national rights for themselves, but only for the right to be incorporated as nationals and equal citizens of the new free

nations. This was the aspiration of the Mendelssohnian school, which in Germany anticipated this outcome of the French Revolution, and it was formally sanctioned, legalised and promulgated, on behalf of the Jews of France, Italy, Holland, and South Germany, by the great Sanhedrin summoned by Napoleon in 1806. This authoritative body renounced Jewish nationality in unambiguous terms. It declared the Jews to be 'neither a nation within a nation, 'nor cosmopolitan'; it affirmed that they were an integral part of the nations among whom they lived, and it claimed for them the same rights, and acknowledged the same duties, as their fellow-citizens, from whom they differed only in religion.* It was practically on the basis of this declaration, which was confirmed by conferences of Rabbis, in Germany in 1845, and in America in 1869, that the whole battle for Jewish emancipation in the Western World was fought. In England, Macaulay accepted it as disposing of the last obstacle to the civil and political enfranchisement of the Jews, and even in Eastern Europe, which for a time had no part in the emancipation movement, and where the Jews were still of the extreme orthodox wing, shrinking from all 'customs of 'the Gentiles,' scarcely a word of protest was heard against it.

This movement of Jewish social assimilation was strengthened and justified by the stirring political events of the next half century. The Congress of Vienna practically annulled the work of the French Revolution, with the result that all over Western Europe a great struggle for popular liberties—in some cases for national freedom—was set on foot. Everywhere the Jews threw themselves with conspicuous enthusiasm and effectiveness into the struggle, not as Jews, but as part and parcel of the suffering democracies, content to merge their own claims for emancipation in the larger claims for civil and religious liberty and constitutional reform. The wisdom of this action was strikingly illustrated by the revolutions of 1848, the final outcome of which was virtually to make the assimilative formulae of the Paris Sanhedrin an integral part of the structure of Western European liberties. Throughout this agitation, not a word was heard of Jewish national claims. It was only in the sixties, when the so-called Principle

* Actes du Grand Sanhédrin (Paris, 1807), pp. 65–73, 191.

of Nationalities was revived by Napoleon III., in connexion with the struggle for Italian unity, that a faint manifestation of national sentiment was noted in the Jewish community. It took the form of a pamphlet entitled 'Rome and Jerusalem, 'the latest National Question,' by the well-known Social Democrat, Moritz Hess. In this work, the re-establishment of the Jews as a nation in Palestine was advocated; but the proposal found no sympathy anywhere, and even in the Jewish community its reception was significantly cold.

The first symptom of a decisive change came from the great Jewish community in Russia, in the early eighties. It was due, partly to the frightful massacres and other outrages which devastated the teeming Jewries of the western provinces in the spring of 1881, and partly to the example of the other sub-nationalities of Western and South-Western Russia, who had also been made to feel the heavy hand of Slavophil persecution. Previously to the eighties, the younger generation of Russian Jews, under the comparatively mild sway of Alexander II., had, like their occidental co-religionists, very largely sought their political salvation in assimilation. They frequented the universities; they took an active part in the liberal, and even the revolutionary, movements of the empire, and they dreamt of a free Russia, of which they also would be free citizens. These dreams were rudely dispelled by the savage anti-Semitism sanctioned by Alexander's reactionary successor, which culminated, not only in the pogroms, but also in a new statute for the Jewish communities, known as the May Laws, under which all their medieval disabilities were revived and aggravated. When the first great rush of emigration to escape the new 'house of bondage' was over, the Jews settled down to consider their hapless situation. Emigration had conspicuously failed, for the Western Relief Committees had even found themselves compelled to repatriate the bulk of the fugitives. On the other hand, the storm of Slavophil reaction showed no sign of abating, and there was clearly a long road to travel before Russia would reach the level of political thought and action which prevailed in Western Europe. In these circumstances, it became apparent to thoughtful minds among the Jews that assimilation on the old plan—the plan borrowed from quite different conditions in Western Europe—was a hopeless failure. Very soon they

began to think of nationalism as a possible alternative. In the autumn of the following year, a Jewish physician of Odessa, Dr. Leo Pinsker, advocated the formation of a Jewish nationality in a striking pamphlet entitled 'Auto-emancipation,' which he published anonymously in Berlin. Impressed by the fact that anti-Semitism was, at the time, not confined to Russia, however less brutal it might be in other countries, he evolved a theory of the perpetual alienage of the Jews, and concluded that the only cure for it was a Jewish nationality, equal in status, and hence in dignity, with other nationalities, and, if possible, with a land of its own. It is noteworthy that Pinsker makes no appeal to Jewish national tradition, and does not even mention Palestine. He rests his case frankly and exclusively on the political exigencies of the times, and he even recognises the patent absence of Jewish national consciousness as a formidable obstacle to the realisation of his plan.

Pinsker's seed did not fall on sterile soil, although the response to it was slow. Nationalism was then in the Russian air, far beyond the confines of the Jewish Pale of Settlement. The Russifying policy of the Tsar's Slavophil advisers, Pobiedonoszeff and Ignatieff, had everywhere stimulated the self-consciousness of the non-Russian sub-nationalities, from the Letts and Esthonians in the north to the Ukrainians, Tartars, and Armenians in the south and south-west. All over this vast region, secret organisations were started to defend the national languages, to cultivate the national literatures and customs, and to assert national rights. Among the Jews a similar movement was soon discernible. Not long after the publication of Pinsker's pamphlet, societies were formed in Odessa and elsewhere under the name of *Chovevei Zion* ('Lovers of Zion'), for the 'peaceful penetration' of Palestine by Jewish agricultural colonists, while the historian, Simon Dubnow, began to outline his idea of 'spiritual nationalism' in opposition to the Territorial or Palestinian Nationalists. For some years, both movements were vague and timid, but their fundamental national idea spread widely. Meanwhile, a new and redoubtable force had arisen in Russian Jewry. The May Laws, by driving the Jews into the towns, had nearly ruined the small Jewish bourgeoisie, and had created in their place a great and hungry Jewish proletariat. The rise of

Russian industrialism under the artificial stimulus of Witte's protectionist policy found employment for much of this *main d'œuvre*, which, together with the already considerable artisan class, soon became organised on a Trade-Union basis, and thus came into close contact with all the wilder spirits of Russian democracy. From these Jewish Trade Unions was evolved the famous Jewish Bund, one of the most powerful of the revolutionary organisations in Russia.* At first purely Social Democratic, and averse from all national, as from all social, distinctions, the Bund found itself gradually impregnated with Jewish national sentiment, owing, in part, to the great development of the Yiddish language and literature, stimulated by its own political propaganda. With the love for the old jargon and the new literature, which was a literature of folk-song, of poetry and romance, as well as of politics, economics and natural science, went a love for all the other ethnographic peculiarities of the people—all except the religion, for the Bund, as true Social Democrats, knew only the religious negations of their political teachers. Round this organised nucleus, or in sympathy with it, many other popular elements ranged themselves, including a large intellectual proletariat which the new political disabilities had fashioned out of the University-trained Jewish youth. Thus, Jewish nationality, although otherwise very indistinctly defined, first began to manifest itself in an essentially secular form, and, although it did not know precisely how, aimed at taking its place among the other secular sub-nationalities of the Russian State.

The definite crystallisation of this interesting movement was due to the organisation of political Zionism in 1897. Until then Zionism, though it was the only actual plan of Jewish re-nationalisation before the public, had timorously eschewed political agitation, and had confined itself to the dreaming of dreams, and the founding of unambitious colonies in the Holy Land. In 1897 a startling impulse was given to the movement by Theodor Herzl, a brilliant Viennese journalist, who, affrighted by the progress of anti-Semitism in Austria, had come to conclusions in regard to the future of the Jews in Europe very similar to those of Pinsker, and had declared for

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* Ular, 'La Révolution Russe,' pp. 238–239, 273 *et seq.*; Mater, 'Le Juif Russe,' pp. 17–20.

a Jewish State in Palestine as the only remedy. But Herzl, unlike Pinsker, was used to the ways of the great world, and he took his measures on a scale and with a flourish which at once stirred the popular imagination. With his magnificent talent for *réclame*, his imposing Pan-Jewish Congresses, his apparatus of political committees and financial institutions, and his showy diplomatic activities, he at first swept the Russian nationalists off their feet. From the beginning, however, the Bund opposed him. They suspected the Zionists as *bourgeois* and clerical, and they objected to the whole theory of Zionism, not only as destructive of their conception of Russo-Jewish nationality, but as a betrayal of the larger cause of Russian freedom. The controversy, which spread far beyond the Bund, lasted for some years, but gradually the fundamental distinctions between the two nationalist schools took striking shape. The Zionists, with unsparing logic, declared that the Diaspora (Dispersion) did not exist for them. They waved it majestically aside, and proposed to recommence Jewish history where the old Jewish State had ended, to resume Hebrew as the national language, and to forget the two thousand years of dispersion and sorrow as the unsubstantial fabric of a bad dream. To this the other side replied that the revival of the old order of things might be magnificent, but it was not practical politics; that two thousand years of European history had made of the Jews a European people, with new ideas, new relationships, a new culture, and a new language and literature of their own. To sweep all this away and forget it was impossible. The struggle eventually centred on the language question, and Russian Jewry rang for a time with the bitter controversy of the so-called Hebraists and Yiddishists. The Yiddishists of course won; for Hebrew, whatever its historic associations, and the zeal with which its study was promoted, was an exotic, while Yiddish was a living language, the natural outcome of Russo-Jewish life, the language of the people and the home, the vernacular in which all the tears and laughter of the Ghetto, and all its strivings for freedom, had found spontaneous expression. On this basis the controversy settled itself, but it was not without a certain formal sanction, for in 1903, at a conference of ardent young Yiddish intellectuals, held at Czernowitz, Yiddish was solemnly proclaimed the Jewish national language. The Zionists have

never formally accepted this declaration, but in practice they have been obliged to do so, for all their own propagandist literature in Eastern Europe and in the Ghettos of the Western World is still perforce in Yiddish, while Hebrew remains the linguistic luxury of their elect.

In one important respect the anti-Zionist nationalists remained for a long time at a disadvantage in their struggle with the Zionists. They had no detailed plan for the organisation of their nationality. It had always been held that historic association with a specific territory was an essential attribute of nationality, and this the Jews of the Diaspora nowhere possessed. The difficulty was recognised at an early date. Pinsker himself, while insisting on the necessity of a territory, claimed 'the same rights for the Jewish nation as for other 'nations,' in opposition to the formula of the assimilative emancipationists, 'the same rights for Jews as for other citizens,' thus apparently providing for the contingency of a landless nationality. Dubnow was more precise. By his theory of spiritual nationalism, he roundly denied the necessity of a territory at all. At the height of the controversy between the Bundists and the political Zionists, Dubnow restated his theory in a more detailed form.* He accepted the normality of the Diaspora, pointed out that the history of Judaism was a history of the successive formation and growth of new religious centres in new countries, and urged that the national preservation of the religion had always been possible, and would always be possible, without a national territory or a national language, and without even the old forms of religious life, or the new forms of political life. Although much of this theory was anathema to the Bundists and other secular nationalists, it had the effect of widening the basis of the national autonomy for which they were craving, and of thus rendering it possible for all classes of Russian Jews to enter the new national life.

Meanwhile, in Austria, where the system of Crownland autonomy had failed owing to the chaotic admixture of the various nationalities, a similar theory of national autonomy had been evolved. As far back as 1848 it had been thought of, and there are clear traces of it in the constitutional

* Dubnow, 'Pisma o Starom i Novom Yevreistvye,' 1897.

scheme presented to the Kremsier parliament by Palacky.* It was not, however, till the later nineties that the question was comprehensively studied, and a definite scheme worked out. This was the achievement of the Austrian jurist, Rudolf Springer, whose elaborate work, 'The Struggle of the Austrian 'Nations for the State,' is now the bible of national autonomists throughout Eastern Europe.

It is not easy, within the limits of this essay, to give more than the barest outline of Springer's ingenious system. He starts boldly from the proposition that in essence nationality is a personal attribute, and has nothing to do with territory. A man does not lose it by quitting his own country, nor does he acquire it by the mere fact of settling in a strange land. A nation is a union of like-thinking and like-speaking individuals, a collectivity with common political, cultural, and economic interests. A certain sacredness must, of course, attach to one's home and one's native land, but economic necessities require freedom of movement and domicile, if not throughout the world, at any rate throughout the State, by which Springer understands the area of federal union. The problem is to assure the national interests of these wanderers, and of all minorities in the Crownlands and the State, and Springer seeks to solve it by a scheme of self-government which combines the principles of territory and personality. While maintaining the existing Crownland limits, he creates, throughout their whole extent, three categories of linguistic circles: (1) Uni-National circles; (2) Circles in which a given nationality is in a majority; and (3) Circles in which it is in a minority. Beyond these circles is what he calls the National Diaspora. The circles themselves are represented proportionately in National Diets, one for each nationality. Minorities are furthermore protected in local administration by a system of proportional representation, or by national electoral curiae. Each diaspora beyond the circles is cared for by its national diet, under special treaties with other national diets. The diet deals with all questions in which national interests are involved, or in which the national idiosyncrasy expresses itself—political rights, public worship,

* Springer, op. cit. pp. 36–37; Eisenmann, 'Le Compromis Austro-Hongrois,' pp. 126–131.

justice, emigration, interior colonisation, education, literature, art, the theatre, and so forth, all being subject to a uniform minimum scheme of essentials laid down by the Federal State. Each diet is empowered to levy taxes, and is supplied with a responsible ministry, presided over by a Secretary of State, who, among other functions, represents the nationality in the imperial or federal councils.

Springer's scheme was in substance accepted by the Jewish national autonomists in Russia, and it was, indeed, largely through their efforts, and more particularly those of the Bund, that Russian public opinion was made familiar with it. At its Conference in 1901, the Bund formally adopted the principle of national autonomy, but it experienced great difficulty in persuading the Russian Social Democratic Party, the so-called 'Iskra,' to which it was affiliated, to sanction its action. The theorists of the party still looked on national distinctions with suspicion, and protested that their work was confined to the abolition of class distinctions and the war against capitalism, which the theory of nationality was calculated to compromise. They furthermore declared that nationality was contrary to the Marxist scheme of sociological evolution, and in this view they were upheld by the great authority of the German socialist thinker, Karl Kautsky.* On the other hand, the Bund cited in support of its action the National-Autonomist resolution passed by the Austrian socialists at their conference at Brünn in 1897. The controversy waxed furious, and the Bund seceded for a time from the 'Iskra.' In 1904 it established its right to autonomous representation as a Jewish National Party at the International Socialist Congress at Amsterdam. Despite Marxist orthodoxy, the 'Iskra' eventually found itself compelled to give way, as it was not unanimously supported by its constituents. The fact was that several of the Russian sub-nationalities, as, for example, the Little Russians, the White Russians, the Lithuanians, the Armenians, and the Tartars, were, in the matter of distribution, very much in the same case as the Jews and the Austrian nationalities. They had the same geographical categories, and the same diaspora, and they realised that, if the system of

* A good review of the controversy will be found in 'The Jewish Worker' (Yiddish), No. 15, June 1904.

territorial nationality might help them where they were in a majority, it would certainly prove fatal to them where—as, for example, in Poland *—they were in a minority. Hence they were not slow to understand the merits of the Jewish agitation for national, as distinct from territorial, autonomy. The result was that, at their conference in 1905, the Russian Social Democrats found themselves compelled to adopt a resolution moved by the Bund, affirming the right of all the nationalities in Russia to self-government within the framework of a free Russian State.

The example of the Bund led to the formation of other Jewish national autonomist organisations, such as, for example, the socialist Seimists or Dietists, and the Heiruth (Freedom) Society, founded by the Jewish students of the Petrograd, Moscow, Kieff, and Odessa universities. The latter in turn strongly influenced the bourgeois and assimilative elements in Russian Jewish society, with the result that in 1905, the revolutionary year, the Jewish Union for Equal Rights in Petrograd, supported by the most eminent lawyers and other personalities in Russian Jewry, adopted the principle of national autonomy. The only difference of opinion manifested in the Union was whether the autonomy should be an administrative State unit, or a voluntary association, but, on the national principle itself, all the members were unanimous. Later on, the principle became a plank in the programmes of the Constitutional and Radical parties in Parliament, and this, indeed, was one of the reasons for the abrupt dissolution of the Second Duma. To-day, national autonomy, more or less on the Springer plan, is an accepted principle of all shades of Russian liberal politics. The principle of self-government and equal rights for all nationalities has taken its place as a necessary corollary of the principle of individual freedom and equal rights for all the many varieties of Russian citizens. The Jews themselves are no longer as sharply divided as formerly in regard to it, for the Zionists eventually found that they

* In Poland, besides 2,000,000 Jews, there are 400,000 Little Russians, 30,000 White Russians, and 400,000 Lithuanians, all as strongly hostile to Polonisation as they have hitherto been to Russification. In a reunited Poland these numbers will be largely increased.

could not oppose it, more especially as their own political hopes offered until recently little prospect of immediate fulfilment. The Russian Zionists are now only a wing of the greater party of national autonomy in Russian Jewry, the chief difference between the two bodies being that the Zionists do not regard national autonomy as a final solution of the so-called Jewish question.

The Zionists, however, are not confined to Russia, and their main policy is now made elsewhere. Since their foundation by Herzl just twenty years ago, their movement has pursued a not altogether unchequered career. While Herzl lived, his political aims and activities dwarfed everything else in the Zionist programme. The magnetic personality of the man, and the sense of dignity with which he inspired his followers by the amplitude of his plans and his romantic traffic with European Courts and Chancelleries, reconciled them for a time to the barrenness of his achievement. Murmurs, however, were not unheard. They came chiefly from Russia, where the great masses of Zionists had the mortifying consciousness of paying the piper while Herzl's German and Austrian *État Major* always called the echoless tune. Moreover, the Russians were to a great extent homely idealists of the old ' Chovevei Zion ' type, anxious to do practical colonising work in Palestine, and to serve the spiritual interests of Judaism, and for them the glitter and extravagant promises of the Politicals had little attraction. Shortly after the death of Herzl in 1904, the storm burst. Under the pressure of the Russians, many of whom loudly avowed that, in a material sense, political Zionism, even if successful, could bring no appreciable relief to the suffering millions in Eastern Europe, and, in short, offered no solution of the Jewish question,* the policy of the organisation was gradually modified. The change was, however, not made definite until 1911, when, at the tenth congress, the opposition carried their programme in favour of ' peaceful penetration (in Palestine), the goal of ' which should be a spiritual centre instead of a State of Jews.' † This policy, which led to a great deal of extremely valuable

* Achad ha-Am, ' Pinsker and Political Zionism,' pp. 14–16.

† H. Sacher in ' Sociological Review,' Jan. 1912, p. 40, cf. Protocols of Tenth and Eleventh Zionist Congresses (Berlin, 1913, 1914).

colonising, educational, and other social work, lasted until the entry of Turkey into the present war, when the new horizons thus opened for Zionist political ambitions threw all power into the hands of an emergency political junta which took the place of the paralysed semi-German and Austrian executive in Berlin.

With this political revival has come a new Zionist teaching, more aggressive, more sweeping and dogmatic than any that ever came from Herzl himself. The present leaders, all hailing from Eastern Europe, but working in London, Copenhagen, and New York, claim the whole body of Jews throughout the world as a separate nationality in a state of homelessness, although at least half of Jewry repudiate both the claim and the imputation. They declare, moreover, that, where emancipation does not exist, it is not worth striving for, and, where it does exist, it is no remedy. Finally, they put forward the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine as the only possible and effective solution of the Jewish question.* One need not take these doctrines very seriously, except in so far as they may be calculated to wreck whatever chances of liberty and happiness there may be at the present moment for the seven millions of unhappy Jews in Eastern Europe. From that point of view they are, of course, deplorable, but they are probably a tactical blunder which will pass. The Zionists, as a matter of fact, are putting their demands very high, and they feel the need of demonstrating a correspondingly large and urgent necessity, but their case in this respect has not the support of any influential section of Jewry, either in the East or the West, and it will not bear a moment's intelligent investigation. In any event, it is not likely to achieve its aim. But, even if it does succeed to the extent of paving the way for the establishment of some kind of Jewish political centre in Palestine, it is certain that it will leave the general situation of the Jews elsewhere unchanged, and thus will prove of no practical value. Whatever improvement is to be effected in that direction must come from the progress of general emancipation, and more particularly from the national autonomy movement in Russia. That movement is a natural move-

* Jewish Chronicle, Feb. 10, 1917, p. 18. Cf. Dr. Weizmann's essay in 'Zionism and the Jewish Future' (London, 1916).

ment, entirely in harmony with its Russian environment, and with the conditions of modern political life, and it offers a complete and practicable solution for the Jewish problem, so far as it is a political problem. Nor is its usefulness confined to Russia. In Austria it has already approached the stage of constitutional realisation,* and it is quite possible that in the Balkans, where the same ethnographic confusion prevails, its value will also be recognised.

One word as to the relations of the national movement to the Jewish communities of Western Europe. Among the Jewish national autonomists in Russia there are dreamers who, like the Zionists, look to the eventual organisation of a Greater Autonomous Jewry, comprising the whole of international Jewry. It is, however, only a dream, for, in Western Europe, so far as human prescience can tell, such a development of Jewish history is impossible. It is impossible because it would be contrary to the fundamental conditions of the local political life and to the rule of assimilation which—protest the Zionists as they may—is the governing rule of modern Jewish life. The Russian and Austrian Jews are Jewish nationalists because their lot has been cast in countries where nationality is the unit of State life. In Western Europe they are equal citizens of their respective States, because in those polities State and Nationality are one. This important distinction between East and West is too often ignored by the statesman and the student as well as the Zionist, but it is sharp and real. If you draw a line from the North Cape to Dantzic, and thence, in a westerly curve, through Venice, to the Straits of Otranto, you will find east of it nothing but heterogeneous States, made up of a Babel of nationalities, more or less federated, or struggling for federation, in State groups, while to the west are only homogeneous nationalities, each coextensive and indissolubly bound up with its own State. In both these divisions the Jew easily adapts himself to the political norm. The fact that in the West he differs in race and religion from the bulk of his non-Jewish fellow citizens need not, and indeed does not, exclude him from full participation in one or another of these homogeneous nationalities. All are, indeed, more or less mixed within themselves, ethnically, theologically, and

* Novy Putj, Oct. 16, 1916.

even linguistically, but they are bound together and made homogeneous by what Mancini called the supreme test of nationality, *la coscienza della nazionalità*, the consciousness of nationality. That test the native assimilated Jew everywhere satisfies without derogating in the least from his religious and racial identity, or from any of his other non-political ethnographic peculiarities.

This state of things is sometimes looked upon with horror by the Jewish nationalists, and only lately I heard from one of them, a leading Zionist, the ugly word 'Apostasy.' But, in truth, it is not unreasonable to claim that it is in the West, and not in the East, that the real Jewish tradition survives in something approaching its original purity. The Jewish secular nationality in the East, admirable though it be in many ways, is a new and utterly revolutionary departure in Jewish life. It is not essentially bound up with Judaism, and even in its Zionist form might conceivably exist without it, or indeed without any religion at all. In Russia it has already opened its doors to baptised Jews, and a very cursory examination of the foreign Jewish colony in the East End of London will suffice to show that the substitution of the national for the religious bond has operated destructively against all religious observance, and has not made for the spiritual well-being of the community. On the other hand, in the purely religious communities of Western Jewry, we have the perhaps unworthy, but still lineal, spiritual heirs of the law-givers, prophets, and teachers who, from the dawn of history, have conceived Israel, not primarily as a political organism, but as a nation of priests, the chosen servants of the Eternal.

Lucien Wolf.

ECONOMY IN LAW

1. Sixth Report of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service, Cd. 7832. 1915.
2. Civil Judicial Statistics for 1913.
3. Return, County Courts (Plaints and Sittings), for 1913.
4. Statistics of Compensation and of Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act for 1913.
5. Report of the Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes. 1912.
6. Report of the Select Committee on County Courts Jurisdiction. 1878.

AT a time when in every department of national life earnest men and women are preaching and practising economy, a correspondent of a northern newspaper complains of the 'two wonderful men playing on key bugles' and the 'splendidly caparisoned coach and horses with more men 'in livery' which are part of the necessary equipment of the Judges of Assize. In times of peace these are pretty playthings enough, but the habit of mind that regards them as of the essence of the social contract between the law and the people makes the hope of a legal reformer almost a forlorn one. It is natural for the lawyer who loves the forms and ceremonies of his craft to cling to old customs, but to the ordinary citizen, who perhaps takes too narrow a view of law and law courts, it is typical of a want of sympathy with the business affairs of the country.

That there is room for a better economy in legal affairs is a commonplace. The necessity of the co-ordination and consolidation of legal matters has long been apparent to men of business and to those lawyers who can approach the subject from the citizen's point of view. What is wanted is more or less manifest. How to bring it about in spite of the apathy and opposition of a powerful profession deeply attached to its vested interests is not so clear. We may, however, believe that lawyers are eager for the welfare of the people though we may decry their methods. This is well exemplified in the

historical account of the early efforts of Moses to establish courts of law. We read in the eighteenth chapter of Exodus that 'Moses sat to judge the people: and the people stood 'by Moses from morning unto the evening.' Then Moses' father-in-law Jethro arrived and inquired what he was attempting to do, and asked Moses: 'Why sittest thou thyself alone, 'and all the people stand by thee from morning unto evening?' Moses explained that it was his idea of instituting a law court; and his father-in-law replied: 'The thing thou doest is not 'good.' Then Jethro set forth his idea of legal reform, and it remains as clear a statement of the true principle of the construction of law courts as one could wish for to-day. He 'chose able men out of all Israel and made them heads over 'the people, rulers of thousands, rulers of hundreds, rulers of 'fifties, and rulers of tens. And they judged the people at all 'seasons: the hard causes they brought unto Moses, but every 'small matter they judged themselves.' Jethro, the man of business ideas, came to the rescue of Moses the Lawgiver, and Moses had the wisdom to accept his advice. Until that happens in this country we shall never have anything but an unworkmanlike, uneconomical legal system clogging the wheels of business and weighing heavily on the poorer members of the community.

Many think that legal reform is of necessity a lawyer's business and that a layman cannot understand, much less solve, the problems of it. That is wholly an error. For the last hundred years questions of legal reform have been thrashed out and discussed and illustrated in the pamphlets and papers of legal writers, the reports of commissions, and the publication of statistics. These can be read and digested by any ordinary citizen. Some of them—as the Divorce Commission—have been the outcome of public discontent with existing laws. From time to time we find small reforms forced by the general body of citizens on the lawyers; for, hitherto, such work has always been done in the teeth of professional opposition. It would be interesting to dwell on the pagan mysteries of special pleading, and the religious enthusiasm with which lawyers fought in its defence. In 1847 John George Phillimore, the jurist, wrote with magnificent scorn of the folly and iniquity of 'special demurrers.' 'The man who would waste a 'moment in arguing with the advocates of special demurrers

'is unworthy of all leisure.' He expressed the view that these 'absurdities' would speedily be abolished; but it was not until the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852 that they disappeared, and many other similar absurdities—such as the indictment—have lingered on into our own generation. Phillimore was certainly right when he said that arguing with lawyers about the absurdities of the law is waste of time. Any layman of reasonable education can read for himself the returns and reports of the various State departments dealing with law. In these he will find not only the facts and figures necessary to form conclusions, but the reasoned opinions of all the great thinkers, both jurists and practical men, on what is wanted in our legal system to make it useful to the community, and also such arguments as the obscurantists can bring forward against any and every proposed change.

The first and most extraordinary point about our legal system is that we have no Minister of Justice. It may be said that the Lord Chancellor occupies this position, but from a business point of view that does not seem to be true. The Lord Chancellor presides in the House of Lords, he is a member of the Government, he is the head of the chief Court of Appeal, he has the disposal of an important patronage in the Church, and also many legal offices in his gift. No doubt he has great controlling powers in legal affairs, but in magisterial matters he is over-shadowed by the Home Secretary. Bankruptcy affairs are in the hands of the Board of Trade, whilst the Treasury has a special department dealing with County Courts. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, too, has certain local legal matters entirely under his direction.

We shall find that the want of a Minister of Justice has made it necessary, whenever a legal reform was mooted, to appoint a commission to examine witnesses and obtain information on the subject from various quarters. When the report is made and the evidence printed there is no department to consider and weigh the result, and in a generation the whole thing is often discussed all over again. The idea of the necessity of a Minister of Justice is no new one. Henry Bickersteth (Lord Langdale), Master of the Rolls in 1836, explained to a House of Commons Committee, in 1848, exactly what was wanted and why. 'My opinion is that you want an office of the Govern-
'ment in which the affairs of Justice should be the particular

'object of attention.' He proposed that the Minister should be called the Secretary of State for the Affairs of Justice, 'and he was to be charged with the whole superintendence 'over the establishment and organisation of the Courts, their 'official arrangements, and everything belonging to them, 'except matters judicial.' The duties were to consist of the discipline and management of all legal and judicial departments, and the collection and arrangement of all information, to enable Parliament to legislate with prudence and caution. In a word, Law was to have as complete a ministry as the Army, the Navy, or Trade; and Lord Langdale concluded by telling the House of Commons: 'You cannot work out a system 'of safe and rational law reform without an authority of that 'kind.' The history of seventy years has proved the truth of his prophecy. We have not worked out any scheme of law reform at all, but have wandered along from pillar to post content to snatch a measure of reform here and there when Parliament was in the mood to grant one.

For many years business men have recognised that no real economy, in the sense of good household management, can be effected without a business manager of legal affairs or Law Minister. He need not be himself a lawyer, and there is much to be said for his being a member of the House of Commons; but if it is thought too revolutionary to divorce the office from legal representation, and the ministry is to devolve on the Lord Chancellor or upon one of the Law officers, then that official should be relieved of all other duties and given a secretarial department necessary to the work, and should gather together all the duties and powers concerning legal affairs now scattered irrationally among different departments.

One great economy of a Ministry of Justice would be that for many years no further commissions to take evidence and report would be necessary; for, during the last fifty years, the questions to be settled have been discussed and reported upon *ad nauseam*. The matter of co-ordination and consolidation of all our Courts has been approved in many of these reports. In 1872 the Judicature Commission—a very powerful body—recommended 'that the County Courts should be annexed to 'and form constituent parts or branches of the proposed High 'Court of Justice.' Upon incorporation, judges and officers would be attached to the High Court and act under their rules

and orders. This would have been an excellent reform if there had been any directing and governing power to manage the business of all the Courts, but in the absence of such it was thought better to leave things alone. At this time the jurisdiction of the County Court was limited to £50, and it would have been easier then to have carried out a consolidation of these Courts than is possible to-day when their extended jurisdiction and increased popularity have made them serious rivals of the High Court. To understand the position, and to appreciate the problems that lie ahead of us, it is essential to set out shortly the evolution of County Courts during the last fifty years.

In 1863 the jurisdiction was limited to actions of £50, and in this year an equity jurisdiction was conferred upon them.

In 1869 jurisdiction in Admiralty actions was given to certain Courts, and unlimited jurisdiction in bankruptcy was conferred out of London.

In 1880 exclusive jurisdiction in Employers Liability was given.

In 1884 the transfer of High Court interpleader proceedings, not exceeding £500, was permitted.

In 1888 a new County Courts Act increased several jurisdictions and raised the limit for remitting actions from the High Court from £50 to £100.

In 1890 jurisdiction in winding up companies whose capital does not exceed £10,000 was conferred.

In 1897 and 1900 the judges of County Courts were appointed arbitrators under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and in 1906 this duty was continued, and other duties were imposed on the registrars of the Courts.

In 1903 the jurisdiction in Common Law actions was raised from £50 to £100, and in ejectment to £100 annual value.

Besides these general jurisdictions there are countless statutes—such as the Rivers Pollution Act, The Tithe Rentcharge Act, The Agricultural Holdings Act, and the recent Courts (Emergency Powers) Act—which confer powers on County Courts to decide matters of great difficulty and importance. During the last fifty years, then, the growth of these Courts shows that the business world, which dominates Parliament in the long run, has thought fit to impose on County Courts duties which have made them important Courts

of first instance in the country. The bulk of the Common Law work of the land that used to be conducted in the King's Bench in London, or on circuit, is in a large measure transferred to the County Court. The exceptions—such as divorce and breach of promise, libel and slander—will be dealt with later; but the business point of view to be emphasised is, that as between the High Court and the County Court no distinction can now be made between the class of legal case fit to be tried in County Courts in respect of difficulty or importance of the legal questions to be decided, the main if not the only test by which one case is sent to the High Court and the other to the County Court is the amount involved. This being so it becomes peculiarly a business question rather than a legal question—since both tribunals have capacity to deal with similar legal points—which Courts are best adapted for different classes of cases and how they can be better regulated for the settlement of citizens' differences with the greatest convenience and at the least expense.

The first problem, therefore, for a business Minister of Justice would be to survey the existing tribunals and seek to make a system by which—as suggested by Jethro to Moses—the 'hard 'causes' should be heard in the higher Courts and the smaller causes in the inferior Courts. The facts about our Courts are to be found in the Judicial Statistics edited by Sir John Macdonell, K.C.B., the King's Remembrancer, and by him submitted to Parliament. These are models of order and lucidity, and the editor's preface is always full of insight and valuable suggestion. The County Court Return issued by the Home Office, with a prefatory note of the Superintendent of the County Courts Department, a Treasury official, contains a mass of detailed information, much of which is also printed in the Judicial Statistics. From a layman's point of view it lacks summaries and requires editorial comment; but it is a return of figures rather than statistics. The Workmen's Compensation Act Statistics, issued by the Home Office, has an excellent preface by Mr. Delevigne, which is naturally of more interest from an industrial than a legal standpoint. The want of a Law Ministry shows itself here very clearly, and leads to considerable overlapping and reduplication, as well as omissions, in our system of legal statistics. Those referred to are for 1913—the last year before the war; and in order that the state of legal affairs in the country may be

appreciated it is proposed first to make a short survey of the work done by the High Courts and the County Courts, and then to endeavour to show how in these affairs time and money could be saved.

And first of the High Court. We find that there are eight circuits in England and Wales containing 57 Assize towns. These the High Court judges visit twice a year, in summer and winter, and in 1913 they made an autumn visit to 13 of the towns. They tried causes on 417 days, and the total amount recovered was £78,621, the number of actions tried or otherwise disposed of being 594. At only 16 Assize towns was the amount recovered in the year over £1000. In no less than 33 towns it amounted to less than £500, and in 13 towns the judicial labours of 16 days recovered nothing at all. There were 364 separate amounts recovered, and of these 180 were of £100 and under, and 148 between £100 and £500. This leaves 36 cases in which really substantial amounts varying from £500 to £3000 were recovered, and from a business point of view these cases were probably the only cases that needed any more prolonged and expensive form of trial than ought to be obtainable in a District Court. Of course money is only one test of importance, and it may be fairly urged that many cases are now tried in the County Courts which really merit the attention of the High Court.

There are four classes of case that the legislature has never permitted the County Courts to try. These are Breach of Promise, Seduction, Libel, and Slander. They are not matters that greatly interest the business community; but they are personal matters on which the parties are ready to spend money in costs, and for that reason are allowed to waste much valuable time at the Assizes. A considerable saving might be made if they were treated in the same way as other actions, and those under £100 relegated to the County Court. The following table shows the number of these actions on Assizes in 1913:

	Amount recovered, £100 and under.	Over £100.
Breach of Promise . .	8	4
Seduction	2	1
Libel	28	5
Slander	25	5
	63	15

It would obviously be a substantial business saving of the time of the High Court judges if they were relieved of these cases, many of them of the most trumpery nature and arising among a class of people who can ill afford to pay High Court costs. This was pointed out by Lord Bramwell in 1878, and he called attention to the great hardship of poor people who, shrinking from the exorbitant cost of litigation in these cases, were shut out from any remedy whatever. The retention of these cases in the High Court merely imposes a tax on litigants in the interest of a profession. As Lord Bramwell said on this subject : ' It has often been reproached to us lawyers that we ' think the public were made for the Bar and not the Bar for ' the public. If there is any disparagement or injury to the ' Bar for the benefit of the public the Bar must undergo it ; ' that is all.' The result of a year's Assize seems to show that from a money point of view, nearly half the cases tried are merely County Court cases, and it would be a great economy in time and money if they were tried in County Courts.

The difference in costs between a case over £50 tried at the Assizes and a similar case tried in the County Court is very large. Before the Divorce Commission Mr. Dendy, the District Registrar of the High Court and Registrar of the County Court of Newcastle-on-Tyne, gave some very interesting figures illustrative of this point. He had taxed 77 Assize actions in the Newcastle District Registry. The average amount of costs in these was £108 5*s.* 10*d.* Since 1903, when the jurisdiction of the County Court was raised from £50 to £100, he had taxed the costs in 47 actions tried under the extended jurisdiction. The average costs were £30 as against the £108 in the High Court. He emphasised the value of the figures by saying :

' I would like to point out the curious result that not only is the average just under one-third, but the highest is just one-third and the lowest is just one-third—the highest was £106 as against £326, and the lowest was £8 14*s.* 6*d.* as against £26 9*s.* 8*d.* ; and therefore I think you may say from my experience in that particular district the cost of an extended jurisdiction action in the County Court is just one-third of an Assize action.'

Every unnecessary Assize action, therefore, mulcts the loser in treble the costs he would have to pay in the County Court, and this is not only a serious waste, in time of peace or war, but a terrible penalty upon poor or middle-class litigants who are victims of the system.

The lines upon which circuit reform should be carried out, if the needs of the community are to be set before the interests of the profession, are very familiar. Sixty years ago there existed an admirable society of earnest and learned men, known as the Juridical Society, and you may find many excellent essays on the matters now under discussion in the transactions of that body, printed in two somewhat scarce volumes bearing date 1855 to 1863.

Bethell and Bramwell were their Presidents, and many men of note at the Bar were among their members. Frederick Lawrence, the gifted biographer of Fielding, wrote an admirable paper on Circuit Reform in 1863. The problem as he stated it is still our problem.

'The England of to-day [he writes], it is obvious at the outset, differs very widely from the England for which our present circuit system was devised, and for which it continued for a long period well adapted. It would be marvellous indeed if a plan which satisfied the necessities of more primitive times—which sufficed for the days of the Plantagenets, the Tudors, and the Stuarts—should work equally well in a widely different and more complex state of society. Not only have we to provide for a densely populated commercial and manufacturing nation in place of a thinly populated agricultural country, but improved methods of locomotion now render results attainable which, however desirable, must have appeared impracticable to the early lawyer and legislator.'

If this was true in 1863, how much more true it is in 1917! Lawrence points out that to harass important judges with useless journeys and employ them upon inferior duties is bad economy. He instances no fewer than twenty-two Assize towns having less than 10,000 inhabitants, and complains that they are ill-adapted to afford accommodation for witnesses, jurors, attorneys, and counsel, and that they are situated out of the most direct routes. He, too, was impressed by the fact that the costs in many cases were out of all proportion to the importance of the matter in dispute between the parties. His proposal of reform is the one that has held the field since and will continue to do until the reform is made. 'Instead of visiting 'fifty-four places twice a year the judges might with less 'labour transact all the civil and criminal business of the cir-'cuits by sitting in ten or twelve of our largest towns—the 'centres of populous districts and accessible by the most direct 'lines of railway—three times every year.' If that was a

business proposal in 1863, how much more is it a business proposal in 1917! He then proceeds to discuss the position of the Bar. In a pleasant passage he reminds his brethren of the evolution of circuits.

'When the Circuit Bar rode through the country with the Judges, the stately cavalcade was doubtless much admired as it resolutely faced the winds of March, or swept over the green sward in summer-time beneath the shade of English oaks. Yet when in process of time highway roads improved and ceased to be impassable half the year, barristers took advantage of them, like other people, for greater ease and facility of locomotion, though they still endeavoured to preserve their exclusive character by avoiding public vehicles and by travelling in private carriages and post chaises. When the rail began to supersede the road another revolution was at hand. Very timidly at first, but from sheer necessity, the Circuit Bars trusted themselves to *public* conveyances.'

This last touch is a quaint but forcible picture of the attitude of the Bar towards all new things. Nowadays, with large local Bars at Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, and many other centres, the Circuit system has lost all its usefulness. When central legal districts are formed the Courts will be as open to the Bar of England as the High Courts of London and the County Courts of all the country. The necessity of a tied-house system for legal advice and advocacy was necessary to attract lawyers to out-of-the-way places when travelling was expensive and hazardous. To-day it is as out of date as turnpikes and highwaymen, and, as a matter of fact, barristers do not 'go Circuit' in the old sense at all, but go to such places where they have briefs or the expectation thereof. The old Circuit days, when a young man travelled religiously round the Circuit twice a year and was one of a hundred at Grand Court, singing the old chorus:

'All round the Circuit I goes without a guinea,
All round the Circuit for two months and a day,
And if anybody axes me the reason why I do it
It's because I don't know how to earn it any other way';

those days are as dead and gone as the merry drunken times at Lancaster, when Eldon and his friends delivered a bogus brief to Boswell, whom they had picked up in the street overnight, and the little man solemnly moved for a writ of *quare adhaesit pavimento* before the Judge, who enjoyed the jest as much as the members of the Bar.

The suspension of the Grand Jury is to be a war economy, and the abolition of small Assize towns might be carried out on the same excuse. The following analysis of the civil work of twelve Assize towns in five years shows the negligible amount of business that the High Court judges are called upon to do on some of their travels:

AMOUNTS RECOVERED ON CIVIL ASSIZES AT TWELVE CIRCUIT TOWNS.

	1913.	1912.	1911.	1910.	1909.
	£	£	£	£	£
Huntingdon	—	2	—	—	—
Northampton	193	7	110	—	—
Hereford	—	25	—	125	200
Appleby	—	15	20	—	—
Taunton and Wells	20	—	—	1	242
Bodmin	—	—	7	82	275
Welshpool	7	—	—	—	353
Dolgelly	—	—	—	253	—
Ruthin	—	—	256	329	47
Mold	—	—	—	—	—
Presteigne	—	—	1	—	—
Total	220	49	394	790	1117

In five years at 120 Assizes—or what might be Assizes if there was work to be tried—the judges only assisted litigants to recover £2570 in varying small sums, or, put in another way, a little over £20 an Assize. There is probably no business in the above list that could not have been more speedily, cheaply, and satisfactorily dealt with by the County Courts which are constantly sitting at these towns. Another more important reason for sparing the High Court judges useless travelling and fixing their sittings at certain large towns is that two judges sitting in a central district could not only try the crime and causes of that district worthy of their attention leisurely and amidst proper surroundings, but could also sit as a Divisional Court to hear appeals from all the inferior Courts of the district. To appeal to-day from the decision of a County Court judge or local magistrate in the north or west of England, or in Wales, means a grievous expense to the parties. The counsel and solicitor in the case—often local men—have to come to London and wait about until their case can be heard. Local appeals to a High Court sitting in the district would be

bound to exercise an excellent effect on local decisions and do much to promote efficiency and uniformity of decision.

Having now seen what the High Court actually does in the country and how easily it might be released from useless tasks and enabled to render wider services, let us examine a little in detail the work of the inferior Courts.

The activities of the County Court are remarkable. The legislature seems to have thrust on these Courts a vast amount of miscellaneous work, and since 1865 done little or nothing to improve their equipment and machinery. There are 56 County Court judges holding Courts at 562 places. They dealt with the following matters in 1913 :

Plaints entered	1,223,924
Equity matters	191
Actions remitted from the High Court .	1,469
Interpleader actions	996
Bankruptcy petitions	3,203
Winding-up petitions	82
Workmen's compensation cases . .	26,738
Other proceedings	408
	1,257,011

A large number of plaints entered are undefended debt-collecting summonses, which are dealt with by the registrars. Probably less than 4 per cent. of these plaints come before the Judge. Judicial work seems very unevenly distributed, as the following table shows :

CASES TRIED BY JUDGE.

Court.	Under £50.	Over £50 and Jury Cases.	Equity.	Workmen's Compensation.	Admiralty.	Days sat.
Bow and Shoreditch.	1,103	93	10	403	—	237
Swansea, etc. . .	757	52	21	387	20	169
Gloucester, etc. .	238	10	15	20	3	153
Mid Wales . .	182	13	17	28	—	120

In Bow and Shoreditch the Judge has sixty-three days' assistance of another judge. The other Courts are one-judge

Courts. This is not of course a full record of judicial work, for it does not include judgment summonses—the hearing of which take much time—nor remitted actions and other matters; but it suffices to show the necessity of a rearrangement of the districts which seem to have been left more or less untouched since the Courts were first instituted. How they should be rearranged depends, as a business proposition, upon what duties they are to undertake. It is only right to remember that the Judge of Mid Wales, for instance, has eighteen Courts to visit between Builth and Pwllheli, and the Gloucester Judge fourteen Courts, visiting out-of-the-world places like Northleach and Stow-on-the-Wold. A business system would probably not permit a district judge to travel automatically to places where he is not really wanted. Each district should have central Courts for the bigger work, and the Judge should only pay occasional visits to smaller places, where the Registrar should have powers to deal at once with small claims. The amount of money dealt with by the County Courts is very considerable. Judgments were obtained for £1,946,973; awards were made under the Compensation Act for £219,247 in lump sums, and for half wages at the rate of £888 weekly.

We have now a fairly clear statistical picture of the two competing and unattached systems. The business problem is how to make them one. At present, if a man begins an action in the High Court he issues a writ, if in the County Court he issues a plaint; and from that moment each action proceeds according to the rules of the Court in which he starts. These two practices and procedures are very similar, but they each maintain a huge volume of different rules and orders of their own, and innumerable cases are decided as to their meaning and intention. In the country the District Registrar of the High Court is also the Registrar of the County Court, and issues either writ or plaint to his customer as desired, and is equally capable of dealing with matters under either form of procedure. This position was not so absurd fifty years ago, when County Courts were merely small debt courts, but for many years it has been seen to be an indefensible proceeding to have two sets of conflicting practices to carry out a single purpose.

Here, again, the necessary reform has long ago been thought out and described, and lies to hand when there is an authority to set it working. In his evidence before the County Courts

Committee of 1878, Mr. Pitt Taylor, the learned judge of the Lambeth County Court, tells us that he was asked by the Judicature Commission to draft a Bill to consolidate the law and provide for the extension of County Court jurisdiction. He was released from his judicial duties for several months, and, but for the unfortunate retirement of Lord Hatherley in October 1872, owing to his loss of sight, we might, fifty years ago, have had the reform we are waiting for to-day. His idea was that any action that could be brought at common law in the High Court of Justice might be commenced in the County Court; that there should be optional unlimited jurisdiction with a power to the defendant to remove a case from the County Court over and above a certain amount. This was approved by Mr. Hollams, the well-known solicitor, who said: 'I see no objection whatever to proceedings being instituted in any Court, subject to an arbitrary right of removal.' The principle was supported by Lord Bramwell, who at the same time strongly advocated the prohibited actions of breach of promise, libel, etc., being tried in County Courts unless their importance really warranted a more expensive process.

What is necessary may be set out in a few words, and as in 1878 so to-day, there is no real dissent among business men—including lawyers who place business before narrow professional interests—from the following principles of reform. All the Courts of law should be constituent parts of the High Court of Justice. In their judicial duties the judges should be entirely independent of any department. For business purposes they should be under the control of a Ministry of Justice who should direct where they should sit, what class of case they should try, and under what procedure. One sort of writ, plaint, or summons should issue in the office of the District Registrar, who is already one human person, and would then be one official of all Courts. Unless it were deemed right to remove a case on account of intricacy, importance, amount, or other good cause, to the High Court branch to be tried at a central district, it would remain in the County or District Court and be tried there. The waste, cost, delay, overlapping, and uncertainty that is caused to-day would readily disappear, and each case would be tried before an appropriate tribunal. This is far from being so to-day, when in a commercial city in the North or the Midlands a County

Court judge may be construing the meaning of a commercial contract, whilst at the same moment the High Court judge is addressing a common jury on the merits of a village slander.

Although on paper this matter seems simple enough, the reorganisation that it will really require is no small affair, and it will need a powerful department to carry it through against the natural opposition of local and vested interests. One of the first and most important reforms that is a condition precedent to this consolidation is the alteration of the status of County Court and District registrars. These officials at present are allowed to continue in private practice—indeed, it is necessary they should do so, as their remuneration would otherwise be insufficient for their support—and they are paid by fees, which is an intolerable anachronism. The Committee of 1878 recognised that it would not be right to entrust a registrar with judicial functions as long as he is permitted to practise in his district, and until a registrar can try cases of small amount the Jethro principle of devolution cannot be carried out, and the judge must continue to travel to small places to find little or nothing to do.

A registrar who is a permanent civil servant could decide all the small cases in a group of Courts and do all the registry work for District and High Courts, and send on the larger cases to their appointed destination. It has been long recognised that this ought to be done. In London the High Court officials are all public servants, and the larger urban County Courts to-day have permanent registrars. The chief clerks, too, of all Courts should be graded civil servants as they are in the High Court in London to-day. The duties in London and the country are the same, and there can be no sound reason why the pay and the status should be altogether different. The Report of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service hints that it would have desired to make similar suggestions to these, but the Commissioners felt 'bound to make 'recommendations on the basis of the County Court system 'as it exists at present.' The evidence shows quite clearly what decisions might have been arrived at with wider powers. It is of little use to read this Report—or indeed any Report —unless you also study the evidence.

Although it will probably be found with the economies already suggested that the work of the High Court could be

carried out in the country without difficulty the considerable accession of business that would fall on the County Courts would have to be provided for. Assume, however, that small cases were dealt with speedily and locally by registrars, two large economies of time might be made by reducing or abolishing the facilities for imprisonment for debt—a very wasteful and degrading procedure that has long been condemned by those who are familiar with its working—and also by strict inquiry into the necessity of the present day Workmen's Compensation Act litigation; which is fast becoming from the point of view of business men and their workmen something of a scandal.

The story of its evolution is a curious one. When the first Workmen's Compensation Act was passed it was put forward by its authors as an insurance scheme, by which the employer was to insure his workmen against accident of every kind, unless caused by serious and wilful misconduct. The business idea was a sound one. The employer would insure all his workmen with a reputable insurance company and debit the premiums paid to his cost of production, and the public would pay in the price of the manufactured article. Industrially the scheme has been a great success, and in 1913 no less a sum than £3,361,650 was paid in compensation.

Mr. Chamberlain, who if not the author of the scheme was the driving power that forced it through, fought hard to have lawyers kept out of any part in the working of the Act; and his business instinct was sound, for in assessing and paying compensation in small sums on a given event there is really no use for the lawyer, and he is an expense wholly out of proportion to any service he can render. The way in which this unfortunate litigation came into the County Courts was through a clause making the County Court judge arbitrator, if the parties could not agree on some one to arbitrate, and no committee of employers and workmen had been elected to deal with such matters. The voluntary management of the matters under the Act which Mr. Chamberlain hoped for has not come about: there are no commissioners to put the Act in force, and wherever an employer or his insurance company fail to pay compensation there is no remedy for the injured man but an arbitration in the County Court, which is in fact and cost a law-suit.

The matters to be decided under the Act are really very simple from a business point of view. They are: (1) Was the man a workman? (2) Was the man injured by accident during his employment? (3) Is he incapacitated? (4) What are his half-weekly wages? Parliament recognised that any one could settle these matters summarily with a little inquiry and common sense, but the language of statutes always lends itself to subtlety of interpretation, and, once in the hands of the lawyers, it was certain that many difficulties and doubts would be raised and solved over what, from a business point of view, is a comparatively simple insurance scheme. It is good to know that from an industrial point of view the amount of litigation is comparatively small. There were 3748 fatal cases and 476,920 non-fatal cases in the seven great industries of the country which employ 7,509,353 men. The compensation paid was £3,361,650, which works out at an annual charge per person of 8*s.* 11*d.* During the same year only 10,208 cases were taken into Court. This shows the practical good sense and honesty of employers, insurance companies, trade unions, and men, in carrying out the scheme voluntarily to their own satisfaction without outside assistance. But if any small question does arise it is a grave waste of time and money to bring it into a law court when it could be so much better and more speedily settled by a business man, a factory inspector, a doctor, or a cashier, according to the nature of the business dispute. Some points under the Act might need legal interpretations—as they have in the National Health Insurance scheme; but that an injured man, whenever he is not paid his weekly pittance, should have to commence legal proceedings is a grave injustice to him and causes a gross waste of time and money.

From the point of view of the business man who wants to eliminate wasteful and useless litigation the cases under the Workmen's Compensation Act are by no means a negligible quantity. The 10,208 proceedings, though a small number from an industrial point of view, connote a large number of men deprived—for the moment, at all events—of their rights. Settlements out of Court, which generally mean payment of the demand, amounted to 4507. The remaining 5701 were arbitrated in the County Courts under the Act, the decision being in favour of the workman in 4392 cases or 77 per cent.

If, therefore, you could bring these parties, without lawyers, before a business arbitrator, or even a County Court judge acting as conciliator, in the first instance, it seems clear that large sums of costs, and the waste of time of foremen, cashiers, managers, doctors, and lawyers attending the County Courts, might readily be saved. To the 77 per cent. of these injured workmen deprived by accident of the power of earning their living, having for the time being to live on charity and seek a speculative lawyer to take up their cases, what misery, debt, and worry must this system cause! Sir John Collie, and other medical experts, have called attention to the human waste caused, by the worry of litigation, to a man deprived of wages or compensation, and suffering from the effects of serious injury.

But it is with business waste that we have to deal. It is not often that in judicial statistics one finds much detail about the sacred mysteries of costs; but the Home Office reports in the Compensation returns that the average amount of solicitors' costs for a Workmen's Compensation case was £10 18*s.* 8*d.* Assuming this to be the figure of costs of one side in the 5701 cases settled in Court, you have a vision of a really large sum of money wholly wasted, because it is spent to determine matters that could be better determined in almost any other way. From another return we find that in 2230 arbitrations the taxed costs of successful litigants were £26,551: so that there is no doubt about the magnitude of the waste incurred.

In England, County Court judges were called upon to arbitrate in 5289 cases, which gives an average of about a hundred arbitrations a circuit; but of course there are far fewer cases in the agricultural districts than in manufacturing, railway, and mining centres. The judges do not seem to receive any fees for these matters, which must undoubtedly take up a great deal of time. Over and above duties in connection with arbitrations the County Court is the guardian of widows and orphans of deceased workmen, and has the control of the funds paid in for their maintenance. In 1913 no less than £716,846 16*s.* 7*d.* was paid in to County Courts in lump sums. No doubt the judges and officials of the County Courts do their duties usefully and humanely in guiding the economy of these moneys; but they have no machinery for that purpose, and the control of it is social work for which they can have no

special aptitude. The whole working of these matters seems exactly the kind of thing that the Welfare Department of the Board of Trade might take off the shoulders of the County Court. The litigious spirit surrounding Workmen's Compensation cases gives rise to many appeals. There were 150 appeals disposed of in the Court of Appeal and 6 in the House of Lords. The matters appealed about have as a rule little insurance or business interest. No less than 39 appeals in this one year turned on the meaning of the words 'accident arising out of ' and in the course of the employment.' Only 27 appeals in the Court of Appeal were successful, and in 2 out of the 6 appeals to the House of Lords the appeal was successful. The uncertainty of the law in relation to Workmen's Compensation has become largely recognised, and results can be better foreseen through a knowledge of the personality of the tribunal than by a study of precedents.

The truth is that the business of Workmen's Compensation is a ministerial and not a judicial affair. It should be placed wholly in the hands of the Home Office, and the permission to use County Court judges as arbitrators should be withdrawn. Their time should not be wasted on matters that are really wholly outside their range, and a Minister of Justice would see in the removal of these cases from his Courts the ending of a lamentable waste and an economy enabling the new District Courts to undertake the litigious work of which they must relieve the High Court. The abolition or reduction of imprisonment for debt, and the restoration of Workmen's Compensation to its intended beneficent object of insurance without litigation, will not only be sound social reform but will clear the decks of the County Court for the trial of respectable actions.

We have already spoken of the cases of breach of promise, libel, etc., which must of course have audience in our District Courts ; but an even more important jurisdiction of the future will be divorce. The five volumes of the 'Report and Minutes ' of Evidence of the Divorce Commission ' took two years to compile, and for the present have had no useful result. The general question of Divorce Reform is too large a matter to be dealt with here, although from a social point of view it is one of the matters of urgency that requires immediate attention. From a business point of view the refusal to hand over local divorce cases to County Courts is inexcusable. At present

all divorce cases must be tried in London; and, apart from the supposed interests of a localised body of London barristers, no reason can be assigned for this injustice to provincial citizens. Sir George Lewis was no sentimentalist : he had the largest business knowledge of the working of the divorce laws of any solicitor in England, and had been in practice since the passing of the Divorce Act in 1857. His view, therefore, of the effect of the present state of things on the lives of poorer citizens may be accepted as authoritative ; and the fact that it was confirmed by practically all the witnesses who approached the subject undisturbed by ecclesiastical bias, and was in effect accepted by the Commission, renders it the final word on the subject.

'Now with regard to the poor ?' he is asked, and he replies with emphasis : 'Oh, it is a shocking position is the law of 'divorce for them. There is no divorce for them. As the law 'now stands there is no divorce. Unless there is an alteration 'in the law it will continue as it has always existed.'

'Will you tell us why you say that ?' 'Because the poor 'have not the means to come to the Divorce Court in London, 'and if they want divorce they must come to London for it.'

He was then asked if he had any alternative suggestion to make as to constituting a tribunal to deal with divorce in the country, and replied that he certainly had. 'I think it is an 'insult,' he said, 'to tell the County Court judges they are 'not competent to try questions of fact whether adultery has 'been committed, or whether cruelty has been committed.' He referred to the Summary Jurisdiction Act of 1895, which gave lay magistrates power to try these questions in relation to separation and maintenance orders, and continued :

'So that Parliament has already given to these gentlemen who are not lawyers, who have no experience in legal matters, the right to order judicial separations amongst the poor, and to give them the right to determine whether a woman has committed adultery or not. I say in face of that for anyone to come here and to argue that the County Court judges should not be entrusted with these duties is to me astonishing. But I wish further to point out under this Act that if the husband commits adultery, the wife has no protection whatsoever ; the justices have no power to inquire into it. The husband may commit adultery, and what is the poor wife to do ? He may continue to commit adultery, and then in disgust and horror at the position in which she is placed she may

say " I will go away," and she goes away. The Court has no power to give her alimony ; she cannot take her children away with her ; there is no power of the Court to order that she shall be allowed to take them. When she is pining for her children, after a time, all she can do is to go to the Chancery Division of the High Court and, under the Infant Custody Act, to ask for her children to be given her. Of course it is impossible for her to do that, as she has not the means to do anything of the sort. So it seems to me the law, as far as the poor are concerned, is in a painful and disgraceful condition.'

And so it is, and so it is likely to remain until there exists a business department charged with the duty of carrying out the reforms that have been considered and reported upon by the Divorce Commission. An effort was made to give poor people access to the Divorce Court in London by appointing lawyers to act for them without cost. Judging from the constant complaints of the judges about the way the work is done, it is anything but a success, and in any case it only relieves the very poor. The great expense is bringing up witnesses to London and keeping them there, and this is only to be got over by local trial. The ' Rules of the Supreme Court (Poor ' Persons) 1914 ' enable a poor person, on satisfying a judge that he is not worth £50, to take advantage of this procedure. Meagre as this provision is, it was eagerly made use of by poor people whose lives had been wrecked by matrimonial disaster. The rules came into force in June 1914, and to the end of the year there were 1455 applications granted in matrimonial suits. It is too early as yet to judge of the results of the system, which is in any case of no use to the large number of middle-class citizens. The institution of a procedure giving to poor persons legal aid is an excellent thing in itself, but has no real bearing on the demand for properly organised High Courts and District Courts doing their appointed work throughout the country. In Scotland such an institution, making provision for the conduct of litigation by poor persons and providing them with obtaining justice without expense to themselves, has been in force since 1424, and is described by Lord Salvesen in his evidence before the Divorce Commission. It works smoothly and well because the lawyers and judges and people are used to it, and no doubt in course of years we may attain to a machine of similar perfection.

It is interesting to note that the profession made no effort

to maintain in argument before the Commission the retention of all divorce business in London. Mr. William English Harrison, K.C., who gave evidence in his capacity as Chairman of the General Council of the Bar, strongly objected to the proposal to confer divorce jurisdiction on County Courts on two grounds: (1) The large number and varying qualifications of the County Court Judges; (2) the difficulty of depriving litigants in matrimonial causes of their right to a jury, and the character of County Court jurors generally. These objections, of course, might equally well be applied to giving any jurisdiction at all to County Courts and rest on the fallacy that there is some peculiar mystery about the trial of the issues in divorce cases which requires special merit in the tribunal trying them. The answer to them is given by Sir George Lewis, and it is not necessary to repeat it. But the Bar Council agrees 'that the poorer classes should be placed in a better 'position to obtain relief in matrimonial causes, and to accom-'plish this object suggests that provision should be made for 'the trial of matrimonial causes on circuit by a judge of the 'High Court with or without a jury.' When the Bar Council agrees to any legal reform there can be no further question of its urgency. Local divorce being admittedly necessary, the question of what divorces should be tried on Assizes and what in the County Court is a minor question. From the public point of view the question is mainly one of expense. An Assize divorce case would, as Mr. Dendy has shown, cost £100 on the average as against £30 at the County Court, and the best way to deal with the matter would be to commence the divorce proceedings in the Common District Registry that has been suggested, and remove it for trial to the High Court upon good reason being shown.

It is an extraordinary thing that a reform which would make so greatly for morality as divorce reform has been largely hampered and hindered by clerical opposition, and that it is owing to the labours of lawyers—and especially to the self-denying and devoted exertions of Lord Gorell—that the matter has been put before the public in its true light. Lawyers and social reformers were led to study the question by the avidity with which poorer citizens took advantage, in the absence of facilities for divorce, of the separation orders obtainable before magistrates. In 1913 no fewer than 5173

of these orders were granted, parting husbands and wives in the poorer classes without giving them any chance of marrying again and making a new home. It is noticeable that in districts geographically remote from London, separation orders are more freely granted than in the south, though they are common enough everywhere. In Lancashire, which for some reason holds the unenviable record in the matter, no fewer than 1269 orders were made.

Mr. Justice Bargrave Deane was very outspoken about these orders: 'I am dead opposed to separations altogether,' he says, 'I think they lead to immorality.' He instanced what he meant, and his experienced knowledge of facts is well worth the consideration of thoughtful men and women:

'I have seen a great deal of it [he says]. We have numbers of cases—especially undefended cases—where a man brings a suit against his wife on the ground that she is living with another man in immorality. It is suggested very often: "Oh, I was only his housekeeper": and so it goes on until a child is born. Then of course the idea of the housekeeper is exploded. And you find exactly the same thing in the case of a man. A man and his wife do not agree, and they separate or are living apart under a separation, and he wants some one to look after his house and he engages a housekeeper, and the same thing happens. Under these permanent separations people are neither married nor unmarried. They are thrown adrift—especially the poor people—and it leads directly to immorality, and unless you enable them to get divorced it goes on; you cannot help it. It is no good blinding your eyes to what is going on in the country; it is there.'

Mr. Justice Bargrave Deane, like all the non-clerical witnesses, was clear about the evil and the remedy for it, and proposed that judges of the Divorce Court should go circuit and sit at local centres for the express purpose of trying divorce cases.

It would be an interesting matter to continue this inquiry in other fields. There is the old-standing reform of a Land Registry of Titles, which has come down to us from the past ages and still waits for the obstructive professional stay of proceedings to be withdrawn.

Francis North (Baron Guilford), Lord-Keeper of the Great Seal to Charles II., 'was extremely desirous that a register of 'titles to land should be settled, and he worked seriously upon 'it.' And his Bill might have gone through, but the country

gentlemen 'hearkened to the learned' who were 'reputed, for 'the sake of interest in practice,' to be adverse to the reform; and 'they raise a mist of scruple upon every such Bill, and 'represent the possibility of frauds in the offices to be so danger-'ous to men's titles that the country gentlemen who do not take 'upon them to judge, and will trust nobody, fly back: and there 'falls the Bill.' The 'mist of scruple' is still a weapon in the armoury of the profession, and you may see it rising like a poison gas from the printed pages of any Blue Book on the subject of legal reform.

The purity of our administration of justice is one of the jewels of our constitution, but the citizens pay a high price for it, and in the accessibility of our Courts we are often behind other countries. We have no sort of Conciliation Courts, for instance, such as exist in France and Italy and other countries, and save small people much burden of debt—the inevitable result of costly litigation. To-day, when in all our social life we are called upon to exercise economy, why are we not permitted and, indeed, enforced to economise in law? If it be sound economy to hinder a citizen from eating more than two courses in a restaurant, how can it equally be sound economy to insist upon his retaining two counsel in a slander action?

Economy to-day is a national duty, and as the lawyers have been in the forefront in doing their duty in the field, so we may expect that, if a call is made on their self-denial at home, they will make a proper response. They may at least take heart in this historical fact that the prophecies of ruin, freely made by contemporary members of the profession over the abolition of 'fines and recoveries,' 'law French,' 'Doe and Roe,' 'the casual ejector,' 'arrest on mesne process,' and the 'special 'demurrer,' have not been fulfilled; and there is little reason to doubt that if the reforms suggested in these pages were to be made forthwith, we should still find in this country in the future a race of lawyers no less learned, prosperous, and honoured by their fellow citizens on account of the larger and less costly services they were able to render to their poorer clients.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

1. **British Agriculture: The Nation's Opportunity.** By the Hon. E. G. STRUTT, LESLIE SCOTT, M.P., and G. H. ROBERTS, M.P. Murray. 1917.
2. **Agriculture after the War.** By A. D. HALL. Murray. 1916.
3. **The Land and the Empire.** By CHRISTOPHER TURNOR. Murray. 1916.
4. **The Recent Development of German Agriculture.** By T. H. MIDDLETON, C.B. Board of Agriculture. 1916.
5. **Agriculture in Oxfordshire.** By JOHN ORR. Oxford University Press. 1916.

WRITING in this Review after the first year of the war, the present Minister of Agriculture said: *

'Some part of the unfavourable impression which has been 'formed of agriculturists is due to impatience that they have 'not at once realised the complete, though in all probability 'temporary, change in the national view of British agriculture.' At the present time there are signs that the change in the national view of the importance of the agricultural industry will become permanent. It is still possible that the great urban consuming communities may be content to return to a system of *laissez faire*, as regards agriculture, after the declaration of peace, for the purpose of obtaining comparatively cheap and varied supplies of food; but the longer the war lasts and the greater the difficulty of maintaining the supply of food the less probable this contingency becomes. From the beginning of the improvement in the market for agricultural produce, about 1907, there was almost continual discussion of social problems arising from the agricultural system—such as the wages and housing of labour. The problems of production, however, received little attention, except where they came in contact with such contentious subjects as 'land monopoly' and the Game Laws. Since the beginning of 1915 this subject has been rising to the fore, and recently steps have been taken to

* EDINBURGH REVIEW, October 1915.

stimulate production. The problem is an immediate one: on its solution may depend in a large degree the condition of the population during the remaining period of the war. But on the ultimate solution more than this depends—namely, the future of our largest industry and the future of rural England.

The interests of the whole of the population are centred in the available supplies of food during the next few months—perhaps during the next few years; but directly the sea-routes are open, and shipping is plentiful, interests may become divergent. This depends to some extent upon the decision arrived at by the urban consumers as to the possibility of future wars of the present magnitude and extent, and the necessity for national organisation for defence. Should it appear probable after a declaration of peace that there would be no fresh outbreak of hostilities for many years, or that wars of any magnitude would be impossible in the foreseeable future, the consuming classes may be unwilling to undertake any financial burden in the shape of bounties or tariffs for the immediate stimulation of agricultural production. On the other hand, if a current opinion that wars are inevitable spreads and develops, British agriculturists may find that they must submit to an amount of State interference and control, in addition to financial assistance, hitherto undreamed of by those engaged in the industry.

In the first case the agriculturists must depend entirely upon their own efforts for the solution of the essential economic difficulties. Some questions of social importance—such as the remuneration of labour on one hand, or the quality and cleanliness of food supplies on the other—may be dealt with by the State. Facilities for education and research may also be provided by public money. But the great problems of the best systems of the organisation of production and marketing goods must be solved by the agriculturists, largely on their own initiative, as the State would probably decline to do more than provide the indirect means by which these problems can be solved—such as improving educational facilities and subsidising promising efforts for improvement during the earlier stages. In the latter case, the position of the agriculturist, both owner and cultivator of land, may progressively develop into that of a State deputy for the production of the maximum amount of food from the land he controls.

The political aspect of these possibilities is vaguely seen by the consuming population; but many of the agricultural

aspects of the situation have as yet received little or no attention from the general public.

Much has been said and written about the decrease of agricultural production during the last forty years; but in the political discussion of such a subject in a country in which not more than one-sixth of the population has any detailed knowledge of the industry, or is directly concerned with the methods of production adopted, there is likely to be a large margin of error. The facts necessary for a sound judgment are not always available, and the principles are sometimes obscure. Statistics which have not been expressly compiled for the purpose of comparing the production at different periods may provide a rough guide to judgment; but when used without the accompaniment of certain necessary qualifications they are apt to be misleading. Thus Mr. A. D. Hall has tabulated the supposed decline in the agricultural output of England and Wales between 1872 and 1913 as follows:

AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT OF ENGLAND AND WALES

	1872:	1913.	Total value of produce. Million £.	
			1872.	1913.
	Thousand acres.	Thousand acres.		
Wheat . .	3,463	1,702	22·07	10·85
Barley . .	2,064	1,559	11·37	8·59
Potatoes . .	387	442	6·66	7·60
	Thousand animals.	Thousand animals.		
Milch cows and heifers . .	1,774	2,264	19·19	24·48
Other cattle .	2,731	3,453	17·84	22·73
Sheep . .	20,780	17,130	15·94	13·14
Pigs . . .	2,586	2,102	12·94	10·69
			106·01	98·08

In explanation of this table he writes:

'The comparison is made between the output of 1913 and that of 1872, assuming the prices of 1908 and the same yields per acre and production from a given head of stock in the two years. Only

wheat, barley, potatoes, milk and milk products, meat, and wool are supposed to be sold, the other crops being consumed in feeding the stock. The table exaggerates the actual output in 1872 as regards quantity, because at that time the yields per acre were somewhat lighter, and a given head of stock did not produce so much meat in a year because of their slower maturity, though, on the other hand, there was less purchase of foreign grain and feeding stuffs in 1872. More correctly the table may be taken to represent what would have been the output in 1913 had the acreage, etc., remained the same as in 1872. It will be seen that the value of the output from the increased head of cattle barely balances the loss on the sheep, and if we take the pigs into account the lessened production of wheat and barley is not compensated for at all by the increase in the produce from the stock.' *

Mr. Christopher Turnor, again, states that :

'The seriousness of the fact that, in spite of the fair prices which have maintained during the past seven or eight years, the total production of our soil tends to decrease, cannot be over-emphasised. The decrease would be much more noticeable if it were not for the fact that in certain areas there has been a great development of intensive cultivation in the way of market gardening, and the increase in this direction has made the decrease in actual farm produce less apparent.' †

When these statements are closely examined it will be seen that they require considerable qualifications. Take first the question of cattle. The 'Agricultural Statistics' are collected in June of each year, and they represent the number of animals in each class on farms at that date. They do not represent output, except very indirectly. In the case of milch cattle, it must be remembered that the average yield of milk per cow has increased enormously since 1872. Many able agriculturists have estimated the average net yield of milk per cow at various times during this period.

	Gallons.		Gallons.
1875 . . .	334	1890 . . .	393
1879 . . .	385	1895 . . .	400
1889 . . .	403	1907 . . .	437

The net average yield per cow might now be put at 440 gallons per annum. In 1872 the net yield of 1,773,611 cows

* Agriculture after the War, pp. 23, 24.
† The Land and the Empire, p. 18.

and heifers would be 592,000,000 gallons, while the net yield of 2,264,403 cows and heifers in 1913 would be nearly 996,000,000 gallons.

In the case of 'other cattle' a similar change has occurred. In the 'seventies it was common custom to keep cattle for feeding purposes until they were four or five years of age, and they were sometimes kept till they were six or seven years old. This meant that they appeared in the 'Agricultural Statistics' several years in succession, keeping up the number of stock on farms, but actually reducing output. To-day it is quite common to fatten off cattle between two and three years of age, and more go to the butcher at three years or under than over three years of age. Some beef cattle are slaughtered at less than two years. The 'Statistics' themselves confirm this statement. In 1872, 42 per cent. of the 'other cattle' were above two years of age, while in 1913 only 33 per cent. were above that age. Thus the total number of cattle sold for slaughter in each year was much greater in proportion to the total number kept in 1913 than in 1872. The bases on which estimates of carcass weight have been made at different periods have been various, and it is difficult to make comparisons. But, age for age, carcass weights are probably higher now than in the earlier period. The average dressed carcass weight of cattle killed in 1913 would be about 700 lb., and if this figure be taken for the former year it is clear that the present annual output of beef is greater in proportion to the number of cattle kept on farms than in the 'seventies, because fewer cattle now appear in the 'Agricultural Statistics' more than once, after they have reached the age of two years, than in the former period. Also, it is well known that the increase in live-weight or carcass weight of animals per day or week decreases with rising age. Animals over three years of age give less return in live-weight per unit of food consumed than animals under that age; so the beef now produced is the product of a smaller comparative amount of food than in 1872.

This is also true in the case of sheep. Some lambs are marketed before the 'Agricultural Statistics' are collected for the year of their birth, and consequently they are not enumerated at all. The number of these in recent years has been greater than in the 'seventies. But all sheep are marketed for slaughter at an earlier age than they used to be, and, conse-

quently, there is less duplication of sheep from year to year in the 'Statistics.' In 1872 the sheep under one year of age amounted to only 36 per cent. of the total, while in 1913 the number of these amounted to nearly 46 per cent. of the total. Again, average carcass weights relative to the years 1872 and 1913 are uncertain; but, taking into account the increased proportion of lambs slaughtered before they could be enumerated, and the smaller amount of duplication in the 'Statistics' because of the lower age of sheep, it is almost certain that the output of mutton has not fallen in the same proportion as the number of sheep enumerated on farms in each year. Exactly similar considerations apply in the case of pigs.

The precise extent of the modern development of fruit and vegetable farming is not known, but it is known that the area under small fruit has more than doubled since 1888.* The importance of this type of crop at present is shown by the value of annual output. Excluding potatoes, the value of the annual production for sale of vegetables is about £1,600,000, flowers £120,000, and small fruit nearly £2,000,000. These figures are necessarily only rough estimates, and they take no account of the very large quantities of fruit and vegetables produced in private gardens for domestic consumption. Mr. Turnor appears to consider that the production of crops of this type should be excluded in any estimate of production of 'actual farm crops'; but these crops yield the greatest weight and value of food per acre of any type of farm crop.

This is not the time or place to enter on a detailed estimate of the comparative output of agriculture in the years preceding the depression and in recent years, but it is evident that the actual decline is very small. According to Mr. Hall's estimate the decline might be put at about 10 per cent., but the qualifications stated would reduce it to a much lower figure. Some such considerations as have been given may have led the Minority of the Committee on Settlement and Employment

* Some indication of the development of the vegetable and fruit industry is provided by the following figures. In 1875 Mr. F. W. Burbidge stated that orchards in Great Britain covered 150,000 acres and market gardens 39,000 acres ('Horticulture,' Stanford's British Industry Series, 1877); and in 1908 orchards were estimated at 250,000 acres and the area under other market garden crops was much larger than in the earlier year.

of Soldiers on the Land to their more guarded statement on agricultural production:

'Since 1870 more than three and a half million acres of arable land have been laid down to grass, and, coincident with this, the number of male farm-workers has been reduced by nearly 300,000. We think it right to point out, however, that during the same period the dairy industry has been considerably developed to meet the growing needs of the town population, and there has also been an increase of more than one-third in the number of cattle kept for meat production, while the number of sheep kept has been almost maintained. There is no doubt, however, that the shrinkage of the area under the plough has caused a considerable reduction in agricultural employment.' *

Here stress is laid on the decline in employment rather than on diminution of output. The relation of these two aspects of the question is important. The diminution of output has been very much smaller than the decline in the number of persons employed. As a result production per man increased. It thus became possible, even during a period of depression when prices were rapidly falling, slightly to increase wages and shorten hours of labour—two reforms urgently needed.

But if it is dangerous to use, without close examination, statistics of various dates prepared for one country alone, it is doubly dangerous to use statistics prepared in various countries, and to draw conclusions from them as to the relative production without first carefully examining the conditions to which the statistics refer. The frequent quotation and approbation of a statement of Mr. Middleton's, with regard to the comparative production of British and German agriculture, shows how little the principles of statistical investigation are understood, and how dangerous it may be for an uninstructed public to tamper with the organisation of the agricultural industry. The essence of the statement is, that 'on each 100 acres of 'cultivated land the British farmer feeds from 45 to 50 persons; 'the German farmer feeds from 70 to 75 persons.' † Using production per unit of land as the sole standard of judgment this appears to be a fearful indictment of the slackness of the British farmer. In reality it is an illustration of how little we have

* British Agriculture, p. 69.

† For full statement, see 'Recent Development of German Agriculture,' p. 6.

learned about our own system. Farther on, Mr. Middleton quotes figures showing the number of persons employed per 100 acres in Great Britain and Germany, which show that production per person is much greater in our own country. Taking the lowest figures for people maintained, 5·8 persons employed on 100 acres in this country feed 40 persons, or 7·6 persons each; in Germany 18·3 persons feed 70 persons, or 3·8 each. Mr. J. Ellis Barker has stated that 'the output per head of the popula-'tion employed in agriculture (in Germany) is about half that 'of the United Kingdom.'* This is approximately correct, as shown by Mr. Middleton's figures. So far as a comparison of the value of output per head in German and British agriculture is possible such a comparison shows the same result, for the approximate value of output per head in Germany in 1914 was £52, and in Great Britain in 1907 it was £90. The difference in the comparative production per *man* in the two countries would not be so great, because of the large proportion of women employed on German farms. But even on this basis our system gives the best results. Output per *man* in Germany would be some 20 per cent. lower than in this country.

The broad truth is that the results of any system of production adopted in agriculture cannot be judged by one standard alone. There are three standards which must be applied: (*a*) production per unit of land; (*b*) production per man; (*c*) return per unit of capital employed, including permanent equipment provided by the landowner, i.e. buildings, roads, fences, etc., and the farmer's movable equipment—such as stock and implements. In a scientific estimate of the value of any system, not one of these standards can be disregarded without danger of great error. The production per unit of land is apt to dominate the public mind because it is simple in application. When the question arises of the absolute supply of food, without reference to cost, this standard is the only one that need be immediately applied by the consumer. The producer—especially the employed producer—is more concerned with the standard of production per man, because upon that depends his standard of living. The landowner who supplies land and its permanent equipment, and the farmer who supplies stock and implements, etc., for production, are concerned primarily with the return on capital; and this

* Edinburgh Review, October 1916.

depends more upon the standard of production per man than upon the maximum production per unit of land. But ultimately the consumer must consider all three standards, and the cheapest food is usually the product of a system under which production per man and return on capital are moderately high.

In the new countries to which we have been used to look for cheap and plentiful supplies of food, production per acre has been comparatively low; production per man and return on capital comparatively high. Many of these areas are within the British Empire; and while the migration of capital and labour is unrestricted it will be almost impossible to maintain a system of high productivity per acre and low return on labour and capital in this country. This can only be done when the consumers are willing to bear a financial burden in the form of bounties or tariffs to compensate the agriculturists for the low economic returns provided by the system adopted. For purposes of defence the sacrifice may be worth making, and, when it is made, the agricultural industry will be in somewhat the same position as the Army or the Navy.

'The comparatively high production of Germany,' says Mr. Middleton, 'is partly due to the fact that economic policy in 'recent years has favoured agriculturists, who have benefited 'partly from the higher prices resulting from tariffs and 'partly from the steadying effect which the known policy of 'the State has had upon the industry.' Yet he admits that wages are relatively low, and that rural industries are almost necessary to enable the workers to live decently. No particulars of the returns obtained by capital in German agriculture in recent years are obtainable, and, as Mr. A. D. Hall remarks, this information is also difficult to obtain in England. He gives, however, particulars abstracted 'from 'the accounts of certain British farms taken for the few years 'immediately prior to the outbreak of war.' It is worth while to quote the actual figures given by Mr. Hall:

1. *About* 1000 *acres—three-quarters arable.*
   Capital per acre, £8 8*s.*
   Men per 100 acres, 2½.
   Average earnings per man, 15*s.* 2*d.* per week.
   Profit, after paying 5 per cent. on capital, but including management, 13·1 per cent.

2. *About* 4000 *acres—two-thirds arable.*
   Capital per acre, about £10.
   Men per 100 acres, about 5.
   Average earnings per man, 21*s.* 6*d.* per week.
   Management, 10*s.* per acre per annum.
   Profit, after paying 5 per cent. on capital, 10·5 per cent.

3. *About* 5000 *acres—three-fourths arable.*
   Capital per acre, about £8.
   Men per 100 acres, 4.
   Average earnings per man, 21*s.* 6*d.* per week.
   Management, 5*s.* per acre per annum.
   Profit, after paying 5 per cent., 12½ per cent.

4. *About* 1500 *acres—four-fifths arable.*
   Capital per acre, about £12.
   Men per 100 acres, 7.
   Average earnings per man, 22*s.* per week.
   Management, 5*s.* per acre per annum.
   Profit, after paying 5 per cent. on capital, 10 per cent.

5. *About* 1000 *acres—three-quarters arable.*
   Capital per acre, £7 10*s.*
   Men per 100 acres, 2½.
   Average earnings per man, 21*s.* 2*d.* per week.
   Profit, after paying 5 per cent. on capital, but including management, 21·6 per cent.

6. *About* 550 *acres—half arable.*
   Capital per acre, £10.
   Men per 100 acres, 3.
   Average wages per man, 16*s.* per week.
   Profit, after paying 5 per cent. on capital, but including management, 16·1 per cent.*

Mr. Hall adds:

'It may be explained that the gross production per acre is not given, because this figure must vary with the style of farming adopted: for example, a business which buys store stock heavily, and fattens them to a large extent on purchased feeding stuffs, will show a far larger gross output than an equally profitable business which purchases little and depends entirely upon the sale of crops. The profits shown represent the net proceeds after

* It will be noticed that in cases 1, 5, and 6 the cost of management has to be deducted from the profit shown, whereas in cases 2, 3, and 4 a charge for management is made before profits are calculated.

rent, manures, labour, and all outgoings have been paid, and after 5 per cent. has been set aside as interest on the capital employed in the undertaking. In the cases of 2 and 3, the management charges are set down too low: they represent what had been actually paid, but they take no account of the considerable supervision exercised by the proprietors of the respective businesses.'

Many of the figures and statements used in dealing with the amount of agricultural capital, its decline or increase, and the interest return obtained from its employment require careful scrutiny. An instance of this may be found in the general statement regarding the decline in the value of land during the depression, repeated in the Report of the Sub-Committee on Agricultural Policy, and the criticism levelled at the statement by Sir Matthew Wallace in his separate report to the Prime Minister.

In Germany a considerable portion of the increased profit due to tariffs and higher prices has gone into the pockets of landowners. And the recent action of the English Board of Agriculture in taking power to control increases of rent in this country has shown there is fear of this movement here. Mr. Hall suggests that to meet this possibility the State may find it necessary to take over the possession and control of land. But even this expedient does not meet the essential difficulty, for there would be nothing to prevent the State stultifying its action in providing financial assistance by increasing rents. There would still exist the necessity for finding an equitable basis on which rents could be fixed. Even with the regulations recently made this necessity will probably arise in the near future. The subject of rent and the questions of control of agricultural production arising out of the British system of dual control of land by tenant farmers and landowners are too intricate to be dealt with in detail in this article. They are considered at some length in the Report of the Sub-Committee on Agricultural Policy, and the Committee recommend that the system of dual control be allowed to remain, with some minor qualifications, and do not recommend the establishment of a Land Court. On the other hand, Sir Matthew Wallace is in favour of a statutory body to deal with such questions as may arise. But if subsidies which guarantee prices, or tariffs which raise prices, improve the outlook for capital invested in agricultural production, whether in

permanent or movable equipment, they also handicap the employment of capital in other forms of production. An agricultural tariff which raises prices of food must either make labour more costly or reduce the standard of life of the urban workers, and where industrial organisation is strong it is likely to have the former effect. Subsidies increase taxation, and thus handicap the employment of capital in industries which do not receive any part of the subsidy. In German industries the handicap of the agrarian tariff has been severely felt. All things considered, the system of organisation of British agriculture does not compare unfavourably with some other systems.

Mr. Christopher Turnor uses numerous diagrams showing the comparative number of various kinds of stock per 1000 of the population in various European countries to illustrate the weakness of our own agriculture. Such diagrams are of no value whatever, and may be positively mischievous. If used at all, they should be accompanied by diagrams showing the comparative size of each country and the density of population per square mile. Otherwise, diagrams showing the comparative number of stock per 1000 of the population in the administrative counties of London and Oxfordshire could just as legitimately be used. It is quite possible that if we pushed our desire for self-maintenance beyond a certain limit we should have far less live-stock per 1000 of the population than at the present time; for it is well known that the way maximum production of food for human consumption is reached is by direct consumption of all available vegetable matter. The food value of milk and meat is not equal to the food value of the vegetable matter consumed in their production, assuming such matter is in a form in which it can be eaten and assimilated by human beings.

This principle is well illustrated in the case of Japan. With a population and a cultivated area something similar to our own, that country imports a little food—mostly wheat—but is mainly self-supporting. Japan contains about 1,500,000 cattle against nearly 12,000,000 in the United Kingdom; barely 4000 sheep against nearly 29,000,000, and less than 400,000 pigs against nearly 4,000,000. The most scientific attempt to compare the density of stock in various European countries yet made in this country was published in the

'Agricultural Statistics,' * 1912, where it was shown that the density of stock per 1000 acres was greater in the United Kingdom than in Austria, Hungary, Italy, or Prussia, but less than in Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Again, it was shown that the output per agriculturist in the United Kingdom was higher than in almost any other European country. It was stated that:

'The output per man in Denmark appears most nearly to resemble that of this country. As compared with the Eastern Division of England, which most nearly resembles it in its proportion of arable land, Denmark has a considerably smaller output of corn and pulse per agriculturist, and keeps a relatively larger stock of cattle and pigs, but considerably fewer sheep.'

The foregoing is not intrinsically a defence of the British farmer or of the British agricultural system. The farmer has a right to a just estimate of his social service, but at the moment it is more important that the existing organisation should be judged on all the relevant facts and by the essential principles. It is also important that the public should bear in mind two basic principles with regard to agricultural production. Physically, perhaps, it is not impossible that the United Kingdom should become self-supporting as regards food supply, but this condition can only be reached by disregard of the fact that, as total production increases, the unit cost of goods will also increase; and that the dietary of the people will almost certainly be reduced in the process. The Law of Diminishing Returns, or the principle of increasing costs, in agriculture is not a fiction of the economists. If the general validity of the law needs any more proof than the experience of mankind supplies, it can be found in the careful experiments conducted at Rothamsted over a series of years.† The cheapest system of production of food, or the least costly in human pain and labour, has been the huge ranch system of grazing or cultivation in the new countries, where man practically waited for the forces of nature to make plant-food available. The action of nature is slow, and, where population is dense, man cannot wait for it; but when he begins to accelerate the process

* Pt. V., Colonial and Foreign Statistics, 1912.

† For an account of these experiments see Mr. Rowland Prothero's article in the EDINBURGH REVIEW, October 1915.

by cultivation and the provision of plant-food, the return does not rise in proportion as the applications of labour and fertiliser increase.

Experienced agriculturists, who advocate preparation for a condition of self-sufficiency during some future war, admit that this condition would be possible only with the adoption of a special war-diet. They say that we should now begin to increase the area under the plough, continuing the process till the maximum is reached, then, when necessary, adopt a special course of war-cropping—presumably slaughtering many of our animals—and thus maintain the physical sustenance of the population. The condition of self-sufficiency in regard to food supplies could be permanently maintained only by the adoption of a course of cropping to supply a practically vegetarian diet, or one including a minimum of animal products. An approach to this system may have to be adopted before the end of the present war. For two and a half years the Board of Agriculture was anxious that the head of stock in the country should be maintained. It is now more concerned to procure vegetable food for direct human consumption, and unless the area under the plough is rapidly extended this can be obtained only by a sacrifice of stock.

However, so far as the organisation of agriculture in the immediate future is concerned, there are other things to be considered before stress is laid on the principle of increasing cost, or on the possibility of obtaining a greater food value from our soil by the direct consumption of vegetable foods. There are a great number of farms in this country on which production might be increased without increasing unit cost, even with the present organisation; and on some of these such increased production might be accompanied by a diminished unit cost, if the internal management of the farms were improved.

The purely physical aspect of the Law of Diminishing Returns is clearly shown by the results of the Rothamsted experiments; but the financial aspect is open to many qualifications. The forms in which capital and labour may be applied in farm production are not fixed. A given amount of labour may be applied in the form of manual labour with a resulting financial loss; but if the same amount of cultivation can be obtained by the application of horse-power, the loss may turn to profit. Again, though it may be impossible to produce

a crop of a given weight, except at a loss, by horse-power, it may be possible by the employment of steam or oil-combustion power to produce the same crop at a profit. Many problems affecting the economy and the efficiency of labour and capital employed on British farms still await solution, and, when solutions are found, gross production can be increased at a profit to the farmer.

It would not be over-estimating the possibilities to say that the total output of British agriculture could be increased to the extent of 30 per cent., with but slight increase, if any, in the unit cost of goods produced. It is even possible that the proportionate increase might rise to 50 per cent., without reaching the point at which unit cost rapidly increased, if fairly drastic changes were made in management.

The agricultural view of the Law of Diminishing Returns is well stated by Mr. John Orr:

'Economists have looked to the soil instead of the market for an explanation of this phenomenon. If a farmer spends £6 in growing and marketing an acre of wheat, and receives £8 for it, he gets a profit of £2. If he spends £12, and receives £10, he loses £2. The second £6 does not produce £8 as the first did, and, regarded as a chemical and botanical operation, the result is said to be an evidence of the working of the Law of Diminishing Returns; but from the economic point of view the farmer's experience would be described as the punishment for misapplying capital and labour —a salutary arrangement for keeping enthusiastic experimental students in check. The desire to grow an unlimited quantity of wheat per acre is an impracticable ambition, and the pessimism which springs from its failure is unjustifiable: the principle which ought to determine what is best for farmers to produce is not their personal predilection. It is the relation of the cost of the thing to the price received for it. . . . If there is a Law of Diminishing Returns in the real world, it only operates in particular branches of production at a given time, while a law to the opposite effect is operating in other branches at the same time. Because economists too deeply affected by chemical enthusiasm, and farmers too firmly bound to a hard-and-fast style of farming, are losing 16 per cent. in growing wheat, more practical and fortunate people are making 150 per cent. in other lines. If the capital were properly distributed, the loss would be avoided or diminished; but even to-day over the whole field of production there is an increasing return.'

On theoretical economic grounds such a statement warrants criticism; for Mr. Orr forgets that the market price which makes it possible for the English farmer to produce more wheat per

acre, and still maintain or increase his profits, may be the result of the operation of the principle of increasing costs in other countries—such as Canada or the United States. Indeed, such has been the cause of the steady rise in price of wheat during recent years. But as the competition from still unexhausted virgin lands becomes less and less important, it will be possible for the British farmer to increase yields and yet maintain the rate of financial return. This, however, will not protect the consumer from the increasing cost. And should the State decide that farming capital shall be applied to production of specific goods, without regard to the trend of the market, unit costs must increase as the process of increasing yields continues.

Prices were rising prior to 1914, and it was felt by many agriculturists that they were reaching a level which would warrant greater application of labour, capital, and knowledge in agricultural production in this country. The point at which the financial return per unit of capital, etc., employed begins to diminish with the current costs and prices at any given time can be ascertained only by a somewhat detailed system of cost-accounting, although in extreme instances the farmer may become aware that the law is operating by a rough calculation of expenditure upon and receipts from a given crop. But even when the law begins to operate under one system of application of capital and labour, improvements in the method of application may obviate the difficulty.

There is, undoubtedly, scope for much greater application of labour, capital, and management ability in British agriculture. In particular, there is need for such a development of confidence in the market and the ability to organise methods of production which will return a profit as will lead to an increase in the arable area of the country. Arable land produces much more food for both man and beast than pasture on a soil of the same quality. With the guarantees now given to farmers this increase should be secured; and if, as seems probable, the upward trend of prices observable before 1914 continues after the war, the natural level of prices should be sufficient to maintain a greater area under the plough. If the level of prices is not sufficiently high to foster arable farming financial assistance may have to be continued. Under such circumstances the State should take steps to see that the

area of arable is increased as compensation to the consuming and tax-paying population for the financial assistance given. The possibility of the necessity for action along this line has been foreseen, but it remains to be ascertained whether the steps taken will be effective.

Apart from the necessity for an increase in the area under the plough there is a great necessity for use of more capital, and the application of knowledge—especially the ascertained results of practical experiments—to all farming practice. The financial stimulus of guaranteed prices may be sufficient to encourage farmers to apply all their available capital, but the hereditary capital of most farmers will not be sufficient for the whole of the necessary developments. The size and system of management of the ordinary farms are such that capital from other sources is rarely attracted to the industry. With improvement in methods of accounting and of preparation of financial statements, the joint-stock banks might be induced to provide farmers with more credit ; but with the large number of farms worked on varying grades of efficiency the flow of capital from this source will be slow and unequal.

Many landlords, also, do not possess sufficient capital to provide the permanent equipment of farms necessary for a progressive system of farming. Some others possess the capital necessary, but are not anxious to see land intensively developed for agricultural purposes because of the supposed detraction from its amenity value. The whole subject of the position of the landowner in regard to the control of agricultural production requires careful consideration. Landowners naturally desire to retain their present powers, and farmers desire to obtain a greater degree of control and a larger interest in the land they occupy. Many arguments in favour of the continuance of the system of dual control are put forward by Mr. Orr and by the Sub-Committee on Agricultural Policy. But many people who are concerned with securing improvements in agricultural production are looking towards the establishment of a system of complete control by the cultivators, with the addition of public supervision, as a remedy for many of the shortcomings of the present system. All parties are agreed, however, that more capital is required in the industry If the State can afford to pay several millions a year into the

pockets of farmers, in the form of guaranteed prices, it could certainly afford to set aside a capital sum to provide credit for farmers and landlords requiring to equip farms at the rate of interest current at the time the loan was made. The administration of such a loan fund could be carried out through a permanent board of central administrators and voluntary organisations of farmers and landowners.

But the fundamental necessity is for such an organisation of farming as can command capital from the ordinary financial sources. Under most systems of farming this requires a larger unit of land, a larger unit of original capital, and a more developed system of management than at present obtains. Bearing these considerations in mind Mr. Hall suggests the establishment of 'industrialised farming.' This suggestion is of the greatest importance from the point of view of the possibility of improving the system of management on farms. The ordinary farmer is the sole technical and financial manager of his business. He may be a good financial or business manager, but a bad farmer, or *vice versa*; but nobody with an ordinary knowledge of human capacities would expect the majority of farmers to be experts in both spheres. Yet experts in both spheres are urgently needed in the industry. Sooner or later the business expert must be employed, either by the large commercial farmer or by voluntary associations of farmers working as a co-operative society.

In many instances operations on farms have given poor financial results, merely because the system of distribution of goods has been weak and unorganised. Little is known, even by farmers, of the system and costs of transporting and marketing farm products, although complaints are made that the farmer receives only a comparatively small proportion of the price of products paid by the consumer. This condition cannot be allowed to persist if the farming industry is to make progress. For the small holder and small farmer an extension of the co-operative system is extremely desirable; but this method of organising the business of farms has proved to be extremely slow, and it is to be feared that if farmers become financially comfortable it may be even more slow than in the past.

But the expert is needed nearly as much in the sphere of technical management as in that of business and finance. The percolation of scientific knowledge, and the results of

experiments, through the various grades of farmers is extremely slow. Where good farming exists side by side with poor farming, there has been little attempt in many cases to raise the standard of the poor farming to that of the better. Perhaps it is too much to expect that the farmer of one or two hundred acres of land should become an expert in the three or four branches of production on which he must embark. If so, the need of the specialised manager is evident; but scope for his knowledge and activities cannot be found on farms of the prevailing sizes.

We may, however, assume that the existing organisation of the present farms will persist for many years, and steps should be taken to improve facilities for agricultural education, and to arouse desire for more knowledge. This will be more easily arranged by the extension of local farm institutes—as was contemplated prior to the war; for most of the agricultural colleges are too expensive for the sons of farmers. Demonstration farms, organised and managed to illustrate good farming practice and to show a profit, would be of great value. Where public authorities are spending money and effort in establishing small holdings the establishment of demonstration holdings has been too long delayed. Provision should also be made for the technical education of employees, both to secure the best service in the production of food and to improve their economic and social outlook. With public regulation of rates of wages some farmers will find it necessary to secure greater services from their employees; and from all points of view it is desirabl · that efficiency in production should be increased by a development of skill and intelligence rather than by an increase in mere physical exertion.

Mr. Middleton states that the development of agricultural production in Germany has been due, in addition to other causes mentioned, to the greater proportion of land under the plough in that country, to the attention given to the credit system and the supply of capital, to the organisation of the business side of the industry—especially by co-operation—and to the provision of facilities for education. These are the fundamental necessities for a development of our own system; and unless these requirements are met, and a new spirit of enterprise engendered in the controllers of the industry, the community at large can obtain no benefit from a system of public subsidies. The treatment of farming as a business, in

which capital and intelligence should be obtained from every possible source, is the elemental condition of progress. Upon the quality of the business organisation depends both the financial return to the farmer and the rendering of economic service to the community.

Other remedies for our agricultural ills, besides improvement in technical methods and in business organisation, are frequently advocated. The nation is invited, for example, to establish vast numbers of small holdings, for various social and sentimental reasons held by enthusiasts ; but if the whole of England and Wales were cut up into holdings, each large enough to maintain a family, the increase in rural population secured would be insignificant. Considering all types of production, the average size of such holdings would be about twenty-seven acres, and the present cultivated area of England and Wales would provide about one million holdings of this size. But according to the census of 1911 there are already almost exactly one million males over the age of fifteen engaged in agriculture in England and Wales, exclusive of gardeners, woodmen, nurserymen, and seedsmen. So that unless the holdings were very much smaller than twenty-seven acres there would be only a small increase in rural population. If, however, the holdings were smaller the standard of life of the cultivators would almost inevitably fall, although total production and the rate of production per acre might possibly rise.

There is a distinct place for the small holding in agricultural production in such industries as market gardening, poultry raising, and some parts of the dairying industry. But a vast extension of small-scale production means a reduction in the standard of production per man.

Part of the difference in the amount of the net output per person in this country and in Germany is due to the fact that in England only 16 per cent. of the land consists of holdings of less than fifty acres each, whereas in Germany nearly one-half of the total cultivated area is made up of these small units of production. The system of small-scale cultivation and of peasant proprietorship secures a better distribution of the financial returns of the industry than a system of larger farms employing labour ; but as the standard of living ultimately depends upon the rate of production per man, the system which gives good results judged on this standard ultimately gives the best results to the agriculturist.

It must be again repeated that in all discussions of agricultural systems it is futile to consider mere quantity of production without also considering methods of organisation and financial results. If the people of the United Kingdom desire such supplies of home-grown food as cannot be produced by economic methods they must be prepared to pay the price in money and in the possible reduction of the variety of their dietary. Millions of acres of land which may be used for agricultural purposes in the Empire are still unsettled or only thinly settled. On such areas the food necessary for the British population might be produced by methods which would yield the agriculturist a good return for his industry without imposing a drain upon public revenue, and by the settlement of those areas the Empire would be strengthened. The Empire may become self-supporting on a healthy economic system, but so far as can be seen the United Kingdom can become self-supporting in the matter of food supplies only at a prohibitive cost.

As regards the other side of the picture, it must be borne in mind that production can still be increased in this country to the advantage both of producer and of consumer by the adoption of sound technical and business methods. The most trenchant criticism of the policy of guaranteed prices yet published is the work of a tenant farmer, and is contained in the separate report of Sir Matthew Wallace on Agricultural Policy. He states :

'Efficiency is the keynote of the situation, and the means of securing this the State can provide. Instruction and information have not yet reached the man who tills the soil ; his desire for knowledge has not even been quickened. Give the farmer education, acquaint him with the reason of things, and you will give him the most wholesome kind of State aid. To some extent this has been done, and where this is the case I am certain that never in the history of British agriculture has there been a period of better farming and greater production.'

With or without guaranteed prices, or other fiscal assistance from the State, the future health and stability of the agricultural industry will depend in a large degree on the adoption of good field-practice, upon the adoption of sound business organisation, and upon the facilities created for the training of intelligent farm managers and workers.

Arthur W. Ashby.

THE DARDANELLES REPORT

THE issue of the report of Lord Cromer's Commission on the Dardanelles has given a great shock to our countrymen, but it marks an epoch in the history of the war and of the British Empire. In the ordinary course of Cabinet Government the culprit usually escapes. At some stage or another of the operations the minister in charge has to fall back on his colleagues, and the aegis of the whole Government is thrown over him. Hence the individual responsibility of a minister is seldom brought home; the popularity of statesmen and the reverse are in consequence more often decided by individual characteristics than by policy. Mr. Asquith's Government, in full confidence, challenged a verdict by granting this enquiry; they have got it with a vengeance. For the first time since the Crimea the fiction that slackness cannot be brought home to persons at headquarters has been exploded.

The present writer was not among those who pressed these enquiries or desired to force any disclosure from the Government which on patriotic grounds might be inopportune. Like most other Englishmen he has always regarded the war as the supreme issue. The Ministry of 1914 had already made large drafts on public confidence, and many felt a doubt as to its composition. But so long as it represented the country, there seemed no alternative between strengthening its hand and striking a deathblow. It is hardly overstating the case to say that, with this report hanging over prominent members of the Ministry of 1914, what occurred last December could only have been postponed till March.

The disposition to attack Lord Cromer and his colleagues for their statement of the case is not creditable. The composition of the Commission was thoroughly impartial, and its chairman had on many subjects a bias strongly in favour of the Ministry.

What most people fail to recollect is the divergence between efficiency as it is understood at the outskirts of the Empire and at the centre. Great Britain has never been better served at 'out-stations' than in the last fifty years. The pulse of the pioneer notoriously beats faster than that of the politician,

and remoteness from Downing Street has only quickened loyalty and self-sacrifice. On the other hand a nation so prosperous as ours, and secure in its insularity, has been inclined to look placidly on the enthusiasts who dreamed in Dreadnoughts, National Service, and Food Supplies. Lord Cromer came home from Egypt ten years ago to find all minds centred on doles and domestic grievances. It is difficult now to realise to what degree questions like Defence, the Declaration of London, and the Bagdad Railway, on which the life of our Empire was to be tried, took a back seat. Indeed, if national spirit were to be weighed by political preoccupations, it was a decadent nation which had to face the crisis of 1914. Lord Cromer has ended his life by a service to the country which will be remembered side by side with his regeneration of Egypt. He has told a plain story with remorseless exactitude, and has exposed shortcomings in official procedure with unrivalled knowledge. But it was no part of his province to go back and ascertain the habit of mind which led to these aberrations. It is proposed briefly to do so here.

Of the twenty years before the outbreak of war, the Unionist party had held power for over ten years and their opponents for nearly nine years at a stretch. Experience shows that after five years a Government loses its 'snap,' and however outwardly formidable is inwardly disjointed. The Boer War caught Lord Salisbury's Government at a time when it had earned rest, and the great resultant strain, aided in 1903 by the Tariff explosion, landed it in the greatest defeat of the century.

The Campbell Bannerman-Asquith Government had a still more formidable trial. For nine years it stood a bombardment, possibly well earned, but certainly never-ceasing. Education, Church, Budget, Liquor, Navy, Ireland, with two General Elections, made each year a long-drawn-out platform and parliamentary struggle. Graver issues were inevitably put aside. Writing on the wall was not wanting, notably in 1911 when France and Germany were on the eve of mobilising, but there is no evidence that the ministers chiefly concerned, Sir Edward Grey and Lord Haldane, took any step to meet the emergency. Lord Salisbury once declined to back a representation to a foreign power urged by a very strong Viceroy with the words, 'He 'always wants me to negotiate as if I had 200,000 men at my

'back, and I have not.' This consideration did not apparently enter into Sir Edward Grey's diplomacy. In 1912, when the Opposition in the House of Lords offered the Government co-operation in any effort they might make to bring our forces up to our commitments—so grievously strained in 1911—he allowed the project to be snuffed out by Lord Haldane from the Woolsack; and after all the boasting of strength increased by changing Volunteers into Territorials the Munitions Vote for 1913 and 1914 was actually brought down twenty-five per cent. below that of 1905, with the concurrence of Mr. Asquith's special henchman in the Ministry, Mr. McKenna.

Can anyone conceive Lord Palmerston or Lord Salisbury on the top of this unpreparedness continuing, as Sir Edward Grey did in 1914, to support the Home Rule agitation at a moment when, as we now know, the danger of civil war in Ireland was a considerable pawn in Prince Lichnowski's calculations that Great Britain need not be reckoned with? The only possible defence is that the Government was not merely exhausted but distraught.

It is possible to weigh the want of purpose in Government foreign policy by a single illustration. Lord Kitchener came home from India in 1910 as vigorous as any man of sixty has ever been. He desired greatly to return as Viceroy, but this was not deemed advisable. There were three posts for which he was eminently qualified. He had held supreme commands in Africa and Asia but never in England. He might have been made Chief of the Staff at the War Office and begun the work which afterwards made him the protagonist of the war. The position both at Cairo and Constantinople was such that the Englishman whose prestige was highest in the Near East was marked out for service there if not more imperatively needed elsewhere. The Government gave Lord Kitchener the go-by, and Lord Haldane by the highest pressure forced on him an honorary command at Malta which the Duke of Connaught had just vacated because no soldier of his eminence could waste the public money by holding it. Lord Kitchener's subsequent withdrawal when he knew the facts, and the break-down of Sir Eldon Gorst, relieved the Government from the obloquy of having shelved at a most critical moment in national history one of the few Englishmen who 'counted' abroad.

The outbreak of war set at rest all animus against the late

Government. They had one great recommendation to the country that there appeared to be no opposition capable of replacing them. The final phases of Mr. Balfour's Government had been inglorious ; Mr. Bonar Law, who replaced him as leader of the Unionist party, had no experience, and was quite at sea in any department except domestic policy. The country for the moment produced no outstanding personality, nor any group of individuals who could carry with them a preponderance of national feeling. On the other hand Sir Edward Grey was much trusted abroad, and the Cabinet, once their mind was made up to fight, showed a very firm front to the enemy.

When the trumpets sounded in 1914 Mr. Asquith and his Government did their best to cut their losses and face the new situation. The appointment of Lord Kitchener to the War Office ; the despatch of the Expeditionary Force ; the enrolment of the New Army ; the transfer of the Indian Army to France ; the immense demands on the country for material and money, were vigorously and promptly made. It is due to Mr. Asquith's Government that we did not figure as another great power has recently done, and that Great Britain took her proper place in Europe, when flagrant breaches of treaty forced her to take a hand in a quarrel in which her interest was remote.

Mr. Asquith also had the foresight to engage the leaders of the Opposition to a party truce which should free the war from all political hindrance. Possibly most of us did not see then as clearly as now that this was not enough. The old cumbrous Cabinet was maintained ; defence measures filtered slowly through the ordinary channels ; departments ran on the ' business as usual ' principle. Instead of a few ministers devoting the whole of their energies to the war and sacrifices being demanded from all classes without distinction, the war itself was carried on by an ill-defined War Council, and half the time of ministers was absorbed in making the conditions of a death-struggle palatable to the people who were not engaged in it. Wages must be kept up ; employment found ; aliens spared ; amusements encouraged ; recalcitrants cajoled. The Cabinet wasted much time in attempting to spoon-feed 46,000,000 human beings who had been among the most comfortable in the world. Thus to the Nemesis of unprepared-

ness was added tardy awakening on the part of the nation; and no influence such as Napoleon exercised on France in 1803 or Lincoln on America in 1863 was ready to galvanise the chaotic atoms of Great Britain into a harmonious whole.

It is due to all these circumstances, and not to lack of effort or public spirit, that the Dardanelles Report reads like a chapter from the 'Arabian Nights.'

Discarding all the nonsense which has been written about 'Unseen Hands' and pro-German sympathies, it is only patriotic to investigate the source of this breakdown. In war, personalities count more even than men or munitions. In this respect the cast of the War Council was ill set. Mr. Asquith, whose brain-power exceeded that of all his colleagues, had steered his Government through seven perilous years by occasional firmness and constant compromises. He carried these qualities into the war with some success. If, for instance, he had brought in conscription at the outset, he might have put back the clock. He may claim that he kept the country, as he helped to keep the Allies, together; he dealt pleasantly with foreign statesmen. But war cannot be made by shirking decisions, and it required a Prime Minister of more self-assertion to control the discordant elements by which he was surrounded, and of greater prevision as to the war to estimate the extent to which the personal equation governed the schemes between which he had to choose.

No conjunction of persons could have been less happy than the enforced partnership of Lord Kitchener and Mr. Churchill, by whom, as heads of the two services, the war was carried on in the early stages, with the Prime Minister in an undefined position between them. It is always a danger to link two people in national business who habitually disagree. Either they yield to natural impulses and there is friction, or they make concessions from ultra-fairness and the country is ill served. The bad feeling between Canning and Castlereagh was largely responsible for the Walcheren Expedition and other failures in 1809. In the Crimea, Lord Cardigan would never have led a hopeless charge at Balaclava, but for his old differences with Lord Lucan. More recently an unavoidable association was made in South Africa between Sir Redvers Buller and Lord Roberts, who had never seen eye to eye on military topics. But in a study of 'opposites'

none of these cases were such poles apart as Mr. Asquith's Secretary for War and his First Lord.

Lord Kitchener had commanded a force at Omdurman in which Mr. Churchill was a subaltern, and had been chief of an army of 250,000 men in South Africa when Mr. Churchill was a newspaper correspondent. Though he had seen war before Mr. Churchill was born, and had organised it for a quarter of a century, he had written nothing and said little ; Mr. Churchill, who had rapidly absorbed meteoric impressions in several campaigns in which he fought gallantly, assumed his competence to lecture generals and admirals on their duties. Sir Stafford Northcote, speaking of Lord Randolph Churchill's friendliness in 1885, said ' that he forgot the difference between ' being at the whip end and the handle end.' Mr. Churchill, who is not vindictive, has a similarly short memory. It did not tend to close confidence that among the sufferers from his public attacks had been Lord Kitchener, when he was not in a position to reply.

Before the war had been going many weeks it was apparent that the two men breathed different atmospheres. Mr. Churchill not only guaranteed the security of the Channel but was ready to hunt out the enemy's fleet ' like rats.' Lord Kitchener's respect for the German threat of invasion kept Sir John French short of his Sixth Division during his heroic retreat. Lord Kitchener, again holding that none but fully trained troops could be put in line, refused to send any of the 300,000 Territorials to France till November ; Mr. Churchill bustled the newly raised and untrained Naval Brigade to Antwerp, to be captured. Mr. Churchill ordered immediate preparations for a certain combined attack in January 1915 ; Lord Kitchener left those on the spot to demonstrate its impossibility. Both were doing their best to serve the country, but the unfortunate Prime Minister must often have felt that, instead of resting securely on combined advice, he was mediating between two independent and not altogether friendly authorities.

When it came to the Dardanelles the divergence developed. Lord Kitchener, who had found the War Office somewhat denuded by the Expeditionary Force, consulted no one ; he knew that he could not properly spare troops ; moreover, he held that in war to divide forces is fatal. In this respect he represented Sir John French's view as well as his own. Mr.

Churchill similarly gave the go-by to his Council. Instead of restraining the ardour of a splendidly venturesome service already itching to get at an evasive enemy, he stimulated it with the impetuosity of a cavalry officer. He genuinely believed that the Dardanelles could be forced by the fleet alone; apparently he was not disturbed by the silence of his expert advisers at the War Council. When by some accident Lord Fisher was asked a vital question as to how many battleships would be lost in attempting to force the Dardanelles and replied 'Twelve,' he seems to have been treated like a Bishop who was defending Church revenues. Such scruples, however natural, must be got over.

Mr. Asquith's speech in the House of Commons on March 20 throws little light on his condition of mind in this dilemma. He seems not to have appreciated his own predominant power. He defended Lord Kitchener handsomely, and made it clear, which no one who knew him doubted, that he had laboured strenuously to bring all his colleagues into line and only wanted to arrive at truth. But if this were all that was needed, a man of far less calibre might have held the first post in the Government.

To put it clearly, it is admitted on all hands that the diversion was an attractive one. It assisted the Russians; it impressed the Balkan States; it relieved the muddy deadlock on the West Front; it gave the Navy a chance. The question was whether it could be carried out by the fleet alone; if not, were troops available in sufficient strength to support it? if attempted, would the Government be prepared to persist or risk the loss of prestige by drawing off?

These were the points on which the Prime Minister should have secured a clear decision. Apparently he drifted with the stream, and left the various eddies to prevail according to their respective momentum.

Yet he must have realised that all the forces around him were combining for different reasons to stake a precious array of ships, lives, prestige, and material on this gamble. The Foreign Secretary felt the new departure to be a trump card in diplomacy. Mr. Churchill was 'out for' a great coup and, with a considerable turn for military affairs, was irrepressibly sanguine. Lord Kitchener, if the overtaxed army could be spared, had a keen eye to the East. The heads of the two

services were thus impelled to take the risk with ships. Surely with two men of such dominant personality who consulted subordinates little and distrusted each other much, there was a double need to call in the experts associated with them.

Moreover, Mr. Asquith had recently in the Ulster crisis found at the War Office how little the haphazard opinions of military men are to be relied upon without cross-examination. He was President of a Court in which he was possibly the only minister without a bias. The conduct of Lord Fisher in not speaking out is gravely criticised; Mr. Asquith left no doubt on the mind of the Commission that his interposition would have been welcome. Lord Grey said the War Council went solely by the opinions of the two ministers. Lord Crewe said the 'political members of the Committee did too much 'of the talking and the expert members as a rule too little,' a view in which Lord Haldane concurred. Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lloyd George assumed that experts assented if they did not dissent, a view which it is to be hoped the present Prime Minister does not now rely upon. During a whole series of meetings Mr. Asquith and his colleagues were counting on Lord Fisher and the experts to open their minds; Lord Fisher thought he must be silent or resign. Politicians and admirals, following the precedent of Lord Chatham and Sir Richard Strachan, were 'waiting on each other' for many weeks, while the Cabinet accepted the views of the soi-disant interpreter who advised them.

The picture of the War Council on the 28th January 1915 is a tragic one.

Mr. Churchill 'kept on saying he could do it without the 'army'; Lord Fisher during the Council was manœuvring about the room to get away and resign; the other ministers no doubt saw all that passed, but were content at a second meeting that day to take the leap in the dark without a word from Lord Fisher or Sir Arthur Wilson, and to hang on the words of 'a young man in a hurry' the biggest naval operation undertaken since Trafalgar.

The story does not end here. After the first bombardment on February 19 it was quite obvious that troops would be needed; after the second, on March 18, the heavy loss made it clear to all on the spot that the ships could not get through.

Sir Ian Hamilton had fortunately then arrived at the Dardanelles, and was taking a strong hand in the decision. His telegram to Lord Kitchener of March 19th saved the country from a great naval disaster :

'I am being most reluctantly driven towards the conclusion that the Dardanelles are less likely to be forced by battleships than at one time seemed probable. . . . The army's share will not be a case of landing parties for the destruction of forts, &c., but rather a deliberate and progressive military operation carried out in force in order to make good the passage of the navy.'

Mr. Churchill none the less again tried to force the running, in the face of Sir Ian Hamilton's and Admiral de Robeck's opinions, but was headed off by the combined weight of Lord Fisher, Sir Arthur Wilson, and Sir Henry Jackson, and the dash to victory was abandoned. Instead of 'rushing' the Dardanelles it was decided that naval and military forces were to be employed together on a large scale to clear the Turks from the Gallipoli peninsula.

The narrative of events ends at March 23rd. Two very serious questions present themselves upon it. The first of these can be disposed of in a few words. Naval strategy is proverbially most imperfectly understood. There have been great military changes during the war, but trench warfare has reproduced many of the old siege conditions. Naval warfare has been incomparably more changed, and there have been no precedents to guide us. The naval experience of the Russo-Japanese war was partial and unreal. The relation of ships to forts and of mines to ships was realised to some extent at Port Arthur, but the submarine did not exist, and the fight at Tushima, where one fleet was old-fashioned and barnacled by months of voyage, was a travesty of naval war on the modern scale. Moreover the effect of modern guns on forts, as shown at Liége, Namur, and Antwerp, had not been tested by ships. These changes were all realised by sailors, and few of them would re-echo Lord Fisher's cocksure pronouncement quoted above of the exact loss incident to any operation. The meagre nature of the data by which to steer and the awful risks involved, apart from the fact that a repulse at sea would affect British prestige at its most vital point, should surely have combined to make impartial judges scrutinise every detail of the case with microscopic severity. There is

no evidence that they did anything of the kind. *Ex parte* and general statements by the First Lord were held to cover all that need be said, and naval strategy was dealt with as if it were a case of adding a few thousand pounds to the Estimates.

'Both the Prime Minister and Mr. Balfour, with whom I 'discussed the matter,' says Mr. Churchill, 'were inclined to 'my view.' Did either of them cross-question Lord Fisher, Sir Arthur Wilson, or Sir Henry Jackson? We understand they did not do so at the War Council. The meeting after the second bombardment took place 'at the Admiralty.' Were they present? Did they hear the sailors' protest? If they did not, and still 'inclined to support Mr. Churchill,' assuredly they must now reproach themselves. Both of these statesmen have unblemished records, but they seem to have lacked the judicial faculty at the critical moment, for the weakest judge who ever sat on a bench would go through the form of hearing the witnesses for the other side, even if he had made up his mind.

But a far wider and deeper question is raised by Sir Ian Hamilton's evidence. Every one fully realises the temptation to undertake the bombardment, and can make allowance for the difficulty in deciding between expert opinions not very clearly given on a course of action on which there were few fixed signposts. The British nation will always be generous to administrators who make mistakes through excess of driving power. But we now reach a phase of the proceedings which can only be viewed with amazement.

'As early as November 1914 the idea of attacking the 'Dardanelles had been mooted, but there does not appear at that 'time to have been any sort of intention of making a purely 'naval attack.' From the beginning of January the question of ships without troops, or ships with troops, had been incessantly debated. The Admiralty had made great provision for transport and for landing. Stores were being accumulated. The exact locale of the attack was doubtful, but the project was alive. What was being done by way of preparation in the only department of the War Office in which preparation was possible? The answer is given in Sir Ian Hamilton's own words (section 108). There was total absence of information furnished to him by the War Office Staff. No preliminary scheme of

operations had been drawn up. 'The Army Council had disappeared.' No arrangements had been made about water supply. 'There was great want of Staff preparation.'

This point must be pressed to an issue. The War Office as a whole has no right to be exposed to obloquy for shortcomings which do not lie at its door. No servants of the State have come better out of the war than those who constitute the War Office. Restricted by the orders of successive Governments to providing—

(1) An Expeditionary Force of 150,000 men,
(2) 400,000 men for Home Defence,
(3) 75,000 men in India,

this department, against which so much has been written in the past, not only provided all that had been laid down but expanded the Expeditionary Force tenfold within six months, and, with the exception of munitions which could not be improvised, maintained throughout the highest standard of equipment and supply of any troops in any army.

The quality of the Army, which carried out unbroken the retreat from Mons, one of the brightest feats in military history, left nothing to be desired. The soldiers who in the past made that retreat possible—Lord Wolseley and Sir Evelyn Wood, and later Lord Roberts and Sir John French—did not rest satisfied with putting the troops in line. The debt which Great Britain owes to Lord Wolseley has been forgotten. He passed away without a word of acknowledgment in either House of Parliament. Not merely did he, when Adjutant-General during the fateful years 1882–1890, and after 1895 as Commander-in-Chief, put new spirit into the training of the Army, but he was the founder of the Intelligence Department and General Staff.

This all-important branch of the War Office, developed under his auspices, dates from 1885, although General Brackenbury, one of the brilliant group of soldiers who had shared his campaigns, found at first little sympathy from the 'bow-and-' arrow Generals,' to use Lord Wolseley's phrase, to whom he owed allegiance.

Under Mr. Stanhope and Lord Lansdowne the Staff rapidly developed, and when Lord Roberts returned from South Africa, General (now Field-Marshal) Lord Nicholson obtained a com-

manding position and became, after Lord Roberts, the most important member of the War Office Council. It is a matter for lasting regret that this gifted officer was removed from the War Office by Lord Esher's Committee, after less than three years' service, on the trivial pretext that new blood was required, and since 1905 the appointment has been rather the reward of field service than of special Staff aptitude. Needless to say, the immense complexity of the problems which beset the British Empire all over the world makes the post of Chief of the Staff one with which no human brain could cope successfully without some permanence of tenure.

To the ordinary peace calls for studying the conditions under which expeditions might have to be undertaken in a dozen different spheres, the outbreak of war added enormously. The despatch and transport of troops to France was a settled service; on the other hand questions of 'change of venue' were limited in number but of transcendent importance. Mesopotamia, Arabia, Asia Minor, the Balkans, the coast of Belgium, Schleswig-Holstein—each furnished its quota.

The German General Staff would have set to work on such problems in a few hours. Leaving the great centre in France to the trained body who had been accustomed to work together in the War Office, they would have called up their reserves, and delegated a section of each of the other possible fields of action to independent officers. Lord Nicholson was still available, so were a score of others of trained capacity and great knowledge of the East. Instead of this being done, a 'general post' was commenced in August 1914, which, when we remember the tens of thousands of lives lost in consequence of it, can hardly be forgiven.

Sir Charles Douglas, a good officer of no special Staff ability, was Chief of the General Staff at the outbreak of war; greatly overtaxed, he died in October 1914. The office without any undue haste was bestowed on Sir James Wolfe Murray, Lord Kitchener performing the duties in the meantime. A year later, when the Salonika Expedition was under discussion, Sir James Wolfe Murray was hastily removed and Sir Archibald Murray appointed. In December 1915, after sixteen months of war and 300,000 casualties, the full importance of the post was at last appreciated and Sir William Robertson, to the infinite advantage of the country, was brought back from France

and an Order in Council issued 'restoring the power of the 'Chief of the General Staff which had been allowed to lapse.'

These remarkable proceedings speak for themselves. I should prefer to leave them without comment. If Lord Kitchener were alive one might say something as to his methods, especially as to the evidence given by General Callwell, the Director of Military Operations, 'that the real reason why 'the General Staff practically ceased to exist was because 'it was never consulted.'

But it must not be forgotten that it is due to those who waited to employ Lord Kitchener till the last moment that he had no experience of the great War Office machine till it was strained to snapping point by the war. And going still higher, how are we to account for the inactivity of the War Council who, realising the breakdown of the Staff preparations for the Dardanelles, took no steps to have this department properly reconstituted till a fresh breakdown had occurred in the case of Salonika? The Commission has yet to give its verdict on the effect of this neglect of the first principles of war. We know from the present report that the land expedition, for transporting which preparations had been begun four months before, was committed to Sir Ian Hamilton, with definite instructions to force his way through, but without the data necessary for doing so. It is common knowledge that on landing the maps were found to be inexact and insufficient, the arrangements for water supply were necessarily in arrear, and land transport was in its infancy. These conditions could have been obviated if a few of the officers who were denied the right to co-operate in a service to which they had devoted their lives had been allowed to transfer their activities from the library of the 'Senior' to Montagu House.

It is to be feared that when the Commissioners go further we shall find there is worse to come. The Ministry, as is clear from these papers, showed no lack of nerve in deciding to advance to the fullest extent that their resources made possible. Whether for a purely naval attack, or a naval attack with a military reserve, or a combined attack, they had plenty of courage. But in the absence of agreement between the Admiralty and War Office on anything but the general proposition that an attempt should be made to push through, they were in the dark as to what they were undertaking. If

the troops were only to seize and occupy forts when cleared by the fleet, obviously the place of landing depended on the action of the navy, but from the moment Sir Ian Hamilton telegraphed on March 19th the task of the army predominated. The army was to clear the way to make good the passage of the navy. If this had been appreciated in Downing Street probably the whole course of the campaign would have been different. Is it possible that Sir Ian Hamilton's views were never clearly made known to the War Council?

Constantinople could be threatened from three quarters,—directly from the Dardanelles, from Asia Minor, or from Suvla or Bulair. The direct route was strongly fortified, although the forts were under the fire of naval guns; but even if they were occupied the troops would be under a cross fire from the other side of the straits. If it was open to Sir Ian Hamilton to make his onslaught on both flanks and let the navy keep up the original attack, there is no more to be said.

But the reverse, as we gather from this report, was the case. Sir Ian Hamilton was sent to assist the navy; he had received from Lord Kitchener what he regarded as 'a peremptory 'instruction to take the Peninsula.' Any wasting of troops on flank movements on a large scale would not have been within his instructions, for he was greatly outnumbered by the Turks. In other words he must land at Helles in the teeth of the enemy's guns. It is more than doubtful whether any general of experience, if left to himself on the spot and allowed to use the navy to further his expedition to the best advantage, would have come to such a conclusion.

It is necessary to make this point perfectly clear, because there is little doubt that if Sir John French on landing in France had been hampered as Sir Ian Hamilton was on landing in Turkey, his army would have been annihilated. The only concern of the nation now is that such confusion should not recur, and the obvious method of securing that consummation is that, at whatever sacrifice, the ministers who press the button which starts a hurricane should see that all the preliminary steps have been strictly observed. The first of these is to satisfy themselves that any expedition proposed to them has been weighed in all its bearings and the results put before them. Lord Haldane never wearied of extolling the 'clear thinking' which he had established in the War Office, but apparently the

bantling for which he claimed parentage was allowed to be strangled before his eyes.

One other point is worthy of notice. When Lord Panmure abused the telegraph, not previously employed in war, by sending silly telegrams to Lord Raglan in the Crimea, a fear arose that this rapid communication might cause interference from home with the commanders in the field. Fortunately this apprehension has been set at rest. Both Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener put it on record after the South African War that, while they had been left quite unfettered as to operations, they had found the power of interchanging views at any moment with the home authorities of great value. The conviction is forced upon us that a fresh danger has arisen. In this crisis far too much appears to have hung on the wording of telegraphic messages, and too little effort was made, so far as the report shows, to verify by personal communications the opinions expressed and to discuss the steps consequent upon them. An impartial person acting as 'liaison officer' between the Ministry and the Officer Commanding in the Dardanelles would have discovered in time and obviated the fatal errors which ensued on the general instructions to attack with which the commanders so literally and so gallantly complied.

Of one thing we may be assured—that the public will not allow the report of the Dardanelles Commission to be dismissed in the spirit shown by certain sections of the House of Commons on March 20th. The late Government did not grant this enquiry till the feeling in the country, expressed in the House of Commons itself, had reached such a pitch that it was impossible any longer to refuse it. There has been no hesitation on the part of the Ministry in suspending from further employment in the campaign officers whom they conceived to be responsible for these failures. If a portion of the blame, and apparently a considerable portion, lies on civilians higher up, it is preposterous to suggest that they should be allowed to smother their mistakes and retain their former prestige until the close of the war enables a reckoning to be made. Elementary considerations of justice and the imperative necessity for safeguarding the nation in the future equally demand that civilians as well as soldiers should suffer for their mistakes.

Z.

THE TWO PATHS OF EMPIRE

1. **Dominions Royal Commission. Final Report.** Cd. 8462. 1917.
2. **Committee on Commercial and Industrial Policy. Resolutions on Imperial Preference.** Cd. 8482. 1917.
3. **A Platform for an Imperial Party.** By H. Wilson Fox. Reprinted from the 'Nineteenth Century and After.' 1917.
4. **The Expansion of England.** By Sir John Seeley. Macmillan.
5. **The Wealth of Nations.** By Adam Smith. Clarendon Press.

In the fourth quarter of the eighteenth century England lost a great Empire; three generations later she had begun to grow conscious of a greater Empire fashioned upon other lines. There is indeed a remarkable coincidence of dates. It was in 1783 that the American colonies were finally separated from Great Britain; in 1883 was published Professor Seeley's 'Expansion of England,' a work that did more than any other single cause to awaken Englishmen to the meaning of Empire. In the twentieth century that Greater Britain, whose birth and growth Professor Seeley traced, has proved its loyalty and its strength in a manner which may well be one of the marvels of the world for all time to come. Yet in spite of this demonstration we find quite a number of loyal citizens of the Empire eagerly, almost passionately, demanding the abandonment at the earliest possible date of the principles on which this greater Empire is based, and a reversion to the principles which governed the construction of the lesser Empire lost in the eighteenth century. Differences of detail there were, no doubt, between our old colonial system and the system of imperial preferential tariffs advocated of recent years, but the fundamental principle is the same. The essential characteristic of the old colonial system was the restriction of the trade of the colonies for the benefit of the Mother Country. Reciprocally, colonial produce received in the markets of the Mother Country tariff favours as compared with foreign produce. Now as then the

object aimed at is that the trade of the Empire should be confined as far as possible within the Empire.

It is worth while to press this comparison, because historical as well as political memories are so short that some members of the Tariff Reform Party appear to be under the impression that they are the exponents of an entirely new doctrine. In substance what they are advocating is the re-establishment of a system which was maintained with varying degrees of stringency for over two hundred years, and was then deliberately abandoned. This does not, of course, prove that the tariff reformers are wrong. In the changing phases of life it is quite possible that we can learn again from our grandfathers wisdom which our fathers had forgotten. But those who wish to go back should certainly first take note of the broad facts which time has revealed. In this case the facts stand out clearly. The old colonial system failed to bear the strain of a hesitating attempt made by the Mother Country to obtain from the colonies a small contribution to the cost of wars waged by her almost entirely on their behalf ; the new system has yielded a magnificent voluntary contribution both of money and of men from the colonies to help the Mother Country in fighting a war in which her interests are more immediately involved than theirs.

How then, it may be asked, does it happen that, at such a crisis in our history as the present, proposals to revert to the ancient system are being vigorously pressed, even by persons who had previously distinguished themselves by strong opposition to the whole idea of imperial preference ? The answer is to be found in the anxieties which the war has created. Prominent among these is the submarine peril. How far that has been exaggerated it is impossible to say. Public opinion and governmental utterances on the subject have both fluctuated, in accordance with the extent of the temporary successes which German submarines have achieved. At one moment ministers and newspaper writers have all been shaking their heads and declaring that the nation must be regarded as in a state of siege ; a few weeks later submarines have been forgotten altogether. The transition from gravity to indifference has happened more than once during the course of the war. Looking at the matter broadly there does not appear to be any sufficient ground for the belief expressed

in some quarters that the development of submarine warfare has completely altered the character of the war problems with which we have to deal. On the contrary the losses inflicted by the enemy on our shipping during the present war are proportionately less than the losses we suffered during the Napoleonic Wars. This does not mean that the submarine peril can be ignored : it only means that we should do wisely to take a level view of it.

In any case the submarine trouble has little direct connexion, if any at all, with the problem of colonial preferences. For if it were true that a European enemy could by the use of submarines prevent supplies from reaching these islands, that consideration would affect supplies from British possessions at least as much as supplies from foreign countries. It would indeed affect them more ; for, with the exception of Canada, most of our imperial sources of food supply are farther away from the British Isles than many important foreign sources of supply. Ships bringing food to Great Britain from India or Australia run greater risks of being sunk by submarines than ships coming from the United States or South America, both because of the greater sea distance and because of the character of the sea route they generally follow.

This consideration is in no way dependent on the facts of the present war. Indeed, if we were at war with a Mediterranean power our shortest sea route to India and Australia would be in far greater peril than it is at present. To take another hypothesis, let us suppose that fifty years hence England may be at war with the United States and at peace with her present enemies, and also with her present European Allies. In that event it would clearly be safer, so far as submarines are concerned, to import food from the foreign countries at our doors rather than from any of the oversea portions of the Empire. The submarine peril is, in fact—so far as the particular question of imperial preference is concerned—a false scent. It leads nowhere, except to the proposition that the British Isles must entirely give up their oversea trade, both with foreign countries and with British possessions, lest in some future war some still more terrible submarine should make all sea trade impossible.

The really relevant consideration is of quite a different character. It is two-fold. In the first place there is a danger that during peace a potential enemy might obtain a commercial

grip upon some industries essential to our national life, and in the second place there is a danger that during war neutral countries might be terrorised or persuaded by our enemies to the extent of refusing to supply us with necessaries previously purchased from them. Both these dangers have been illustrated during the present war.

The first was dealt with in an article in this REVIEW in July 1916, called 'A Commercial League of Defence.' It was there argued that as Germany had clearly shown that she 'regards 'commercial enterprise as a form of preparation for military action,' we must take that fact into account in framing our commercial policy for the future. It was, however, pointed out that, happily, Germany had not succeeded in doing us so much harm by her belligerent commercial methods as she probably hoped, and as many Englishmen certainly feared. In practice we were able to adapt our industries very rapidly to the new conditions created by the war, and to make for ourselves things previously imported from Germany, before we had suffered any grave inconvenience from the disappearance of the German supply. But there is, of course, a danger that we might on some future occasion be less alert or less fortunate, and therefore prudence demands that we should take steps to prevent the control of vital industries passing into the hands of potential enemies.

The question of the danger arising from the possible action of neutrals has also to be considered. It has been specially illustrated during the present war by the position of Holland and Denmark. The Dutch and the Danes, for very good reasons, are more afraid of Germany than of Great Britain, and though they have doubtless striven to hold the balance fairly there is some ground to suspect that the course of their trade has been deflected to our injury by their dread of a German invasion. Again, in the earlier days of the war, we had to fear a danger on a greater scale from America. The friends of Germany in the United States persistently argued that if America wished to be neutral in fact as well as in theory she must cease to supply food and munitions of war to the Entente Powers. The argument was that, as the command of the sea by Great Britain prevented Germany from obtaining contraband of war from America, the only way to equalise matters was for America to refuse to supply either party. The

superficial plausibility of this argument did at one time undoubtedly affect American opinion. Happily, the common-sense view prevailed that it is not the business of a neutral nation to make good the inequalities of two belligerents. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that if the pro-German and anti-English currents of feeling in the United States had been somewhat stronger a different view might have been taken, and the American people might have refused to supply the commodities we required because they could not render a similar service to Germany. There is certainly a possibility that such a situation might arise in the future.

In both these directions there is a danger that ought to be carefully weighed. Its existence furnishes a valid argument for examining afresh the policy of the open door which has been the basis of our national and of our colonial system for three-quarters of a century. Under that policy the wealth of these islands has grown at a rate unparalleled in our history. Our population, our shipping, our manufacturing industries, our international banking business, have all increased enormously. At the same time the comparatively small Empire that remained to us after the revolt of the American colonies has, during the era of the open door, grown without ceasing, till now the British Empire, taken as a whole, possesses a greater population, a more extended commerce, and more realised wealth than any other national unit within the world. These facts should make us cautious in adopting any fundamental change of system ; they do not prove that we ought to refuse to consider specific changes which may be suggested by the revelation of new dangers.

Nor are we the only nation to whom this problem is presented ; our Allies, although their commercial policy differs very widely from ours, are equally conscious of similar dangers, and it was with a view to considering the possibilities of combined action that a very important conference of the Entente Powers met in Paris in May last. It recommended various steps which the Allies should take conjointly for the defence of their common interests. In the following July the then government of the United Kingdom appointed a committee to ' consider the commercial and industrial policy ' to be adopted after the war, with special reference to the con- ' clusions reached at the Economic Conference of the Allies.'

The Committee were further instructed to have special regard to the following questions :

'(*a*) What industries are essential to the future safety of the nation ? And what steps should be taken to maintain and establish them ?

'(*b*) What steps should be taken to recover home and foreign trade lost during the war and to secure new markets ?

'(*c*) To what extent and by what means the resources of the Empire should and can be developed ?

'(*d*) To what extent and by what means the sources of supply within the Empire can be prevented from falling under foreign control ?' ('The Times,' Feb. 21, 1917.)

Lord Balfour of Burleigh was appointed chairman of the Committee, and among his colleagues were such well-known men as Mr. W. A. S. Hewins, Lord Faringdon, and Mr. Henry Birchenough — to pick out only a few names from a distinguished list.

After sitting for six months, this Committee suddenly addressed to the present Prime Minister a letter enclosing resolutions in favour of the principle of preferential tariffs. No attempt was made to show how this principle would affect the problems which the Committee had been appointed to consider. With great frankness the Committee explained that they proposed to deal with their appointed task at a later date. The reasons they gave for issuing a sudden pronouncement on an extraordinarily complex and difficult problem were, the imminence of an Imperial Conference, and their own belief that it was 'necessary for the sake of the unity of the 'Empire that a serious attempt should now be made to meet 'the declared wishes of the Dominions and Colonies.' To emphasise this argument the Committee recited the facts that both in 1902 and in 1907 'the Prime Ministers of the 'self-governing Colonies unanimously urged the expediency 'of granting in the United Kingdom preferential treatment 'to the products and manufactures of the Colonies, either by 'exemption from or reduction of duties then existing or there-'after to be imposed.' The Committee went on to add :

'We think that, regard being had in particular to the sacrifices made and the services rendered by our fellow subjects overseas for a common purpose during the present war, the time has now arrived at which this request should be granted to the fullest extent which is now or may hereafter become practicable.'

No other reason was given, and the Committee carefully announced that they proposed to consider later the 'practical difficulties involved' in carrying out the policy which they recommended the Government of the United Kingdom to adopt at once. In plain words colonial preference was to be set up, not on its merits, but because the Dominion Premiers had asked for it, and because the Committee thought that the colonies ought to be paid for their loyalty. Whether this pronouncement was spontaneous on the part of a committee which had been appointed for another purpose, or whether it was produced on a hint from higher quarters, there is no public means of knowing. Presumably, in neither case was the pronouncement intended as an insult to our fellow citizens whose homes are across the seas. But those who know anything of the spirit which brought thousands of gallant men from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand to die in Flanders or Gallipoli will regret that a responsible Committee should have so reflected upon the memory of these brave men.

Very different has been the action of another body appointed to deal with similar problems. The Dominions Royal Commission was appointed in April 1912, in consequence of a resolution passed by the Imperial Conference of 1911. The business of the Commission was to inquire into and report upon the following subjects:

'(*a*) The natural resources of the five self-governing Dominions and the best means of developing these resources.

'(*b*) The trade of these parts of the Empire with the United Kingdom, each other, and the rest of the world.

'(*c*) Their requirements, and those of the United Kingdom, in the matter of food and raw materials, together with the available sources of supply.'

The Commission in its final shape was composed as follows: Lord D'Abernon, chairman, Sir Rider Haggard (Norfolk), Mr. T. Garnett (Lancashire), Sir W. Lorimer (Scotland), Mr. Tatlow (Ireland), Sir Alfred Bateman (formerly of the Board of Trade), Sir G. E. Foster (Canada), Mr. J. R. Sinclair (New Zealand), Sir J. W. S. Langerman (South Africa), and Sir E. R. Bowring (Newfoundland). During its five years' existence this Commission has travelled round the self-

governing Dominions, so that the members of it have been able to see with their own eyes the greatness of the Empire, and to get into personal touch with the men who are helping to make that Empire greater still. Not the least valuable part of the final report of the Commissioners is contained in the opening pages, where the Commissioners paint in glowing words a picture of what they themselves have seen. They speak of the size and wealth of Canada, with its enormous forests still untouched, with thousands of acres of fertile prairie-land still waiting the plough. They refer to Tasmania as 'one of the most lovely islands known'; they record the spacious prosperity of Melbourne and Sydney. They note the reserves of timber in Western Australia, the sugar possibilities of Queensland, the wonderful beauty of New Zealand, with its 'snow-capped mountains and fertile plains, its forests and 'swiftly-flowing rivers, and the fiords of its western coast.' They declare that 'South Africa is a country of infinite variety 'of natural resources,' of which few have yet been developed. Finally, they pay a tribute to little Newfoundland, with its vast forests and hardy fisher-folk.

This wide survey of our wide Empire leads up to a detailed examination of the natural resources of each of the self-governing Dominions. The information here concisely set forth ought to be of very great service both to politicians who are engaged in planning commercial policies for the Empire and also to the mere business man who troubles himself little about general policies, but sees where a particular thing can be done, and does it. Specially interesting is the analysis which the Commissioners make of the more important raw materials required by the human race, and of their distribution within the British Empire. They divide these materials into three groups: (i) those mainly or wholly produced within the Empire, (ii) those of which the Empire's requirements are approximately equal to the Empire's production, and (iii) materials mainly produced and controlled outside the Empire. The first group is much larger and more important than most Englishmen have hitherto suspected. The Empire has a practical monopoly of the following commodities: nickel, cobalt, asbestos, mica, diamonds, and jute. In addition, the Empire possesses the major portion of the world's supply of palm-nuts and plantation rubber; it produces

40 to 45 per cent. of the world's supply of wool, and 60 per cent. of the world's output of gold. As regards this group of articles the Commissioners point out that no extraordinary measures are needed to encourage further development. 'The Empire's needs are fully met, and a large export trade 'is carried on with the outside world.' But 'it might become 'desirable to use the possession of these assets as an instrument 'of commercial negotiation,' much in the same way that Germany has used her possession of a monopoly of the supply of potash to bring pressure to bear upon other countries.

Passing to the second group the Report deals with such commodities as wheat, meat, butter, wool, and cheese. In most of these the Empire is approximately self-supporting. In this group are also included certain minerals, which, before the war, had passed under the commercial control of foreign countries. The Commissioners rightly urge that steps should be taken to prevent the renewal of that control after the war.

The third group comprises the articles the supply of which within the Empire is insufficient for the needs of the Empire. Such are: quicksilver, platinum, borax, potash, sulphur, petroleum, timber, cotton, maize, and nitrates. As regards some of these commodities the Commissioners suggest that a more careful mineral survey of the Empire may lead to further discoveries. It should be added that as regards one of the most important of these articles—namely, petroleum—the course of the war has already brought under British control some of the most valuable of the world's oil-fields. But it is more than probable that the Empire will remain dependent upon foreign countries for several essential commodities. So far as these are concerned the Commissioners properly insist that, 'in the general interests of the Empire,' we should draw our supplies, whether they be required for civil or for military use, 'from as many sources as possible, and not depend on a 'single foreign country.'

All this is practical wisdom. Equally sound is the broad general principle which the Report lays down as the necessary basis for an imperial commercial policy:

'In our opinion it is vital that the Empire should, so far as possible, be placed in a position which would enable it to resist any pressure which a foreign Power, or group of Powers, could exercise

in time of peace or during war in virtue of a control of raw materials and commodities essential for the safety and well-being of the Empire, and it is towards the attainment of this object that co-ordinated effort should be directed.'

The position could not be better stated. The practical application of this principle can only be secured by detailed study of the actual facts and by careful adaptation of the means available to the ends desired. There is, as the Commissioners themselves say, 'no short cut.'

The most important proposal which they make is for the improvement of the harbours of the Empire, so as to secure the economic advantages which result from the use of deep-draught steamers. In an extremely interesting chapter of the Report this matter is dealt with in detail. Particulars are given of the depths which are already available in the principal harbours of the Empire, and a rough calculation is made of the expense which would have to be incurred to secure improvements which would be feasible. In the same practical spirit the Commissioners urge various improvements in the mail services throughout the Empire, for the sake both of economy of carriage and rapidity of inter-communication. Their reasons for laying so much stress upon the problem of sea communications are stated in a passage which is worth quoting in full :

'The War has abundantly demonstrated that the life of the Empire depends upon its sea communications. Whatever the existing magnitude of the ocean-borne commerce between the United Kingdom and the Dominions, and whatever the prospects of its development in the future, producer, manufacturer, and merchant alike are concerned, and vitally concerned, with securing cheap, regular, and efficient transport for their goods, and, consequently, with the progressive improvement of the Empire's shipping facilities.

'We emphasise this point, for we feel that, in discussions as to the best means of fostering trade within the Empire, its importance has been obscured by other factors affecting the exchange of merchandise, and, in particular, by the prominence given to fiscal legislation. In our view cheap sea transport is not only of importance in relation to other means of fostering exchange of merchandise, but it also confers absolute advantages on the countries which possess it. So long as freights are cheaper, and means of communication better, between the Mother Country and the Dominions overseas, and between the Dominions themselves than between foreign countries and the Dominions, so long will

trade naturally follow Imperial channels. If, therefore, it is possible to devise some means of permanent betterment of sea routes within the Empire, a powerful impulse will have been given to Imperial trade, while the strength and cohesion of the Empire will be notably increased.'

The question of migration within the Empire and the proposals of the Royal Commission with regard to it are dealt with in another article in this REVIEW; but it is desirable to call special attention to the proposal made for the interchange of school-teachers between the self-governing Dominions and the Mother Country. There are immense possibilities in this proposal, and it ought not to be difficult for the various governments and educational authorities concerned to make the necessary arrangements. The idea put forward by the Commissioners is not limited to elementary-school teachers. Its application to secondary teachers and to university teachers is even more important, and certainly easier to organise.

After touching upon minor problems, such as the reform of the consular service, the Commissioners reach their final conclusion that it is desirable to create an Imperial Development Board for dealing with problems of production and exchange within the Empire. This Board, they say, should be only a little one. It should consist of twelve members, of whom seven would represent the United Kingdom, India, the Crown Colonies and protectorates, while the remaining five would each represent one of the five Dominions. Its duties would be to survey, from time to time, the relation between the production and the requirements of the Empire, to investigate new possibilities of production, to direct the stream of capital to the development of Empire resources, to study the problems of migration, and to advise on the development of harbours and the improvement of mail routes.

The programme for the Board, which has here been concisely summarised, covers a very wide area. Whether it is desirable to create a new governmental institution to undertake such a variety of tasks is open to question. In making this proposal the Commissioners seem to have allowed themselves to be influenced too easily by the current fashion of assuming that the creation of a new government department will solve every problem. Possibly new organisations may be needed for some of the tasks now awaiting accomplishment, and it may

be that in some cases these organisations would have to be under government control. But the proposal to place so many varied problems under the control of one Central Board does suggest very grave dangers. The country, during the war, has writhed under the delays often imposed upon its activities by the centralised control of government departments, and it is not pleasant to contemplate the possibility that the myriad activities of our gigantic Empire might be held up from time to time while twelve gentlemen in London cogitated over the problems of co-ordination. It is better that a progressive empire should stumble a little, and occasionally wander from the straight course, than that it should be brought to a standstill in order to wait for the guidance of co-ordinated wisdom.

The proposal of the Dominions Royal Commission is, however, a good deal more cautious than the scheme launched under a similar title by Mr. H. Wilson Fox, now member of Parliament for Tamworth. The primary idea of Mr. Wilson Fox is to employ the direct agency of the State for the development of the resources of the Empire with a view to obtaining revenue. This idea, which he has expounded in the pamphlet mentioned at the head of this article, and in other writings, has received the endorsement of an important group of public men. The group includes such well-known names as: Sir Starr Jameson, Mr. Rudyard Kipling, Sir Horace Plunkett, Lord Desborough, Lord Grey (of Canadian fame), and Lord Selborne.* These gentlemen, with others, formed themselves into a committee in January last to advocate what for brevity may be described as Mr. Wilson Fox's scheme. The proposition put forward is that if the immense latent resources of the Empire are developed 'for State purposes, under State 'auspices,' it will be possible to lift 'from the peoples of the 'Empire the burdens caused by the war.' The Committee point out that the war will probably end leaving us with a national debt of £4,000,000,000; and they express the belief that by developing the resources of the Empire through the agency of the State it will be possible to secure an income sufficient to pay interest upon that debt and ultimately to wipe it out altogether. The extent to which this distinguished

* See 'The Times,' January 29, 1917.

Committee is prepared to go in the direction of State socialism may be gathered from the following paragraph of their manifesto :

'The Committee include in their plans that the State should derive a revenue by assisting in the provision of certain public facilities, such as electric power, and in the distribution of certain commodities, and especially of certain articles of food, with the double object of cheapening the cost to consumers and of deriving a revenue therefrom.'

The special stress laid on electric power schemes tempts one to ask whether any of the members of this Committee have ever troubled to examine the record of the British State in its dealings with electricity up to the present time. There are two striking examples. In 1870 the State acquired possession of the electric telegraph system of the country, which had been built up by various private companies. The purchase was recommended to the House of Commons as a splendid bargain for the State. The permanent officials who prepared the scheme assured the House that the whole of the capital cost would be repaid in fifteen years out of profits and that after that period there would be an ever-increasing revenue to relieve the burdens of the taxpayer. That was the promise. What actually happened was that the whole of the profit disappeared after the second year of working by the State ; that year by year the financial position has grown worse, till in the last years of peace the telegraphs were costing the taxpayer a sum which cannot be put at less than £1,400,000 per annum.

Meanwhile, the telephone had been invented. During many years the State, in order to protect its telegraph monopoly, did its utmost to stifle the development of the new invention. Finally, the State bought up the telephones, completing the purchase in the year 1911. Again there were prophecies—though in a somewhat minor key—of a lucrative bargain. These prophecies have gone the way of the old ones. The whole of the handsome tribute of over £350,000 a year, which the National Telephone Company was gratuitously paying to the State, vanished at once, and within three years the income collected by the State barely covered outgoings. After the war—unless telephone rates are greatly raised—it will be found that the telephone service,

like the telegraph service, has become a heavy drain upon the taxpayer. In view of these experiences of the State in connexion with electricity, it shows an audacity almost amounting to recklessness for a committee of distinguished men to suggest that the State can make money for the taxpayer by assisting in the provision of electric power.

As for the proposal that the State should undertake the distribution of certain articles of food, one is entitled to ask whether the representatives of the State would be the same gentlemen who recently in dealing with food problems have shown an incapacity to distinguish between maximum and minimum prices. The orders which have been showered upon the country day after day by the Food Controller, the Minister of Agriculture, and the Director of National Service have made the government the laughing-stock of the nation. Yet the men who hold these posts are all men of ability, all men who in their own businesses had earned high reputations. There is no reason to believe that any better men could be found for the control of the giant schemes which Mr. Wilson Fox and his committee wish to foist upon the Empire. Ultimately, these State controllers must themselves be controlled by political influences. From that law there is no escape. The authority of the State is exercised through parliament. The life of the executive government depends upon the goodwill of the House of Commons, and to secure that goodwill it is necessary for the government to defer in little things, as in big things, to influences which can be brought to bear by members of that House. Sometimes the cause of parliamentary interference is a great popular movement; sometimes it is the desire of active supporters of the government to obtain favours for themselves, or to appease a few noisy constituents. But, whatever the motive, the interference, or the possibility of interference, is always there. As a necessary consequence the conduct of a business directed by the State is liable to be deflected at any moment from the purpose of earning a profit to the purpose of placating a politician.

In addition, there is the equally fundamental and irremovable difficulty that employees of the State have not the direct incentive to industry and to economy that private enterprise gives. The head of a private undertaking knows that

if his business fails his income goes; the head of a government department knows that whatever happens to the business under his control his income is secure until he is ready to retire upon a pension. Similar considerations affect subordinates. A junior in a private firm knows that, if he distinguishes himself by industry and intelligence, chances of rapid promotion lie before him; a junior in a government office knows that promotion can only come to him through the slow creeping years that lead to seniority. Nor do the men who serve in the ranks—the junior clerks and the manual workers—escape the deadening influences of State management. In a private business a clerk or workman who habitually idles is discharged; in government service dismissal for idleness or incompetence is almost unknown. Once engaged, always engaged, with the result that the 'govern-'ment stroke' has long been a by-word. Until some way has been discovered of dealing with these fundamental defects of State enterprise it is certain that State control, though it may in some directions be necessary, will not yield money; it will cost money.

There is another somewhat obvious consideration which Mr. Wilson Fox and his Committee have overlooked. They foreshadow a national debt of £4,000,000,000, and their estimate may be even more than justified. But that debt will be an obligation upon the United Kingdom alone. Yet this Committee propose to wipe it out by utilising the natural resources of the Empire as a whole, including those under the 'ownership or control' of the 'Dominion or Indian govern-'ments.' It would be interesting to hear the comments of Australian and Canadian ministers on this proposal, and also the comments of the Government of India. The proposal is in direct conflict with the main principle upon which the organisation of the Empire has been based for at least three-quarters of a century. It is a reversion to the old colonial principle of treating the colonies as the property of the Mother Country, to be used by her for her own ends.

To show the kind of material upon which this Committee based their recommendations it is interesting to note that one of the proposals laid before them—and apparently smiled upon by them—was a scheme for the creation of a 'Great Empire Farm.' England is to advance £40,000,000

to Canada in four yearly instalments, on condition that the Dominion Government spends that money in purchasing and developing 200,000,000 acres of arable land. 'It is believed 'that the value of these great lands in such an Empire farm 'would speedily reach £20 an acre, or, in all, the Empire 'would receive in cash £4,000,000,000—the value of its debts 'for war or pre-war' ('The Times,' Jan. 29, 1917). The author of this fantastic calculation is evidently a pupil of the late Henry George, who imagined that all the wealth of the world came from the unearned increment in the value of land. But even supposing that £40,000,000 could be 'speedily' converted into £4,000,000,000, is it conceivable that any Canadian government would agree to administer such a scheme and to surrender all the realised profits to the government of the United Kingdom? Or is it conceivable that the settlers, who are to do the work of converting land worth £1 into land worth £100, would look on calmly while the government of the United Kingdom appropriated the results of their labour to pay its debts? Except for the pleasant element of humour involved, it is a distinct public evil that the hard problems of war finance in a prosaic world should be discussed in a spirit which recalls the fairy tales of childhood.

Unfortunately, schemes such as these also recall the uglier pages of our eighteenth-century history, when, in Professor Seeley's phrase, colonies were looked upon 'as public estates 'of which the profits were to be secured to the population of 'the Mother Country.' That was the essential basis of the trade restrictions on which the old colonial system was founded. There was little or no interference with the colonies, so far as their internal government was concerned. Apart from trade restrictions, they enjoyed almost complete independence. In this respect the English colonies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries differed widely from the French and Spanish colonies. France and Spain insisted on maintaining an autocratic rule over their possessions abroad, and even subjected the settlers to restrictions on their personal freedom, from which they would have been exempt if they had remained at home.

'Nothing of the kind (writes Seeley) can be said of the English colonies. They were subject to certain fixed restrictions in the matter of trade, but apart from these they were absolutely free. Carrying their nationality with them, they claimed everywhere

the rights of Englishmen. It has been observed by Mr. Merivale that the old colonial system admitted no such thing as the modern Crown colony, in which Englishmen are governed administratively without representative assemblies. In the old system assemblies were not formally instituted, but grew up of themselves, because it was the nature of Englishmen to assemble. Thus the old historian of the colonies, Hutchinson, writes under the year 1619: "This year a House of Burgesses *broke out* in Virginia.". . . Thus our old colonial system was not practically at all tyrannous ; and when the breach came the grievances of which the Americans complained, though perfectly real, were smaller than ever before or since led to such mighty consequences. The misfortune of that system was not that it interfered too much, but that such interference as it admitted was of an invidious kind. It claimed very little, but what it did claim was unjust. It gave unbounded liberty, except in one department—namely, trade—and in that department it interfered to fine the colonists for the benefit of the home traders.'

The working of this old colonial system is discussed in detail by Adam Smith. He shows how the export trade of the colonies was regulated in particular by the Act of Navigation. That Act 'enumerated' certain commodities which the colonies were permitted to export to the Mother Country alone ; 'non-enumerated' commodities might be exported to other countries provided they were carried 'in British or 'Plantation ships,' of which the owners and three-fourths of the mariners were British subjects. The 'enumerated' commodities consisted (*a*) of articles which were not produced in Great Britain at all—such as molasses, coffee, cotton, beaver-skins, indigo, etc.; (*b*) of articles—such as naval stores, tar, pitch, pig and bar iron, copper ore, etc.—which, though produced in Great Britain, were not then produced in sufficient quantity to satisfy our demand. As regards the first category, Adam Smith states that the object of the restrictions was not only to enable the merchants of the Mother Country to buy the colonial produce more cheaply, and so to sell it at a better profit, but also to make Great Britain the emporium for distributing colonial produce to other European countries. As regards the second category, it was calculated that, by a proper scale of duties, colonial produce could always be placed at a disadvantage in relation to home produce, while receiving an advantage in relation to foreign produce ; so that the net result would be 'to discourage the produce not of Great 'Britain, but of some foreign countries with which the balance

'of trade was believed to be unfavourable to Great Britain.' Here we almost seem to be reading the language of tariff-reform pamphlets of the twentieth century.

The non-enumerated commodities could originally be exported from the colonies to all parts of the world, subject to the condition above mentioned with regard to the employment of British ships. But the classification of enumerated and non-enumerated articles was varied from time to time; and by an Act passed in the sixth year of the reign of George III. the export of all non-enumerated articles was limited, so far as the European market was concerned, to countries lying south of Cape Finisterre. On this last restriction Adam Smith comments:

'The parts of Europe which lie south of Cape Finisterre are not manufacturing countries, and we were less jealous of the colony ships carrying home from them any manufactures which could interfere with our own.'

While describing these restrictions and their effect upon the value of colonial produce, Adam Smith points out that in certain other directions the colonies were allowed to enjoy a very wide liberty in matters of trade. In particular he refers to the complete freedom of trade which the American colonies enjoyed with the British West Indies to their immense mutual advantage. But he adds:

'The liberality of England, however, towards the trade of her colonies has been confined chiefly to what concerns the market for their produce—either in its rude state, or in what may be called the very first stage of manufacture. The more advanced or more refined manufactures, even of the colony produce, the merchants and manufacturers of Great Britain choose to reserve to themselves, and have prevailed upon the Legislature to prevent their establishment in the colonies—sometimes by high duties, and sometimes by absolute prohibitions.'

He goes on to give examples. The refining of sugar in the West Indies was prevented by imposing a duty of £4 2*s.* $5\frac{8}{20}$*d.* per cwt. on West Indian refined sugar imported into Great Britain, as compared with 6*s.* 4*d.* a cwt. on Muscovado sugar. In America, though the production of pig and bar iron was encouraged, there was an absolute prohibition upon the erection of steel-furnaces. Another regulation prevented the American colonists from conveying from one province to another such articles of local manufacture as hats and

woollen goods, the object being to confine the production of the domestic industries concerned to domestic use. That these restrictions did not, in the then condition of industrial development in North America, prove so oppressive as they appear on paper Adam Smith admits; for the colonists in their own interest were more busily engaged in exploiting the untouched natural resources of the vast territory they occupied than in trying to establish manufacturing industries prematurely. Consequently, he argued, these restrictions upon the freedom of the colonies must be regarded for the moment merely as 'impertinent badges of slavery imposed upon them,' 'without any sufficient reason, by the groundless jealousy of 'the merchants and manufacturers of the Mother Country. 'In a more advanced state, they might be really oppressive 'and insupportable.'

Nor was it only the colonies across the ocean which were subject to tyrannical restrictions on their commerce and industry. At the bidding of trade rivals in the Mother Country, exactly the same policy was applied to Ireland. Such industrial and agricultural prosperity as Ireland achieved in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was undoubtedly due to the energy of the English and Scottish settlers. In this sense Ireland was a colony and was treated as such. The actual injury she suffered was, however, far more serious than that inflicted upon the American colonies by English protectionists; for while England may, at worst, have slightly retarded the natural development of the North American colonies, in Ireland she definitely destroyed industries which had begun to flourish. The story is a shameful one. Take first the most important of Irish industries, then as now—the cattle industry. The importation of Irish cattle into England was prohibited, at the request of English landlords, by an Act of Parliament passed in 1663, which was humorously styled 'An Act for the Encouragement of Trade.' A few years later an Act was passed declaring that the importation of Irish cattle, swine, and sheep into England was a public nuisance. The effect of this legislation was that Irishmen, being unable to export cattle or sheep, turned their attention to the exportation of wool. That again aroused English jealousy, and a few years later the importation of Irish woollens into England was forbidden. Almost at the same time Government encouragement was given to the linen trade in Ireland. England then had no

linen industry, and did not object to Ireland adopting that industry if she would abandon woollens. Later on, we find that the Irish shipping industry was severely hit by an Act excluding Irish shipping from the foreign trade. The glass industry, the silk and glove industries were also penalised. The brewing industry was attacked, not on temperance grounds, but because of competition with English beers.

These shameful incidents in our past history have generally been forgotten by Englishmen ; they are bitterly remembered by Irishmen. Yet curiously enough the recital of these past wrongs is made by Irishmen to serve as an argument for the re-establishment of a political relationship between the two islands which would render possible the repetition of many of the worst of the ancient wrongs. As long as the Union endures, so long is it impossible for England to destroy Irish industries by hostile tariffs ; but if Ireland is to have a separate Parliament with a separate fiscal system she must be prepared for the possibility of the exclusion of her products from their nearest and most profitable market. Yet so far are present-day Irish politicians from realising this danger that many of them are now arguing that Ireland's commercial interests can only be safeguarded by the erection of a tariff wall between Great Britain and Ireland. This view is expressed by the two Irishmen who were members of Lord Balfour of Burleigh's Committee. They accepted the principle of imperial preference, but refused to sign the letter to the Prime Minister advocating that principle because no recognition had been made of the special case of Ireland, and they demanded 'that the same 'fiscal liberty which is at present enjoyed by the self-governing 'Dominions should be extended to Ireland.' This can only mean that the signatories, Mr. John O'Neill and Mr. Richard Hazleton, are of opinion that Ireland ought to be free to exclude British products from the Irish market. But if Ireland is to have this freedom, a reciprocal freedom must be conferred upon Great Britain, and—if this island is once more to be ruled by a protectionist spirit—the anti-Irish legislation of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries may again be enacted.

It is a pity that Irish politicians of to-day, while feeding the passions of the Irish people by recalling the fiscal wrongs which Ireland suffered in the past, have not taken the trouble to examine the cause of those wrongs. The leaders of Irish

political life in the eighteenth century fully understood both the cause and the remedy. It was the protectionist spirit which led England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to destroy Irish industries, and it was against the measures which resulted from that spirit that Irishmen rebelled. The revolt of the American colonists gave a lead and an opportunity to the Irish colonists. The Irish volunteers were formed, and the demand they put forward was for 'free trade.' In 1779 Grattan moved a resolution in the Irish Parliament declaring that 'It is by no temporary expedient, but by free trade 'alone, that this nation is now to be saved from impending 'ruin.' This declaration was emphasised by the volunteers, who paraded with two field-pieces bearing on their muzzles the legend 'Free Trade, or this.'

It must be explained that the phrase 'Free Trade' as then used did not mean freedom from import duties (Irish import duties were relatively low), but freedom for Irishmen to export their produce where they chose, and especially freedom to trade direct with the English plantations. The English manufacturers strongly objected to this last point. They said that Ireland would be getting all the benefit of the British Empire and that England would be bearing the whole cost of imperial defence. Pitt attempted to strike a bargain between these opposing forces, on the basis that Ireland in return for Free Trade with the colonies should make a further contribution to the British Exchequer. But this proposal was not welcomed by either party. Then it was that sprang up the demand for union in order to bring Ireland under the same fiscal system with England, and to compel her to pay for the advantages she would derive from liberty to trade with the British possessions.

A closely similar proposal had already been made by Adam Smith, not only for Ireland but for the Plantations as well. This proposal, outlined a hundred and forty years ago, is one of the most remarkable features of the 'Wealth of Nations.' It may almost be described as the culmination of Adam Smith's great work. He leads up to it by reviewing the fiscal obstacles to internal trade which existed in many European countries. He shows how some of the provinces of France were subjected to taxation from which others were exempt; how some were treated from the fiscal point of view as parts of France, others as foreign countries; how specific prohibitions

were laid on the export of some commodities from one province to another. With regard to Italy he says :

'The little duchy of Milan is divided into six provinces, in each of which there is a different system of taxation with regard to several different sorts of consumable goods. The still smaller territories of the Duke of Parma are divided into three or four, each of which has, in the same manner, a system of its own.'

In contrast with these and other foreign countries Great Britain possessed the advantage of a uniform system of taxation which removed the necessity for fiscal restrictions upon internal trade, so that 'goods may be carried from one end of 'the kingdom to the other without requiring any permit or 'let-pass, without being subject to question, visit, or examina-'tion.' This 'freedom of interior commerce,' Adam Smith argues, 'is perhaps one of the principal causes of the prosperity 'of Great Britain.' He then presses home his conclusion :

'If the same freedom in consequence of the same uniformity can be extended to Ireland and the Plantations, both the grandeur of the State and the prosperity of every part of the Empire would probably be still greater than at present. . . .

'All the invidious restraints which at present oppress the trade of Ireland, the distinction between the "enumerated" and "non-enumerated" commodities of America, would be entirely at an end. The countries north of Cape Finisterre would be as open to every part of the produce of America as those south of that Cape are to some parts of that produce at present. The trade between all the different parts of the British Empire would, in consequence of this uniformity in the Custom-house laws, be as free as the coasting trade of Great Britain is at present. The British Empire would thus afford within itself an immense internal market for every part of the produce of all its different provinces.'

But Adam Smith saw clearly enough that his conception of a great British Empire—united by a system of complete internal free trade, and further strengthened by a greatly extended freedom of commerce with foreign countries—could only be realised through political union. He saw that it would be necessary to enlarge the British Parliament into the 'States 'General of the British Empire,' and he also saw how that proposal for inter-imperial free trade would be opposed 'by 'the private interests of many powerful individuals and the 'confirmed prejudices of great bodies of people.' Nevertheless he asked leave of his readers to indulge in a speculation which 'can at worst be regarded but as a new Utopia, less amusing

'certainly, but not more useless and chimerical than the old 'one.'

That great speculation still remains unrealised, except so far as Ireland is concerned. There the anticipations of Adam Smith have been fully justified. The breaking down of the tariff barriers between Great Britain and Ireland, which unfortunately was not completed till a quarter of a century after the Act of Union, has been a moral boon to the greater island, a material boon to the lesser. No Englishman or Scotchman is any longer tempted to suppress the industries of Ireland; her people have reached a level of material prosperity never approached before. The silly fiction latterly put about that England adopted her present fiscal policy, the policy of free imports, regardless of the interests of Ireland, is absolutely without foundation. As it happens, the very earliest pamphlet that Cobden wrote in favour of free trade contained an account of his impressions of the poverty of Ireland ten years previously. It is sufficient to quote what he says of Dublin in 1825: *

'The river Liffey intersects the city, and ships of 200 tons may anchor nearly in the heart of Dublin. The small number of shipping betrays their limited commerce. It is melancholy to see their spacious streets (in some of which the whole trade of Cheapside might with ease move to and fro) with scarcely a vehicle in their whole extent. While there is so little circulation in the heart can it be wondered that the extremities are poor and destitute!'

Nor ought it to be forgotten that Cobden's agitation for the abolition of the Corn Laws received the active support of many Irishmen, including the great Irish leader, Daniel O'Connell, who spoke at many of Cobden's biggest meetings, vehemently urging that the Corn Laws had driven the Irish people to destitution.† And even politicians with the shortest memories ought to be able to recollect that the final blow to the Corn Laws was the Irish potato famine. The story is told in a few concise sentences by an Irishman, who for many years led the Nationalist Party in the House of Commons, JustinMcCarthy: ‡

'In the autumn of 1845 the potato rot began in Ireland. . . . The great cry all through Ireland was for the opening of the ports.

* Morley's 'Life of Cobden,' p. 11.

† See, for example, O'Connell's speech at Manchester on Jan. 13, 1840, quoted in Prentice's 'History of the Anti-Corn Law League.'

‡ A Short History of Our Own Times, p. 74.

The Mansion House Relief Committee of Dublin issued a series of resolutions declaring that the potato disease was expanding more and more, and the document concluded with a denunciation of the Ministry for not opening the ports or calling Parliament together before the usual time for its assembling.'

As Lord Morley writes in his 'Life of Cobden': 'It was the 'rain that rained away the Corn Laws.'

Nor is there any ground for the assertion that Irish agriculture suffered any special and peculiar injury from the opening of the ports of the United Kingdom to the wheat of the world. On this point the testimony of another well-known Irishman, the late Judge Shaw, may be quoted. Writing in 1902 in the 'Saturday Review' for September 27th of that year, Judge Shaw said:

'I have lived all my life in Ireland, and I have been brought into close contact with all sorts and conditions of men in Ireland, both north and south. In my boyhood I used to hear the farmers of the County Down talk about the poverty, the struggles, and miseries they and their fathers endured between 1815 and 1845 when Protection was at its height. I have seen with my own eyes the prosperity which the same farmers enjoyed for thirty years after the Repeal of the Corn Laws. . . . It is true that since 1878 farming has not been so profitable in Ireland as it was for thirty years before. But the farmer is far from being ruined. He has at least maintained the standard of comfort and living which he acquired in his thirty years of great prosperity.'

That was in 1902. In 1911 Mr. T. P. Gill, Secretary of the Irish Department of Agriculture, and formerly a prominent Nationalist Member of Parliament, called public attention in Dublin to the remarkable progress achieved by Ireland both in commerce and in agriculture.* In the same year Mr. T. W. Russell, M.P., a strong Home Ruler, speaking on November 3rd in Manchester, said: 'People talk about "poor Ireland," 'but I have the opinion that relatively Ireland is doing as well 'as any part of the Empire.' † Coming down to the year 1916, we find the Nationalist party in the House of Commons issuing to the world a manifesto in which they bear testimony to the general prosperity of Ireland, and in particular to the prosperity of the Irish labourer.‡ The evidence is overwhelming that

* Irish News, August 8, 1911.
† Manchester Guardian, November 4, 1911.
‡ Quoted in the EDINBURGH REVIEW for July 1916.

Ireland has, like the rest of the United Kingdom, grown in prosperity enormously during the free trade era. Doubtless certain Irish industries could be rendered even more profitable by a system of tariffs designed to give protection to those industries alone. If, for example, a heavy duty were imposed on the import of colonial and foreign wheat into the United Kingdom, it is probable that Irish farmers, in spite of their unsuitable climate, would turn again to wheat growing, and would reap handsome profits, even if they reaped poor harvests. But though every protectionist farmer or manufacturer instinctively assumes that protection is to be for him alone, in practice it never is so. The protection conceded to one industry is claimed by others, and when these others have been satisfied the original beneficiary may find himself worse off than he was without any protection at all. If, for example, the Irish linen spinners obtained a protective duty in their favour, the Irish flax-growers might demand and obtain a duty on imported flax, with disastrous consequences to the linen spinners.

There are, as it happens, few parts of the Empire which have a greater interest in Free Trade than Ireland. She is a small country quite incapable of supplying all her own wants from her own resources. Her prosperity must depend on the activity of her export industries, and no export industry can benefit by an import duty except so far as that duty enables the controllers of the industry to sell cheaper abroad by selling dearer at home. In a large country like Germany that policy is feasible for a limited number of industries ; in a little country like Ireland it would be quite impracticable. When Irishmen talk of the advantages of protection, what they really mean is protection for Irish industries and agriculture at Great Britain's expense.

The same confusion of thought underlies a great deal that is said and written about the larger problem of imperial preference. There are a few keen imperialists in Great Britain who cherish Adam Smith's conception of internal free trade throughout the Empire, but there seems little prospect of their hopes being realised in any near future. Both here and in the Dominions the large majority of the advocates of imperial preference are strongly opposed to inter-imperial free trade. They have the word preference on their lips, but the spirit of protection is in their hearts. For this reason the apparent agreement between the advocates of preference at home and in the Dominions

is altogether delusive. They use the same phrase, but they do not mean the same thing. The colonist who asks the British Government to establish a preferential tariff pictures a tariff which will let in colonial goods free, or almost free, and will exclude foreign goods; the Englishman or Scotchman who makes the same verbal demand pictures a tariff which will give the Mother Country adequate protection both against colonial and against foreign goods, with a slight concession in favour of the colonies. The latter is exactly the type of preferential tariff established in some of the Dominions. Its inadequacy from the point of view of the Mother Country was frankly explained by Mr. Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Conference of 1902. He then said:

'But so long as a preferential tariff, even a munificent preference, is still sufficiently protective to exclude us altogether, or nearly so, from your markets, it is no satisfaction to us that you have imposed even greater disability upon the same goods if they come from foreign markets.'

But it is certain that so long as the protectionist theory predominates in colonial politics, the colonies will not freely open their ports to the manufactures of the Mother Country; it is equally certain that if the protectionist theory should obtain predominance in Great Britain the ports of the Mother Country, which are now wide open to colonial products, will be partly closed against them.

The moment the preferentialists from different parts of the Empire sit down to discuss details they will discover that they are fundamentally in disagreement, and, if they attempt to give any wide application to their respective theories, instead of binding the Empire closer together, they will create elements of disunion. Moreover, so far as the policy of preference is successful in confining the trade of the Empire within the Empire, to that extent will the fundamental disagreement between colonial and home producers become aggravated. As long as all parts of the Empire are free to trade where they will they can afford to be tolerant of domestic differences with one another; but if they are to be limited to the 'tied house' conception of commerce the conditions of inter-imperial trade will become matters of vital importance and of rancorous controversy. Some indication of the kind of temper that will be aroused can be gathered from the fierce indignation excited

in Lancashire by the action of the present Ministry in definitely sanctioning the adoption of a protectionist policy by the Government of India.

It cannot be too strongly insisted, in considering the great problem of imperial unity, that the protectionist spirit is in itself an element of discord, because it is finally based upon selfishness. That statement does not mean that free traders are personally exempt from the vice of selfishness. What it does mean is that the thing for which the free trader asks is something which he has to share with everybody else ; whereas the protectionist asks for a tariff privilege for himself to hold against others. That privilege can only be obtained through the State, and thus the protectionist spirit leads directly to conflicts between States. That such trade conflicts should arise between different countries is a sufficiently grave evil ; that they should also arise between different parts of the same Empire is an aggravation of the evil which we ought to strive our utmost to avoid. It has been avoided in the United States and in the German Empire by the establishment of complete fiscal unity. The United States is the largest single free trade area within the world. From the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific coast, from the Canadian borders to the borders of Mexico, trade is free. Goods may be carried over the whole of that vast area ' without requiring any permit or let-pass, ' without being subject to question, visit, or examination.' In exactly the same way complete free trade prevails throughout the numerous States of the German Empire.

The difficulties in the way of establishing similar fiscal unity throughout the British Empire are both material and mental. On the material side the divergent economic conditions prevailing in the different portions of our far-flung Empire make complete fiscal unity almost impossible, and certainly undesirable. Where the conditions of life are totally different an arbitrary uniformity of law is not an advantage but an inconvenience. It is inconceivable that the same system of taxation which suits London and Edinburgh could be made to suit a tropical or semi-tropical dependency of the Empire. For example, the United Kingdom derives an enormous customs revenue from a high duty, about 1000 per cent., levied upon imported tobacco ; it would be impossible to levy the same duty in India, for tobacco can be and is grown almost everywhere throughout India. Nor would there be the slightest

administrative gain in such uniformity, for in any case cargoes arriving at Bombay or Calcutta from Europe would have to be subjected to customs examination. A sea-divided Empire cannot in fact hope to gain those administrative advantages which the United States and Germany have gained by preventing the erection of, or by sweeping away, internal customs barriers. It is worthy of note that both the United States and Germany have failed to establish fiscal unity between their oversea possessions and the metropolitan State. The sea divides as well as unites.

Beyond these material considerations is the obstacle created by the sentiment of the peoples concerned. The people of Canada do not regard the Dominion merely as an administrative division of the British Empire ; they have a Canadian as well as a British loyalty, and steps taken in disregard of the former might easily result in the destruction of the latter. The same consideration applies to the other self-governing Dominions. It even applies, though in a different sense, to India. The conception of India as a nation is not of course of native growth. It is an exotic conception imported from Europe, and so far has only affected the handful of Indians who have received an English education. But this handful is growing in numbers and in influence, and though they may never be strong enough to overcome the internal differences which divide the inhabitants of India from one another, they may be able to combine the mutually warring elements in that enormous population for the purpose of opposing external measures which can be represented as anti-Indian. At any rate, the self-governing Dominions would never consent to such a derogation from their conception of nationhood as would be implied in the surrender of their present powers of self-taxation to some new central government for the whole Empire.

For these reasons the fiscal unity which the United States and Germany enjoy throughout their continuous land territories must be pronounced unattainable by the British Empire.

Therefore if we are to avoid the danger of fiscal conflicts within the Empire our only hope lies in discouraging the spirit of protection which breeds these controversies. Unfortunately during the past twenty years or so a considerable party within these islands has devoted itself to preaching in the name of Imperial unity principles which cut at the very root of that unity, and to demanding in the name of progress that we should

hark back to the disastrous colonial policy of past centuries. To bolster up their campaign the spokesmen of this party have persistently depreciated the achievements of their own country during the era of free trade. They have dinned it into the ears of the world that England was in a state of decadence; part of the world has believed them, and England has suffered direct injury from that groundless belief. Surely the time has come when all Englishmen, whatever their fiscal creed, should be able to recognise how wonderfully their country has grown in riches and in strength during the past seventy years. That she needs to be watchful lest her economic prosperity and her defensive powers should be undermined by the insidious commercial methods of some ambitious rival everyone admits. But that admission involves no necessary acceptance of protectionist doctrines. France and Italy before the war, in spite of—perhaps even in consequence of—their protectionist tariffs, suffered at least as much from German methods of commercial penetration as Great Britain.

Here again the eighteenth century furnishes a warning. Of all the achievements of Great Britain since the beginning of the free trade era none has been more remarkable than the expansion of our mercantile marine. Whether we compare ourselves with the United States or with Germany our progress in this prime element of our commercial prosperity and national strength has been immense and continuous right down to the outbreak of the present war. That progress has been achieved without any preferential favours for British shipping in British or colonial ports. Yet for nearly two centuries it was assumed that the Act of Navigation, passed in the reign of Charles II., was necessary for the maintenance of our mercantile marine. Even Adam Smith was so impressed with the apparent necessity of that piece of restrictive legislation as a weapon against the 'naval power of Holland, the only naval power which could 'endanger the security of England,' that he made it the text for his oft-quoted aphorism that 'defence is of much more 'importance than opulence.'

That aphorism needs no justification, but England has had the peculiar good fortune that while seeking opulence she has also found defence. She has found it along the path of freedom. In the eighteenth century her restrictive commercial policy not only led up to the loss of the North American Colonies, but it also provoked the jealousy and the hostility of other nations.

As Professor Seeley well says: 'Commerce in itself may 'favour peace, but when commerce is artificially shut out by a 'decree of government from some promising territory, then 'commerce just as naturally favours war.' He goes on to point out how the conquests which England achieved in the first half of the eighteenth century excited the jealousy of the rest of Europe:

'In this culminating phase England becomes an object of jealousy and dread to all Europe, as Spain and afterwards France had been in the seventeenth century. It was about the time when she won her first victories in the colonial duel with France, that an outcry began to be raised against her as the tyrant of the seas. In 1745, just after the capture of Louisburg, the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg handed in a note, in which he complained of the maritime despotism of the English, and their purpose of destroying the trade and navigation of all other nations. . . . From this time till 1815 jealousy of England is one of the great motive forces of European politics.'

It is true that to some extent all success provokes jealousy; but the jealousy is less when the success is used for other than selfish ends. It is also true that no nation can afford to be entirely unselfish; self-preservation comes first, and nations which neglect the duty of defending their own interests sink into oblivion. But if it be possible to build up a great Empire, and secure its safety, without restricting the liberty of other nations, surely it would be a wanton thing to provoke the hostility of the rest of mankind by segregating for our own exclusive use the vast territories covered by the British flag, territories that will be vaster still when the present war is ended. Equally would it be a wanton thing to imperil the unity of the Empire by destroying, under the pretence of imperial preference, the wide imperial freedom of trade that now exists. Upon the policy of freedom we have reared a gigantic empire, prosperous, powerful, united, and tolerant. We have done this less as the result of reason than as the result of instinct. From the earliest days of our history the spirit of freedom has been the pride of our race. It is the instinct thus bred in our bones that has taught us to seek the greatness of Empire by following the path of freedom.

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